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SUMMARY 
Throughout the history of universities, university autonomy 
and academic freedom have come ~o be regardeci as indispensable 
if the university has to fulfill its function of generating 
and disseminating knowledge and information for the benefit of 
society. Al though these are often conflated, they are 
distinguishable though interdependent. Autonomy relates to 
the self-governance of the university without external 
interference. Academic freedom entails the freedom of an 
individual academic to hold whatever views, orthodox or 
unorthodox, without censure or other penalty. 
critical inquiry. 
It also entails 
Although academic autonomy and freedom are critical to the 
academic function, they are not beyond dispute. There is 
always a continuous debate on what are the proper boundaries 
of legitimate academic autonomy and freedom. These boundaries 
are not fixed and keep on shifting. The shifting is often 
caused by government intervention into university education by 
way of subsidising it. 
As a quid pro quo for subsidizing university education, the 
government often feels entitled to stipulate conditions for 
the granting of such subsidies. Various governments follow 
different ways of doing this. There is a general trend in 
terms of which the government is defining the degree of 
academic autonomy. With autonomy it emphasizes accountability 
and with academic freedom it emphasizes responsibility. These 
are not mutually in conflict. 
iii 
Al though universities cherish their autonomy and academic 
freedom, these are always subject to threat. These cannot 
flourish in an authoritarian culture, but can only thrive in a 
democratic culture where other civil liberties are respected. 
The reason for this is that human freedom is indivisible and 
academic freedom cannot survive when other rights ar-e 
violated. 
The South African Constitution protects academic freedom. 
This is not generally done in most constitutions of the world. 
The reason why the South African Cons ti tut ion expressly 
protects academic freedom is because academic autonomy and 
freedom were severely violated in the past. Al though the 
protection of academic freedom in the Constitution does not 
provide indefeasible security, it makes the way of a 
transgressing government difficult. This is important because 
even a democratic government can violate academic freedom. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A university is the most important institution in the 
educational system of any country. For this reason it has been 
described as an "educational institution at the pinnacle of 
the country's educational system operating at the highest 
level of teaching and research, centred on the pursuit of 
learning of a sort fundamental to the understanding of the 
physical and human world and necessary for the practice of 
certain professions and occupations requiring advanced 
knowledge. 111 
According to this definition, the role a~'ld function of a 
university is the generation and transmission of knowledge 
through teaching and research and the training of students for 
certain professional occupations which require advanced 
knowledge. A university therefore occupies an extremely 
important position in society. 
Owing to the important position which the university occupies 
in the educational system of this country in particular, it 
requires critical consideration especially during this period 
of transition in order to establish whether it is operating 
effectively. This necessitates a re-evaluation of its role and 
mission and of its fundamental assumptions. This is nothing 
new. The history of universities in gene::::-al has been 
punctuated by periodic debates on the idea of a university and 
2. 
what is regarded as its proper function and mission. 2 Even in 
South Africa this has been the case. The recent establishment 
of the National Commission on Higher Education in this country 
bears eloquent testimony to L:.t:.is. The purpose of this 
Commission is to consider the whole position of higher 
education in South Africa. Universities as providers of 
higher education are in the centre of this investigation. 
1.2 THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF A UNIVERSITY 
A university is undoubtedly unique and different from other 
educational institutions because it not only teaches but also 
does research. It differs from other research institutions 
because it not only does research but it also teaches. 
Teaching and research form an inseparable part of the 
university system. While teaching relates to the transmission 
of existing knowledge, research is concerned with the 
discovery or creation of new knowledge through the creative 
exploration and re-interpretation of existing knowledge. 3 
This puts a university in a special position. As the saying 
goes, knowledge is power. Knowledge is power because it has 
t:he ability to change things and in particular the quality of 
life of the people. By generating and disseminating knowledge, 
a university is therefore in a powerful position. It is this 
potential power of a university which often puts it in 
conflict with organs of state power and certain sections of 
society. 
Although a university is sometimes loosely referred to as a 
school, it is different from a school. A school is mainly 
3. 
concerned with the transmission of existing knowledge and 
skills whereas, as has been said, a university is also engaged 
in the important task of research and the advancement of 
knowledge. 4 
In order to do this effectively, a university has to have not 
only libraries, laboratories and other facilities essential 
for research and teaching, but it also has to have the ability 
to recruit the ablest and most creative people that can be 
lured into the academic life. It also has to provide an 
environment of freedom where free inquiry can flourish and 
where professors can do their work without constraints or 
external direction. Highly intelligent and imaginative people 
often resent and resist orders from above. They do not do 
their best under those conditions but prefer a free 
environment. Freedom of the mind and university autonomy 
often go together. Free thinkers resent restraints on the 
kinds of ideas and hypotheses they can publicly entertain. 
Such restrictions stifle the spirit of "venturesome inquiry 
while blocking off entire fields of investigation that seem 
threatening to those who have strong interests in maintaining 
the status quo 115 • 
Free inquiry and creative thought also go together. As to 
which should predominate, teaching or research, is not easy to 
say although, as has been said, both of them are important. 
In the words of Brook: 
"To ask whether teaching or research is the more 
important is like asking whether the engine or the 
4. 
wheels are the more important in a motor-car. A 
stationary engine is useful for some purposes, and 
anybody who has fixed four wheels to a soap-box 
knows that a useful vehicle can be constructed 
without an engine, but neither the stationary 
engine nor the soap-box on wheels would be a 
motor-car and neither would be able to do all that 
a motor-car can do. "6 
In considering what the nature and function of a university 
should be, the van Wyk de Vries Commission described it as 
essentially that of advancing knowledge by bringing to light 
the knowledge amassed through the ages, by systematising it, 
and by incorporating every facet into the various disciplines 
as a component of the whole structure of knowledge, and by new 
discoveries through investigation and research. This knowledge 
and research should be applied for the betterment of society. 7 
In this respect the Commission was emphasising the fact that 
the role and function of a university is not simply that of 
preserving and transmitting knowledge, but also that of 
creating new knowledge as well. It also emphasized the fact 
that knowledge is for the benefit of society. 
As the Commission further pointed out, the function of the 
university is also to educate and mould a student into a 
mature person by developing his gifts and talents. It should 
inculcate in him certain qualities like scholarliness and 
honesty, a scientific and enquiring mind, perseverance and an 
ability to apply one's mind to issues and should cultivate in 
him or her the attributes of a cultured person and an outlook 
5 . 
on and a philosophy of life which will enable him to be a 
balanced person. Moreover, the Commission further contended 
that it must also prepare students to practise a profession 
requiring university education. It should also transmit 
culture to the student and instil in him good citizenshi~, 
although the transmission and preservation of culture should 
always be accompanied by constant re-examination in the light 
of new discoveries. In this way a university can make an 
important contribution by demonstrating why older views should 
be discarded as well as by preserving the past9 • One might 
add that a university should be committed to universal values 
of knowledge, truth, justice and intellectual humility.w 
In further expanding on the role of the university, the 
Commission circumscribed it as that of being "intensely active 
in a scientific manner in the field of politics, to gather 
knowledge of this field from South Africa and from all over 
the world, to process this knowledge scientifically and to 
publish the product in a scientific manner, however critical 
it may be of the national system, government policy, party 
policy or prevailing views in society and the community; the 
State shall continue to respect and protect this function of 
the university; the university shall not allow this function 
to degenerate into pure politicking or into pseudo-scientific 
politicking, or tolerate the improper use of the university, 
its teaching staff or students as an active political 
instrument in the politics of the country since this cannot be 
proper to its functions, falls beyond its capacity and would 
lead to revolution and not reformation. 1111 
6. 
This view is apparently based on the assumption that a 
scientific approach to knowledge is to the benefit of society 
even if it may be critical of the curreht repositories of 
political power or the current views of society. While it is 
accepted that a university should not "allow this function to 
degenerate into pure politicking or into pseudo-scienti::ic 
politicking" the views of the Commission are a bit restrictive 
and somewhat exaggerating when it says the university should 
not "tolerate the improper use of the university, its teaching 
staff or students as an active political instrument in the 
politics of the country since this cannot be proper to its 
function, falls beyond its capacity and would lead to 
revolution and not reformation". It is not the role of the 
university to prevent its staff or students frdm being active 
political instruments in the politics of the country. On the 
contrary it should encourage them to do that. Nor does such 
political activism necessarily imply support for revolution. 
Admittedly the improper use of the university by staff and 
students is unacceptable. 
however, may be debatable. 
What is regarded as "improper", 
What is supported, however, is political neutrality on the 
part of the university which is conducive to free inquiry.a 
Although university neutrality is a desirable ideal, it is by 
no means incontrovertible. Some regard neutrality as a myth, 
as they hold the view that universities generally espouse 
particular political stances. 0 Admittedly even a scientific 
approach is not value neutral. There will obviously be a 
value implicit in the theory·or methodology an inquirer adopts 
which may in turn influence perception and cognition of what 
7. 
we regard as true facts and objective truth. This does not 
imply that we should disclaim truth and fact, but that we 
should realise that what we perceive as truth or fact is often 
mediated by values and theories, and it takes place within the 
confines of fallible human cognitionw. This may also be the 
case with university neutrality. Having said that, it is 
still necessary to consider the issue of university neutrality 
in some detail. 
1.3 UNIVERSITY NEUTRALITY 
There is no doubt that the attainment of absolute neutrality 
may be difficult, and, some might even say, impossible . 1; Yet 
the complete rejection of the concept of university neutrality 
is equally open to considerable criticism. The problem is that 
the ideal of neutrality is sometimes misconstrued as a reality 
or description instead of an ideal. 16 Moreover, what is meant 
by university neutrality is often misconceived. If by 
neutrality is meant the absence of any social or political 
effects of any action or inaction by the university, then no 
university is or can ever be neutral. This is because even the 
very process of education itself has enormous consequences for 
society as it creates an educated class of persons who behave 
differently from the way they would have behaved if they had 
not been educated. Even the decision to adopt a neutral stand 
on social and political questions has social consequences. The 
traditional theory of university neutrality does not postulate 
that the university should avoid taking any action which could 
have social consequences, but that it is open to the 
expression of all points of view and does not assume 
8. 
institutional stands on all controversial social and political 
issues. This means "that the implicit theory of neutrality is 
not a neutrality of effects (consequences, results) but a 
neutrality of institutional intent. Of course, the university 
has effects on controversial social and political questions, 
but its institutional intent is education not politics. "17 
The main reason behind this . is that university neutrali ~y 
f~cilitates both university autonomy and academic freedom. If 
a university were to take a rigid stand on certain political 
and social controversies, it would assume the role of a 
political agency and it would stifle debate and scrutiny from 
those who do not agree with its point of view. It would in 
other words, contradict its very mission of being committed to 
free inquiry and of providing an arena where all points of 
view are aired and freely examined and criticized.u 
Knowledge is more likely to be advanced through free inquiry 
than through collective endorsement or rejection. This is the 
basis of rationality to which universities are committed. But 
even if a university may make pronouncements on certain 
controversial issues, the concept of university neutrality is 
not seriously compromised, as long as such pronouncements are 
still open to critical scrutiny. Anything to the contrary 
stifles alternative answers to the questions under discussion 
and it frustrates the ideal of rationality and academic 
freedom. 19 
It is also important to bear in mind that neutrality relates 
to the university as a corporate body and not to the 
9. 
individual members. A university is a complex entity. For this 
reason a distinction should be drawn between it as a corporate 
entity and its individual members. While individual members 
are free to be committed to certain positions, the university 
as an institution should not or should strive not to.m Such 
institutional commitment should be avoided, because as 
Lowenthal puts it, it is not only 11 incompatible with the 
spirit of free inquiry, 11 but also because, as he further puts 
it, 
11 no university is entitled to pronounce on the 
political questions of the day on behalf of its 
members on the basis of majority decisions. Nobody 
who joins a university, whether teacher or student, 
does so in order to expose the view of a particular 
political grouping, or intends to empower his 
colleagues to speak in his name on current 
political issues. In that sense, the university as 
an institution must be neutral between the 
political parties and on the various issues 
disputed in a democratic community at any given 
moment, both to respect the freedom of opinion of 
each of its members and in order to preserve its 
own primary commitment to the unbiased search for 
truth and to the principle of tolerance.nu 
The need for neutrality can also be justified on the basis 
that in a complex society for a university to adopt a 
particular position is to expose it to powerful political and 
cultural attack which may eventually seek to restrict academic 
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members' freedom of thought.~ What is therefore crucial is 
that university neutra~ity is important for both autonomy and 
academic freedom. It facilitates both. 
While what has been said is true, there will obviously be 
exceptions to this :::-ule, where the university as an 
institution would be entitled or compelled to take a 
particular stand. This may be so in cases of national 
emergency or where the safety of the nation is at stake as 
where there is a threat of war against the country. These are 
cases where there is consensus rather than controversy, 
although the determination of whether there is controversy or 
consensus may itself be controversial.~ A university may also 
take a stand on political issues which generally threaten its 
autonomy and academic freedom. This has been the case against 
apartheid. 24 The policy of apartheid not only violated 
university autonomy and academic freedom, but 'r l- also 
militated against justice and equality and against political 
freedom and tolerance. A university may also take a political 
stand if some of its educational objectives are at stake.~ 
There may well be others. But the few that have been 
mentioned will suffice. 
1.4 UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN GENERAL 
From the above discussion it is clear that there are certain 
attributes which a university must possess in order to carry 
out its function of generating knowledge and pursuing truth 
and thus fulfilling its role effectively. University autonomy 
and academic freedom are the two most important ones. There 
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are obviously others, but these two are the most critical. In 
many, and especially western societies, these are regarded as 
fundamental rights. They are considered to be the foundation 
stones of the university system.n I~ is for this reason that 
they deserve closer analysis and re-evaluation. It has been 
said that 11 academic freedom, like other 'great, abiding 
truths' , is only 'abiding' in so far as each generation 
reinterprets and makes that truth its own. The concept of 
academic freedom is, like all concepts, subject to some 
reassessment in the light of changing needs and changing 
social circumstances, though the core of belief remains 
unchanged. 11 n This is the spirit which animates the present 
investigation. 
1.5 UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM DEFINED AND 
DISTINGUISHED 
The definition of university autonomy and academic freedom has 
exercised the minds of many scholars so that no one can claim 
to have the final answer. Although these are often conflated, 
they are distinguishable from each other, and it is important 
to draw this distinction. It is important because, as will 
appear here below, while some may support the idea of academic 
freedom, they may treat university autonomy with scepticism 
and yet the two are mutually supportive. Autonomy entails the 
collective activities of a university, and it relates to the 
corporate freedom of an institution in society which includes 
the powers of self-government by the university in respect of 
its affairs free from extraneous regulation. These encompass 
the academic, managerial and administrative aspects of the 
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university. Of fundamental importance is the power to manage 
the university and to regulate its affairs. Autonomy is 
concerned with its independent status as an institution in 
relation to other external institutions including the 
government, the church, the organised industry and business 
and other organizations. Academic freedom, on the other hand, 
is concerned with the working conditions and conditions of 
service of staff and students as regards teaching, learning, 
research, the expression of opinions and the publication 
thereof. It entails the freedom of an academic to perform his 
functions without unnecessary restrictions.~ 
From this distinction academic freedom can be regarded as a 
subset of a bigger set of university autonomy, although the 
two can exist without each other. For this reason autonomy 
has been regarded as a necessary though not sufficient 
condition for academic freedom. 29 General 1 y, university 
autonomy has been considered as embracing the four essential 
freedoms "to determine for itself on academic grounds who may 
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may 
be admitted to study". 30 Although this has later on been found 
to be a bit restrictive, 31 it still remains one of the most 
authoritative statements on academic freedom in the form of 
institutional autonomy, not only here, but also in the United 
States of America. 
Owing to the nature of the function of the university, 
appointment to it must be based on high intellectual merit and 
high academic standards. Once a person has demonstrated high 
academic ability through teaching and research, this must be 
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respected and must be beyond control. The university's 
decisive autonomy lies in its choice of people who will do its 
job. In order to main~ai~ the intellectual calibre of the 
institution, a uniform and system of collegial 
appointment should be established. That is the only way of 
ensuring equality of opportunity to individuals and to sustain 
the morale of those involved in co-operative research. 
Moreover, a university must also have autonomy in such 
pedagogical issues as the selection of students, the grading 
of their examinations and the setting of the level and nature 
of study. It should also be able to define its character and 
mission32 • 
The autonomy of a university is, however, not absolute; in any 
case no right is absolute. In South Africa in particular, 
university autonomy is qualified by the nature of the 
university which circumscribes its capacity and function. It 
is also qualified by the fact that its essential structure 
unites scholars, the community, society and the government, 
and all of these have to be taken into account in the exercise 
of all self-governing powers in order to preserve a harmonious 
equilibrium among them. This is obviously not an easy task. 
There are various areas where government may interfere with 
university autonomy to regulate the admission of students and 
the hiring of staff. It may further be qualified by the 
general law of the country or statutory law relating to its 
establishment and functioning," and today in the context of a 
constitution which entrenches fundamental rights, it may have 
to be balanced with other rights. But apart from these 
important considerations, it is undesirable that university 
14. 
autonomy should be unnecessarily restricted. It is well known 
that there is always a threat of government intervention in 
the running of universities. 
University autonomy also does not imply that the university is 
insulated from and is not subject to external influence. It 
is impossible for the university to be completely free from 
external influences. But once an external influence becomes 
irresistible, then the autonomy of the university is seriously 
undermined.3-1 
The nature and function of the university largely determine 
the content of its academic freedom. This freedom is confined 
to the academic field al though it is related to other 
freedoms~. The autonomy of the university as an institution 
consists of its power to regulate, organise and control all 
the facets of its academic function in its discretion without 
extraneous regulation by the government or society. As pointed 
out already, this relates to the powers of the university to 
appoint academic staff, to lay down curricula and standards, 
to decide who must be admitted as students, who should be 
taught and how to strike a balance between teaching and 
research. 
The academic freedom of a teacher or student entails the 
intellectual freedom for each to exercise his respective 
functions. The teacher is free to perform his teaching 
function according to his own conception of fact and truth, to 
express and publish his views, to study, investigate and to do 
research of his own choice and to be free from discriminatory 
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treatment on the grounds of sex or convictions or any other 
impermissible grounds. The student is entitled to study, 
learn, do research and publish in intellectual freedom and 
should not be discriminated against. This freedom, may be 
curtailed by the nature and function of the university or by 
the university itself in order to be able to carry out its 
functions effectively.~ 
According to Tight: 
"Academic freedom refers to the freedom of 
individual academics to study, teach, research and 
publish without being subject to or causing undue 
interference. Academic freedom is granted in the 
belief that it enhances the pursuit and application 
of worthwhile knowledge, and as such is supported 
by society through the funding of academics and 
their institutions. Academic freedom embodies an 
acceptance by academics of the need to encourage 
openness and flexibility in academic work, and of 
their accountability to each other and to society 
in general" . 37 
This definition attempts to stress that academic freedom is 
for the benefit of society. It is, however, confined to the 
academic freedom of teachers and not that of the students. 
But, as already pointed out, academic freedom is not a 
privilege of the academics alone; students are also entitled 
to it. For this reason an examiner has no right to penalize a 
candidate for reaching a conclusion different from that he has 
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reached himself as long as the candidate gives sound reasons 
to support his view.~ If that were so, it would stifle the 
growth of knowledge. Despite the above attempts at der~n~ng 
it, academic freedom has been regarded as defying precise and 
final definition.~ 
Although one type of definition has been used for academic 
freedom, the matter is not a ~imple one. On the contrary 
three types of definition have been propounded, all of which 
reflect certain political and philosophical underpinnings. 
According to one version, academic freedom 11 is a fundamental 
right in the service of the disinterested pursuit of 
knowledge, and a right to be defended against interference 
from the state and other movements or organisations outside 
the university 11 ~. This view of academic freedom often goes 
with the ivory tower conception of the university. According 
to this idea the pursuit of knowledge is intrinsically 
valuable on its own and has to be pursued irrespective of its 
immediate benefit to society although this may also benefit 
society. 41 
In terms of the second version of academic freedom, academic 
freedom is only a privilege afforded universities so that 
knowledge can be acquired for the good of the community. It 
is a privilege which has been used by elitist educational 
ins ti tut ions in South Africa to hide their fundamental 
activity of serving the political and economic interests of 
the white elite. This view belongs to the people's university 
idea. According to this view universities must be 
democratized and made relevant so that the control thereof is 
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taken away from the reactionary forces and placed in the hands 
of the progressive forces. In this way university education 
would become available to the broad mass of the people anQ 
research programmes would be geared to immediately benefit the 
broad mass42 • 
According to the third view, academic freedom is seen as 
sometimes useful al though "often distracting, fetish that 
academics have as they go about what it is held ought to be 
their main business" which is the training of students to 
service the economy. This model of academic freedom is 
compatible with the supermarket model of the university. This 
view regards universities as similar to markets or factories, 
the main business of which is the buying, selling and 
production of commodities which in the present case is 
education. In line with this approach, a good university is 
one where there are courses for which students and employers 
have a demand43 • 
Although these various models express important elements of 
academic freedom, they tend to exaggerate and are not mutually 
exclusive. There is no doubt that universities are, or ought 
to be, centres of rational inquiry and of knowledge 
acquisition and dissemination. Consequently, their focus is 
necessarily wider than the purely economic. Their role is not 
merely instrumental, but it is also critical and 
transformative of society~. 
Even a university that enjoys autonomy can restrict academic 
freedom and in many cases institutions treat their staff 
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unfairly or with bias or prejudice.~ It is, however, doubtful 
whether academic freedom can exist in the absence of autonomy. 
There is no doubt that acade~ic freedom can only exist in a 
free and democratic st.ate al tho:..:.gh even within a limited 
autonomy there can be academic freedom. 46 The reason why 
academic freedom cannot exist in an unf ree society is that 
violations of general liberty will always impinge on the 
freedoms of the university. For this reason it has been said 
that academic and human freedom are one and indivisible. 47 
This, however, does not mean that for conceptual purposes it 
is not possible to separate academic freedom from other 
freedoms. 48 Al though the university is not a product of a 
liberal-democratic society, it has contributed to the 
development of liberal democracy and has in turn benefited 
from liberal democracy in the pursuit of its mission.~ 
It is important to emphasise that academic freedom is not an 
end in itself. The same can be said of university autonomy. 
University autonomy facilitates academic freedom. The purpose 
of academic freedom is to facilitate the untrammelled 
attainment of the mission and goal of a university which is 
the pursuit of knowledge through teaching and research. This 
is to the benefit of society in general,~ although some would 
argue that in a university "knowledge is its own end and not 
merely a means to an end".~ There is no real conflict here. It 
is a matter of emphasis, which implies that society should not 
place unnecessary restrictions on the extension of knowledge 
on the grounds that it is not of immediate benefit to society. 
Ultimately all true knowledge is to the benefit of society, 
even if in the interim it may not be perceived to be so. 
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University autonomy is an institutional, and not an individual 
right. It is the right of the institution to govern itself and 
to direct its affairs free from external interference. 
Although academic freedom is not a general human right but an 
institutional one, it is also an individual right in that it 
has to be exercised by an individual. University autonomy and 
academic freedom are institutional rights because they are 
rights which derive from being and belonging to an institution 
and not from being human in general.£ 
Individual or human rights in general are those rights which 
human beings have or are deemed to have by virtue of their 
being human. They have these rights irrespective of race, 
gender, or perhaps age, noble or ignoble descent, social 
class, national or ethnic origins, and regardless of wealth or 
poverty, occupation, talent, merit, religion, ideology or 
other personal idiosyncrasy. It also means that they are 
inalienable and cannot be transferred, forfeited or lost by 
having been usurped or by failure to exercise or assert them 
for any length of time.~ 
These rights are also referred to as fundamental rights. This 
means that they are important and that they should not be 
easily sacrificed on utilitarian grounds. It does not 
necessarily imply that they are absolute and may never be 
curtailed for any purpose in whatever circumstances. As has 
been said, no individual right is absolute as every right is 
limited by the rights of others and other considerations. 
What it means is that "they are entitled to special protection 
enjoying at least a prima facie, presumptive inviolability, 
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bowing only to compelling societal interests, in limited 
circumstances, for limited times and purposes, and by limited 
means. "5-l 
Individual or fundamental rights are generally rights against 
or upon society as represented by the government and i t.s 
officials. A good society is therefore, according to the 
theology of human rights, one where indi victual rights 
flourish, and where the promotion and protection of individual 
rights constitute a public good. Although conflict often 
arises between the protection of individual rights and some 
other public good, according to the ideology of human rights, 
in the resolution of this conflict individual or fundamental 
rights should not be lightly sacrificed on utilitarian grounds 
of the greater good for the greater number, or even for the 
general good of all. 55 In· accordance with this line of 
reasoning the dichotomy between the individual and society is 
only temporary and superficial. In the long run it is in the 
best interests of society if the individual's right is 
protected. 56 
Al though university autonomy and academic freedom are 
institutional rights, they are also fundamental rights because 
they are indispensable to the existence of a university and 
ultimately for the benefit of society. A university without 
autonomy and academic freedom is a contradiction in terms. It 
is a fire that burns not. They are also fundamental because 
they enable a university to attain its mission. It is 
essential to stress that they are rights and not privileges or 
concessions, nor are they something that depends on the whim 
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of the authority either inside oY outside the institution 
which authority can deal with as it pleases. On the contrary 
they are something inherently bound up with the performance of 
the university's Yo le, "something as necessary f O:!'." that 
performance as pen and paper, as classrooms and students, as 
laboratories and libraries"n. For this reason they should be 
treated with care and not be easily sacrificed, qualified or 
denied. 
1. 6 THE RATIONALE FOR UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY AND ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM 
The rationale for university autonomy and academic freedom is, 
as already mentioned, to be found in the nature and function 
of the university. As already pointed out, the function of the 
university is the generation, advancement and dissemination of 
knowledge through teaching and research. This is not an end in 
itself. The advancement of knowledge is essential for the 
improvement of the quality of life of society whether it be 
physically, socially, economically, spiritually and 
politically. 58 
Knowledge can be advanced only if there is freedom of inquiry 
which entails freedom of thought and expression as well as to 
criticize without fear of sanctions however unpopular or 
unorthodox the views expressed may be. 9 As Turner puts it: 
"Academic freedom is not therefore some arcane and 
anachronistic privilege. It is to the academic 
what judicial independence is to judges, freedom of 
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conscience to the clergy, the protection of sources 
of information to the journal is ts, parliamentary 
privilege to the MP, the exercise of clinical 
judgment to the aoc~or, the right of pursuit to the 
policeman. It is the simple and basic condition 
for the job" . 60 
There is ample evidence that throughout history considerable 
progress has been made as a result of the growth of knowledge 
which has led to the better understanding of ourselves, our 
institutions, and the environment in which we live. 
Notwithstanding 
discoveries and 
this, experience teaches us that 
advances in knowledge are often 
great 
highly 
unsettling and distasteful to the existing order. It is rare 
that individuals have the intelligence and imagination to 
conceive those ideas and the courage to express them openly. 
If we place a high premium on progress, we cannot afford to 
restrict such persons by imposing orthodoxies, censorship and 
other artificial barriers to creative thoughtfil. 
It does not mean that all intellectual thoughts are 
infallible. For this reason it has been said that commitment 
to academic freedom is more a matter of faith than a product 
of logic and empirical demonstration. It is always likely 
that the exercise of this freedom can produce mistakes and 
misperceptions that may mislead the public or lead to the 
adoption of faulty and harmful policies. A solution to this 
is not to censor academic freedom but to encourage it so that 
in the process ideas can be subjected to critical scrutiny and 
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errors can be corrected through continuing· argument and 
debate62 • 
Academics should be allowed to subject any idea or practice to 
critical scrutiny however hallowed by veneration or practice. 
Indeed one of the most important roles of a university, in its 
service to the society that sustains it, is constantly to 
subject to critical scrutiny and review that society's 
institutions, policies, goals, value systems, and its 
self-image.~ In doing this, the university should not be what 
has been regarded as an "ideological handmaiden of the 
state 11 • 64 On the contrary, the university and its graduates 
should be able and free to act as critics and agents of social 
renewal and reconstruction. This does not mean the destructive 
criticism of the state or plotting its violent overthrow, but 
rather it implies that social, moral and political issues of 
contemporary modern concern are subjected by universities to 
debate while alternative value systems are compared and 
critically examined. Universities should also be able to 
challenge existing beliefs and conventions if they are in 
conflict with justice and truth.~ 
As Rawls once put it: 
"Justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A 
theory however elegant and economical must be 
rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws 
and institutions no matter how efficient and well 
arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are 
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unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability 
founded on justice that even the welfare of society 
as a whole cannot override The only thing that 
permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory is 
lack of a better one; analogously, an injustice is 
tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid even 
greater injustice. Being first virtues of human 
activities, truth and justice are uncompromising." 66 
The fundamental question is, as Pontius Pilate once put it: 
"What is the truth?" While no attempt will be made here to 
answer that question, it is the very existence of that 
question which necessitates free inquiry so that no one can 
claim to have the monopoly of truth. There must be a 
continuous search for truth which implies the challenging of 
conventional wisdom and accepted conventions. Moreover, while 
no attempt will be made here to define justice, there is no 
doubt that justice is important and that the continued 
appraisal of societal practices is essential if justice has to 
be done among fellow human beings. It would not be possible to 
challenge existing theories and practices if academic freedom 
were restricted. It is for this reason that academic freedom 
has been regarded as the very lifeblood of a university. In 
its absence the mission of a university in society atrophies. 
Academic freedom entails that a university should be free to 
follow its traditional role of pursuing the truth. As Higgs 
points out, 
schools of 
"a university must be free to weigh up different 
thought, political, economic and social, a 
university must be free tQ disseminate insights flowing from 
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scholarly activities; a university must be free to appraise 
trends and tendencies in society, based on scientific 
research; a university must be free to pass on its knowledge 
to all students who are capable and wish to learn; and a 
university must be free to establish a climate in which i~s 
members may contemplate and be creative." 67 
As has been said, academic freedom can only thrive within an 
autonomous and democratic institution and in a democratic and 
free society. The reason why university autonomy is essential 
for facilitating academic freedom, is based on the assumption 
that those who manage and direct the affairs of the university 
are best equipped by knowledge and experience to run a 
university and to determine the parameters of academic 
freedom. As Brook points out: 
"Put in its simplest terms the case for academic 
freedom for university teachers rests on the belief 
that, provided he is fit for his job, the man on 
the spot knows best. This is true of most kinds of 
work, but there are many occupations, of which 
university teaching is one, that lose their meaning 
if there is any attempt to interfere with the 
independence of the man who is carrying out the 
duties of that occupation. Those who are paying 
the salary of the man concerned do not thereby 
acquire the right to inter£ ere with the way in 
which he does his work and the first test of 
fitness to undertake work to which the term 
'professional' is often applied is the 
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determination not to allow the paymaster to abuse 
his position. A doctor's diagnosis and treatment 
would be valueless if they were prescribed by those 
who paid his and accountant must be 
prepared to arrive at conclusions whose publication 
will expose and ruin his client. The university 
teacher should make a similar claim. It is 
essential that a university teacher or researcher 
should follow an argument to its conclusion, 
whatever that conclusion may be, and he cannot hope 
to do that if his job depends on his reaching one 
particular conclusion. The success of universities 
depends on the quality of the teachers and students 
that they can attract, and neither teachers nor 
students of the right quality are likely to be 
attracted to universities unless they enjoy 
freedom. People are fond of saying, in connection 
with government grants to universities, that those 
who pay the piper must call the tune, but, if there 
is any truth in this it is important to define what 
we mean by calling the tune". 68 
It is quite clear that the university ought to have control 
over the awarding of degrees and the methods of teaching and 
researching to be followed. This follows naturally from the 
fact that it is the authority in the area of the acquisition 
of knowledge and rational inquiry. It is the institution 
responsible for knowledge acquisition and testing claims to 
knowledge and for inducting members of society into procedures 
for acquiring and testing knowledge. The university's 
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authoritative status in matters of the acquisition of 
knowledge and rational inquiry also provides the main 
justification why the university has to exercise control over 
who should be employed as teacher and researcher. It is only 
the university that is competent to judge who among the 
candidate teachers and researchers is of the appropriate or 
highest academic standard and who is not. This does not mean 
that the university is not subject to limitations when it 
comes to this. There may well be other factors it has to 
consider. While for instance the university is not _supposed 
to take the factor of race into account, it may legitimately 
do this in order to address the racial imbalances in its staff 
complement. It may also pref er to appoint a South African as 
opposed to a non-South African~. 
the best position to determine 
students. 
The university is also in 
who should be admitted as 
The mission of a university is committed to the responsible 
exercising of freedom of expression and of inquiry. In this 
way a university in its pursuit of truth should "place genuine 
academic thought in permanent opposition to received dogmas, 
and will seek to teach people how to think, and not dictate to 
them what they should think."~ It is a right that is liable 
to abuse but should not be abused71 • 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Centlivres et al, in the 
following terms: 
"A university is characterised by the 
free enquiry, its ideal being the 
'spirit of 
ideal of 
28. 
Socrates - 'to follow the argument where it leads'. 
This implies the right to examine, question, modify 
or reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and 
hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an 
immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a 
university. The concern of its scholars is not 
merely to add and revise facts in relation to an 
accepted framework, but to be ever examining and 
modifying the framework itself."r-
Some of the quotations made above seem to emphasize a 
different perspective of the rationale or justification for 
academic freedom. This perspective is to the ef feet that 
academic freedom is justified by the very nature and role of a 
university. According to this view academic freedom is 
defensible on the ground that it is unjust for persons or 
groups to prohibit someone from doing or to punish him for 
doing what they have demanded or expected of him. 
Universities or higher education institutions expect teachers 
and scholars to seek the truth in their various fields of 
inquiry. Universities themselves are expected to be involved 
in the pursuit of truth. It would therefore be unfair to 
prevent academics or universities to do what they are supposed 
to do. A university that does not pursue truth and the 
advancement of knowledge, is not a university in the strict 
sense of the word even if it may claim to be". This view is 
not necessarily in conflict with the utilitarian view of 
academic freedom; it may be regarded as the other side of the 
coin. 
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As already indicated, academic freedom is dependent on other 
related freedoms like freedom of thought, of conscience and of 
expression. This is so because academics can be effective only 
if they are allowed to think critically, to reason logically 
and to follow logic wherever it leads them. They must also be 
able to express their ideas freely and openly, either orally 
or through publications. They can only influence contemporary 
ideas if their views are publicised and not censored.~ To do 
otherwise would be to postulate a contradiction in terms. 
Their views may also be subjected to critical scrutiny so that 
the frontiers of knowledge are in the process extended. They 
should also be able to follow their consciences. While 
academic freedom is dependable on these rights, it includes 
more than what these rights entail. 
Searle, in discussing the rationale for academic freedom, 
distinguishes between what he regards as the special and the 
general theories of academic freedom. According to him the 
special theory of academic freedom is the same as what has 
been stated above, namely that academic freedom is 
indispensable for the fulfilling of the mission of a 
university which is the pursuit of knowledge and truth for the 
benefit of society. He, however, concedes that this theory 
does not cover all contingencies. As a result he postulates a 
supplementary theory of academic freedom which he regards as 
the general theory of academic freedom. 75 
This so-called general theory of academic freedom is 
unnecessary if one bears in mind that academic freedom does 
not exist in isolation. It is one of the freedoms in a free 
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and democratic society. An academic is not only entitled to 
academic freedom, but he is also entitled to other freedoms 
like freedom of speech, of assembly and of association :.o 
mention but a related few. 
While it has been said that academic freedom is related to and 
sometimes dependent on freedom of speech, it is necessary to 
make a distinction between the two. Academic freedom involves 
more than freedom of speech. It is particularly important to 
emphasize this because some would argue that there is no need 
for special protection of academic freedom as it is subsumed 
under freedom of speech. The distinction is also important in 
another respect. There has been a growing intolerance of 
certain views which are regarded as racist or fascist or 
merely conservative at South African universities and 
universities abroad. People espousing or representing such 
views have been denied platforms to speak on many campuses. 
This intolerance has attracted the criticism from those who 
advocate an "open-door" policy at universities, namely that 
universities should allow all views and not censor some. 
Academic freedom is not just concerned with the propagation of 
views, which freedom of speech entails, but it also involves 
subjecting those views to critical scrutiny. A university has 
a particular ethos which is characterised by free inquiry. It 
can, therefore, invite any speaker who is prepared to have his 
views tested and subjected to critical scrutiny. But it can 
refuse its hospitality to a speaker who comes to spread 
propaganda without wanting to conform to the ethos of the 
university. It can do this without any qualms about its image 
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because academic freedom means more than freedom of speech. 
As Parekh puts it: "There is an important distinction between 
talking politics and talking about politics, speaking a racis~ 
language and speaking about racism, and the university is 
concerned with the latter".u 
Academic freedom is conducive not only to the creation and 
expansion of knowledge but also to artistic and scientific 
creativity. Persecution or absence of freedom impedes both 
creative and scientific work and "it is the business of a 
university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive 
to speculation, experiment and creation. 1177 This does not mean 
that lack of freedom and persecution completely stifle these, 
but they make their realisation difficult. As it has been 
said: "Persecution does not preclude creation, of course, any 
more than it can prevent scientific speculation. After all, 
The Pilgrim's Progress emerged from a prison, as did Grotius's 
Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland; and Galileo's 
Dialogue of the Two Principal Systems of the World was 
published after he had been warned by the Inquisition. 1178 But 
it is ideal that a university should operate in an atmosphere 
that encourages free inquiry and scientific and artistic 
creativity. 
Support for academic freedom is not synonymous with 
encouraging indolence. For this reason a university teacher 
cannot claim to be entitled to lecture or not to lecture at 
the whim of the moment under the guise of academic freedom. 
If that were so, the university would be as much entitled to 
be capricious in the payment of his salary. "One should be 
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unsympathetic towards a university teacher who claims that to 
lecture when he does not feel like doing so is unfair to his 
students because it would mean that he was not giving them his 
best". 79 
Al though university autonomy and academic freedom are 
indispensable for the acquisition and dissemination of 
knowledge for the betterment of society, they are nonetheless 
often stifled. The society served by the university or 
scholar, often puts obstacles in the way of his or her service 
in the form of prejudice, fear, short-sighted interest, 
complacency and sheer ignorance. The scholar himself may be 
subject to temptation from within and from without~. 
1.7 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The perennial problem of organised society is human 
selfishness resulting in the hunger for and abuse of power on 
the part of the rulers and those who are in possession of 
political power. Lord Acton's famous aphorism remains true 
even today, namely, that power tends to corrupt and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely. The corrupting influence of power 
often leads to the violation of the rights of the individual 
or institution. The violation of individual rights usually 
leads to conflict and instability and society in the process 
suffers. This is a situation that must be avoided. Even in the 
absence of conflict and instability, society suffers if 
certain fundamental rights are violated through the abuse of 
political power. The challenge of democracy is how best to 
limit the abuse of power and to direct its use to good ends.~ 
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This has been largely responsible for the evolution of rights 
and guarantees in society. Despite the existence and 
recognition of these rights, they are never completely beyond 
threat. For this reason they need constant appraisal and 
redefinition. They also need vigilance and effective 
protection. 
freedom. 
This is true of university autonomy and academic 
It is usually governments and government officials that 
violate the rights of individuals and institutions. From the 
earliest development of universities there has been mutual 
rivalry between the 
government and the 
university on 
church on the 
the one hand, 
other. This is 
and the 
usually 
because universities are often critical of the practices of 
governments and other organisations of society. Universities 
emphasise rationality whereas politicians and churches often 
appeal to emotions and established practices and beliefs of 
society. As a result governments often react by limiting the 
autonomy of universities and academic freedom if universities 
are irksome by criticising what governments do. This should 
not be so. The government's need to govern and a university's 
need to enquire freely should be allowed to coexist "in a 
complex, delicate and trustful balance". The government and 
university should recognize each other's distinctive natures 
and their fundamental missions in order "not to maul and 
manipulate each other."~ But this is easier said than done. It 
is for this reason that both the institution of university and 
individual academics are vested with certain rights in the 
form of university autonomy and academic freedom which they 
can assert if the government oversteps the mark. 
34. 
Governments of developing countries may sometimes emphasise 
other ideals which have to be attained at the expense of 
university autonomy and academic freedom. 83 The results are 
often unfortunate. The government often intervenes in internal 
university matters. Too much government interference in the 
internal affairs of a university often results in the academic 
ethos of a university suffering and the university being 
unable to attain its goal of being a beacon of light. 
In most countries governments are responsible for the 
subsidising of university education. Government subsidy is 
always given with an implicit expectation of loyalty to the 
government.~ If the university does not toe the government 
line, the government may react negatively to this. There is no 
doubt that governments feel considerably comfortable if they 
have the support of universities in what they do. In the 
process university autonomy and academic freedom suffer. 
Society itself may unwittingly aid and abet this. The reason 
behind this is that both the government and society may hold 
ideas which are wrong. People in general tend to def end 
established institutions and practices even if they are wrong 
and unjustifiable. They then become hostile to any person who 
challenges those practices or institutions even if it may not 
be in the best interest of society in the long run to retain 
those practices. The reason for this is that change is for 
many people uncomfortable. It brings about uncertainty and 
anxiety whereas to follow established practices is both easy 
and convenient. 
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The problem of academic freedom, of course, is not that what 
happens at universities is the exclusive concern of the 
teachers and students who live in them. It is rather the 
problem how to satisfy the government's legitimate interest 
while the government interferes as little as possible with the 
traditional freedom of universities.u 
Rights when considered individually may not be problematic, 
but when considered in the context of others, it becomes 
necessary to weigh each right against others in order to come 
to a decision that is fair and just to the protection of each 
right. The new Constitution contains a chapter on fundamental 
rights. 86 This chapter is binding on the legislative and 
executive branches of government.n Although a university is 
not part of the government, there is no doubt that the 
provisions on fundamental rights will be applicable to it as a 
result of the interpretive section of the Cons ti tut ion. 
Section 35 (3) of the Constitution stipulates that in the 
interpretation of any law, the court should have due regard to 
the spirit, purport and objects of the chapter on fundamental 
rights. A university is also entitled to certain rights in 
terms of the Constitution. This is because of the provisions 
of section 7(3). This section stipulates that juristic persons 
are entitled to the rights contained in this chapter, to the 
extent that the nature of the rights permits. 
A question that has been seriously debated is whether the 
Constitution, and in particular the chapter on fundamental 
rights, should apply vertically or horizontally. This is what 
in German parlance is ref erred to as the Dri ttwirkung. 
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Although there are ins~ances where the Constitution can apply 
between citizens, the better view seems to be that it should 
regulate the relationship between the state and the 
individual.~ For present purposes it is not necessary to be 
involved in this investigation. What is important is that a 
university is entitled in terms of the Constitution to 
exercise its rights against the government or individual. 
Some of the provisions of the chapter on fundamental rights 
have a bearing on the autonomy and academic freedom of 
universities. Alternatively, the interpretation of these may 
impinge on university autonomy and academic freedom. Section 
14(1) of the Constitution guarantees to every person the right 
to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and 
opinion. This includes academic freedom in institutions of 
higher learning. Section 15 provides for the right to freedom 
of speech and expression, which includes freedom of the press 
and other media, and the freedom of artistic creativity and 
scientific research. These provisions guarantee both 
institutional autonomy and individual academic freedom without 
necessarily derogating from accountability. This is borne out 
by the provisions of section 247(2) of the Constitution which 
precludes the national government from altering the rights, 
powers and functions of the controlling bodies of universities 
except through bona fide negotiations. But section 24 7 ( 3) 
stipulates that if agreement is not reached in terms of 
subsection (2), the national government is not precluded from 
altering the powers and functions of the controlling bodies of 
universities. A proviso to this subsection states that 
interested persons and bodies are entitled to challenge the 
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validity of any such alteration in terms of the Constitution. 
This no doubt refers to the provisions on fundamental rights. 
The alteration may, for instance, be challenged on the ground 
that it is a violation of university autonomy and academic 
freedom protected by the Constitution. 
Universities will obviously be affected by the constitutional 
prohibition of discrimination. Section 8(2) provides that no 
person should be unfairly discriminated against, directly or 
indirectly on the grounds of race, gender, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture or language. Section 8 (3) (a) 
allows for a form of affirmative action in order to achieve 
adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups or 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, 
in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of all 
rights and freedoms. 
Section 32 creates a right to education. 
follows: 
"Every person shall have the right -
It provides as 
(a) to basic education and to equal access to 
educational institutions; 
(b) to instruction in the language of his or her 
choice where this is reasonably practicable; 
and 
(c) to establish, where practicable, educational 
institutions based on a common culture, 
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language or religion, provided that there 
shall be no discrimination on the ground of 
race. 11 
This provision implies that universities should facilitate 
equal access of students to university education. In this way 
they do not have the last say when it comes to admission 
policies. The government may intervene in this matter. For 
that reason university autonomy may be affected. Section 32(b) 
is linked with section 31 which entitles every person to use 
the language and to participate in the cultural life of his or 
her choice. A number of problems of interpretation will arise 
from these provisions. This interpretation will have an effect 
on university autonomy and academic freedom. 
1.8 AIM OF INVESTIGATION 
As pointed out above, section 14 ( 1) of the interim 
Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of conscience, 
religion, thought, belief and opinion which includes academic 
freedom in institutions of higher learning.u From this section 
it appears that the Constitution guarantees not only 
individual academic freedom but also institutional autonomy. 
The aim of this investigation is to establish the content and 
parameters of university autonomy and academic freedom as 
guaranteed by the Constitution. These are not defined in the 
Constitution. It is assumed that it is well known and agreed 
what university autonomy and academic freedom entail. But the 
content of these may be controversial in the light of the 
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changed circumstances in which the South African university 
operates today. 
The government is assuming greater powers and these may affect 
both university autonomy and academic freedom. The purpose of 
the research is to throw light on the possible scenario of how 
the courts in general, and the constitutional court in 
particular, should interpret and protect the right to 
university autonomy and academic freedom. This will be done by 
tracing the historical evolution of university autonomy and 
academic freedom and by making a comparative study of similar 
concepts in other countries. The history of university 
autonomy and academic freedom will be traced to the inception 
of universities in the Middle Ages. Having traced that 
history, it will be necessary to trace the concept of 
university autonomy and academic freedom from the 
establishment of universities in South Africa up to the 
present moment. The purpose thereof is to have an 
understanding of the evolution of these concepts of university 
autonomy and academic freedom. 
It has been said that in order to understand the growth of 
institutions "an ounce of history is worth a pound of 
theory."~ This is to be attributed to the fact that "history 
in illuminating the past, illuminates the present and in 
illuminating the present, illuminates the future."~ It will 
then be necessary to make a comparative study of other 
jurisdictions. The purpose thereof is to deepen our 
understanding of our situation. It has been said that by 
comparing our law with the laws of other countries we enhance 
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our understanding of our laws and of the concept of law in 
general. 92 These countries include Britain, Germany and the 
United States of America. One or two on the African continent 
will complete the picture. Even the Constitution provides that 
in the interpretation of the provisions on fundamental righ~s 
the courts are entitled to refer to international and 
comparative jurisprudence on these issues. 93 
Admittedly the concepts of university autonomy and academic 
freedom are not new. They are as old as the university itself. 
But when circumstances change, 
and established institutions 
it is necessary to revisit old 
in order to ascertain their 
relevance and effectiveness or even their alteration in the 
light of changed circumstances and needs. Although university 
autonomy and academic freedom developed with universities, 
universities themselves have been constantly changing and 
adapting to new changes. New demands have been imposed on them 
and they have been asked to meet new challenges. In the 
process of these changes a~d adaptations, university autonomy 
and academic freedom have of necessity altered accordingly. 
During this era of transition, universities in South Africa 
are called upon to fulfil certain new roles. They are expected 
to contribute to the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) and to transform in the light of the new political and 
constitutional dispensation. In the course of this, 
university autonomy and academic freedom have to be affected. 
Apart from the need to give guidance to the constitutional 
court on how to interpret the constitutional provisions 
relating to academic freedom, it is essential that 
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universities themselves, and in particular their officials, 
should know what university autonomy and academic freedom 
entail in order to defend these rights. This is based on the 
assumption that universities can remain effective only if 
these rights are protected. 
1.9 CONCLUSION 
Although academic freedom is distinguishable from university 
autonomy, the two are interdependent and mutually reinforcing 
although the one can exist without the other. Academic freedom 
can only flourish within an autonomous university although 
even an autonomous university can restrict academic freedom. 
These concepts are undoubtedly of fundamental importance to 
the role and function of a university of generating knowledge. 
Knowledge can only be generated in an atmosphere of free 
enquiry. For this reason it has been said: 
"A university is fundamentally about inquiry - that 
is what a free society is about, that is what the 
growth of knowledge is about, and ultimately that 
is what being human is about. A university is the 
guardian of the imagination that both describes and 
asserts the essential nature of humankind. A 
university thrives on ___ g~ba te because inquiry 
thrives on debate. Criticism is not suppressed nor 
should it be merely tolerated. Rather, a university 
should encourage critical exchange in pursuing its 
mission. Yet the phenomena of political, economic 
and technological power everywhere threaten the 
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university survival as a distinctive institution 
which stands in the service of humankind and which 
is characterised by a self-determining, 
regulatory inquiry after truth."~ 
self-
Academic freedom is also dependent on or related to other 
democratic freedoms. These include freedom of thought, freedom 
of expression and freedom of conscience. This is to be 
ascribed to the fact that academic freedom entails the freedom 
to think critically and creatively on one's discipline. It 
also entails the freedom to express and publish one's views 
even if they are contrary to conventional wisdom. Moreover, it 
involves following not only one's mind, but also one's 
conscience when it comes to one's discipline. Academic 
freedom may therefore in a way be regarded as the sum total of 
these rights and freedoms exercised in an academic 
environment, although it is an independent and substantive 
right. In addition to this, any academic is entitled to 
exercise the other freedoms like freedom of speech, of 
conscience and of association and any other political right. 
That is why it was pointed out above that academic freedom can 
only thrive within a free and democratic society. Academic 
freedom is aimed at facilitating the generation of knowledge 
which is ultimately for the gocd of society. In this context 
the words of Higgs are once again apposite: 
"The interest of a university is none other than 
civilisation itself - the quality of humankind's 
existence. In other words, it subsumes the concern 
of the body politic and the market in the interests 
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of humankind's need for enlightenment in order to 
ensure a quality of existence that is becoming of 
civilisation. As a custodian of civilised values a 
university seeks to serve ~he cause of civilisation 
in pursuing truth by way of learning, research and 
scholarship. This value-laden activity represents a 
university's education mandate, wherein the 
individual often alone, often with others, seeks 
constantly, with imagination and creativity, to 
clarify limits in order to surpass them, to order 
the mind so as to set it free. This seeking is a 
university's essence."~ 
Academic freedom can only flourish in a democratic society if 
democracy is understood in the liberal sense. Liberal 
democracy entails not simply majoritarianism which implies the 
rule by the majority, but it also means that certain rights 
could be enforced even against the majority. That is why 
rights are protected in a bill of rights. 96 In this way 
academic freedom implies that a person should be allowed to 
hold and express his views even against the views of the 
majority. Part of this is due to the fact that the majority 
may of ten be wrong because truth is not a monopoly of the 
majority. Yet truth is indispensable for freedom" and for 
people to attain the good life. Academic freedom therefore is 
of the very essence of a university as an ins ti tut ion of 
higher learning and deserves not only careful scrutiny but 
also effective protection if the university is not to be a 
contradiction in terms, a fire that burns not. 
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Al though provision is made in the Cons ti tut ion for the 
protection of academic freedom and university autonomy, it 
does not mean that this is the end of the story; it merely 
signifies the new beginning where individual and institutional 
rights are respected. It is well known that to provide a bill 
of rights is one thing, but to make it work is entirely 
another. Generally, the effective working of a bill of rights 
depends on a culture of democracy.~ A culture of democracy is 
what we lack in this country. Universities in the past were 
influenced by societal views and government policy which led 
to academic freedom being inhibited. This may be so in future. 
Despite the constitutional guarantee of academic freedom, it 
does not mean that academic freedom will automatically be 
respected by all. It is the universities themselves that must 
continually strive to preserve and assert it. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY AND 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM FROM THE MIDDLE AGES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As stated earlier, it may be necessary to examine the 
historical evolution of institutions in order to obtain a 
proper understanding of their true nature.' Universities are 
no exception to this rule. In the words of Versveld: 11 In die 
oorsprong van dinge kan ons dikwels die elemente bespeur 
waarsonder hulle nie sou kon voortbestaan nie. " 2 Allott 
expressed the same sentiments when he said that history is of 
interest to an historical jurist interested in the processes 
by which legal systems, and legal ins ti tut ions and ideas, 
evolve over time, and change from one form to another in 
response to new demands or new influences. 3 This is so because 
human institutions are sometimes influenced by the course of 
political, sociological and cultural history of a people, 
country or sub-continent. Universities in South Africa regard 
themselves as modelled on their medieval counterparts in 
Europe. It is for this reason that we have to trace the 
history of universities to the Middle Ages. The purpose of 
this is not to promote idle curiosity, but to go to the roots 
of universities in order to establish why they developed 
certain practices and principles. It is also to seek 
justification for the existence of certain practices and 
principles which universities continue to follow. 
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Al though there are precursors to the university as 
developed during the Middle Ages/ there is general agreement 
that the university as we have it today is a product of the 
Middle Ages. 5 The word "uni versi tas" had hitherto not bee:i 
used exclusively to mean a university as we understand it 
today; it was a term used to deno::e merely a plurality or 
aggregate of persons. There was even a "Universitas 
Carceratorurn", an association of prisoners. 11 Universitas 
vestra" in a letter addressed to a body of persons merely 
meant 11 the whole of you 11 • In a technical sense "universitas" 
meant a legal corporation or juristic person. The term that 
was mostly used to describe a university was "studiurn 
generale 11 which meant a place where students from all parts of 
the world were received. 6 
It was during the Middle Ages that great studia generalia like 
Bologna, Salerno and Padua in Italy, Paris and Montpellier in 
France, and Oxford and Cambridge in England came into being. 
The corning together of masters and students was the result of 
a spontaneous movement and not that of planning.' There were 
intellectual, social and economic reasons for that 
development. It will not be possible to deal extensively with 
all of them here. Only a few cursory remarks will suffice in 
order to put the matter in proper perspective. Although there 
may be entirely rational reasons for the existence of 
university autonomy and academic freedom today, there is no 
doubt that the circumstances surrounding the inception and 
development of universities give one a better grasp of the 
need for and the evolution of these concepts. 
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2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSITIES AND UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY 
2.2.1 Reasons behind the establishment of universities 
In order to understand the evolution of university autonomy 
and academic freedom, it will be illuminating to consider the 
circumstances under which universities developed. As already 
stated, there are various reasons for the origin of 
universities in the Middle Ages. 
One of the reasons for this development was that the eleventh 
century was the turning point in the intellectual history of 
Europe. There was both eccleaiastical and cultural renewal. 
This culminated in what has been called the Renaissance of the 
twelfth century which, although not as profound as and as 
conspicuous as that of the fifteenth century, resulted in the 
intellectual revival which was spearheaded by people like 
Petrus Abelardus and others who popularised theology and 
philosophy through their dialectical method. This caused a 
resurgence of interest not only in theology and philosophy but 
also in law, 8 and hence in the growth of universities. 
A second reason for the origin of universities in the Middle 
Ages is to be ascribed to certain political, social and 
economic considerations. This was the era that marked a change 
from an agrarian society, based on the feudal system, to an 
industrialized one. The increase in trade with the east led to 
the creation of industries and financial institutions which 
led to bigger groups of people corning together. This resulted 
in the establishment of cities. The population increase that 
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ensued required a . sophisticated management system and the 
services of administrators, lawyers and medical doctors. 
Training for the occupation of posts outside the church, 
became more necessary than before. This further resulted in 
the need for better training and better utilisation of the 
work force. These needs could no longer be adequately 
satisfied by the cathedral and monastic schools of the time. 
Consequently, the creation of new and more differentiated, and 
later more advanced, institutions was a natural parallel to 
the development of the city as a political, social and 
geographical unit. 9 
A third aspect of the Middle Ages university, which does not 
necessarily explain its origin as the form it took, was that 
this time coincided with the origin and development of the 
guilds owing to the growth and freedom of cities. Traders and 
craftsmen formed themselves into brotherhoods or guilds to 
protect and promote their specific interests. These guilds 
were self-managing and formed close-knit units where outsiders 
were excluded unless they were masters of their craft. Members 
of the guilds took care of each other's interests. In order to 
be admitted to a guild, a person had to have undergone years 
of training as an apprentice under a master of a particular 
trade. The master craftsman would then recommend him to the 
guild of which he would also. become a member and master 
craftsman. The guilds were therefore autonomous and only 
admitted masters of the particular trade as members. 10 
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2.2.2 Autonomy and the role of the guilds 
The model of the guild contribu~ed in no small measure to the 
development o= universi~y a~~onomy and academic freedom. The 
spirit of independence and coherence which pervaded the guilds 
was attractive to the brotherhood of the learned, as they 
strove for a greater say over their affairs and wanted to free 
themselves all the more from domination by the local church 
and secular authorities. At Bologna, for instance, foreign 
students formed themselves into guilds to protect their 
interests. At Oxford and Paris it was the masters who formed 
themselves into guilds. Although the masters controlled the 
guilds, the students were also part of the guilds because they 
would themselves ultimately be members thereof. This gave rise 
to universities being regarded as corporations of masters and 
scholars (universitates magistrorum et scholarium). It was 
this organizational pattern of the guilds which gave rise to 
the principle of autonomy which is important even today and 
which is the subject matter of this investigation. The 
corporate identity gave rise to the independence of the 
guilds. The spirit of independence on the one hand and 
communal protection, on the other, which guilds had, had a 
profound influence on education and contributed to the 
evolution of universities in that form. 11 
2.2.3 Autonomy and the role of the chancellor 
The situation at Bologna and Paris led to a great variety of 
studies being offered in the schools. This also led to the 
coming together of a great number of pupils and teachers. At 
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Paris they were under the control of the bishop who mostly 
delegated his responsibility to another member of the church 
hierarchy. Although this person sometimes had other titles, it 
was usually the chancellor of the cathedral who was the master 
of the schools. As he had other obligations, he was seldom 
involved in teaching himself. For this reason, he appointed 
people under him to do the teaching. He wielded considerable 
power over those teachers directly under his control. As the 
numbers of those students who came to study grew, a group of 
masters developed who wanted to be more independent and to be 
able to give lectures to those students who could pay without 
the control of the chancellor. As a result a struggle ensued 
between the chancellor and the masters. This struggle was not 
only between the chancellor and the masters, but it was also 
between the masters and the church as represented by the 
chancellor. It was a struggle of the masters to free 
themselves from the control of the church and the chancellor. 
A practice then evolved for the chancellor to give permission 
to such masters to establish their own schools in the vicinity 
of the cathedral. This licence to teach became known as the 
licentia docendi. Although initially the chancellor had great 
power, even over teachers who were not directly under his 
authority, these masters gradually obtained more powers and 
began to stand together to protect their interests.u In this 
way the fledgeling universities gained more autonomy. 
During the twelfth century, this group action began to take 
shape. The ma~ters were, among other things, dissatisfied that 
the licentia docendi was frequently issued to people who did 
not really qualify and were consequently not masters of their 
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subjects. Here the influence of the guilds was exercised. The 
masters insisted that no new member would be allowed to t.~e 
guild without having t.he necessary schooling and traini::~ 
under a trained craftsman. The masters also wanted to ensure 
the proper training of new masters. To attain this they 
introduced an initiation ceremony which became known as t.he 
inceptio. After having been examined and licensed by the 
chancellor, the novice had to deliver an inaugural lecture or 
engage in a public disputation in the presence of his former 
master and some fell ow masters. In this way, he proved his 
ability to teach in the area of expertise he had chosen. This 
gave him admission to the fellowship of the "elect masters". 
It was during this time that the practice of conferring 
doctorates commenced. Initially "doctor" simply meant a 
licence to teach. It started in the middle of the twelfth 
century. The terms "doctor", "master" (magister) and 
"professor" were used synonymously throughout the Middle Ages, 
and meant one licensed to teach. The masters co-operated 
closely in matters of common interest. The corporate action of 
the masters gave rise to the form in which the university 
would develop. 13 
The introduction of the inceptio did not mean the end of the 
struggle between the chancellor and the masters. The 
chancellor still had the power to examine and license 
candidates. The masters also wanted to possess this power. 
Once they had gained this, it would mean the eventual freedom 
from the chancellor and the cathedral. Students also wanted 
greater autonomy and certain guarantees as they were in 
constant conflict with the city population which sometimes led 
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to violent clashes. Students felt they were unreasonably 
punished by the city authorit~es whereas they fell under the 
jurisdiction of the church. After such a clash, and in the 
year 1200 where a number of students were killed, the masters 
approached King Philip Augustus. As he feared that they would 
leave the city, he issued a charter to both masters and 
students. In this charter he acknowledged their privileges and 
provided that they be treated with respect, and in the event 
of misconduct that they be handed to the church authorities.w 
During this period the idea of a community of scholars and 
masters had crystallised. Thus the university had come into 
being not necessarily as a consequence of a deliberate act of 
foundation but as a result of a gradual process of 
development. The victory of 1200 led the masters to realise 
that their power lay in unity. Consequently, certain practices 
were established whereby their mutual responsibility for their 
interests was accepted. Various rules were also accepted on 
matters like academic dress, the holding of lectures, the 
attendance of funerals of deceased masters and many other 
issues. The local church authorities did not take kindly to 
these developments and attempts were made to suppress them, 
but the masters apparently had the support of the pope. This 
ultimately led to the masters not taking an oath of allegiance 
to the chancellor as had been the case before. It was also 
provided that they should be consulted on the competence of a 
candidate to whom a licentia docendi was granted. In this way 
the masters received greater powers. They could choose certain 
officers. They also received a seal and recognition for their 
rectors and other officials.~ 
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Although Oxford Universicy had a close affinity to Paris in 
its academic and intellectual life, there were striking 
differences which arose from the different milieux of the two 
institutions. Whereas Paris had been characterised by the 
struggle for autonomy against ~he chancellor and the cathedral 
chapter, this was not so with Oxford. At Oxford there was no 
struggle for independence, either against the chancellor or 
the mendicants and there was little intervention from the 
pope. Oxford did not form part of a capital, never had a 
cathedral school and was in a more remote kingdom where there 
was not frequent contact with the pope. Moreover, the position 
of chancellor at Oxford was radically different from that at 
Paris. At Oxford the chancellor was far more an intermediary 
between the bishop and the university than at Paris where he 
stood outside the society of masters as a representative of 
the bishop. While at Paris the chancellor was a symbol of 
alien rule, at Oxford he was a symbol of self-rule. He was the 
direct successor to the master of the schools and did not 
originate in the cathedral chapter.~ 
The main reason for this development was that there was no 
cathedral school at Oxford and the bishop was distant from 
Oxford. The fact that there was no immediate control from the 
bishop or that there was no subjection to the chapter, gave 
the masters greater freedom. This also accounted for the 
absence of an intense struggle between the university and the 
church. The chancellor wielded a lot of influence and while at 
Paris hi.s powers were gradually reduced, at Oxford the 
opposite took place. This was also facilitated by the fact 
that at Oxford the chancellor was nominated by the masters and 
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his name submitted to the bishop who confirmed the appointment 
on the fiction that he had nominated him. Whereas after 1231 
the chancellor at Paris had been di vested of most of his 
original powers, and retained only the power to confer the 
licence to teach, at Oxford he not only retained his original 
powers, but he also combined them with those of the Paris 
rector and the chief magistrate of the city. His position, 
however, was made easier by the fact that he was elected by 
the masters and not imposed by the bishop. He held office for 
two years. If he proved to be intolerable, he could be deposed 
by a direct decree of the congregation of the whole university 
following representations to it by the congregation of 
regents. The proctors, who initiated the process, could then 
call upon the chancellor to resign. If the chancellor expelled 
a master, he did that in the congregation. On the whole when 
the chancellor became the presiding officer of the university, 
he became identified with the university and was separate from 
the bishop. Yet educationally the university was genuinely 
autonomous al though there were al ways struggles with the 
society. 17 
2.2.4 The great dispersion 
In 1229 at the University of Paris an event took place which 
had a great influence on the university. A group of students 
entered a tavern during a carnival. In this tavern they found 
good wine. A quarrel with the owner of the tavern over the 
account ensued and fighting broke out. The neighbours were 
summoned to help and the students were driven out, but the 
students returned the following day with reinforcements and 
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armed with swords and sticks to take revenge. Mercenaries were 
called in and killed a few innocent students. The masters 
protested against this and decided to suspend lectures. This, 
however, did not succeed in swaying the authorities to their 
side. For this reason the masters decided that, if within a 
month justice was not done, they would dissolve the university 
for a period of six years and that even after the expiry of 
this period they would not return unless their grievances had 
been addressed. They carried out this threat and the great 
dispersion of 1229 took place. Many of the university teachers 
went to Oxford and Cambridge in England and others went to 
smaller universities in France where they continued their 
activities in peace.u 
The pope did not agree with his representative in Paris on how 
this matter had been handled and recalled him. In this way he 
demonstrated his support for the masters. The removal of the 
university caused a great loss, not only of prestige but also 
of income, to the city. This forced the king to reconsider the 
matter. It is not clear what concessions were granted, but in 
1231 students and masters were back in Paris. During the 
period of dispersion, they managed through their 
representatives to extract further rights and privileges from 
the pope. The grievances were redressed by papal bulls, and 
especially by the Charter of 1231, the Parens scientiarum, 
often ref erred to as the Magna Carta of the University of 
Paris. It laid down rules that were to promote the welfare 
and growth of the University of Paris. Through this the powers 
of the chancellors were restricted. This gave the masters a 
position of power.w 
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This victory is regarded as an indication of a final triumph 
of the university which led to its entrenchment a:ld 
recognition as a third power which exercised great influe~ce 
in the Middle Ages. This was a power in addition to the state 
and the church. For this reason one writer during the Middle 
Ages ref erred to the triad as the Sacerdotium, Imoerium and 
Studium to emphasise the powerful position of the uni versi t.y. 20 
2.2.5 The struggle continues 
Although the above describes the situation at Paris, the same 
type of struggle took place at Bologna, although here it was 
not against the church, or the archdeacon (later chancellor) 
who had been recognized and willingly given a say in 
university matters, such as the examination of students. Here 
the students were opposed to the city authorities as 
represented by the oodesta or chief magistrate. This 
ultimately led to the greater recognition by the city for the 
independence or autonomy and right of the university to 
regulate its affairs. 21 
In the matter of governance, two models emerged. At Bologna 
the government of the university was in the hands of the 
students, who had full authority over their teachers. At Paris 
on the other hand, the government of the university was in the 
hands of the teachers and the students had no say in it. The 
Bologna model was followed throughout Italy and Spain and by 
all the French universities other than Paris. The Paris model 
was adopted in England and Germany.~ 
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The reason behind this difference is that the students at 
Bologna were adults who were already working and were even 
financially independent. Some of them occupied important 
positions in society. They were therefore more mature and 
responsible than the students from the north. It is quite 
understandable that they wanted to manage the university and 
why the idea of guilds was strongly under the influence of 
students at Bologna. In Paris, on the other hand, the students 
were still young and inexperienced.~ 
2.2.6 Autonomy in internal matters 
In matters of admission, internal management and admin-
istration, curriculum content, method of teaching and 
examinations, the university was entirely autonomous and 
regulated its own affairs without any external interference. 
As regards admission requirements, what was only necessary was 
that a prospective student should possess a knowledge of 
Latin. At Bologna, a student had to register by having his 
name on the matricula. This was a list of the names of the 
members of the university. At Paris and Oxford, where only the 
masters constituted the university as a corporate body, there 
was no matricula. When a student matriculated at Bologna, in 
other words when he put his name on the matricula, he had to 
take an oath of allegiance to the university and had to pay a 
prescribed fee.~ 
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2.2.7 The role of the students 
The students came from practically the whole world of that 
time. Students had fre~dom of movement and as a result the 
university of this era was international. This was facilita~ed 
by the fact that Latin was the medium of instruction of all 
universities and all belonged to the Roman Catholic Church.~ A 
problem that arose from this internationalism was that foreign 
students felt that they were sometimes overreached. They also 
experienced considerable problems on many issues. One of these 
problems was that of accommodation. As strangers, they did not 
enjoy any diplomatic immunity and were subjected to stricter 
laws than the indigenous population. Consequently they often 
landed in gaol and faced many other problems. The result was 
that the students from many countries formed themselves into 
groups. At Bologna there were initially many such groups. They 
were, however, later reduced to four and ultimately, to two. 
These were known as the Cismon~ani and the Ultramontani. The 
Cismontani meant those who come from this side of the 
mountains (the Alps) and the Ultramontani meant those who come 
from the other side of the mountains. These groups were called 
nationes or nations. These nations acted as groups on behalf 
of their members and at Bologna they took the management form 
of the guilds. A similar practice obtained at Paris. But 
otherwise than at Bologna there were four nationes and the 
masters were also in control of the nationes.u 
At Paris the nationes were largely confined to the faculty of 
arts. Because the faculty of arts was the biggest in the 
university, the nationes had a considerable influence on the 
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management of the whole university. Each nation had its own 
representative or procurator and they in turn chose a rector 
who was in charge of the four nations and was ultimately in 
charge of the whole university. Nations were la:::-gely 
educational institutions. They we:::-e involved in teaching and 
the passing of examinations. They contributed in asserting the 
autonomy of the university against the chancellor and in the 
process increased the power and authority of the rector who, 
as has been said, was initially the head of the arts faculty. 
The reason for this was that the rector was elected by the 
representatives of the nations and was therefore drawn from 
th~ masters and was one of them, unlike the chancellor who 
stood over the university and was initially appointed by the 
bishop. His tenure was unlimited and his powers were 
spiritual, judicial and educational whereas the rector's 
tenure was limited - initially a month or six weeks, although 
later extended to three months.n 
The nations gradually obtained official recognition from the 
pope. This also entailed the right to appoint officials, to 
issue statutes and perform other functions. This led to the 
whole corporation being known as the universitas magistrorum 
et scholarium studii Parisienisu At Oxford, the nations were 
not the independent bodies they were at Paris. There were only 
two nations in the arts faculty; they did not have the 
importance of the four Paris nations. They were divided into 
those north and south of the river Nene - the Boreales and 
Australes. The Scots belonged to the Boreales and the Irish 
and Welsh to the Australes together with anyone from France or 
elsewhere. Although the nations at Oxford were also bellicose, 
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they did not receive formal recognition in the functioning of 
the university and their autonomy was not fostered. They were 
characterised by fighting with each other which led to the 
making of treaties between them. Because of these disturbances 
they were forced to merge into one. But the two proctors who 
were elected by them remained. It was these two who had an 
influence on the university as they were regarded as executive 
officers in the absence of the rector. As at Paris they were 
initially called rectors, but this name fell into disuse. They 
exercised a number of functions and assisted the chancellor. 
The constitutional difference between Oxford and Paris is that 
at Oxford the university performed many of the functions of 
the faculty and nations.~ 
The statutes of the universities frequently dealt with the 
daily life of the students. Even at Bologna with its typically 
mature students, these people were exuberant and sometimes 
made themselves guilty of all sorts of misconduct. The Italian 
students apparently frequently made themselves guilty of 
brawls and gambling. This explains the strict regulations on 
the carrying of weapons and the prohibition of gambling. A 
student could not even be a spectator where gambling took 
place in public. At the University of Lerida in Spain, 
students were prohibited from entertaining actors and 
professional jesters, except at specified times and even then 
the jesters were not allowed to pay the students. They could 
also not ride on horseback to classes and they could not keep 
horses, although mules were allowed.~ There were also rules to 
regulate initiation and to protect new students from harsh 
treatment. 31 Rules and regulations against the keeping of dogs 
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and falcons, against gambling and chess, against visits to 
taverns, against commercial traffic, the throwing of stones, 
the carrying of weapons, the use of improper language, 
disobedience and serious misdemeanours of an indecent nature, 
to mention but a few. 32 There was also constant friction 
between the students and the townspeople33 which sometimes 
erupted into violent conflict as pointed out above. What is 
important, however, is that in making these rules, 
universities were entirely autonomous of outside bodies. The 
rules were meant to ensure discipline and order within the 
university as no education can take place in the absence of 
order and discipline. 
2.2.8 The role of the faculties 
The masters during the medieval period grouped themselves 
according to the three areas of specialisation, namely, law, 
medicine and theology. In order to gain admission to any of 
these faculties, students had first of all to be admitted to 
the arts faculty which was also regarded as the lower 
faculty.~ Each faculty had a great measure of autonomy. But 
gradually the masters realised that their salvation lay in 
co-operation especially in times of struggle against the 
chancellor. As a result they were gradually recognized as 
organs of the university where each one worked within its 
confines for the benefit of the whole. 35 Each of the higher 
faculties was headed by a dean whereas the arts faculty was 
headed by a rector. Owing to the great numbers of the students 
and masters in the arts faculty, at Paris the rector later 
became the head of the university as a whole. By virtue of his 
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position, he was empowered to convene a congregation to 
discuss a matter referred by one of the faculties to the joint 
meeting. 36 
As already mentioned, before a s~udent could be admitted to 
one of the higher faculties, he had to join the arts faculty. 
The influence of the guilds played a significant role here. 
When he was studying in the arts faculty, the student was a 
pure student. On comp let ion of the course, he would be 
examined according to the practice of the time, and if he was 
successful he would receive the title of bacalarius (later 
baccalareus) . He would then proceed with his studies in the 
higher faculty. During this time he was entitled to give 
lectures in the arts faculty. After completing about five or 
six years, he could submit himself for examination for the 
licentia docendi which examination was conducted by the 
chancellor, although the role of chancellor later became 
purely ceremonial. He would then have his inceotio. There were 
no written examinations, but the examination consisted of 
disputations or argumentation with the masters and fellow 
students on the prescribed books.n 
As already stated, the chancellor was initially involved in 
the granting of the licentia in the higher faculties, but 
later his involvement was merely ceremonial. The examinations 
and the granting of the licentiates were accompanied by a lot 
of ceremony and celebration. The licentia docendi gave the 
holder the right to give lectures even independently. With the 
increase in the number of universities, the recognition of 
university qualifications became a problem. The right to 
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lecture in one university did not imply the right to lecture 
at other universities. During the thirteenth century a 
practice developed whereby those who held qualifications from 
recognized studia aeneralia were entitled to lecture at other 
universities. This right became known as the ius ubiaue 
docendi.~ This is evidence of the autonomy of each university. 
But it is also evidence that university autonomy is not 
absolute. 
Obtaining a licence to teach did not entitle a candidate to 
admission to a guild. After the student had undergone a 
private examination, a public examination or conventus had to 
take place. This was the ceremony in terms of which the 
candidate was admitted to the membership of the masters by 
holding a practical lecture. This was derived from the Roman 
law practice whereby a person was invested with the de facto 
possession of his off ice by an actual and solemn performance 
of its functions. 39 At Paris there was a similar ceremony, the 
inceotio, where the licensed candidate delivered his inaugural 
lecture, whereupon he was given his biretta and book. Then he 
received .a kiss of brotherhood from the presiding master and 
took his place on the chair, cathedra, of the masters.~ 
At Oxford the higher faculties had no independent organization 
with their own deans and statutes. Their regulations dealt 
with academic requirements and especially with the way in 
which they sought dispensations from higher authority, 
generally the congregations. This was largely due to the 
dominance of the arts faculty.a 
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2.2.9 Course content 
As already indicated, at Paris and other northern universities 
students had first to be admitted to the arts faculty. Here 
the universities followed the tradition of the earlier schools 
and offered the seven liberal arts, the septem artes 
liberales. They were regarded as the liberal arts because they 
were inherited from the Romans. According to Roman culture 
these were skills or abilities which a free and civilised 
person had to have in contradistinction with the labourers and 
slaves. During the Middle Ages, these were regarded as forming 
the foundation for higher learning. The septem artes liberales 
were further divided into two groups of subjects, namely the 
trivium and the quadrivium. The trivium consisted of 
grammatica, rhetorica and dialectica. The quadrivium entailed 
arithmetica, geometrica, astronomica and musica. This was the 
state of affairs at the universities at the end of the twelfth 
century when the universities came into being. They retained 
the name septem artes liberales although there was a shift of 
emphasis. After a person had become a master in the arts 
faculty at Paris, he had to undertake to teach for at least 
two years. He could then be admitted into one of the higher 
faculties where he could specialize.c The universities were 
entirely free in determining their course content. 
2.2.10 Teaching method 
The method of teaching took the form of the lectio and 
disputatio. Initially the lectio entailed that the prescribed 
work had to be read with the students. This was accompanied by 
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annotations and exegesis. This method was based on the 
interpretation and re-interpretation of the text. The written 
word was therefore of great importance. There was even an 
attempt to regulate the teacher and his style of teaching in 
class. In the thirteenth century at Paris a number of 
regulations were issued which even provided that the teacher 
had to read ex tempore and not to dictate and even prescribed 
the tempo of reading, that it should not be tractim or 
leisurely but raptim or rapid as if nobody was sitting and 
writing. Students who complained about the pace in various 
ways were subjected to a penalty.~ 
The other method of teaching was the disputation which was a 
debate that followed a prescribed procedure. The master who 
acted as: leader or chairman, presented a problem to the 
student. The student had to attempt to answer the question 
through a process of argumentation. He was then criticised by 
the presiding master and other students. At the end of the 
proceedings the master would summarize the arguments for and 
against and come to the conclusion. From this brief account it 
is clear that the lectio and disputatio were complementary to 
each other.~ They were designed by the universities as methods 
that effectively transmitted knowledge from the masters to the 
students. 
2.2.11 Physical facilities 
At the beginning, 
fixed property. 
in the Middle Ages, universities had no 
Great ceremonial occasions, lectures, 
disputations, meetings of the congregation and other 
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activities took place in cathedrals, churches, halls and 
houses of the masters, or in other places hired from the city 
dwellers. The fact that the universities had no capital assets 
and were therefore poor, was also a strength they could use 
and in fact used effectively. They were consequently not 
dependent for their income from anybody except the students. 
For this reason nobody could prescribe to them what to do or 
not to do, on the basis of financial support. They were 
therefore independent. They were also not tied down to a 
particular place by buildings and other facilities. As a 
result they were mobile and could move away from a particular 
place if they experienced problems from the local residents 
and other bodies. Such a movement was not a trivial matter for 
the city where the university was located. A sudden departure 
of a number of students meant a loss of income to the city and 
also a loss of prestige when a city or town lost its studium. 
Thus a threat of migration from the university was generally 
sufficient to let the authorities, whether church or secular, 
rethink. In this way both students and masters were able to 
extract a number of rights, concessions and privileges from 
the authorities. This autonomy could be used effectively and 
weighed heavily not only with kings but also with the popes.~ 
2.2.12 Colleges 
Initially universities did not provide accommodation for their 
students as they had no physical facilities. At Bologna where 
students were generally people of means, the corporations took 
care of their members so that they would not be overreached. 
At Paris and Oxford, young boys of about fourteen years came 
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as strangers and had to hire poor accommodation. The 
universities of Bologna and Paris and other universities of 
the Middle Ages tried to protect students from exploitation by 
accommodating them in hospicia or hosoitia, the rent of which 
was jointly determined by the university and the town 
authorities. At Paris a practice developed that a master had 
to be head of such accommodation. All except the richest and 
poorest stayed in the hosoitia. It was the plight of the poor 
students which evoked the sympathy of certain philanthropists 
who established certain hosoitia through donations from rich 
people. The purpose was to assist students who could not pay 
for their accommodation.~ 
A lot of influence was exercised on these hospitia by the 
monastic colleges. As a result of this influence many of these 
hospitia developed into colleges. Each of these had its own 
rules and practices and each had a measure of autonomy. At 
Paris they were largely under the control of a master who was 
in turn under the authority of the university. The most famous 
college in Paris was the one founded by Robert de Sorbon 
around 1251, mainly for students of theology. Al though 
colleges originated largely at Paris, they quickly spread to 
other medieval universities. It was especially at Oxford and 
Cambridge where they reached their fullest development and 
continue to exist even today.~ 
Initially the colleges were no more than ordinary hospitia or 
residences. But they were soon transformed into educational 
institutions.~ Although the philanthropists who founded them 
initially did not erect buildings for this purpose but hired 
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them, later they erected such buildings. In England the 
colleges followed the example of Merton Colle$e, Oxford by 
having land from their benefactors not necessarily situa~ed 
near the college but away from it. From this the college 
derived a fixed income. Just like colleges, the universities 
of the Middle Ages gradually had their own buildings and 
property. This in turn deprived them of their mobility and the 
power this gave them to bargain for better deals with the city 
authorities. It must, however, be conceded that during the 
latter part of the Middle Ages the practice of migration had 
fallen into disuse. 
From this account it is clear that the medieval university 
moved from a situation where it had no capital assets to a 
position where it had buildings, classrooms and other 
facilities so that the university was not simply characterised 
by its corporate nature, but could also be identified by its 
buildings. 50 This development affected the autonomy of 
universities although there were other ways whereby they could 
protect such autonomy. 
2.3 ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
From the above discussion it has become clear that the 
corporate nature of the university of the Middle Ages gave it 
its autonomy and that this autonomy gave it bargaining power 
and a greater say in its internal affairs. This has been 
regarded as a feature which ensured its continued existence 
and also enabled it to serve as a model for future 
development. This autonomy did not make universities 
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completely free from the secular and ecclesiastical 
authorities. On the contrary, they continued to subjec':: 
themselves to the pope and to the emperor. They sometimes 
relied on the pope or the king for the protection of their 
privileges against the local authorities.~ 
There is, however, no doubt that autonomy gave universities 
great power to influence the cultural and spiritual life of 
the time. The great measure of autonomy in relation to their 
management, which their corporate nature facilitated, ensured 
.. 
greater freedom of thought and action on the part of the 
university and its members. It gave them the power to decide 
what to teach and how it should be taught. This meant the 
origin of the concept of academic freedom which has become the 
corner- stone of the university system even today. This 
academic freedom was further influenced by the emphasis on 
rational thought which was fostered by the later period of 
Enlightenment. 52 
Although academic freedom was recognized during the medieval 
period, it does not imply that the situation was perfect. 
During the eight centuries since universities started, there 
were many attempts to limit the search for truth. Limitations 
were placed by outside bodies. In the medieval period, the 
church through the Holy Inquisition, tried to limit 
speculative thought within rigid limits. University teachers 
were not immune from its awful examinations and condemnation. 
A few examples can illustrate this point. For eight years 
Giordano Bruno was a prisoner of the Inquisition because he 
taught that the uni verse is infinite and that there are 
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endless particular worlds similar to this of the earth, that 
the earth is "a star and similar to it are the moon, the 
planets and other stars". When he refused to recant, he was 
eventually burnt. Later Galileo was subjected to denunciation 
by the Inquisition in 1612 and was ultimately forced to 
publicly renounce his teaching that the sun and not the earth 
is the centre of the universe.~ 
From the earliest times universities have had the right to 
choose for themselves who may teach within themselves. 
Conflicts, however, arose when teachers were condemned by the 
church or government for heretical teachings. Sometimes the 
church or government imposed undesired lecturers on a 
university. There were also limitations on who might attend 
universities as students. During the first seven centuries of 
university history, women were excluded from admission to 
university. It was only during the last century that this 
obstacle was removed. From the medieval period students were 
debarred on religious grounds. Non-Christians, for instance, 
were excluded. In England the Non-Conformists, who refused to 
sign the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, were 
excluded from the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge from 
the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century. There 
were other limitations on admission to the university, 
although the above were the most common.~ This demonstrates 
that although universities have, from their earliest period of 
inception, been autonomous institutions and espoused academic 
freedom, they could not escape some of the societal influences 
which impinged on them. 
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2.4 FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
2.4.1 The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
The rise of humanism in the 14th and 15th centuries undermined 
the medieval style of life and affected the existing 
universities that were based on the scholastic method. It also 
led to the establishment of new universities, especially ~n 
Germany, which were known as universitates litterarum. As a 
result of the universalism of humanism, the medieval 
universitas magistrorum et studentium came to an end, and 
universities became territorial and national. Humanism was 
soon superseded by the Reformation and the universitates 
litterarum also came to an end. The 16th century saw research 
being driven out of universities and universities concentrated 
on "learning" and "scholarship".~ 
Humanism was on the main not a university movement.~ It rather 
influenced the development of academies which were different 
from universities. They were closed corporations of the 
learned which met from time to time to hold lectures or 
discussions. These academies, however, had no teaching 
function. Teaching on a high level still remained the function 
of the university. Yet there were no major changes among 
universities. 57 There is also no evidence that during this 
period there was ·any meaningful change to the ideas of 
university autonomy and academic freedom. Although there was a 
change in the content of the subjects offered, the method of 
teaching largely remained unaltered. 
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2.4.2 The Reformation 
Although the Reformation had a pervasive influence on European 
society in general and on the church in particular, it did no~ 
contribute to the development of university autonomy and 
academic freedom. Al though a person such as Martin Luther 
recognized the role of universities in providing qualified 
ministers and church officials, he was not well disposed ~o 
certain aspects of the university. Melanchton, on the other 
hand, had served the university practically during the 
Reformation. Not only was he a teacher of no mean substance, 
but he also played a leading role in the organisation of 
universities. He also played a significant role in the 
training of teachers for the protestant universities and 
schools and wrote prescribed books. The protestant 
universities quickly became, on the main, centres of service 
to the Reformation. They served as custodians of the church 
doctrine. There was therefore strict control over universities 
and no deviation from the teachings of the church was 
permitted. As a result there was no freedom for the 
development of new ideas.~ 
During this era the state came to play a greater role. The 
landlords of the various regions, like the reformers, had seen 
the universities as a potential source for trained officials. 
This led to each region striving to establish its own 
university. Consequently a number of new universities came 
into being. These universities were territorial and lost much 
of the internationalism of previous centuries especially in 
the Middle Ages. These universities were parochial and had no 
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long tradition of autonomy and academic freedom. There was 
also strict control over what was taught and heresy was 
strictly monitored. All this inhibited intellectual 
creativity. It 
been regarded 
especially in 
is for ~his reason that the Reformation has 
as having adversely affected universities 
Germany and the Scandinavian countries. 
Enrolments declined and science suffered a severe blow owing 
to the academics paying unquestioning loyalty to and respect 
for the reformers. Al though the period of the Reformation 
brought about welcome changes in ecclesiastical circles, it 
did not contribute to the growth and development of university 
autonomy and academic freedom. On the contrary, universities 
in general in Europe reached a low water mark, especially 
towards the end of the seventeenth century.~ 
2.4.3 The age of Enlightenment 
During the era of Enlightenment two universities in Germany 
came into being. These were destined to play an important role 
in breaking away from the stagnation into which universities 
had fallen towards the end of the seventeenth century. The 
first was Halle, which had already been established in 1694, 
and the other was G6ttingen which came into existence in 1737. 
At Halle it was in particular Christian Wolff who played a 
pivotal role. Wolff took the view that philosophy should be 
based on its own reason. This meant that reliance in 
philosophy was not simply had on immutable concepts, but 
rather that with the help of, inter alia, mathematics or the 
natural sciences, one could without any pre-conditions seek 
for truth. This emphasised rational thought which led to 
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original research by means of the individual's own reason. In 
terms of this, the search for truth was a search for new 
answers to problems posed by life. In this way at Halle it was 
possible for a lecturer not only to research what he wished 
to, but also to teach what he wanted to.~ 
Although G~ttingen came into existence later than Halle, it 
soon overtook Halle, and by the end of the eighteenth century, 
it was the leading university in Germany. It introduced new 
subjects which contributed to the freedom of reason. On the 
whole, the two universities spearheaded changes which 
influenced other universities. These changes emphasised the 
autonomy of reason and rational thought. They also led to 
freedom of research and freedom of teaching.~ Rational thought 
is fundamental to university autonomy and academic freedom. 
2.4.4 The nineteenth century 
A significant impetus to the ideas of university autonomy and 
academic freedom in Germany came from the establishment of the 
University of Berlin. The defeat of the Prussians by Napoleon 
Bonaparte in 1806 led to the closure of the University of 
Halle. It was in 1809 that Wilhelm von Humboldt was appointed 
as Minister of Education. He undertook to establish the 
University of Berlin which came into existence in 1810.Q 
In his memorandum on "the state of our learned institutions", 
from which emerged the University of Berlin, Von Humboldt 
expressed the idealistic liberalism that looked to the 
universities as institutions aimed at the formation of the 
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character of the autonomous cultivated individual. He built on 
the ideas developed in the eighteenth century and perfected 
them. The ideals of the ur:i ty of teaching and research 
(Einheit der Forschuna und Lehre), the freedom of teaching and 
learning (Freiheit der Lehre und des Lernens) and of academic 
self-government (Akademische Selbtsverwaltuno) were the 
corner-stones of what he thought the university should do. In 
his view, the highest good to which universities could 
contribute was the formation of individuality of character. 
This could be attained through the disciplined, methodical 
search for truth, unhampered by any restrictions. Owing to 
this, the ideal of academic freedom became an integral feature 
of universities of many countries in the nineteenth century.~ 
Von Humboldt reverted to the medieval idea of the university 
as a corporate entity with its different faculties and with 
the arts faculty occupying a central position. The freedom to 
teach what he willed, on the part of the lecturer, and the 
freedom to learn what he willed, on the part of the student, 
(Lehr- und Lernfreiheit) were adopted as a firm principle to 
the utter disregard of the idea of preparation for a 
profession. 64 
The University of Berlin was distinguished by its emphasis on 
research. The role of the university was seen as not simply 
that of transmission of knowledge, but also to search for 
knowledge. This was the duty of both lecturer and student. It 
did not mean that teaching was jettisoned, but it emphasised 
the unity of teaching and research. The role of a professor 
was perceived as being not that of giving, while that of a 
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student as being that of receiving, but both were regarded as 
having a seeking and creative role. Both lecturer and student 
had the task of developing scientific thought. They were, as 
it were, both fellow labourers on the same task, and although 
the lecturer had more 
student, the student 
knowledge and 
had more energy 
experience 
and less 
than 
bias 
the 
and 
prejudice than the lecturer. This meant that there was freedom 
from censure on the part of the professor and freedom from 
coercion on the part of the student.~ 
The emphasis on the unity of teaching and research led to the 
use of the seminar as a regular feature in the university 
set-up. This enabled both student and lecturer to quietly 
continue with their research and occasionally discuss it with 
each other. In this way both students and lecturers 
constituted a research community. By this Von Humboldt wanted 
to propagate a cultivated form of communal life which through 
its constant exchanges would be devoted to academic 
scholarship. Initially this did not mean empirical research on 
a large scale which would have required a complex system of 
administration. It was rather a direct participation of 
students in the speculative ideas of their lecturers.~ 
These ideas permeated the whole German university system 
although they were sometimes difficult to attain. Because the 
University of Berlin admitted students from all over, its 
influence spread to other parts of the world. These ideas are 
still influential in various forms and in various parts of the 
world." 
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Von Humboldt had specific views on the role of the government 
in the life of a university. Although he undoubtedly regarded 
the university as a state institution and as constituting a 
part of the government's whole education system, he 
nonetheless held the view that the university should have a 
great measure of autonomy without prejudicing the interests of 
the state. In his view the government had the authority to 
appoint lecturers. But the university had to be allowed to 
attain its own objectives. This required a high degree of 
autonomy. The only role of the government was to provide the 
necessary facilities and to look for the right people. The 
government, however, was not supposed to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the university. If it did that, it would 
constitute a hindrance to the university.~ 
As long as there was inner harmony between the government and 
the university, the ideas of Von Humboldt could work. But if 
there was disharmony, the government and university would move 
apart. (This actually happened later in Germany) . In that 
event, the harmony between the government and the university 
would disappear and the autonomy of the university would not 
be guaranteed. Al though some of Von Humboldt's ideas were 
superseded by the later influence of industry and the greater 
role played by the natural sciences and technology, he brought 
about considerable changes and held views which had a 
pervasive impact on universities in general, especially his 
emphasis on the unity of teaching and research which has 
become the characteristic feature of the university system 
even today. 69 
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2.4.5 Models of autonomy 
Although it has been said that university autonomy started in 
the era of the foundation of universities in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, there was no uniform model of autonomy. 
Initially there were two models, as already mentioned, the 
Bologna and the Paris models both of which differed. 
According to the Bologna model, the idea of autonomy applied 
to the student cons ti t.uency. It entailed the individual's 
freedom to learn. The Paris model on the other hand, viewed 
autonomy as the freedom to teach and applied primarily to the 
scholars of which the students were a subset rather than the 
teachers as the employees of students. The medieval concept 
of autonomy was part of a rather broader underpinning of 
contemporary social organization, grouped around guilds .or 
corporations. Each of these enjoyed certain privileges or 
exemptions in the practice of their activities. They owned 
property and, like other guilds, exercised control over those 
admitted after due apprenticeship to their ranks. They also 
enjoyed a high degree of self-government. Their independence, 
however, considerably depended on the protection from the 
local ruler. In this way university autonomy depended largely 
on the conflict between princes and prelates, or in certain 
instances, on the determination of the city fathers to 
demonstrate their independence from the prince by founding 
their own establishment.~ There were other models of autonomy 
that evolved to replace the two original models which had 
gradually become obsolete. These are the Kantian model, the 
Humboldtian model, the Napoleonic model and the British model. 
These models were influenced by the growing state involvement 
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into universities. The critical question was, how far the 
state had to intervene into university matters or 
alternatively how to strike a balance between the independence 
that scholarship requires against the rights of the state to 
have some measure of control over law, theology and medicine. 
In 1878, Emmanuel Kant set out a model of autonomy which 
recognized the right of the state to intervene in those areas 
which directly influenced the well-being and thinking of its 
citizens. He contended that such intervention did not apply 
to philosophy for a variety of reasons. First, owing to the 
fact that philosophy was concerned with scholarship and truth 
rather than with the administration of public order; second, 
because it had to be free from external constraints if it were 
to judge the teaching of other faculties; and third, because 
human beings are by nature free and under no constraints save 
that involved in the pursuit of truth. On all these grounds, 
therefore, state regulation in the sphere of philosophy was 
regarded as inappropriate. The Kantian model of academic 
autonomy therefore rested on a fundamental dualism between 
those activities where the state might intervene and those 
where it might not.n 
While Kant acknowledged the legitimacy of state authority in 
certain specific fields, von Humboldt interpreted the role of 
the state in a minimalist fashion. Its task was viewed as 
that of ensuring that the external conditions were appropriate 
for the maintenance of freedom to teach and to learn 
(Lern-und-Lehrefreiheit). Von Humboldt's concept of academic 
autonomy differed in many respects from that of Kant. He did 
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not regard the existence of the state as in conflict with the 
"inner life" of the academia. On the contrary, one of the 
essential expressions of statenood was a common cultural 
identity. One of its primary functions was to advance 
culture, learning and teaching for the well-being of society 
in general. As a patron of culture and science, a central 
element in the state's mission vis-a-vis the university was 
the protection of disinterested science against sectarian 
pressures from within and from without the academia. In von 
Humboldt's idea of academic freedom, the state itself served 
as a "buffer organ" against outside pressures, one of which 
was the utilitarianism associated with the "rising industrial 
classes''. The fact that the state underwrote the university's 
commitment only to the interests of science and learning, 
"involved it in a species of self-denying ordinance in those 
matters associated with research and teaching". This did not 
mean that the university was not accountable to public 
authority. 72 
Unlike the Kantian model, where intervention was legitimate in 
"vocational areas" while preserving an "autonomous domain" for 
philosophy, the Humboldtian model redefined this duality in 
the form of a descending administrative hierarchy and an 
ascending academic hierarchy which vested in an individual 
interpretation of the freedom to teach and to learn. Although 
von Humboldt sought to bring together both student and teacher 
as part of an organic community of scholarship, this community 
was not a community of equals. On the contrary, it comprised 
various degrees of individual autonomy with the highest and 
freest expression being found in the individual full 
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chairholder, around whom were grouped co-workers, assistants, 
students and aspirants who formed part of a "school of 
thought''. The concept of academic autonomy therefore did not 
assume a collegial form across all grades. Autonomy was 
individual and not institutional.n 
A third model of the relationship between government and the 
university is found in the Napoleonic university. Unlike the 
Humboldtian view of academic autonomy which rested on a form 
of partnership in which the state provided the legislative 
framework within which the university advanced culture and 
learning, and consequently afforded a higher expression of the 
state as a cultural entity, the Napoleonic model involved a 
clear subordination of the university to the state. The 
university's function was to ensure the political stability 
and unity of the nation in a physical sense. This was in 
contrast to the Humboldtian view in which culture, science or 
learning existed over and above the state. Teaching and 
learning were not conceived as independent of the state, but 
rather as expressions of a unity that had already been 
achieved74 • 
Teaching and learning were therefore subject to legislative 
oversight by central government acting as the incarnation of 
the nation, its culture, ambit ion and genius. The 
bureaucratic control by central administration over matters 
such as section and appointment of staff to tenured positions 
was a means of upholding universalistic criteria for judging 
merit and advancement. The state.had to act as the ultimate 
guarantor against corporate reproduction. It also served to 
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maintain the quality and institutional homogeneity in the 
universal sector, and, it was regarded as a means of upholding 
national unity by ensuring the formal equality of provisions 
of services, programmes and courses among universities. 75 
The designation of university teachers as one of a series of 
technical aims of central government seriously affected 
hitherto held notions of corporate autonomy. The 
incorporation had an effect on the way in which autonomy was 
conceived and, until the late 1960's, continued to be 
conceived. Autonomy was not regarded as being coterminous 
with the pursuit of scholarship and the maintenance of 
particular privilege, of serving vested, sectoral and 
self-interest, rather than of service to the nation. The 
Napoleonic model did not allow the inclusion of academic 
autonomy as part of the legitimate relationship between 
government and university, because to have done so would have 
been to deny the universal nature of the unit of government. 
Instead of being a species of reserved area "contained within 
a general legislative frame, which distinguished the 
Humboldtian theory, institutional autonomy in France was less 
a matter of formal theory than an series of marginal 
activities over which the state had not seen fit explicitly to 
extend its purlieu". An alternative view as revealed in the 
Napoleonic model would be to see it as residing in the 
initiation of procedures which ultimately required official 
sanction·. 76 
A fourth model of autonomy is that found in Britain. The 
British theory of academic autonomy was based on the Whig 
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constitutional theory of the eighteenth century, reinforced by 
the nineteenth century liberal theories of the state. As 
opposed to either France or Germany, Britain saw no general 
attack on the corporate stance of the academia. 
The political revolution which took place in Continental 
Europe in the latter part of the eighteenth and the early part 
of the nineteenth centuries had no counterpart in Britain. As 
a result a university was neither incorporated as part of the 
national bureaucracy, nor was it subject to any one coherent 
constitutional or administrative theory of the relationship 
between the state and the university. 
The status of academia as a property-owning corporation of 
scholars, the purest expression of which was in the two 
ancient English universities, was preserved. Although other 
models grew up with provincial universities, these have 
assumed extensive self-governance and internal 
self-validation. The reasons why the corporation of scholars 
retained its importance in Britain is because until the First 
World War, British political life had no concept of "the 
state" as a distributive or regulative entity, and there 
existed a broadly held view which regarded education, and 
cultural responsibilities by extension, as ill-served by state 
intervention. "The British model of academic autonomy 
therefore derived not from the action of the state defining a 
'reserve area' of non-intervention, but rather from the 
absence of a concept of the role of the state which itself 
could serve to legitimize such a definition". 77 
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Although the above discussion has largely been confined to 
European universities, it is necessary to consider 
developments from another part of the world which had a lot of 
influence on the university system as well. This is the 
development as regards the universities in the United States 
of America. 
As the United States was a relatively new nation, it did not 
have well-established universities with a tradition of 
autonomy and academic freedom at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Many American scholars went to German 
universities where they came into contact with Humboldtian 
ideas which they in turn imported back into the United States 
of America where these ideas influenced American universities. 
These ideas led to the establishment of American universities 
based on the German model.~ 
2.4.6 The land-grant institutions of the United States of 
America 
Owing to industrialisation and the agriculture in the United 
States of America which increased during the middle of the 
nineteenth century, there arose a strong need for institutions 
of higher education which would be accessible to the ordinary 
person and which were not based on pure theoretical 
speculation but were more practical. This need was met by the 
land-grant cclleges which were established in 1862 by means of 
the Morrill Act. This legislation provided that 30 000 acres 
of land of the federal government be made available to each 
member of the Senate and the House of Representatives and that 
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this land would be sold to serve as a permanent donation for 
the establishment in each state of at least one college where 
the leading object would be, without excluding other 
scientific and classical studies and including military 
tactics, to teach such branches of learning as related to 
agriculture and the mechanical arts. The purpose of this was 
to promote the liberal and practical education of the 
industrial classes in various pursuits and professions in 
life.~ As time went by, further legislation provided for the 
addition of further functions to these colleges and 
universities and provided for additional funds. Besides 
providing courses for women and providing for courses in 
business administration, these colleges started doing research 
in various fields.~ 
2.4.7 Academic freedom among American universities 
2.4.7.1 The early period 
The evolution of academic freedom in American universities 
started in the second half of the nineteenth century. Prior to 
this period, the role of the university had been cultural 
conservation. In the first half of the nineteenth century the 
American university was centred on tradition. This effectively 
stifled academic freedom in the ante-bellum colleges. Students 
were not allowed to freely express their views on the issues 
of the day. 81 "The college in America could not be a market 
place of ideas so long as it regarded its students as both 
gullible and perverse".n Religious conservatism stifled not 
only freedom to express ideas on various issues of the day, 
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but also had an adverse effect on science and scientific 
research.~ This period was characterised by "traditionalism, 
authoritarianism, paternalism, doctrinal moralism and 
sectarianism" which depressed academic freedom.s.i 
2.4.7.2 The influence of Darwinism 
The idea of academic freedom among American universities was 
greatly influenced by Darwinism. Darwinism propagated the 
theory of the evolution of the human species. This doctrine 
was contrary to the accepted church doctrine of the creation 
of human beings. It therefore caused a revolution among 
universities that were closely associated with churches. 
Darwinism was regarded by the church as a heresy. This led to 
those who propagated this theory being dismissed or threatened 
with dismissal from universities.u The reaction to this was 
not uniform and penalties were not consistent. Whether or not 
evolutionists would be dismissed, depended on a number of 
factors, inter alia, the strength of the college's tie to a 
church or sectarian sponsor, the rigidity of the religious 
creed binding trustees and staff, the importance of science 
and scientists in the college's scheme of education and the 
determination of the college to defend its reputation. A 
number of academics were tried for their belief in Darwinism. 
These cases in turn led to the attack on sectarian control of 
universities as being rigid and intolerant." This attack on 
religious authority and moralism led to academic reform.~ 
A new rationale of academic freedom grew out of the Darwinian 
debate. Science invested the theory of academic freedom with a 
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special conception of truth and a formula for tolerating 
error. Although this idea was not new, science reinforced it. 
The concept of scientific competence enabled faculties to 
control the misuse of administrative power. The infusion of 
the values of science made academic freedom an ethic II ...., Ti ""-•· 
affirmative moral position and not merely a negative 
condition, the absence of overt restraint" . 88 The main 
justification for intellectual freedom is that nobody has the 
monopoly of truth. It is therefore necessary to tolerate 
error. Contrary to earlier views about the truth as being, 
inter alia, revealed in the dogmas of faith and needing no 
further argument or verification, the evolutionists argued 
that all beliefs are tentatively true and tentatively false 
and can only be verified through a continuous process of 
inquiry. Academic freedom was therefore imperative and all 
seeming errors must be tolerated "for what is truth is never 
fully known and never finally knowable". 89 
Disciplined inquiry was emphasized and set important limits to 
the permissible tolerance of error. This implied that not 
every opinion was of equal value. For this reason every claim 
to a discovery of truth must be subjected to open 
verification. The process of verification must follow certain 
rules,· and this process can only be understood by those who 
qualify as experts. As Metzger puts it; "Academic freedom does 
not theoretically justify all kinds of intellectual 
nonconformity, but only that kind of nonconformity that 
proceeds according to the rules; not any private belief but 
that kind of private belief that allows itself publicly to be 
tested; not a perfect competition of ideas, but rather an 
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imperfect competition, t:> which certain opinions come enhanced 
with a special professional warranty. In this respect, .... 1. I... 
makes fewer allowances for vagaries of opinion than do, say, 
the doctrines of Milton and Mill. In the modern theory, though 
no conclusion is unchallengeable, t.he method for arriving at 
conclusions is prescribed. 1190 
The institutional aspect of the struggle for academic freedom 
revolved around whether and to what extent trustees should 
exercise their prerogative. Since the Darwinian era, the 
limitation of administrative power has been based on 
scientific competence which entailed that the professional 
standing of a professor could only be established by experts, 
chosen from among his professional peers and the general 
consensus of the peers should be decisive. It was essential 
that trustees should not dismiss professors on inadequate 
knowledge of the facts and that they should not admit 
prejudice to evidence or be influenced by irrelevant 
considerations. All of these were not new and reflected the 
"due process" philosophy or the principles of natural justice 
based on the common law,~ but the Darwinian debate revitalized 
them. 
The rationale for academic freedom was also endowed with 
certain fundamental values which, although not original to 
science, were implicit in scientific assumptions and inherent 
in scientific activity. These values included tolerance and 
honesty, publicity and testability, individuality and 
co-operativeness. It also entailed reliability the 
dissociation of a scientific work from the beliefs and 
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associations of its au~hor. It bestowed on academic freedom 
the value of universalism which means "the elimination of 
particularistic criteria - creedal, racial or national - in 
judging the merits of a work, and the elimination of unearned 
advantages - connections, rank and caste - in considering the 
merits of a man." The other value is that of neutrality "an 
interest in disinterestedness that is deeply ingrained in 
science". By assimilating the values of universalism, academic 
freedom has come "to signify the brotherhood of man in 
science, that is akin in aspiration to the brotherhood of man 
in God". For this reason, to foist on the academic community a 
person on the basis of considerations other than merit would 
be an infringement of academic freedom. By acquiring the value 
of neutrality, academic freedom came to signify that science 
must transcend ideology, and that professors might abjure all 
commitments that corrupt the passion for truth. For this 
reason, attempts to suborn professor by pay or other 
preferences and attempts by professors themselves to force 
departments to toe a particular line, are infringements of 
academic freedom. As a symbol and guardian of these two 
values, academic freedom came to be equated not only with free 
intellectual activity, but also with 11 an ethic of human 
relations and an ideal of personal fulfilment."~ 
2.4.7.3 The German influence 
As pointed out above, the American university was modelled on 
the German one. In the centennial year of the United States of 
America's independence, Johns Hopkins University, the first 
University in America based on the German model opened its 
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doors. The aim o:: this university was said to be the 
encouragement of research; the promotion of young men; and ~he 
advancement of individual scholars who by their excellence 
would advance the sciences they pursued and the society where 
they dwelt. This university was aptly referred to as G6ttingen 
at Baltimore. 93 
As has also been said, the German concept of academic freedom 
had a great influence on American universities. This concept 
which, as we have seen, entailed Lehrfreiheit und 
Lernfr-eihei t, meant in the words of Metzger, "the absence of 
administrative coercions in the learning situation", which 
implied that the German students were "free to roam from place 
to place, sampling academic wares; that wherever they lighted, 
they were free to determine the choice and sequence of 
courses, and were responsible to no one for regular 
attendance; that they were exempted from all tests save the 
final examination; that they lived in private quarters and 
controlled their private lives". This freedom also meant that 
"the university professor was free to examine bodies of 
evidence and to report his findings in lecture or published 
form - that he enjoyed freedom of teaching and freedom of 
inquiry". This freedom was not, as the Germans perceived it, 
an inalienable endowment of all men, nor was it a superadded 
attraction of certain universities and not of others. On the 
contrary, it was regarded as a distinctive prerogative of the 
academic profession, and the essential condition of all 
universities. "Without it, no institution had the right to 
call itself a 'university'".~ 
The German's immense pride 
has been attributed, to 
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in the concept of academic freedom 
some extent, to the status it 
conferred and to its significance as a patriotic symbol. As 
Metzger aptly puts it: 
"To the university student, coming from the 
strict and formal Gymnasium, Lernfreiheit was a 
precious privilege, a recognition of his arrival 
at man's state. To the university professor, 
extremely sensitive to considerations of social 
esteem, Lehrfreiheit was a dispensation that set 
him apart from the ordinary civil servant. In a 
nation still aristocratic and feudalistic in its 
moves, caste considerations thus underlay the 
loyalty to academic freedom. In addition, Lern-
and Lehrfreiheit had patriotic associations. They 
were identified with the national revival. The 
renewal of student preregrinations in the 
eighteenth century symbolized the breakdown of 
territorial exclusiveness and the growth of 
national consciousness. The University of Berlin, 
dedicated to academic freedom, was a phoenix that 
had arisen from the ashes of military defeat. The 
denial of academic freedom in the Metternich era 
had been the work of Catholic dogmatism, 
Protestant particularism, petty absolutism - all 
enemies of the Reich. Moreover, after 
unification, academic freedom was thought to 
atone for the lack of political freedoms and to 
prove the special virtue of the Fatherland."~ 
102. 
American universities did not adopt the German notion of 
academic freedom without any modification. Although they 
evidenced dependence on the German concept, they wE?re also 
selective. Many Americans who went to German universities were 
lavish in their praise of academic freedom. This is to be 
attributed to the fact that most of them attended the freest: 
of the German universities, G~ttingen and Berlin. At these 
universities they did not have to take the religious oaths 
that would have violated their consciences at the South German 
Catholic universities. Moreover, most of the Americans who 
went to Germany were young men who were impressionable and 
were consequently greatly influenced by the free atmosphere of 
German universities as opposed to the rigid puritanism at 
home. Many of those were greatly impressed by the idea of 
academic freedom which was regarded as the chief German 
contributiGn to the American conception of academic freedom. 
As a result academic freedom, like academic research, defined 
the true university. This idea was reflected in the rhetoric 
of academic ceremonials. Despite the rhetoric, there was 
sometimes a discrepancy between the words and their 
implementation as when presidents told academics to omit from 
their publications doctrines that were offensive to powerful 
interests. 96 
As has been said, the German concept of academic freedom was 
not adopted without selection and modification. This can be 
evidenced from the 1915 "Report on Academic Freedom" of the 
American Association of University Professors which, although 
in its opening statement it acknowledged that academic freedom 
had traditionally had two applications, namely to the freedom 
-----------------~ 
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of the teacher and to that of the student, to Lehrfreiheit and 
Lernfreiheit, it later stressed that the freedom that was the 
subject of the report was that of the teacher. This was the 
trend that was later followed.~ 
There are entirely plausible reasons why the freedoms of the 
student were either subordinated to or excluded from the 
American. definition of academic freedom. The American 
professor was in a different position from that of the German 
professor. He was an employee of a lay board of control, and 
was not, as in Germany, a civil servant. Moreover, he was 
governed by an 
take important 
administrative hierarchy which had power to 
decisions and which did not consist of 
officials elected from the professor's ranks, as in Germany. 
The problems that beset an American professor led to a change 
of focus. Another distinction between the American theories of 
academic freedom lay in their arguments for the defence of the 
autonomy of the university. German theorists relied on the 
protective power of the government and on traditional guild 
prerogatives both of which were meaningless and irrelevant to 
the American situation. Here the government by trustees not 
only inhibited professorial independence, but it also 
facilitated the notion that professors were incapable of 
self-government. The local sponsorship of American education 
forestalled federal intervention. The courts were reluctant to 
interfere with decisions of the administrative authorities 
except when these were in conflict with the university's 
charter. It would be futile to appeal to state legislatures 
because their members were often, like the trustees, not 
favourably disposed towards intellectual freedom. For this 
------------------~ 
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reason, American theorists appealed to the will of tt~ whole 
community. This will was not regarded as synonymo·c. v.rith 
public opinion, but as being something more elusive, a ~neral 
will analogous to that o: Jean Jacques Rousseau. They c 5erted 
that all universities belonged to the community as a w: .e and 
trustees were merely public servants, while professc 
public functionaries. The universities were public pro: 
Consequently, they should not be treated as 
were 
t.ies. 
_vate 
possessions or be tied to a particular faith or ideolo~ ~r be 
bent to the interest of a class or sect or party. If ~ - was 
done it was a violation of a public trust. This the - ran 
into difficulties if the public consented to the viola ~n of 
the trust. That is why proponents of this theory 
interpret public interest as meaning something oth~ 
j to 
than 
public opinion. The problem was that in America at tr.Jc . ime, 
academic freedom was too new an idea to arouse pa: otic 
feelings and too exclusive to prompt mass support.~ 
A further difference between the American and German cc epts 
of academic freedom relates to inner and outer f reedo The 
German idea of 11 convincing 11 one's students and of per~. i.ing 
them over to the personal system and philosophical vi of 
the professor were not appealing to American academic o~ on. 
American professors took the view that in the classrc the 
proper stance for an American professor was that of neut ity 
on controversial issues, and silence on subs tan ti ve ues 
which fell beyond the purview of their competence. There ~s a 
strong belief that college students were always in danc of 
mental seduction by their teachers. The old fear that st.· ~ts 
could fall easy prey of heretical doctrine "became t:;·. ·:ew 
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fear that students had but fragile defences against subtle 
insinuation of 'propaganda'".~ 
Although American ideas on academic freedom were influenced by 
German ones, there were different underpinnings. The Americans 
did not follow the idealism of Kant and Hegel but were much 
more influenced by evolutionary pragmatism and positivism. 
Darwinism also had a strong influence. on American academic 
thought. In Germany, philosophy was used to attack religious 
authority whereas in America, science was used to break the 
hold of religious authority. The empiricist heritage promoted 
the view that the facts must be the arbiter between competing 
notions of truth. This strengthened the standard of 
neutrality. A corollary of this was that universal and 
synthetic speculation must give way to specialized knowledge, 
which promoted the standard of competence. Moreover, the 
Darwinian influence, promoted the belief that certainty was as 
foreign to inquiry as immutability was to the processes of 
life. The right to pass judgment on scientific questions was 
the prerogative of those who possessed special credentials. 100 
These theories related to the norms for intramural utterance, 
that of the utterances of professors in their role as 
teachers. Outside the university, professors in America had 
greater freedom than the German ones because of the stronger 
social and constitutional commitment to freedom of speech. 
Al though academic freedom and freedom of speech have many 
connections, history has demonstrated that the advance of the 
one has not automatically produced a comparable advance of the 
other. The two freedoms developed independently for different 
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reasons, al though they are causally connected to a common 
long-term factor, which is generally the diffusion of 
political power or the fostering of the habit of tolerance. 
Nevertheless under certain conditions these two freedoms do 
affect each other directly. Consequently, the secure position 
of the one may improve the position of the other and deepen 
its meaning and effect. American universities provided an 
opportunity to engage in outside activities and professors 
also showed a lot of interest in outside affairs. There was 
also a move, on the part of professors, away from the quiet 
life of moral philosophy in favour of the more worldly concern 
of social science. This was influenced by the rise of 
pragmatism which emphasised the application of the trained 
intelligence to the practical problems of life. Owing to the 
fact that the American professor, as opposed to his German 
counterpart, operated in the arena of social and political 
action, he relied more on freedom of speech. For this reason 
he felt that he had the right to express his opinion on 
controversial subjects, even on matters that fell outside his 
field of competence. 101 
The attempt to assimilate the right to free speech into the 
doctrine of academic freedom created problems. It created the 
perception that professors were given special protection when 
they were involved in the "rough give-and-take" of politics. 
In the words of Metzger: 
"To argue that the institutional position of 
professors should not be affected by what they 
said as citizens, was to urge immunity for them 
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from the economic penalties that may repay 
unpopular utterances - the dwindling of clients, 
the boycott of subscribers, the loss of a job. 
Such a demand for immunity, exceeding anything 
provided by the constitutional safeguard of free 
speech, going even further than the 'free market' 
conceptions of the great philosophers of 
intellectual liberty, was bound to strain the 
less tensile tolerance of American trustees and 
administrators. 1110: 
Professors reacted by def ending and justifying the social and 
political activism. These justifications sometimes did not 
hold water. A number of questions arose on the role of 
academics in public life. Was it proper for a professor to run 
for political office or to work actively for a political 
party? Moreover, was it proper for a professor to publicly 
criticize the actions of a colleague or a superior? In most 
cases it was not easy to decide where free speech ended and 
insubordination began. A further question was whether the 
professor's relations to his trustees was similar to the 
relation of the judiciary to the executive power? If that be 
the case, it meant that the trustees could not remove their 
appointee at will, although this also meant that professors 
were bound by the 11 staid public ethics of judges 11 • 103 All these 
issues were reflected in the 1915 Report of the Committee on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of 
University Professors.~ 
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2.4.7.4 Academic freedom and big business 
It is sometimes thouaht that private universities and colleges 
"'-' -
enjoy greater autonomy and academic freedom than universities 
which are supported by government and which are legally under 
the control of the state. Although this may appear to be so in 
principle, there are a number of exceptions where in American 
private universities the academic freedom of academics was 
stifled by or the academics were dismissed from universities 
for expressing views that were contrary to the interests of 
the benefactor.™ 
The clash between philanthropists from big business and those 
who upheld academic freedom was explained on the theses of 
"conspiracy" and "cultural incompatibility". According to the 
"conspiracy" theory big business was believed to support the 
universities only to further its own interests, and attacks on 
academic freedom were regarded as part of a plutocratic plot. 
The thesis of 11 cultural incompatibili ty 11 was to the effect 
that the values of the factory and the counting house were in 
conflict with the values of research, and attacks upon 
academic freedom were the consequence of this dichotomy. 106 
Both theories received some support and criticism, but the 
amount of support cannot be measured. It is also probable that 
professors of social science were more hostile to businessmen 
than professors of business administration. Moreover, the 
correctness or otherwise of these theses has not been proved 
although there are many cases of professors who were dismissed 
because they criticised or antagonised powerful business 
interests. 107 
109. 
Those who supported the 11 conspiracy 11 theory were of the view 
that there were basically essential conditions for and 
effective cause of the curtailment of academic freedom. These 
entailed a liberal professor, pursuing his science, and a 
conservative board dominated by business. These were regarded 
as the necessary conditions. The efficient cause was regarded 
as the presence of an antagonistic trustee or an imperious 
patron. 108 
An analysis of the cases on which the "conspiracy" theory was 
based revealed certain flaws in it. It was an 
over-simplification and lacked the social and psychological 
dimensions that the complexity of the situation required. It 
overlooked many significant factors like the disposition of 
the president, the professional status of the accused, and the 
standing of the complainants. It also omitted factors like the 
geographical location of the college, its particular ideals 
and traditions, its receptivity to various pressures and the 
power and personality of the patron. It did not distinguish 
between different kinds of professional heretics such as 
theorists and activists, or between different kinds of 
business patrons, such as those who shared the biases of their 
community and those who were themselves nonconformists, or 
between different kinds of pressure from business, such as 
that which arose from patrons and trustees and that which 
originated from outside. It also falsely attributed to one 
faction, the economic conservatives, a uniquely sinister role. 
Despite these objections, the germ of truth in the thesis of 
conspiracy is the corrupting influence of power. "Devil 
theories of history are rarely categorically false, 
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particularly when the devils they delineate are men who are 
very rich, who have taken controlling positions, and who are 
accustomed to being obeyed. But power may be a function of 
numbers, as well as a function of wealth; and power may be 
curbed and chastened by the safeguards of tradition and 
form. 11109 
Besides the conspiracy theory, the clash between academics and 
big business was ascribed to the clash between the culture of 
science on the one hand and the culture of business on the 
other. The scientists were interested in the pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake, while the businessmen who were 
sitting in the boards of trustees or in the administration 
were actuated by profit motives. They brought in a whole new 
culture alien to that of the academics, a culture that had a 
crude utilitarian outlook which they imposed on universities. 
This had the effect of turning mansions of learning into what 
tended to be business establishments. Universities, owing to 
the influence of businessmen, adopted a hierarchical structure 
used in business management. They also encouraged a spirit of 
competition similar to that of business. Professors were 
reduced to the status of hirelings. Each of these business 
practices were perceived to be subtle restraint on the 
academic freedom of professors. The bureaucratization of the 
university was perceived to serve as a convenient way of 
controlling the faculty from above; the promotional activity 
of the university stressed intellectual acquiescence; and the 
reduction of the scholar to the status of an employee damaged 
his self-respect and limited his freedom of action.rn 
111. 
Although these accusations contained important elements of 
truth, they were liable to exaggeration. Although bureaucracy 
introduced a strain between the university's interest in 
efficiency and its interest in creative thought, certain 
business practices were adopted by the universities to 
facilitate efficiency owing to the size of universities. 
Bureaucratization also arose from the ranks of professors, 
partly as a result of the increasing competition for 
placement. As the number of available teachers increased, 
their bargaining power decreased. The increase in the number 
of job-hunters made job-holders feel insecure. This led to the 
demand for academic tenure. 
meant a demand for rules 
The demand for academic tenure 
and regulations which led to 
bureaucratization. Strictly speaking these bureaucratic 
features were not necessarily in conflict with academic 
freedom. It was more the way they were perceived that led to 
their being so regarded. Obviously the rules are not 
self-enforcing, but are enforced by those in charge and this 
may sometimes lead to arbitrariness. 111 
The emphasis on bureaucratization changed the course of the 
struggle for academic freedom in America. The fight for 
academic freedom as a result became the fight for 
precautionary rules, for academic legislation. This was so 
because it is no use fighting for the rectification of 
injustice after it has occurred. It is much better to prevent 
it. For this reason academic freedom and academic tenure 
became inseparably linked. The problem with emphasis on the 
security of tenure was that it made academic freedom 
synonymous with the security of professors in the guild rather 
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than the social necessity of appointing men who weye 
independent thinkers. 112 
There is no evidence that the presidents who adopted business 
attitudes were responsible for the timidity and acquiescence 
of academics. On the contrary, some of them "brought 
university ideals to business, as well as business ideals to 
the university". They led the fight for evolution and the 
introduction of German ideals. They also promoted love for 
knowledge, interest in research and the concept of academic 
freedom. There obviously were exceptions. Even they were an 
educative force as they had to reiterate these platitudes in 
the course of academic rituals. Although the thesis of 
cultural incompatibility saw the businessman corrupting 
academia, and not the academia enlightening the businessman, 
the truth is that these two cultures, through the mediation of 
presidents, tended to influence each other. 113 
On the accusation that the business culture changed professors 
into hirelings, it must be admitted that certain trustees did 
propagate the idea that the views of the professors had to be 
subservient to those of the boards of trustees. But on the 
whole the businessmen on the boards of trustees did not depart 
from academic tradition. The theory that professors were 
employees was not new. Even the courts had supported that 
view. To regard this as being a product of the business 
culture was therefore imprecise. In a number of court cases 
the view that professors were hirelings was supported.'~ 
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2.4.7.5 The establishment of the AAUP and its influence on 
academic freedom 
The establishment of the American Association of University 
Professc....~:-·(AAUP) in 1915 was an important event in that it 
marked the culmination and the beginning. It was the 
culmination of the process towards professorial 
sel:E;-consciousness that had been in existence 
decades. It was the beginning of an era in 
for many 
which the 
principles of academic freedom were codified, and in which 
violations of academic freedom were systematically 
investigated and punished. There are various reasons why the 
AAUP was established late although there were conditions which 
justified its earlier establishment. These reasons are that 
professors, unlike workers in industry, were often working in 
isolation; they were restricted by the disciplinary laws of 
each ins ti tut ion; and the professors themselves disliked 
organising themselves into a body that smacked of trade 
unionism for material gain. Both the ideology and the dignity 
of the profession militated against the idea of a pressure 
group. With time this had to change. 115 
It was the spirit and ideology of progressivism that 
precipitated the formation of the AAUP. This was the spirit of 
reform. Opposition to boss rule in the cities manifested 
itself as opposition to trustee rule in the universities. 
There was a need to make university government more 
responsible. This led to the need for consultation when 
matters of appointment, promotion and tenure were considered. 
As some felt that these reforms were cosmetic, they advocated 
the democratisation 
limiting the power 
establishment of an 
of 
of 
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the universi'::ies 
trustees. They 
with the purpose of 
also advocated the 
association for better government to 
realise schemes for reform. As far as academic freedom was 
concerned, there was a great diversity of opinion on its 
principles and scope, and a great diversity of practices 
relating to its protection. With the hope of creating some 
order, three societies collaborated in 1913 to formulate 
general rules of academic freedom and tenure. A joint 
committee of the American Economic Association, the American 
Sociological Society and the American Poli ti cal Science 
Association worked for a year to solve the complex problem of 
principles. On the issue of academic freedom the commit tee 
doubted whether universal rules should apply to colleges and 
universities; to teachers of junior as well as advanced 
students, to men who expressed themselves on matters outside 
their subjects as well as to those who remained within their 
competence, and to extramural as well as intramural 
utterances. It was also difficult to draw the line between 
propriety and impropriety. On the issue of tenure, they were 
undecided whether a professor should be virtually irremovable; 
whether a distinction should be drawn between an officer of 
higher grade and one of low grade; whether there had to be 
trial before dismissal; and whether the reasons for dismissal 
had to be given or withheld. 116 
The call for a conference to consider the establishment of a 
national association emanated from the professors of Johns 
Hopkins University addressed to the faculties of the nine 
leading institutions of the country. Seven of them responded 
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by sending delegates. The delegaLes formed a committee on 
organization. When the organization had been fully mapped out, 
invitations were extended to persons of full professorial rank 
whose names appeared on the list of distinguished specialists. 
867 professors in 60 insti~utions accepted this invitation and 
became the charter members of the AAUP. Al though the 
membership was initially small and elitist, it gradually grew 
so that by 1922 it had 4,046 members from 183 institutions. 
There was also initial suspicion and reluctance from some 
leading academics who were sceptical of the role and 
efficiency of the Association. The Association however, 
gradually won respectability. While it focussed on the issues 
of academic freedom, it had to be forced to investigate cases 
of unfair treatment and to impose penalties. 117 
The first attempt of the AAUP to work out the scope of 
academic freedom was Committee A's Report on Academic Freedom 
and Academic Tenure of 1915, the general philosophy of which 
was referred to above. Its basic premises were that academic 
freedom was a necessary condition for a university's 
existence; that trustees occupied the position of public 
officials discharging a public trust; that the only exception 
to this was when they served private propagandistic purposes, 
in which those purposes had to be made clear; that in the 
classroom professors were constrained by the norms of 
neutrality and competence; that outside the university 
professors had the same right as any other citizens to freedom 
of utterance and action, limited only by the duty to observe 
professional decorum. 118 
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The report offered more than generalities and gave practical 
proposals. The practical proposals had the objectives of 
limiting the trustees' prerogative to dismiss teachers and to 
provide security and dignity in the academic job by providing 
definite rules of tenure. The commit tee suggested that 
mistaken opinion should never be grounds for dismissal. 
Al though there were differences in traditions and local 
conditions which made the application of uniform subs~antive 
limitations difficult, the committee held that there should be 
uniform procedural limitations. It suggested that every 
university or college teacher should be entitled to a hearing 
before dismissal or demotion. This entailed that charges 
against him be stated in writing in specific terms and that he 
should have a fair trial on those charges before a special or 
permanent judicial committee chosen by the faculty senate or 
council. At this trial the accused teacher should be given the 
opportunity to present evidence, and if the charge was one of 
professional incompetence, a formal report upon his work 
should be first made in writing by the teachers of his own 
department and of cognate departments in the university, and 
if the teacher concerned so desired, by a committee of his 
fellow specialists from other institutions appointed by some 
competent authority. On the issue of tenure the committee held 
that in every institution there should be an unequivocal 
understanding on the term of each appointment. In those state 
universities which were legally incapable of making contracts 
for more than a limited period, the governing boards should 
announce their policy with respect to the presumption of 
reappointment in the several classes of position, and these 
announcements, though not legally enforceable, should be 
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regarded as morally binding. 119 These were the ordinary 
principles of natural justice based on the common law. 
The practical proposals were elitist and tended to protect che 
position of professors more than those below them. The AAUP 
code was also greeted with cynicism. Its practical proposals 
were dismissed by the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure 
of Off ice of the Association of American Colleges (AAC) , an 
organization of college presidents also established in 1915. 
The presidents' committee tended to distort some of the 
proposals of the AAUP. It regarded the AAUP as a revolutionary 
dictate rather than a serious attempt to solve a professional 
problem. Within six years, however, the attitude of the AAC 
college presidents towards the AAUP report had for a variety 
of reasons, completely changed to that of agreement. 1w 
Another criticism of the 1915 statement is that it confined 
the violation of academic freedom in a narrow way, as 
something that happens in a university and not something that 
happens to a university. Nothing was mentioned in this 
document about the relations of the academy to the state 
authority. The external enemies of the university like the 
inquisitorial church official, the meddlesome minister of 
education, the intruding policeman and the biased judge 
although history had amply demonstrated these. Moreover, the 
document was silent on threats to the autonomy of the 
university that were not, at one and the same time, threats to 
the livelihood of its members; "indeed, it was not even 
clearly acknowledged that a corporate academic interest, as 
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distinct from an individ~al academic's interest, existed and 
had also to be preserved. 11121 
After a lot of preliminary negotiation, the American Council 
on Education convened a conference in 1925 which was attended 
by the representatives of the American Association of 
University Women, the American Association of University 
Professors, the Association of Governing Boards, the 
Association of Land Grant Colleges, the Association of Urban 
Universities, the National Association of State Universities, 
the Association of American Colleges, and the Association of 
American Universities. At this conference they adopted a 
statement. Only the AAUP and the AAC endorsed it. This had the 
effect of closing the great chasm between the two 
organizations. The colleges and universities did not 
incorporate the 1925 statement into their rules except in rare 
cases. The reason for this was that it was couched in the form 
of mandatory rules which were perceived as violating the 
charter provisions of the various colleges and universities. 
Al though most of the presidents and trustees accepted the 
spirit behind it, they rejected it because it gave equal 
weight to principles and procedures. By 1939 only about six or 
seven boards of trustees in the whole of the United States had 
formally adopted the statement. The feeling that what was 
required was a statement of policy that needed approval rather 
than a set of rules to be adopted, led to a revision of the 
code by the AAUP and the AAC in 1938. This conference gave an 
opportunity to rectify the long-standing discriminatory 
provisions against the junior members of the profession. A 
probationary period of six years was set, after which the 
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teacher was entitled to permanent tenure. Notice of dismissal 
was to be given for one year for all the teachers. During the 
period of probation a teacher had the academic freedom that 
all other members of the faculty had. 122 
The AAC endorsed the 1938 report with several amendments. This 
necessitated a further reconsideration by the two 
associations. The new agreement reached in 1940 altered a few 
things, namely the probationary period was changed to seven 
years. The 1940 statement is so important that it merits 
quotation in full: 
"The purpose of this statement is to promote public 
understanding and support of academic freedom and 
tenure and agreement upon procedures to assure them 
in colleges and universities. Institutions of higher 
education are conducted for the common good and not 
to further the interest of either the individual 
teacher or the institution as a whole. The common 
good depends upon the free search for truth and its 
free exposition. 
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and 
applies to both teaching and research. Freedom in 
research is fundamental to the advancement of truth. 
Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is 
fundamental for the protection of the rights of the 
teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in 
learning. It carries with it duties correlative with 
rights. 
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Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: ( 1) 
Freedom of teaching and research and of extra-mural 
activities, and (2) A sufficient degree of economic 
security to make the profession attractive to men and 
women of ability. Freedom and economic security, 
hence tenure, are indispensable to the success of an 
institution in fulfilling its obligations to its 
students and to society. 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in 
research and in the publication of the results, 
subject to the adequate performance of his other 
academic duties; but research for pecuniary return 
should be based upon an understanding with the 
authorities of the institution. 
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the 
classroom in discussing his subject, but he should be 
careful not to introduce into his teaching 
controversial matter which has no relation to his 
subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of 
religious or other aims of the institution should be 
clearly stated in writing at the time of the 
appointment. 
(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a 
member of a learned profession, and an officer of an 
educational institution. When he speaks or writes as 
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a citizen, he should be free from institutional 
censorship or discipline, but his special position in 
the community imposes special obligations. As a man 
of learning and an educational officer, he should 
remember that the public may judge his profession and 
his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at 
all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate 
restraint, should show respect for the opinions of 
others and should make every effort to indicate that 
he is not an institutional spokesman. 
ACADEMIC TENURE 
(a) After the expiration of a probationary period 
teachers or investigators should have permanent or 
continuous tenure, and their services should be 
terminated only for adequate cause, except in the 
case of retirement for age, or under extraordinary 
circumstances because of financial exigencies. 
In the interpretation of this principle it is 
understood that the following represents acceptable 
academic practice: 
(1) The precise terms and conditions of every 
appointment should be stated in writing and be 
in the possession of both ins ti tut ion and 
teacher before the appointment is consummated. 
(2) Beginning 
full-time 
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with appointment to the rank of 
instructor or a higher rank, the 
probationary period should not exceed seven 
years, including within this period full-time 
service in all institutions of higher education; 
but subject to the proviso that when, after a 
term of probationary service of more than three 
years in one or more institutions, a teacher is 
called to another institution it may be agreed 
in writing that his new appointment is for a 
probationary period of not more than four years, 
even though thereby the person's total 
probationary period in the academic profession 
is extended beyond the normal maximum of seven 
years. Notice should be given at least one year 
prior to the expiration of the probationary 
period if the teacher is not to be continued in 
service after the expiration of that period. 
(3) During the probationary period a teacher should 
have the academic freedom that all other members 
of the faculty have. 
(4) Termination for cause of a continuous 
appointment, or the dismissal for cause of a 
teacher previous to the expiration of a term 
appointment, should, if possible, be considered 
by both a faculty committee and the governing 
board of the institution. In all cases where the 
facts are in dispute, the accused teacher should 
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be informed before the hearing in writing of the 
charges against him and should have the 
opportunity to be heard in his own defense by 
all bodies that pass judgment upon his case. He 
should be permitted to have with him an adviser 
of his own choosing who may act as counsel. 
Xhere should be a full stenographic record of 
the hearing available to the parties concerned. 
In the hearing of charges of incompetence the 
testimony should include that of teachers and 
other scholars, either from his own or from 
other ins ti tut ions. Teachers on continuous 
appointment who are dismissed for reasons not 
involving moral turpitude should receive their 
salaries for at least a year from the date of 
notification of dismissal whether or not they 
are continued in their duties at the 
institution. 
(5) Termination of a continuous appointment because 
of financial exigency should be demonstrably 
bona fide. 11123 
This statement had great persuasive authority on universities. 
It also placed the idea of academic freedom on a secure 
footing. Furthermore, 
academic freedom with 
connections. It also 
it had the effect of reconciling 
colleges having denominational 
reconciled the idea of faculty 
participation in the selection of personnel with the 
possession, by trustees, of great powers. Security of tenure 
was shown not to be incompatible with a need for competence.w 
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In the area of the investigation and punishment of 
malpractices against academics, the AAUP was less successfu2.. 
It was limited by personnel and financial shortages. 
investigative function required it to be a policeman, judge 
and jury. It required the AAUP to have an array of lawyers, 
advisors and investigators which it could not afford. The 
investigation itself required a lot of ingenuity. There was 
also hostility on the part of the administrators to these 
investigations. The compiling of the report took a long time. 
When it came to sanctions, the association had no power to 
punish except to "blacklist 11 an offending institution. 
This in itself was controversial and had dubious effect. The 
reporting and publicising of the injustices was regarded as 
another form of punishment. The reported cases confirmed the 
assumption that academic freedom is dependent upon academic 
tenure and due process. Despite its many limitations, the AAUP 
introduced an apparatus for finding facts in an area that 
hitherto had been shrouded in mystery and was governed by 
untested testimony. It revealed certain ins ti tut ions where 
malpractices had for years gone undetected. The threat of an 
investigation was in many cases a sufficient deterrent and 
caused administrators to rethink. It also became clear that 
there was no substitute for courage on the part of each 
academic. 125 
With the outbreak of the First World War in 1917, the 
principle of academic freedom suffered a severe set-back in 
the United States. This had the effect of nullifying the gains 
that had been gradually made over the years. This was caused 
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by the fact that the war created a fanaticism which undermined 
academic freedom. The nation was pervaded by zealous 
patriotism. All over the nation patriotic zealots on boards of 
trustees, in the community and on faculties harassed those 
college teachers whose passion for the war was dubious or 
lukewarm. Professors were expected to show total allegiance 
and loyalty to the nation during the war and any show of 
disloyalty was a serious mis demeanour. Any person who· was 
regarded as a "slacker", "pro-German" or a "pacifist" was 
liable to prosecution by the state. This new orthodoxy was 
pervasive and transcended any other form of orthodoxy 
religious or otherwise; "it exceeded economic conventionalism, 
for it permitted no havens of dissent. Its pharisaical 
division of the saved and the dammed was not only the concern 
of sectarians, but of every group in society."™ 
The fear was largely based on the doubtful loyalty of new 
Americans whose loyalties were divided by immigration and who 
were therefore not regarded as sufficiently patriotic. For 
this reason there was concern that many Americans with 
pacifist tendencies were not sufficiently bellicose. It was 
not sufficient to be neutral. One had to display his loyalty 
and be pro-war. This new orthodoxy did not allow room for 
academic freedom or one to be critical of decisions of the 
government relating to the war. No German sympathies were 
allowed. Academics could not express themselves freely on 
these issues. If they did, even if they did not do anything 
seriously seditious, they were liable to prosecution and to 
dismissal by the boards of trustees. A number of such cases 
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took place and these cases demonstrated the vagueness or 
morbidness of what was regarded as disloyalty.m 
Within the ranks of the AAUP the war produced severe 
conflicts. As Metzger puts ' ..... l L. • "The Association could not, 
lest it betray all that it stood for, consider academic 
freedom a peacetime luxury. Its docket of academic freedom 
cases was filling up with sordid evidences of the censorship 
that called itself patriotism and the malice expressed in the 
name of loyalty. At the same time, it had given itself without 
compunction, to those martial symbols and apocalyptic hopes 
with which America goes to battle. Its historians had given up 
research to write propaganda tracts for the Committee on 
Public Information; its scientists were devoting their skills 
to the multifarious problems of war."rn 
The report of the AAUP Commit tee on Academic Freedom in 
Wartime presented the association's decision. It was of the 
opinion that there are two sides to the duty of the citizen in 
time of war. The more urgent one was to help win the war. The 
other one was to preserve democratic ins ti tut ions. The 
committee mentioned four grounds on which academic authorities 
might legitimately dismiss professors. These were 
(a) conviction of disobedience to any statute or lawful 
executive order relating to the war; (b) propaganda designed 
or likely to cause others to resist or evade the compulsory 
service law or the regulations of the military authorities; 
(c) action designed to dissuade others from rendering 
voluntary assistance to the efforts of the government; and 
(d) in the case of professors of Teutonic origin and sympathy, 
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violating the obligation to ref rain from public discussion of 
the war, and in their private intercourse with neighbours, 
colleagues and students, avoiding all hostile or offensive 
expressions concerning the United States and its government.c9 
The committee introduced various qualifications, namely that 
the trustees should exercise magnanami ty in dealing with 
pacifists, that teachers had to be spared the extreme penalty 
of dismissal on their first offence, and that the proceedings 
should be strictly judicial in character. The committee 
assumed that the war had fundamentally changed the conditions 
of academic freedom and that the university should assume 
responsibility for its professors' utterances.~ 
Although there have been problems with academic freedom after 
the First World War, none was similar to that of the First 
World War. The reason for this is that a more sympathetic and 
profound understanding of academic freedom became more 
widespread among teachers, administrators and trustees than in 
1917. The institutional mechanisms for defending academic 
freedom had been better developed. The AAUP had become more 
powerful. Although these are not an indefeasible bulwark, they 
give considerable security for professors who are determined 
to express their views. 
2.4.7.6 The Second World War and its aftermath 
Although developments after the First World War had created 
the impression that academic freedom among American 
universities was secure, the aftermath of the Second World War 
128. 
ushered in a new wave of intolerance which led to severe 
attacks on academic freedom. These attacks were facilitated by 
the climate of public opinion in the United States and the 
form of academic government.w 
The new wave of intolerance was precipitated by the "Cold War" 
and its accentuation especially since the Korean war. This new 
wave took on considerable proportions. It led to a vast 
increase of suppressive controls over books, public addresses 
and over all forms of expression of opinion. There was also a 
hunt for subversive material. This was based on the assumption 
that any kind of liberalism or non-conformity was a step on 
the road to communism. Any attack on the proponents of these 
ideas was regarded as a blow against communism itself. The 
convenient way of doing this was to label non-conformists as 
communists and thereby discredit them. What was painful was 
that not only real communists, but also people who were former 
communists or who showed liberal inclinations were branded 
with the same brush as "fellow-travellers" etc. Once they were 
labelled as communists, they were severely discredited. Their 
writings were either banned or censored. Libraries and 
librarians were coerced to exclude those books that had been 
regarded as spreading communist propaganda. The pretext was to 
protect the public that would be ignorant of this propaganda. 
The main casualties of this attack were academics and academic 
freedom. When books were banned, censored or destroyed, no 
expert evidence was obtained to support the allegations that 
they were communist inspired or spreading communist 
propaganda. People who regarded themselves as "patriots" 
simply styled themselves experts and declared this literature 
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undesirable. Many of them who were on boards of trustees of 
universities supported the dismissal of professors on flimsy 
grounds and sometimes without proper trials.m 
Concomitant with censorship was the passing of a spate of 
legislation by the state legislatures to suppress subversive 
activities - this without any noticeable increase in communist 
infiltration in the country. These acts were hastily drafted 
and left much room for identifying the new criminal offence. 
This was in addition to the pre-existing laws against 
conspiracy and treason which were wide enough to include such 
behaviour. The effect of this was to breed bitterness. It also 
led to the extension of the meaning of disloyalty with the 
consequence that any unorthodox behaviour or conduct deviating 
from the tribal code became punishable under the guise of 
patriotism. This spirit was manifested, among others, by the 
increasing imposition of loyalty oaths on people of all kinds, 
government employees, candidates for off ice, educators, 
speakers at public meetings on public property, applicants for 
fellowships provided by government grants and many more. 
Although a loyalty oath may seem innocuous, it was complicated 
by the inclusion of a clause renouncing membership in any 
subversive organization. This also had a negative effect on 
democracy as the investigations were often conducted by people 
who were anti-democratic and merely interested in conformism. 
For this reason, believers in civil liberties opposed any 
extension of such procedures beyond the demand of national 
security. 133 
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Certain conduct was labelled "un-American 11 • This came to mean 
anything that those who supported the new orthodoxy did not 
agree with however incompatible that was with the great 
traditions of the country. It was reminiscent of the old Nazi 
charge against non-Nazis, that they did not have a "positive 
attitude toward the Party 11 • The definition of un-Americanism 
was a negative attitude towards the "sound" doctrines of the 
supporters of the new orthodoxy. This had a negative impact on 
schools and colleges. Many areas of inquiry became, "in the 
eyes of the faithful, un-American". As Maciver further puts 
it: 11 It was un-American to mention unpleasant facts about the 
social order, and so a schoolbook was revised because it said 
one third of the people were badly housed. It was un-American 
to admit that our form of government, like every other in the 
history of the world, had collectivistic, or socialist 
aspects. It was un-American to plead for international 
organization or for international understanding. 11 ~ 
Although this approach is called the "new orthodoxy", it was 
compounded of the old intolerance and the old narrow 
interests. What made it new was that it had a new appeal, a 
new mode of attack and a new label for the supposed heretic. 
"Whatever he may be, a liberal, an independent, a radical, an 
anti-Marxist socialist, a pacifist, a non-conformist of any 
kind, a simple believer in the rules of evidence, a 
conservative who upholds fair play, an advocate of civil 
rights, he is sure to be classified as one of the vast phantom 
army who are on the road to communism and are meantime aiding 
and abetting it."m 
A number of pressure groups 
intolerance. These aligned 
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were used to support this new 
themselves with a variety of 
congenial political elements. At the same time they galvanized 
into action a number of other organizations, especially those 
with some form of economic interest, the self- interest of 
which they appealed to. This gave them a great impetus and 
impact on society. Their impact was increased by the belief 
they evoked that the greaL mass of the people is on their side 
and they took advantage of the state of mind "evoked by our 
time of trouble, the impatience and apprehensiveness and sense 
of frustration of a people which after winning a peace of 
heavy cost find itself menaced by a more portentous threat 
than before. "130 
The organizations that became engaged in the campaign to 
control or influence education or educators may be classified 
into legislative committees, "patriotic" organisations, 
certain special-interest organizations and lobbies, and 
propagandist associations that set themselves up as having 
mainly or exclusively educational objectives. Their mode of 
operation was arbitrary. They had the tendency to impute guilt 
by association, the assumption that denunciations and 
expulsions were the proper way to deal with disaffection of 
the relatively small body of American communists and they were 
disinclined to seek the roots of the problem. Most of the 
legislative committees adopted unfair investigative procedures 
which violated the rules of decent and dignified 
investigation. The same could be said of other organizations. 
In the process they totally ignored or misconceived the 
function of the institution of higher learning and demanded 
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that all its teaching, in every relevant subject, be solely 
along the line of the particular viewpoint or doctrine to 
which they themselves adhered. When it came to research, they 
insisted that all its researches in every relevant subjecc, 
should arrive at the position from which they themselves 
started. Their main goal was conformity and they denounced 
difference. Moreover, they did not reason with those who 
differed from them, but they simply condemned them. Obviously 
they were not, unlike universities, interested in the pursuit 
of knowledge. Their mode of operation was repressive, seeking 
to remove whatever they disliked, whether it be textbooks of 
which they disapproved or teachers with whom they disagreed. 
To attain these ends, they did not appeal to educators, but to 
a public which they misinformed and to authorities they could 
pressurise. In the process they distorted the issues. 
Their main weapon was the deliberate exploitation, for their 
own purposes, of the fear of communism. They incited that fear 
all the more in order to misdirect it. Their strategy was to 
exaggerate the number of communists in universities and the 
influence they wielded. They pretended that universities and 
colleges were overrun with communists, undermined by them, and 
infected by them. Anyone who advocated any social reform like 
social security, or state medical aid, or better facilities 
for housing, or more adequate relief for the unemployed, or 
more measures against unemployment, or some kind of 
international organization would be regarded as "statist'', a 
11 collectivist 11 , a 11 socialist 11 , a follower of the communist 
line, a fellow traveller, or a downright 11 red 11 • Anyone who 
thought the economy might be improved, was accused of seeking 
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to destroy it. They were unconcerned with the falsity and 
misleading nature of these charges. They appealed to prejudice 
rather than to intelligence. In the process they seriously 
threatened not only academic freedom, but the whole broad 
freedom of thought and of inquiry. 137 
The lines of attack on universities and academic freedom were 
economic, religious and social tradition. Anything that 
deviated from the accepted and orthodox ways was condemned and 
discredited. 138 But the greatest enemy was communism. 
Those who sought to debar communists from being employed at 
universities relied on the argument that a communist, at list 
a Party member, has renounced his own intellectual liberty and 
is no longer qualified to seek the truth wherever it may lead 
or to impart knowledge without bias. The organization to which 
he belongs is extremely authoritarian and is against freedom 
of inquiry, of opinion, and of teaching and is himself 
committed to a movement to extinguish academic freedom. 
Moreover, he belongs to an organization that is intent on the 
violent overthrow of the government. Although some of these 
accusations are cogent, they tend to over-generalize and to be 
arbitrary. There may be communists who may believe in 
communism in general, but not in everything for which the 
Communist Party stands. Moreover, it would be unfair to 
dismiss a person because he is a communist unless he is 
indoctrinating students with communism or is advocating the 
violent overthrow of the democratic government. 139 
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There is no doubt that academic freedom in America has had a 
chequered career. 
In the words of Metzger: 
"No one can follow the history of academic 
freedom in this country without wondering at the 
fact that any society, interested in the 
immediate goals of solidarity and 
self-preservation, should possess the vision to 
subsidize free criticism and inquiry, and without 
feeling that the academic freedom we still 
possess is one of the remarkable achievements of 
man. At the same time, one cannot but be appalled 
at the slender thread by which it hangs, at the 
wide discrepancies that exist among institutions 
with respect to its honoring and preservation; 
and one cannot but be disheartened by the 
cowardice and self-deception that frail men use 
who want to be both safe and free. With such 
conflicting evidence, perhaps individual 
temperament alone tips the balance toward 
confidence or despair."~ 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
From the aforegoing account it is quite clear that history has 
demonstrated that university autonomy and academic freedom are 
indispensable if the university has to fulfil its function of 
the pursuit of knowledge and truth. This function often puts 
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the university in conflict with the government or the church 
or society in general. From its inception the university had 
to struggle to maintain its autonomy and academic freedom from 
the church authorities. Later on the university had to contend 
with the government. It is interesting to note that university 
autonomy and academic freedom, like individual liberty, were 
not attained in the West as a result of a deliberate aim, but 
as a by-product of the struggle for power. 141 In America 
academics had to contend with the power of boards of trustees. 
One would never imagine that in a country renowned for its 
commitment to democracy and liberty like the United States of 
America academic freedom would ever be under threat, but this 
has been the case. This means that university autonomy and 
academic freedom can never be beyond threat. The struggle for 
academic freedom has been long and arduous. Sometimes what has 
been gained over a long period of time is lost because of 
certain emergencies. This was the case in particular in the 
United States during the First World War and after the Second 
World War. But university academics have always striven to 
retain this autonomy and academic freedom. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF UNIVERSITIES AND UNIVERSITY 
AUTONOMY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Before one can discuss university autonomy and academic 
freedom in contemporary South Africa, it is necessary to trace 
the historical evolution of these concepts in South Africa in 
order to put them in proper perspective. It is hardly 
possible to discuss the historical evolution of university 
autonomy and academic freedom in South Africa without at the 
same time addressing the inception and historical development 
of universities in this co~ntry. It is in the light of this 
that we have to understand why, for instance, academic freedom 
is regarded as a fundamental right in our constitution whereas 
that is not so in many democratic countries. 
Generally the university system in South Africa was modelled 
on those older countries which had minimized the exercise of 
state power over universities. These countries had accepted 
values such as university autonomy and academic freedom. 
Although before the era of apartheid there is no evidence of 
government interference with these, during the heydays of 
apartheid there was to be a drastic change in this which led 
to severe restrictions on university autonomy and academic 
freedom. 
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3.2 EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF HISTORICALLY WHITE UNIVERSITIES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
University educatio:-i in South ]';..f rica had its humble begin:-iings 
in the establishment of the South African College in 1829 in 
Cape Town. It was largely modelled on the English 11 redbrick" 
and Scottish institutions of the time. It catered exclusively 
for the white population and its academic st:aff was largely 
drawn from Britain and to a lesser extent from the European 
continent. This college was established as a result of a 
petition that had been sent to the governor of the Cape. It 
was incorporated as a public institution in 1837. Its 
regulations stipulated that no student under the age of ten 
would be accepted. The college mainly did pre-university or 
secondary work "there being a very small university 'top' to 
the school." It merely prepared students for ~he matriculation 
and higher examinations of the Universit:y of London. 1 
Many schools or colleges similar to the South African College 
were established in the Western and Eastern Provinces of the 
Cape. The Church of England and the Dutch-Reformed Church were 
responsible for erecting a number of these colleges. These 
included the Diocesan College, Rondebosch (1848); Grey 
College, Bloemfontein (1855); St Andrew's College, Grahamstown 
(1855); Grey Institute, Port Elizabeth (1856); the Theological 
Seminary, Stellenbosch (1859); the Graaff-Reinet College in 
1860; the Pietermaritzburg High School (1863); Gill College, 
Somerset East ( 18 64) ,· the Gymnasium (later Stellenbosch 
College and then Victoria College) (1866); the "Theologiese 
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School van de Gereformee::::-de Kerk'', 3-...irgersdorp (1869) and the 
Huguenot Seminary, Wellington (:874) .= 
After the granting of responsible government to the Cape in 
1872, the University Incorporation Act of 18733 was passed. In 
terms of this ace an examining university, the University of 
the Cape of Good Hope, modelled on the University of London, 
was established. It was granted its royal charter in 1877 and 
had its chancellor, vice-chancellor, council and convocation. 
This ins ti tut ion did not do any teaching but conducted 
examinations for degrees in arts, law, divinity, agriculture, 
certain law certificates and matriculation examinations. 
Teaching was done by the colleges. The teachers of these 
colleges were not allowed to become examiners in their own 
subjects and the syllabuses were laid down by the university. 4 
3.3 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE AND THE 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGES 
During the period between 1874 and 1916 considerable growth 
took place. The South African College developed as an 
institution which did only post-matriculation work in 1900. In 
1881 Stellenbosch College was incorporated and became Victoria 
College in 1887; the university work at the Diocesan College 
was taken over by the South African College in 1911. Rhodes 
University College (which grew out of St Andrew's College) was 
incorporated in 1904 and the Huguenot College at Wellington in 
1907. s 
14'7. 
The council of the University of the Cape of Good Hope 
provided for the representation of Natal and the two northern 
republics. This was on condition ~hat they contributed towards 
the expenses of the Uni versi ~y. Natal made use of this 
opportunity in 1897 and the Transvaal and Orange River Colony 
in 1902. 6 
A School of Mines was established in 1896 in Kimberley. In 
1903 it was transferred to Johannesburg as the Technical 
Institute. Later 
University College. 
(1906) it became known as the Transvaal 
In 1908 the college was split. Classes in 
arts, science and law were offered in Pretoria. By 1910 the 
Johannesburg branch became the South African School of Mines 
and Technology and the Pretoria branch became known as the 
Transvaal University College. The Natal University College 
which developed out of the Pietermaritzburg High School was 
incorporated by an act of the Natal parliament in 1909. 7 
The need for a teaching university grew especially after the 
1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War. Two competing ideas developed, that 
of a single-college university a.nd that of a federated 
university. Some even advocated a system of affiliation. 8 
In 1908 the Inter-Colonial Conference in London recommended 
that a South African University with constituent colleges be 
established. It was resolved that it was inexpedient to 
establish single college universities. A federal institution 
was seen as the only way out. 9 Whereas up to 1910 all higher 
education was vested in provincial government, article 85 
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(iii) of the South Af2'."ica Actll• :Jlaced all higher education in 
the hands of the central government. The minister of education 
became responsible therefor. I~ 1913 a parliamentary select 
committee was appointed to investigate the whole issue of 
university education. It recommended that a commission be set 
up. The result was the Laure::ce Commissior~ of 1914. The 
commission recommended that two universities be established to 
pursue teaching and research. One would be in the south with 
the South African College and the Victoria College as 
constituent colleges. The second one, the Northern University, 
was supposed to incorporate the Transvaal University College, 
the Grey University College and the Natal University College. 
Initially Rhodes University College was to be part of the 
southern organization but had an option to join the northern 
group later. 11 These recommendations were not implemented. With 
the outbreak of the world war, the government pushed the issue 
of the university to the background. 
In 1916 two universities were established. They were the 
University of Cape Town12 and the University of Stellenbosch. 13 
The 1916 legislation also provided for a federal examining 
university to be called the University of South Africa. 14 This 
would incorporate the University of the Cape of Good Hope and 
a number of the existing teaching university colleges, namely 
Huguenot, Rhodes, Grey, Transvaal, the School of Mines and 
Technology and Natal. The South African College had to become 
the University of Cape Town and Victoria College had to become 
the University of Stellenbosch. Provision was also made for a 
joint matriculation board which had the function of 
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controlling the entrance examination which admitted students 
to the South African universities. 15 
The ~niversity of Sou~h Africa was ~o have its own chancellor, 
vice-chancellor, council, senate and convocation. Each 
constituent college which prepared students for the 
examinations and the degrees of the parent body were 
represented on the senate of the university although it had 
its own council, senate, principal or rector, faculties and 
departments. With the establishment of the University of South 
Africa, the University of the Cape of Good Hope came to an end 
after 45 years of existence.u 
3.4 TOWARDS AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITIES 
Between 1918 and 1951 there was a period of accelerated growth 
which saw six of the seven original university colleges become 
fully-fledged universities. The School of Mines in 
Johannesburg was granted its charter in 1921 as the University 
of the Witwatersrand. 17 At the same time the South African 
parliament incorporated the Potchefstroom University College 
as a constituent part of the University of South Africa. 18 This 
college had been transferred from Burgersdorp . 19 
In 1930 the Transvaal University College became the University 
of Pretoria. 20 The Natal University College became the 
University of Natal in 1948. 21 In 1950 Grey University College 
became the University of the Orange Free State. 22 The 
University College of Rhodes became Rhodes University in 
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1951," and in 1950 the Huguenot University College came to an 
end. 24 
When the process. of emancipatirig the constituent university 
colleges had been completed, the Uriiversity of South Africa 
was converted25 into a non-reside:itial university which 
specialised in distance teachi~g by means of correspondence.u 
More than a decade later, two historically white universities 
were created. These were the University of Port Elizabet~' and 
the Rand Afrikaans University.u The establishment of these two 
universities was motivated by political and demographic 
reasons. The political motive was the establishment of 
Afrikaans universities to counter the influence of English 
universities like the University of the Witwatersrand in 
Johannesburg and Rhodes University which had sought to have a 
satellite campus in Port Elizabeth. 29 
There were basic differences in the way these two universities 
came into existence. It is not quite clear whether this had 
been politically motivated. They became fully-fledged 
universities from their inception and did not start as 
university colleges sheltered under the University of South 
Africa until they had attained autonomous status as had been 
the case with others. The University of Port Elizabeth was a 
dual-medium university which was unlike most historically 
white universities although every effort was made to ensure 
the bias towards Afrikaans.~ 
151. 
The use of ideological reasons for establishing a university 
was, however, nothing new. The creation of the University of 
Stellenbosch had been based on this idea. In a memo:randum 
compiled by Dr D F Mala:-:, Mr J. G van der Horst and Pro: 
Moorrees this was expressed as follows: 
11 Stellenbosch is the place where the Afrikaner 
nation can best realise his ideals from where it 
can exert the greatest influence on South Africa. 
It would be the best fulfilment the nation has yet 
found of a deeply felt need. It stands for an idea! 
To the nation it has therefore become not a mere 
educational institution, but also a symbol and the 
guarantee of its own vigorous, growing national 
life seeking to express itself. 1131 
There were other universities which were established on the 
basis of political considerations. These were the historically 
black universities. Much will be said about these here below. 
In 1955 the Universities Actn was passed. This act applied at 
the time only to historically white universities and not to 
historically black ones, most of which were not yet in 
existence at the time. Even after their establishment the act 
did not apply to them. The purpose of this act was to 
.consolidate the laws relating to universities. It provided, 
inter alia, for a committee of university principals, 
_consisting of the principal or rector of each university and 
such additional members as would be appointed by the council 
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of each university. ! 3 The function of the commit tee is to make 
recommendations to the mihister on any matter it considers to 
be of interest to the universi~ies, or which may be referred 
to it by the minister or the director-general of the 
Department of National Education. It also prescribes the 
requirements for admission to every course of study at a 
university, excluding post-graduate study and approves that 
the certificate of any person who has complied wit:h the 
minimum requirements for admission to study at a university be 
endorsed accordingly.~ 
The traditionally western university grew spontaneously out of 
the community and was developed by the community itself, or 
the community for which it was created was involved in its 
establishment . 35 Similarly, white universities in South Africa, 
just like their western counterparts, came into being as a 
result of the initiative and participation of the communities 
concerned, aided and supported by the church. These were 
established by private acts and they were private, autonomous 
and relatively independent institutions where there was 
minimum government interference. This system of university 
autonomy entitled each university to choose its own staff, to 
decide the nature of its curricula and to select its own 
students from among those who were academically qualified. It 
was not a system of absolute autonomy as these universities 
were financed by the government and the government required 
these universities to submit annual accounts in a prescribed 
form. Despite the high government subsidy to the universities, 
the policy of the universities was an area in which the 
government did not exercise its sovereign power and the 
government supervision of the ur1iversities had hitherto been 
reduced to a minimum which ensured that the state funds were 
properly administered.H With the Nacional Party being firmly 
in power, it sought to change this and to impose its policy of 
apartheid in the admission and staffing policies of che 
universities. Before one can deal with this, it is necessary 
to sketch a brief historical background to put the matter in 
proper perspective. 
3.5 THE DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORICALLY BLACK UNIVERSITIES 
3.5.1 Early period of university education for blacks 
Since their inception the Universities of Cape Town and 
Witwatersrand had an ''open" policy to the admission of black 
sr.udents. In academic matters they pursued a policy of 
non-segregation, but in other issues like hostel 
accommodation, sport and social intercourse, segregation was 
applied as was the practice at the time.n This inconsistency 
was later used as justification by the spokesmen of the 
National Party in propelling through parliament the Extension 
of University Education Bill.~ 
In 1936 the University of Natal provided part-time classes for 
black students. The university adopted a policy of 
segregation, whites and blacks being taught in separate 
classes. The same staff was used for teaching, the same 
examinations were written and the same degrees were awarded. 
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When the faculty of medicine was started in 1951 it: 
exclusively admitted black students. In the other classes t~e 
attendance of classes took place over week-ends in order to 
enable students who lived far from Durban to attend them. With 
the purpose of having a semblance of 11 residential collegiate 
life and study" to the undertaking, a winter vacation school 
was held a fortnight annually in July at Adams College, a 
black residential college at Amanzimtoti in Durban. 39 
The Universities of Stellenbosch, Pretoria, Orange Free State 
and Potchefstroom did not admit black students on their 
campuses. Rhodes only admitted a small number.~ 
3.5.2 The establishment of the South African Native College 
In 1916 provision was made for higher education of black 
people when the South African Native College, later Fort Hare, 
was founded. Its students sat for examinations of the 
University of South Africa although it was not a constituent 
college of that university. In 1951 it became affiliated to 
Rhodes University as the University College of Fort Hare. 41 The 
University College of Fort Hare was originally open to white 
students although for all intents and purposes it was a black 
institution.~ Before this the standards of the South African 
Native College as it then was were regarded as lower than 
those of the other university institutions of the time. The 
cause of this was that there was one school at the time, 
Lovedale, which offered effective secondary education to black 
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people. This educaticn did not go beyond the junior 
certificate. 43 
With the increase of blacks who received secondary education, 
it became clear that the existing institution was inadequate 
for the needs of black students. The Report of the Commission 
on Native Education (1949-51) recommended that adequate 
facilities be provided with the purpose of eventually 
establishing a black university. The future development of 
university education for blacks, however, would have to be 
part of the total development plan.~ The name South African 
Native College was altered in 1953 to University College of 
Fort Hare after the Brookes Commission had recommended 
accordingly in 1947.~ 
3.5.3 Towards the establishment of black university colleges 
In 1953 a three-man commission, the Commission of Enquiry on 
Separate Training Facilities for Non-Europeans at 
Universities,~ under the chairmanship of Dr J E Holloway, was 
appointed "to investigate and report on the practicability and 
financial implications of providing separate training 
facilities for Non-Europeans at Universities". The commission 
was of the opinion that if separate facilities were provided, 
they had to be absolutely equal. If that were so, the 
commission felt, there would be no objection on the part of 
black people. In the words of the commission: "The Bantu do 
not object to segregation as such, but to enforced 
segregation. They fully realize that if there were 
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institutions based more specifically on their own economic and 
cultural level, these would have many advantages for them. For 
them it is coercion which goes against the grain. 1147 The 
commission rejected, largely on financial grounds, suggestions 
that a new university for blacks be created or that a black 
section be created at Cape Town and Johannesburg. On the 
contrary, it recommended that black students be concentrated 
in Durban and Fort Hare and that coloured students be allowed 
to continue being admitted at "open" universities. 48 
On the issues of university autonomy and academic freedom the 
Holloway Commission had the following to say, which, because 
of its seminal importance, is worth quoting extensively: 
"In theory, therefore, it is true, in so far as the 
admission of European and non-European students to 
a university is concerned, that the State is 
equally competent to compel such an institution to 
admit Europeans and non-Europeans on an equal 
footing to classes as it is to prohibit their 
admission to the same classes or even the same 
institutions. 
Al though the State may possess this competency, 
there are, under a democratic system of government 
at any rate, certain spheres in which, in practice, 
it does not lightly venture to intrude. 
1 ~ ~ 
-'.: I • 
This applies pa:!'."ticularly to its dealings with 
certain institutions through which the highest in 
the human spirit finds expression, as, for example, 
in the case of religion and science. In these 
spheres very strong considerations must prevail 
before the state will in oractice interfere and 
take away or curtail traditionally existing 
rights. "49 
Further on the Commission had the following to state: 
"Any limitation of a university's autonomy is, 
however, always a serious matter because it may 
open the door to interference in the purely 
internal policy of the universities.~ 
The progress of science is dependent to the most 
profound degree on the freedom to search for the 
truth. Where new knowledge, new truths, may not be 
sought, the expansion of the range of human 
knowledge suffers incalculable harm. On this fact 
is based the fundamental claim to one of the 
academic freedoms of a university, namely its 
freedom to seek the truth. 
The concept of academic freedom, has another aspect 
as well, namely, the freedom to communicate 
acquired knowledge to others and not only such 
knowledge but also hypotheses. The communication of 
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their knowledge and hypotheses to one another by 
research workers and· ~hinkers is of cardinal 
importance for cheir co-operation in the 
advancement of knowledge. To ~his must be added the 
fact that to the extent to which a research worker 
or thinker is prevented from imparting his findings 
to others, the dissemination of knowledge and its 
useful application by mankind are repressed. A 
university's freedom to communicate knowledge to 
others connotes by implication the freedom of 
others, such as students, to receive the 
information imparted. On the strength of this 
argument the concept of academic freedom can be 
expanded to include the freedom of the student to 
study, and hence the establishment of the academic 
facilities to enable him to do so. 
The members of a university should therefore have 
the right, so long as it occurs on strictly 
scientific lines, to think freely, to seek the 
truth without restraint, and to give free 
expression to their thoughts and findings, even if 
these should be erroneous. The only way to show 
that a view is wrong, is to answer it by refutation 
and not to stifle it by authority imposed from 
above. 
It follows from the aforegoing that the 
preservation of academic freedom at universities, 
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as centres where the truth can be sought and 
imparted to others, is for them a matter of the 
most vital imnortance. Whatever trammels academic 
freedom hampers the universities in the execution 
of their task. Restriction should be introduced 
only with the utmost circumspection and in the most 
serious circumstances, as is today the case in 
regard to certain aspects of atomic research. "51 
This statement by the Holloway Commission on 
autonomy and academic freedom is a classic and 
endorsed wholeheartedly. Al though this statement 
university 
is to be 
was quite 
cogent, it is not the view that was later followed by the 
government. 
There were a number of suggestions made to the commission. One 
of the most important ones came from the University of 
Pretoria. This tended to coincide with later developments. It 
advocated the creation of a separate black university in the 
north. This institution was supposed to be Afrikaans in its 
orientation. It was part of the proposal that black 
universities be set up according to ethnic lines. A university 
for coloureds would be set up in the south under the control 
of the University of Stellenbosch. The University College of 
Fort Hare was supposed to be reconstituted as a university of 
the Nguni group under the guardianship of Rhodes University. 
The black section of the University of Natal in Durban would 
be allocated to the Indian group. The eventual goal was that 
all would become independent universities as they developed.£ 
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The Holloway Commission, unfortu~ately could not support total 
university apartheid. In spite of the recommendations of this 
commission, the gove:r-nment appcinted an interdepartment:al 
committee (the Van der Walt Commi::tee) to work out the cost: to 
be incurred in providing separate university facilities for 
blacks without excessively draining the state coffers. 53 This 
committee was to provide justif icat:ion for the establishment 
of ethnic universities in accordance with the policy of 
separate development. 54 This by implication meant that the 
government had rejected the advice of the Holloway Commission 
and that theories of the Department of Native Affairs had 
prevailed. 55 
In the course of 1955 the minister stated that the policy of 
the government was to have separate university facilities for 
blacks. This would, however, take time because provision would 
have to be made for blacks who were already attending white 
universities.!'6 
The Van der Walt Committee summed its findings up as follows: 
"Underdeveloped societies are particularly prone to 
suffer from a certificate complex and are inclined 
to neglect the development of personality. The 
Committee is of the opinion that, in order to 
restrain this evil tendency, there ought to be a 
great preponderance of internally trained scholars, 
and the expansion of facilities for internal study 
should therefore receive priority. How necessary 
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this shifting of the numerical preponderance to the 
internal sector is, becomes sufficiently clear from 
the very low percentages of successes reflected in 
the external sector. 
From the above it follows that more university 
facilities for non-Europeans should be provided and 
that these should be created for them. To 
enable non-Europeans to enrol as internal students, 
bursaries and loans will have be be granted.",, 
The Van der Walt Committee made an estimate of capital costs 
for the establishment of two university colleges for blacks 
and the take over of Fort Hare. It recommended that this be 
spread over three years. It further recommended that these 
university colleges be created.~ 
3.5.4 The Extension of University Education Act and its 
implications 
Despite the recommendations of the Eiselen and Holloway 
Commissions, in April 1957, the minister introduced the 
Separate University Education Bill in parliament. 59 The policy 
formulated in the bill was as follows: "The necessity of 
maintaining ethnic ties in university institutions flows from 
the conviction that the future leader during his training, 
including his university training, must remain in close touch 
with the habits, ways of life and views of members of his 
population group. What we envisage is to make provision for a 
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separate university college for the Xhosa population group at 
the existing University College of Fo::.--t Hare, as well as a 
separate university college for the Zulu group in Zululand, 
one for the Sotho group in Northern Transvaal, one for the 
Coloureds at Athlone in the Cape Peninsula and one for Indians 
near Durban in Natal. The Coloured popula~ion is concentrated 
here in the Cape Peninsula and their ins ti tut ion will, 
therefore, be in their midst, and that applies also to the 
Indians in Durban." 
<:Whites were not supposed to be admitted to these university 
) colleges and blacks were not to be admitted to white 
~"'<''" 
~' 
universities. The Minister of Native Affairs, and not of 
Education, Arts and Science, was to control these 
institutions. This control included the appointment and 
dismissal of professors and lecturers. They would be state 
employees subject to the disciplinary code similar to that of 
the civil service which even prohibited staff members from 
publicly commenting adversely upon the administration of any 
department of the government or of any province. It also 
prohibited the propagation of any idea or participation or 
identification with any propaganda or acts likely to cause or 
promote antagonism in any section of the population against 
another or to impede, obstruct or undermine the activities of 
any government department. 00 
There was considerable opposition to the bill on the grounds 
that it seriously viclated the autonomy of universities and 
the academic freedom of university staff. In its eagerness to 
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introduce university segregat.:.on, the government had 
o•Jerlooked the fact that the 3ill was a hybrid one that 
a.ffected private interests as well as matters of public 
policy. This meanc that it shoulc have been published well in 
advance in order that the private individuals and bodies 
concerned might be afforded an opportunity to state their 
views. 61 An amended Bill appeared later in the session without 
the clauses affecting private interests. This passed its 
second reading in May 1957. The bill was then referred to a 
select committee. 62 Owing to the prorogation of parliament, the 
committee recommended that a commission, consisting of the 
members of the committee, be established to conclude the 
investigation. On 19 August 1957 the Commission on the 
Separate University Training Bill was appointed to investigate 
and report on the provisions of the Separate University 
Training Bill, taking into account the principles contained 
therein as accepted in the second reading of the Bill. The 
Commission reported on this in 1958. The essence of its report 
was that many educated Africans were not serving their 
communities because they had been educated along Eu.r-opean 
lines. As they were underdeveloped people who lacked the sense 
of responsibility, initiative or necessary knowledge to found 
and control their own universities, the government had to do 
it if it was in earnest about the full development of the 
Bantu. Owing to the need for leaders in many fields the whole 
development plan would collapse if they were not available in 
large numbers. The "open" universities were inadequate. 
Consequently separate university colleges should be 
established on an ethnic basis with the object of each group 
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serving its own community, guiding and developing the group i~ 
all respects, and training their students to "realize their 
duty towards a greater South Africa and to humanity as a whole 
and to maintain a balanced outlook". The state had a duty to 
ensure that they should undergo a sound process of development 
and not to remain at an inferior level. Moreover, they should 
serve the black section of the population just as the white 
universities served their communities.~ 
State control was regarded as ideal because the state, "as 
guardian of the non-Europeans, had taken the initiative to set 
up the university colleges and was responsible for their 
success". This control was supposed to be temporary only 
during the formative years. Eventually it would be transferred 
to the councils of the university colleges which would then 
exercise the powers which had previously been exercised by the 
council of an autonomous university. Full university status 
would ultimately be accorded to the black university colleges 
as soon as they were mature enough to manage their own 
affairs.~ 
The minority report took a different view to the problem. The 
minority members were not convinced that a university can 
fulfil its true function only if its aims and aspirations were 
specifically based upon the needs of the community it has to 
serve. They agreed rather with a memorandum submitted by the 
University of the Witwatersrand which stated: 
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"The University ho:ds the view t:}1at there is only 
one basic type or ki~1d of genuine university 
education and that all those who attend a 
university should, broadly speaking and in 
spite of their respective racial, 
cultural differences, receive 
education and training ... 
the 
The 
religious or 
same kind of 
Witwatersrand 
University as a South African university is well 
aware of the fact that no university and least of 
all no South African university functions in 
racial, religious or cultural vacuum ... While 
differences 
theme, the 
do impose variations upon a common 
theme itself is the same for all 
universities." 65 
The minority report rejected ethnic grouping and the design 
for separate councils and senates. It advocated the creation 
of autonomous councils which had the power to appoint, subject 
to the approval of the minister, its own staff. It also 
recommended the association of the black colleges with South 
African universities and that the closing of ''open" 
universities be postponed for ten years. Moreover, it 
specified that the Minister of Education had to take charge of 
the new university colleges because not to do that would make 
it difficult to maintain the same standards.~ 
The Extension of University Education Bill was introduced in 
parliament without prior consultation with either the 
University Advisory Committee or the Committe~ of University 
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Principals. The Extension of University Education Act67 was 
passed in 1959 despite heated opposition from the opposition 
parties. This act was a misnomer as it restricted rather than 
extended university education. The act provided for two 
racially separated councils for each university college. The 
council of the college would consist of whites only and an 
advisory council would consist exclusively of blacks.~ The 
purpose thereof was to prevent any racial integration in the 
councils. It was envisaged that when the black advisory 
council had been trained, the two groups would exchange 
roles. 69 There was, however, no mechanism built into the 
councils which could enable the advisory council eventually to 
take full responsibility over the affairs of the university. 
Each council had power to appoint, promote or discharge staff 
in certain academic posts.~ 
In terms of the Transfer Act,n the University College of Fort 
Hare was transferred to the Minister of Bantu Education as 
from January 1960. The new university colleges commenced their 
activities between 1960 and 1961. The University College of 
the North, with its seat at Turfloop, was supposed to serve 
the Sotho, Tswana and Venda groups; the University College of 
Zululand, with its seat at Ngoya, was supposed to serve the 
Zulu and Swazi groups; the University College for Indians, 
with its seat in Durban, had to serve the Asiatic group; and 
the University College of the Western Cape, with its seat in 
Bellville, was to serve the coloured group. The University 
College of Fort Hare, at Alice, had to serve the Xhosa group. 
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Initially the relationship between the council and the senate 
was rather tenuous.n There were two senates, the senate made 
up of white lecturers and an advisory senate consisting of 
black lecturers. 7~ Once again the purpose of this was to 
forestall any racial mixing in accordance with the 
government's policy of apartheid. The advisory senate 
discussed everything but senate matters. It did not advise the 
senate, nor did its agenda have any academic content. 
Moreover, there were no advisory faculty boards to give 
substance to its deliberations. Although both black and white 
staff members taught the same black students, they could not 
sit jointly and plan curricula or to discuss the achievement 
and progress of their students. The whole situation "could be 
regarded as a travesty of university education. 1174 Moreover, it 
was a serious infraction of university autonomy and academic 
freedom. 
In terms of the Extension of University Education Act the 
Minister of Bantu Education had wide powers in relation to the 
black university colleges. He was empowered to appoint the 
rector. 75 The council could acquire stores and equipment 
subject to the conditions stipulated by the minister.n The 
minister also had the power to determine the faculties and 
departments and to prescribe courses to be offered; 77 he 
determined the number of students to be registered;n he also 
determined the ethnic group(s) of students to be registered;~ 
he granted bursaries and loans to students;" he decided on the 
establishment and classification of posts on the 
establishment ; 81 he was empowered to appoint:, promote and 
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discharge persons at: :~he college ; 8" and he determined the 
conditions of service of the scaff .~ 
The effect of these was that the university colleges were 
outposts of the Department of Bantu Education. The management 
and control of the univers~ty was overly centralized in the 
person of the minister. The management structure of the 
university college therefore did not grow out of its own 
philosophical foundation. 8~ Moreover, these colleges had no 
autonomy whatever. Academic freedom could also not flourish 
under such conditions. 
In terms of the 1959 act, blacks could not attend white 
universities except under specific conditions and with the 
approval of the Minister of Education, Arts and Science. 85 
Sections 31 and 32 stipulated that no black student who was 
not registered at an established university when the act came 
into operation might attend such a university without the 
consent of the responsible minister. These sections did not 
apply to the University of South Africa which offered 
correspondence courses or to the Natal Medical School. 
Contravention of one of these sections was made an offence 
punishable by a fine of R2 o o or by imprisonment for six 
months. In order to ensure the maintenance of academic 
standards the university colleges had to write the 
examinations of the University of South Africa. The problem 
with this arrangement was that there was no formal 
relationship between the senates or faculty boards of these 
institutions. Contact between them was confined to the level 
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of academic departments. Although the ~niversity colleges had 
to teach the syllabuses of the University of South Africa and 
conduct examinations approved by it, there is no evidence of 
the management role UNISA played ~n the teaching or research 
programmes of these colleges. The only role UNISA played in 
staffing was confined to the selection of applicants for 
appointment in academic posts. There were no staff development 
programmes or academic support programmes. Moreover, the 
approach of UNISA to teaching was based on distance teaching 
as opposed to the teaching approach of the colleges which, as 
residential institutions, was premised on the interface 
between lecturers and students.~ 
The establishment of separate university colleges resulted in 
a dual system of state-controlled university ins ti tut ions 
which existed alongside state-aided universities. 87 It put paid 
to the whole concept of university autonomy. Even the 
historically white universities were restricted on who to 
admit as students. The debate that accompanied the passage of 
the bill was of a political nature. Support for the 
legislation was based on race and ideology. It was premised on 
the desire on the part of the government to make provision for 
black students in separate institutions which could develop 
towards independence on their own bases. It was also contended 
that this would enable blacks to develop fully on what was 
"peculiarly their own" and they would be the "bearers of their 
own culture to stimulate the culture among their own national 
groups". Moreover, future leaders would be trained there not 
to break down the colour bar but to retain it in the best 
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interests of both whites and blacks. This was based on the 
opposition to all sorts of social integration which could flow 
from integration at university. Such integration would be 
disastrous for South Africa because it would be dominated by 
black masses. The state as a guardian, the argument further 
continued, was establishing the separate institutions because 
the respective communities could not be expected to do iti the 
white guardian had to help their development along 'right 
lines' until the black communities were ready to acquire full 
control. 88 
The Extension of University Education Act was severely 
criticized both inside and outside parliament for a variety of 
reasons. 89 It was criticized for instance for depriving 
universities of the right to determine their admission 
policies and thus infringing their autonomy. The University of 
Cape Town, on 29 July 1959, consequently dedicated itself to 
freedom of association and to the right 11 to determine who 
shall be taught, who shall teach, what shall be taught, and 
how it shall be taught in this University, and to strive to 
regain the right to determine who shall be taught, without 
regard to any criterion except academic merit".~ On 26 July 
1960 a bronze plaque which recorded the deprivation of its 
academic freedom was erected in the lobby of the university 
library. It was unveiled by the chancellor the Hon Dr A van de 
Sandt Centlivres. The spirit of protest was kept alive by the 
inauguration of academic freedom addresses at the "open 11 
universities. In 1959 the University of Cape Town instituted 
the T B Davie Memorial Lecture, an annual lecture on the theme 
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of academic freedom "to keep be:ore ::he University a ' ' reminaer 
of the seriousness of its loss, to keep alive its faith that 
the lost freedom will one day be restored, and to keep its 
members vigilant lest further inroads into the remaining 
freedoms should be made." A number of distinguished speakers 
delivered this lecture, starting from the Chancellor the Hon 
Dr A van de Sandt Centlivres. This lecture was supplemented by 
the address on the Day of Affirmation of Academic and Human 
Freedom of the Students' Representative Council.~ In 1968 a 
second plaque was unveiled. It recorded that in that year the 
right of appointing teachers at the discretion of the 
university alone had been removed. The University re-dedicated 
itself to the "constant opposition to all forms of academic 
segregation on racial grounds".n 
The University of the Witwatersrand reacted in a similar way. 
In 1961 a plaque was unveiled at a formal ceremony which 
declared: 
"We affirm in the name of the University of the 
Witwatersrand that it is our duty to uphold the 
principle that a university is a place where men 
and women, without regard to race and colour, are 
welcome to join in the acquisition and advancement 
of knowledge; and to continue faithfully to defend 
this ideal against all those who have sought by 
legislative enactment to curtail the autonomy at 
the University. Now therefore we dedicate ourselves 
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to the maintenance of chis ideal and to the 
restoration of the autonomy of our University. 1193 
In the same year the university declared that it would hold a 
triennial public lecture to be known as "The Chancellor's 
Lecture" when it would pledge itself co the above ideal. This 
lecture was delivered by a number of eminent speakers from 
here and abroad. It was supplemented by the Students' 
Representative Council's Annual Richard Feetham Memorial 
Lecture to fill the gap between the chancellor's lectures. 
These were further complemented by the National Union of South 
African Students (NU SAS) lectures on Academic Freedom and 
Human Freedom. These lectures were delivered on the various 
English-speaking campuses. The tenth anniversary of the 
passing of the Extension of University Education Act was 
marked by protest and solemn meetings. At the University of 
the Witwatersrand this led to a confrontation with the police 
and to the arrest and prosecution of nineteen students for 
distributing pamphlets condemning university segregation.~ 
Although the reaction of these universities was laudable, it 
was to some extent an exaggeration as previously they had not 
pursued a completely non-racial policy to the treatment of 
black students. Although the University of Cape Town had never 
officially adopted a policy of excluding black students on 
racial grounds, the same could not be said of the University 
of the Witwatersrand. Even the University of Cape Town had 
bowed down to the pressure of the Provincial Administration on 
the use of provincial hospitals for the clinical training of 
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black students. Here segregatio~ was used. African students 
were not admitted to the medical faculty of the university. In 
1912 an Indian who had wanted to be admitted to the medical 
faculty had been persuaded to go elsewhere. The university had 
to accommodate the sensibilities of the white patients and the 
attitude of the white nurses." 
In 1927 the white nurses in Mafeking went on strike against Dr 
Silas Molema, a practitioner and graduate of Glasgow 
University. Their action was supported by country doctors. As 
a result of this the Cape Provincial Administration adopted a 
regulation to the effect that doctors on the staff of a 
hospital would require permission in writing from the hospital 
in order to have access to the hospital for the purpose of so 
attending patients.% 
Admittedly the University of the Witwatersrand did :-10t 
officially adopt a policy of excluding students on the grounds 
of race or colour. Its first principal, Jan Hofmeyr, had 
stated in his inaugural address that the University should be 
open to all groups of the com~unity irrespective of class, 
wealth, race or creed. But when the question of the admission 
of non-whites arose in 1925, as a result of a coloured student 
who had applied for admission to the medical school in 1926, 
legal advice confirmed that the university act and statute did 
not prohibit a black student. Although the admission of this 
student caused "little trouble", the registrar of the 
university, H van der Brugge, intimated to the secretary for 
Education in 1927, "chiefly owing to the discreet attitude of 
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the student himself", that it was nonetheless anticipated that 
"considerable friction may arise, both amongst the students 
and also possibly between coloured students and members of the 
staff, when one of the =ormer should enter the second year of 
study, which embraces the subjects of Anatomy and 
Physiology. "97 
In 1926 the university had appointed a committee "to ascertain 
what procedure (was) necessary to empower the university to 
exclude students on the grounds of colour". Apparently the 
council was reluctant to take the steps itself but wanted the 
government to exclude black students from white universities 
or to make available separate facilities especially for the 
training of medical students. The Hertzog government refused 
to do this, arguing that it was the university's prerogative 
to do this. 98 
When the government appointed a committee in 1·927 to enquire 
into the training of "Natives in Medicine and Public Health" 
under the chairmanship of C T Loram, the council of the 
University of the Witwatersrand testified before the Loram 
Committee and stated that the university was not averse to the 
training of black students for the medical profession provided 
they were taught in separate classes although the training 
would be the same as for whites.~ It was Dr C Louis Leipoldt, 
a leading Afrikaans poet and editor of the Journal of the 
Medical Association of South Africa who put the council of the 
university to shame by publishing an article in the journal of 
22 December 1928 where he said: "We work and live alongside of 
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and in close proximity to natives in all phases of our life, 
and do not find any great dif£iculty in doing so. Deep down in 
our hearts we have no real antipathy to the native. Why, as 
educated university men, do we not act as true citizens of the 
Universities and throw our portals open wide to anyone, 
whatever his colour, who satisfies the same conditions as the 
European? 11100 
Despite these protestations white prejudice won the day. The 
Transvaal Provincial Council passed a Public Hospitals 
Ordinance, 18 of 1928 which empowered hospital boards to 
disallow any registered medical practitioner to have access to 
any public hospital or any specified portion thereof. This 
ordinance was later used to exclude non-white medical students 
from the wards of Johannesburg General Hospital and enabled 
the university to exclude non-whites from its medical 
school. 101 
In 1931-33 the university was again confronted with requests 
for admission to the medical school of two individuals 
11 obviously of native birth 11 , A Mtimkulu and R J Xaba. Both of 
them could not be admitted on the grounds that the university 
could not provide them with appropriate clinical training. 
Although the board of the Johannesburg General Hospital was 
willing to allow these students to work in the non-European 
wards, the university authorities feared the "social 
implications of a possibly far-reaching character". The 
university wanted the government to bear the responsibility 
for non-admission.~ 
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In June 193 2 the principal of the university, H R Raikes, 
wrote to the secretary for education on behalf of the senate. 
He pointed out that the senate wanted to bring to the notice 
of the minister of education that they were receiving an 
increasing number of applic'""tions from "coloured and native 
students" but the government had not laid down a clear policy 
for university councils to follow. The government, however, 
did not interfere in this matter. He also wrote to the Student 
Representative Council allowing student societies to invite 
black visitors from time to time, subject to strict rules such 
as the provision of separate seating. He reserved the right to 
refuse permission for blacks to attend a meeting if he 
considered that there might be a potential for racial 
friction. 103 
In 1934, however, the university moved towards a more open 
policy. At first this was done cautiously. The annual report 
of the university council of that year stated: 
"In the course of the year several enquiries were 
received from, or on behalf of, prospective 
students of Indian, Coloured and Native birth. 
·Since the Act and Statutes of the University do not 
make mention of differences of colour or race 
it may therefore be expected that in the near 
future, students belonging to these categories will 
offer themselves for the various courses of study. 
It is hoped that the exercise of tact and 
discretion will avoid the difficulties which are 
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sometimes attendant upon the closer contact of the 
various races. "iw 
There were vario~s reasons which compelled the University of 
the Witwatersrand (WITS) to adopt a more open policy on the 
admission of black students. One of these was the pressure of 
white liberal opinion which pressed for the open admission of 
black students. The other factor was the change of government. 
The government had a liberal minister of interior, education 
and public health, Jan Hofmeyr who was the former principal 
and vice-chancellor of Wits and who favoured that Wits should 
open its doors to black students. In spite of these pressures 
it cannot be said that Wits had thrown its door wide open to 
black students although "it had nudged the door ajar". Black 
students remained few and they continued to be denied access 
to clinical training at the medical clinic of the 
university. 10$ 
Although in 1935 a number of blacks were admitted to the 
university, including a post-graduate to the medical school, 
they were still debarred from medical studies. It was only in 
1938 that the university relaxed this prohibition somewhat by 
admitting three Indian students to the medical school on 
condition that they would do three years of their study at the 
university and for the remainder they would have to go 
overseas. 
In 1939, however, an uncle of one of the students approached 
J H Hofmeyr, who was then chancellor with a request that the 
~ ... , ,..., 
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student be allowed to complete his st~dies at the university. 
Hofmeyr conveyed the request council. The council 
regrettably turned down t:ne request. "under the present. 
circumstances". Int.he following year the students approached 
the board of the Johannesburg Hospital which permitted them to 
attend the "Non-European war::ls". This it did without 
consulting the university. The university had then to allow 
the students to continue with their studies.™ 
Not only in the admission of black students was the university 
hesitant, but also in the appointment of blacks as academic 
staff. A typical example is that of B W Vilakazi who in 1935 
was appointed as a language assistant in the Department of 
Bantu Studies. The appointment had been "sanctioned after some 
furious infighting at Senate and Council". It sparked off a 
great deal of controversy which forced the Senate committee to 
issue a press statement that the appointment was subject to 
certain conditions. His status was not that of a lecturer; 
students would not be compelled to consult him and he would 
have no disciplinary authority over students. Regrettably 
Vilakazi was never elevated to the status of lecturer at that 
university despite his obtaining a D.Litt in 1946.m 
From this account it is clear that, as Welsh and Savage point 
out: 
"the admission of black students had been for both 
institutions a matter of acquiescence, rather than 
an active concern to promote any kind of racial 
.. 
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'integra ti.on' . The universities were deeply 
conscious of powerful segregationist norms in the 
white community outside, and were accordingly 
reluctant ~o go any further than permitting black 
students to 'academic equality' while seeking to 
preserve social segregation inside each 
institution. Various awkward formulae for this 
incongruous dichotomy were p::::-oduced. 11108 
As a typical example of this the authors refer to a statement 
of principles published in 1957 by the "open" universities 
where they said: 
"Segregation is only applied at what may be 
described as the purely social or non-academic 
level: that is to say, it is applied at the 
university residences, dances and sports. The open 
universities believe that practice in these matters 
depends on the conventions of the community in 
which these universities exist. Moreover non-white 
students have not clamoured for changes and the 
vast majority of them value their membership in 
spite of the element of social segregation."~ 
The history of the University of Natal when it comes to the 
admission of black students is hardly inspirir.g. From 1916 to 
1936 Indian applicants had been refused admission. When the 
university was ultimately forced by a threat of a court order 
to admit two Indian candidates who had obtained articles of 
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clerkship and required tuiticn for the Natal Attorney's 
Admission Examination, this was provided in separate classes. 
Parallel classes were arranged during the period 1939-41. This 
was discontinued when the war broke out. 1w 
Even when part-time classes were provided by the university 
for non-white teachers, the council would not allow mixed 
classes. The teaching staff consisted partly of lecturers who 
belonged to the Natal University College and part::.y of 
graduate teachers who were in full-time employment of the 
Natal Education Department. This was regarded as a temporary 
measure as an Indian college was being envisaged. 111 
Although there were isolated cases of non-white students who 
attended full-time classes for whites, this was done 
clandestinely. In 1952 the Department of History and Political 
Science declared openly to the university authorities that the 
"non-European classes 
University life, not 
were part 
a kind of 
of the main stream 
hole-and-corner effort 
of 
to 
provide special coaching for workers". 112 This did not receive 
any enthusiastic support from the university. The university 
largely bowed to white prejudice against non-whites . 113 At the 
Medical School only blacks were allowed and although there was 
no prohibition against white students, no white students were 
admitted by 1952 at a time when apartheid had affected all 
university education. 114 
The above exposition is not meant to drag skeletons out of the 
cupboard, nor to embarrass the universities concerned. It is 
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merely to point out that the view chat these universities were 
always open is not true. They were obviously subject to the 
pressure of white public opinion at the time. No university 
can exist in a vacuum. White prejudice of the time could not 
countenance integration even at university level. This is not 
unique. Welsh and Savage point out that: 11 (e) ither the 
university is rooted in a particular segment of the population 
and becomes their symbol of inte~lectual awakening; or the 
university may seek to straddle the ethnic cleavages, when it 
may well become a battleground for its own possession. Rarely, 
it would appear, is the university able to remain aloof from 
the powerful, and often divisive forces of nationalism in the 
society in which the university is situated."m 
After referring to a number of examples to substantiate this 
point of view the authors conclude in the following ter~s: 
"In all of the situations referred to above, 
universities have displayed little or no ability to 
act as agents of integration and reconciliation or 
as broker institutions where they exist in divided 
societies. In fact it may well be that 
universities, staffed partly or wholly by 
nationalist-minded intellectuals teaching readily 
mobilised student bodies, have heightened rather 
than diminished outside conflicts." 1ffi 
Similarly, the South African university system has been shaped 
by ethnic, racial and geographical factors and "has arisen in 
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a society whose deep cleavages and inequalities, between 
Afrikaner and English as well as between white and black, need 
no recitation here. "117 
It might be contended that although these universities had 
shown reluctance to admit black students, at least they had 
not formally adopted a policy Qgainst the admission of black 
students. Admittedly that is so, but the same can be said of 
the other historically white universities which had never 
admitted black students. Although they had never adopted a 
formal policy to that effect, they excluded black students by 
virtue of convention. 
This argument is not intended to convey the impression that 
there was no distinction between the two types of historically 
white universities. Concededly there was. But it was not a 
formal one. The distinction is that whereas both types of 
university had the power to admit black students, the one type 
of university never exercised that power in favour of black 
students whereas the other type of university sometimes 
exercised it in favour of these students. There was, however, 
no uniformity among the latter group of universities on the 
treatment of black students after admission. 
The National Party government therefore did what some of these 
universities had asked the previous government to do, namely 
to exclude black students formally by statute. They had in 
vain attempted to pass the buck. Their subsequent reaction 
therefore is a question of political posturing rather than 
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action out of conviction. This, however, does not mean that 
what the government did was commendable. What the government 
then did is still open to criticism on the grounds that it 
stifled development towards open universities. It was also an 
unwarranted interference with the cherished values of 
university autonomy and academic freedom. 
The above is not merely a scurrilous attack against the "ope:!.1 11 
universities. Mrs Helen Suzman in 1959 admitted in parliament 
that if these universities openly admitted black students they 
could experience a backlash from the white community. In her 
words: 
"I have the utmost confidence in the sense of 
responsibility of the authorities at these open 
universities, who have always themselves been 
mindful of the traditions and conventions ~n South 
Africa. I have no reason to believe that they will 
be unmindful of those conventions in future. 
Indeed, if they attempted to breach the accepted 
mores of South African society they would soon find 
that the parents would refuse to send their 
children to these universities." 118 
To the credit of Mrs Suzman, however, it should be pointed out 
that she did not condone these conventions and anticipated 
their eventual alteration. As she put it: 
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"They will ctange as the So:..:.th .L\frican traditions 
and conventions change, and ! have every reason to 
believe ~hat in future whe~ we overcome this sad 
period of darkness through which we are going at 
present, South Africar.. traditions will change, I 
hope, in a progressive direc~ion. 11119 
As has been said this account of the "open" historically white 
universities is not meant to condemn them for criticizing the 
Extension of University Education Act or to castigate them for 
even making this imperfect attempt while turning a blind eye 
to those white universities which, although they had the 
power, never admitted black students. It is merely to point 
out that universities in South Africa, have always been 
ethnic. Whatever autonomy these universities had possessed 
previously had not been used maximally in favour of the 
admission and equality of treatment of black students in all-. 
respects. The move towards open universities is therefore a 
"long haul" . It has been fraught with problems based on 
societal prejudices of the time. 
3.5.5 The case for the "open" universities 
Apart from the inconsistency displayed by the "open" 
universities, it must be conceded that they had a formidable 
case to present for university autonomy and academic freedom. 
This case cannot be faulted on its merits and deserves a 
detailed exposicion. On 12 December 1956 the council of the 
University of Cape Town resolved that: 
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11 ( i) It is opposeC:. in pr ::..nciple to a::ademic segregation on 
racial groun:is; 
(ii) It believes separate academic facilities for 
Europeans and non-Europeans could not be equal to those 
provided in an open university; 
(iii) It is convinced that the policy of academic 
non-segregation, which as far as possible the 
University of Cape Town has always followed, accords 
with the highest university ideals and has contributed 
to interracial understanding and harmony in South 
Africa; 
(iv) It desires that the University be permitted and enabled 
to carry on its functions under the same conditions as 
hitherto, and that nothing be done to change or impede 
the University's policy of academic non-segregation. 11120 
On 14 December 1956, the council of the University of the 
Witwatersrand took a similar resolution. It resolved that: 
" ( i) It is opposed in principle to legislative enforcement 
of academic segregation on racial grounds; 
(ii) In its view the policy of academic non-segregation 
accords with the highest university ideal and 
contributes to iEterracial understanding and harmony in 
South Africa; 
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(iii) It desires that the University be permitted and enabled 
to carry on its function under the same conditions as 
hitherto, and that nothing be done to change or impede 
the U!1iversity's ... ' .- - ' policy o: acaaemic non-segregation." i:i 
On 18 December 1956, these resoluti~ns were made public. I~ 
was also announced that the councils of the two universities 
had agreed to organize jointly a conference consisting chiefly 
of senior members of the academic staff of the two 
universities to prepare and publish a reasoned statement on 
the subject of the "open" universities in South Africa. It is 
this case that is being outlined. The essence of this case was 
that the legislative enforcement of academic segregation on 
racial grounds was an unwarranted interference with university 
autonomy and academic freedom, which in their opinion, were 
fundamental values not to be interfered with, except with the 
utmost circumspection. If the government contemplated such 
interference, it had the onus to justify its proposed action 
in clear and irrefutable terms.m 
As a point of departure the two universities adopted and 
endorsed the views of the Holloway Commission on university 
autonomy and academic freedom. 123 They built upon these and 
drew the following conclusions. In their view the policy of 
academic non-segregation provided the ideal conditions under 
which the pursuit of truth and the promotion of racial harmony 
could best be advanced. To impose academic apartheid on them 
would deprive the South African community as a whole, both 
white and black, of an invaluable service. This was a serious 
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violation of uni versi ':y autcncmy· e:<.:-1d academic freedom. The 
four pillars of academic freedom constituted an indivisible 
whole, namely the right to decide what may be taught, how it 
may be taught, who may teach, and who may study. !f one of 
them was violated, the others would also be adversely 
affected. If universities were compelled tc accept some 
non-academic criterion for the admission of students, respect 
for university freedom would be diminished and no longer stand 
in the way of unwarranted outside interference on what may be 
taught in universities, how it may be taught and who may teach 
there. Moreover, a limitation on admission for other than 
academic reasons inhibited the search for truth which has been 
the chief endeavour of universities since the Middle Ages. 
Universities in the Middle Ages were cosmopolitan in nature. 
The diversity in the membership of the university community 
contributed to the discovery of truth, 11 for truth is hammered 
out in discussion, in the clash of ideas."w 
If a university was coerced to accept a practice that was 
incompatible with its ideal, this was an infringement of 
academic freedom which not only adversely affected the 
intellectual climate where members of the university lived and 
worked, but which also created fear, fear that advances in 
knowledge may also be judged by irrelevant considerations. In 
such a situation the country would neither retain its best 
scholars nor succeed in attracting distinguished scholars from 
abroad. As Centlivres et al further put it: 
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"Truth is a hard mistress. T:'.·'"ose who are endowed 
with a talent to lead in the advancement of 
knowledge are limited in number. If I of this 
number, some are excluded fo:::- non-academic reasons 
- whether it be religion, sex, race or colour - or 
are kept out by the fear created by such a policy, 
the discovery of truth is hampered and the 
community loses the fruit of their talent. The 
I 
whole experience of eight: centuries of university 
life makes it clear that the loss is not only to 
the excluded group, but also to those excluding 
them. " 125 
The "open" universities wanted to remain open. They believed 
that the advantages which black students enjoyed under the 
policy of academic non- segregation far outweighed any 
disadvantages emanating from social segregation which entailed 
the exclusion of black students from certain sporting and 
social activities. As pointed out above, this was specious. 
Nonetheless these universities rejected the idea that they 
should be forced to close their doors to black students simply 
because they were not open enough. 126 
The "open" universities further rejected the notion that the 
presence of black students on their campuses led to the 
lowering of academic standards. On the contrary, they believed 
that their academic standards were not inferior to those of 
any other university in South Africa. They would always strive 
to maintain their academic standards. Nor were they disturbed 
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by the contention that if they continued their policy of 
admitting black students they would eventually become "black". 
This was because they had f ai t:h in the capacity of whi t:e 
people of South Africa to mair:tain their place in the 
intellectual life of the country. Racial diversity within the 
university, in their opinion, was essential to the ideal cf a 
university in a multi-racial society. They regarded it as 
their bounden duty to provide higher education to all t:hose 
who could benefit from it, irrespective of race or colour. 
That the racial composition of their students could alter in 
such a way that they became predominantly "black" was a remote 
possibility which did not perturb them and which was dependent 
on unforeseeable contingencies.m 
The "open" universities further rejected the argument that 
they should close their doors to non-white students on the 
ground that in being "open" they were in conflict with an 
established South African tradition. In their view apartheid 
was not the only relevant established tradition in the 
country. The tradition they followed was firmly rooted in the 
Cape Colony and was not only South African, but was also in 
line with the universality of Christendom. 128 In this they 
relied on the view of the Holloway Commission which said: 
"The position is . . . that the desirability of any 
restriction of university autonomy which may be 
proposed must be examined on its merits. Broad 
social considerations as well as those peculiar to 
a university are necessary to that end. 
-------------------
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Any limitation of a university's autonomy is, 
however, always a serious matter ... Restrictions 
must not be introduced unless they can be supported 
by reasons which should be regarded as overriding 
in the social sphere."rn 
The ''open" universities were of the opinion that a university 
is not merely organized for teaching, learning and research, 
but that it was based on certain fundamental and universally 
acknowledged ideals and traditions which formed part of the 
western way of life. These were the values and traditions they 
upheld and which formed part of Western European civilization 
long before the first European settlement was established at 
the Cape. The "open'' universities, although of recent origin 
as compared with the ancient universities of Western Europe, 
regarded themselves as members of an international community 
of universities, that was continuously enlarging itself along 
with the extension and diffusion "of our kind of civilization 
and culture ... It is by virtue of these universal ideals and 
traditions that a particular university may on occasion find 
itself in conflict with sectional interests or with a narrow 
interpretation of national loyalties and interests. When such 
conflicts do arise, as the result of pressure from outside, 
and a university is obliged to yield against its judgment, 
then we have a serious interference with its autonomy. 11130 
The "open" universities also felt that they not only had the 
right to resist any unwarranted inter£ erence, from the 
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government, but that they also had an obligation to do so 
unless they wanted to become party to the betrayal of their 
own ideals and traditions. As Centlivres et al further put "~· 
"These ideals and traditions demand the rejection 
of any policy involving the exclusion of students 
on racial grounds. To force a university to abandon 
its ideals and principles is to affront its dignity 
and to restrict its legitimate activities, a 
situation which no self-respecting university can 
accept with equanimity. As open universities view 
the matter, it is part of their function in a 
society such as ours to continue to represent and 
maintain ideals and principles upon which they have 
always taken their stand. In so doing they hold 
firmly to the view that they have rendered, and are 
rendering, a valuable service to human relations in 
a multiracial society, a service which is in the 
long-term interests of South Africa. 11131 
By bringing together students from all racial groups, the 
"open" universities saw themselves as playing a positive 
educative role for both black and white students. This was an 
exercise in race relations. Students were enabled not only to 
prepare themselves professionally, but also to be useful 
members of a multi-racial society. "Understanding, tolerance, 
sympathy, a capacity for seeing the other man's point of view 
all these are different ways of expressing the same 
fundamental fact that if a multiracial society is to survive, 
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what it needs above all else is a humane and civilized people. 
For the young white men and women who enter an open university 
there is an unrivalled opportunity to acquire an educated, 
humane and civilized point of view on race relations. There 
they have the opportunity of meeting (possibly for the first 
time in their experience) a racial situation in which the 
usual relations between white and non-white do not obtain. 
This experience should help to broaden their minds, and 
mind-broadening is one of those exercises that every 
university should provide for its students."rn 
Ref erring to the adage that he who pays the piper calls the 
tune, as a justification for compulsory university apartheid 
on the grounds that the government was heavily subsidising 
university education and therefore entitled to dictate terms, 
in line with its policy, the two universities rejected this as 
imprecise. In their opinion no government would be justified 
in using its control over the national purse as a lever for 
such a purpose. This was so because all sections of the 
population contributed to the national income including 
university endowments. It was the taxpayer that should call 
the tune and the taxpayer was not only white. State 
interference with the way in which universities select their 
students is bad in principle and dangerous in tendency. It 
could not be advocated for any university in the country. 1" 
Government interference with the university autonomy and 
academic freedom was regarded as obnoxious because it 
frustrated the university in fulfilling its functions. These 
193. 
functions could not be fulfilled u~less members were left free 
to pursue knowledge. The pursuit of knowledge and truth would 
hardly be possible if ideas and discoveries were not 
communicated to others. s~ch kno~ledge would be lost and the 
labour wasted. The clash of ideas was conducive to the 
creation of new knowledge. In the words of Centlivres et al: 
"There is no substitute for the clash of mind 
between colleague and colleague, between teacher 
and student, between student and student. It is 
here, that is found, in its most intense form, the 
stimulus of the new, the exciting and the 
different. It is here that the half-formed idea may 
take shape, the groundless belief be shattered, the 
developing theory be tested by the criticisms of 
one's fellows. It is here that controversy 
develops, and out of controversy, deeper 
understanding. For challenge is as essential to 
knowledge as to life. This is why discussion may be 
most fruitful when it begins with disagreement, and 
when it is conducted between persons from different 
environments, holding different beliefs, and 
approaching problems from different standpoints. 
For knowledge is not advanced through conformity: 
without the continuous need to defend his 
convictions from the attacks of the unconvinced, 
the sceptic, or even the heretic, the individual 
has little protection against the dangers that his 
own prejudices may bring into his own thinking. It 
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is as a product of this disputat~on among different 
persons that new questior:s a::::-e asked and new 
answers tested. " 134 
The "open" universities also rejected the claim that separate 
but equal university facilities could be provided. In this 
they relied on the American decision where the 
separate-but-equal doctrine had been rejected as being 
inherently contradictory. 13" The bas is of the reject ion was 
that the separate-but-equal doctYine ignored factors which 
matter most, namely factors which could not be assessed in 
physical or monetary terms. 136 As Centl i vres et al further 
pointed out: 
"The real disintegration of the 'separate but 
equal' doctrine came when it was realized that a 
university cannot be treated as if it were a public 
amenity. There are factors and spiritual values 
which cannot be weighed and measured, and these are 
the ones that matter most. The ethos of the 
university and the professional reputation of 
particular faculties cannot be assessed in physical 
or monetary terms. Gradually it was realized in the 
United States that segregated education, to the 
extent that it entailed a restriction of choice in 
these matters for Negroes, entailed inequality. 
With this realization the doctrine fell by its own 
inherent and inevitable weakness. In 1950 the 
importance of 'intangible considerations' was 
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unmistakably recognized and made the basis of a 
decision which condemned certain segregated 
educational facilities as being 'unequal' . And 
finally in 1954 in a now famous judgment the United 
States Supreme Court unanimously declared that: 'in 
the field of public education the doctrine of 
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal'. 11137 
As has already been said, this was a formidable argument. The 
significance of the case presented by the ''open" universities 
is that it focused attention on the central role to be played 
by the university. It also provided the first comprehensive 
exposition of university autonomy and academic freedom in 
South Africa. It further developed the tentative ideas on 
these concepts expressed by the Holloway Commission. In the 
course of this, these universities articulated the salient 
features of university autonomy and academic freedom. Clear 
parameters were set to what is permissible government action 
in relation to the universities. Moreover, it constituted an 
unequivocal rejection and refutation of enforced academic 
apartheid as being incompatible not only with the role of the 
university, but also as being a violation of university 
autonomy and academic freedom. These universities demonstrated 
that a university should not be a "hand-maiden" of the 
government, but should challenge the government when it 
oversteps the line of what is legitimate involvement in 
university affairs. In the process these universities had to 
influence others. They also had to make a painful 
·--------------------~ 
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re-evaluation of cheir own practices to bring them in line 
with what they professed. As a result steps were taken, where 
the law permitted, to extend all university facilities to all 
students, irrespective of race. DL.:ring the debate on the 
Extension of University Education Act, the ''open" universities 
had been criticized by government spokesmen who had contended 
that black students had been denied full education at these 
universities because of the policy that restricted certain 
social activities and many sporting events to white 
students. 138 
Despite the forceful case presented by the "open" 
universities, the government was not deterred, but continued 
to pass and to implement the 1959 Act. As has been said, this 
piece of legislation had various implications for universities 
and university education in general. It may be necessary to 
add a few to those already referred to. The multi-racial 
nature of "open" universities was altered. Black students 
diminished at these universities and this led to further 
deterioration of attitudes between black and white students. 
Those students who had commenced studying at these 
universities in 1959 or earlier were allowed to continue with 
their courses, provided they qualified in terms of ordinary 
university regulations applicable to all students for 
re-admission. After 1959 black students were admitted to these 
universities only with the consent of the responsible 
minister. This meant that permission would generally be 
granted where no alternative facilities existed at the black 
university colleges.m 
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The 1959 Act effectively restricted the right of universities 
to decide who to admit as students. Students at the 11 open" 
universities refused to approve segregated societies on their 
campuses. In 1965 for instance, the constitution of the newly 
formed Conservative Students' Association was rejected by the 
SRC and the council of the University of Cape Town on the 
grounds that it contravened the existing SRC constitution, 
which stipulated that membership of s~udent societies should 
be open to all students. This attracted the reaction of the 
Minister of Education, who threatened that the government 
would intervene if the university authorities persisted with 
this. Later in the year the University Amendment Bill and the 
Extension of University Education Amendment Bill were 
introduced. The first one prohibited discrimination against 
any person at any university on the grounds that he advocated 
or practised racial separation. Should the minister be 
satisfied that such discrimination had taken place he might 
compel the university council to remedy the matter by 
withholding grants-in-aid. The second Bill was intended to 
debar 11 non-white students'' from joining student associations 
consisting largely of whites. When the council of the 
University of Cape Town had introduced a new constitution for 
the SRC which modified the total prohibition by allowing 
societies to apply for recognition as racially segregated 
student organizations, these Bills were withdrawn. The dispute 
that ensued between the council and the SRC was resolved in 
1968 when the council permitted the SRC in its own standing 
orders to prohibit discrimination on racial grounds in the 
membership of societies, subject to the right of any society 
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to approach the council. The University of the Witwatersrand 
adopted a similar procedure.~ 
In 1968 the Universities Amendment Act 24 of 1968 extended the 
powers of the government to impose conditions for the grant of 
university subsidies. At the time t:he Minister of National 
Education denied that this was aimed at re-introducing the 
principles of the 1966 Bills. although he warned that such 
legislation would be introduced in future is necessary. 1~ 
The 1959 Act did not place any restrictions on who should 
teach at the universities. Africans, Coloureds and Asians were 
therefore appointed at some of the historically white 
universities. There was one occasion, however, where the 
government prevented the appointment of an African academic to 
the staff of the University of Cape Town. In 1968 Mr Archie 
Mafeje, who held the degree of MA from the University of Cape 
Town and who was then doing research at the University of 
Cambridge, was appointed as senior lecturer in social 
anthropology. This decision was rescinded after the council 
had been threatened by the Minister of National Education with 
legislation to prohibit this or any similar appointment. This 
led to a nine-day sit-in protest in the university 
administrative block by the students of the University of Cape 
Town. This protest spread to the University of the 
Witwatersrand although there the protest was intercepted by 
the intervention of the then Prime Minister, Mr B J Vorster.1~ 
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Undoubtedly the Extension of Univers~ty Education Act was open 
to criticism in more respects than one. As has been said, it 
may be criticized for the fact that it deprived those 
universities of the lever that they were gradually developing 
of admitting black students. also gave rise to other 
problems. Criticising this legislation Sir de Villiers Graaff 
expressed the fear that the university colleges established by 
this legislation would become 11 incubators for black 
nationalism, mass-produced Black Nationalism. "w And indeed 
his fears have been more than realized in later years. 
The black community obviously did not take kindly to this 
legislation. It, however, had no option. Apart from the 
critic ism levelled against it at the time, it has been 
criticised a number of years later by Nkabinde in the 
following words: 
11 This Act was viewed by many Africans as an 
encroachment upon their liberty because it deprived 
them of the right to choose where they wanted to be 
educated. It also sealed the fate of the "holy" 
alliance between education and Christianity which 
the African people had known for about 100 yeas. 
There was a firm suspicion in the minds of many 
African people that the said Act was designed to 
lower their standard of education. This view found 
support in the fact that the Extension of 
University Education Act was passed during the time 
when white politicians of the day believed in the 
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superiority of the white man. 'White supremacy' was 
generally accepted by a large section of the white 
population o: South Africa. Ir:. accordance with this 
belief, the South Africa::. Pa::::-liament could pass 
laws without first discussing them with people 
affected by such laws. The Ex~ension of University 
Education Act also followed closely upon the heels 
of the much-maligned Bantu Education Act. The 
Extension of University Education Act confirmed the 
fears of many people that education of the African 
people had gone beyond the pale. The Act was the 
last straw! 111.f.4 
Although the university colleges to which the Extension of 
University Education Act gave rise were often criticized as 
"bush colleges", they have weathered the storm and continued 
to exist up to today. Most of them have tried to shed the 
stigma of apartheid and they have made a contribution to the 
manpower needs of the country. But at the time this happened, 
the situation was uninspiring. 
Although the 1959 Act did not affect the appointment of staff 
in general, at some of the historically black universities it 
did. When Fort Hare was transferred to the Department of Bantu 
Education by the University College of Fort Hare Transfer Act 
eleven members of staff resigned.'~ This act not only put Fort 
Hare under the Department of Bantu Education, but it also had 
a twisted effect on the whole university set-up. The creation 
of a council and senate consisting of whites only and an 
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advisory council and advisory senate consisting of blacks 
only, had the ef feet that Prof Z K Matthews who had been 
acting principal and other African heads of departments who 
had sat on senate and had been elected members of the council, 
could no longer be such members but had become members serving 
in an advisory capacity. This also meant that the faculty 
members at Fort Hare who had enjoyed the academic freedom 
permitted at the other universities, ·became comparable in 
status to school teachers or civil servants; academic freedom 
was drastically curtailed and faculty members were precluded 
from taking part in any political activity. 146 When the 
transfer was effected the government did not consult the 
council to consider this drastic change. In the process of the 
transfer the principal Professor H R Burows and two other 
senior staff members were not re-appointed, while six other 
staff members were dismissed. On the issue of dismissals the 
Minister of Bantu Education was reported to have said: "I 
disposed of their services because I will not permit a penny 
of any funds of which I have control to be paid to any persons 
who are known to be destroying the Government's policy of 
apartheid. "147 
3.5.6 The development of black university colleges 
The new university colleges continued under the guardianship 
of the University of South Africa until they were granted full 
university status a decade after their establishment. 1~ With 
some minor alternations their structures largely remained the 
same. 
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These universities were still supposed to serve the national 
uni ts for which they were created. Seven years later the 
Medical University of Sout:hern Af:::-ica was established149 to 
serve black students in South Africa. The councils of these 
universities were given the discretion to admit students other 
than those for which these universities were created if they 
felt the admission was justified. But the first admission of 
any such student had to be subject to the approval of che 
Minister of Bantu Education. 150 White persons were precluded 
from registering as students of these universities.m 
The provisions of the Acts which constituted the historically 
black universities were largely similar.m Each university had 
a chancellor, 153 a rector and vice-chancellor, 154 a council, 155 an 
advisory council, 156 a senate 157 advisory senate, 158 joint 
committees of the council and the senate, academic staff 159 and 
registrar and administrative staff . 160 These universities did 
not enjoy an autonomy that was comparable with that of the 
other universities. The respective ministers responsible for 
the three different groups retained extensive powers over the 
appointment of the Rector and Vice-Chancellor, the staff, the 
promotion and discharge of members of staff and the approval 
of salary scales and conditions of service. Even the drawing 
up of regulations by the council required ministerial 
approval . 161 These universities also did not fall under the 
more important provisions of the Universities Act 162 which 
governed the other universities in the country. Their rectors 
for instance, were not members of the Committee of University 
Principals and the joint statutes that governed standards for 
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South African universities and facilitated inter-university 
mobility of students did not apply to ::hem. The students at 
these universities were regula::ed by rigorous rules of 
conduct . 163 
From the time the historically black universities were made 
largely autonomous, a number of developments took place which 
led to the attainment of greater autonomy. In 1973 in terms of 
the Black Universities Amendment Act 1(\.l provision was made for 
each unive~sity to establish branches at other places with the 
approval of the minister and in consultation with the 
council. 165 It was, however, stipulated that the university 
could not borrow money without the approval of the minister. 1~ 
The provisions relating to the council and the senate were 
amended by granting the council and the senate of each 
university the power to appoint committees of the council and 
the senate, which would consist of members of the council or 
the senate, as the case might be, and other members and to 
give powers and functions to these committees. The council or 
the senate would, however, not be divested of its powers and 
would be entitled to alter or set aside the decision of the 
committee at its next meeting . 167 
The Black Universities Amendment Act of 1977 1~ brought further 
changes to the acts of the various historically black 
universities by removing some of the obnoxious provisions 
which were remnants of the Extension of University Education 
Act. This act repealed the advisory council and the advisory 
senate and provided for the establishment of the 
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convocation. 169 This was an important step in moving away from 
the discriminatory practice of relegating black people to the 
advisory council and advisory senate which had no real powers. 
Provision was also made for the reconsti~ution of the council 
which gave black people representation on the councj 1. 170 It 
was provided that a vice-rector be a member of the council; 
provision was also made for four members to be appointed by 
the state president and three members to be elected by the 
senate. One or two persons had to represent the convocation 
and two or more persons had to represent the governments of 
the various ethnic groups served by each university. 171 The act 
further provided for the appointment of the rector or acting 
rector by the council with the concurrence of the minister. 172 
Further provision was made for the appointment of the 
vice-rector by the council with the concurrence of the 
minister. 173 
Provision was also made for the council to determine the 
establishment of the university. The creation or abolition of 
posts would, however, be subject to the approval of the 
minister. 174 Fees payable by a student had to be determined by 
the council with the concurrence of the minister in 
consultation with the minister of finance . 175 The Black 
Universities Amendment Act also repealed section 38 of the 
acts of the various historically black universities. This 
section provided for the delegation of powers by the minister 
to the secretary and to the council. 176 
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Although the Black Universities Amendment Act was a further 
process of change in the str~cture 0£ the historically black 
universities in that it swept away the moribund advisory 
councils and senate, it still left the management of the 
universities centralized in that the approval of the minister 
was required for a number of important decisions. Other 
restrictions were also left intact. The process of change had 
to be taken a step further by the Universities for Blacks 
Amendment Act of 1979. 177 
The act repealed the restriction imposed on each university to 
admit only persons of a specific black ethnic group and made 
provision for each university to admit every black person. 1n 
It also made provision that every person registered as a 
student would only be registered for one year or for such 
shorter period as determined by the council. His registration 
would be renewable at the end of each year. 179 The prohibition 
of the admission of white students was also repealed. 180 The 
council was empowered to admit non-black students with the 
permission of the minister which had to be in writing.u1 This 
meant that persons of all racial groups could now be admitted 
to these universities. 
The Universities for Blacks Amendment Act of 1982 112 made 
further amendments to the constitution of the council and the 
senate of the University of Zululand and repealed obsolete 
designations. The constitution of the councils and senates of 
the historically black universities were vested with greater 
responsibility and autonomy in relation to the internal 
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matters by the Tertiary Education (Education and Training) Act 
of 1984. 183 The staff of the u:iiversity is, for instance/ 
supposed to be determined by the council.™ 
The council was vested with the power to determine the 
conditions of service of the staff. m The council of each 
university was enjoined to submit an annual report to the 
. . t-m1n1 s ... er, of its proceedings and of the management of the 
university together with an audited financial statement of the 
previous year and any other information that he might require 
on the administration and finances of the university. 1~ 
The Universities for Blacks 1 Technikons (Education and 
Training) and Education and Training Amendment Act 187 effected 
further amendments to the structure of the historically black 
universities. Provision was made for the appointment of one or 
more vice-rectors by the council with the concurrence of the 
minister. The rector was empowered to delegate some of his 
powers to the vice-rector. 188 The council was also empowered to 
cancel the registration of a student if it considered it to be 
in the interests of the university.m 
In terms of the Universities and Technikons for Blacks, 
Tertiary Education (Education and Training) and Education and 
Training Amendment Act, 190 provision was made for the 
appointment of more than one registrar and more than one 
vice-rector. 1~ It was also provided that the vice-rectors be 
members of the council although, if there was more than one 
vice-rector, not more than two could be members of the 
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council. It further provided for the increased representation 
of donors on the council.m 
Perhaps the far-reaching amendments to the structure of the 
historically black universities were effected by the 
Universities (Education and Training) Amendment Act of 1987 . 193 
The act made the provisions of the Universities Act 194 
applicable to the management and control of the affairs of the 
historically black universities. Certain sections of the 
University of Zululand Act and the University of the North Act 
were repealed . 195 
In terms of the Universities and Technikons (Education and 
Training} Amendment Act of 1990, 196 provision was made for the 
appointment of an acting rector without the concurrence of the 
minister. Provision was also made for the appointment of the 
members of the council not by the State President but by the 
minister.m 
The development and the evolution of more autonomy for the 
historically black universities has largely been the same in 
respect of all these universities except for the University of 
Fort Hare, the act of which was last amended in 1980. These 
amendments have had the effect of bringing them in line with 
historically white ones. The University of the Western Cape 
had a new and revised act in 1983. 1~ The same applied to the 
University of Durban Westville. 199 There have been more recent 
amendments to make the historically black universities more 
democratic in their structures of governance. In the meantime 
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independent homelands like Bophuthat:swa:::-ia, Transkei and Venda 
established their own universities. With the establishment of 
the new democratic dispensation, these u~iversities have been 
re-incorporated, like the homela:::-ids of which they form part, 
into South Africa.~ 
In 1981 Vista University came into existence. 201 It would 
appear that this additional black university was established 
to provide a university for blacks in the urban areas, 
presumably with the purpose of easing the pressure for th~ 
demand of admitting black students into white universities. 
Moreover, the existing black universities are in the rural 
areas. This university would provide "more generous 
opportunities and more adequate facilities for the urban Black 
to receive tertiary training within their own residential 
areas. 11202 
From the above discussion it is quite clear that unlike their 
white counterparts, which were established as a result of the 
initiative and with the participation of the communities for 
which they were created, black universities were established 
not only without the consultation of the black communities for 
which they were meant, but they were also established against 
the opposition of those communities. 203 They were consequently 
imposed on those communities. This led to the legitimacy 
crisis which these universities have encountered. Moreover, 
these universities were exclusively in the control of white 
officials and did not enjoy any autonomy. This exacerbated the 
problem of legitimacy and has been regarded as being 
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responsible for instability at these universities.~ This was 
evidenced, among others, by the violence that erupted and the 
resultant burning down of the administration building and a 
portion of the chapel at the University of Zululand in 1976. 
These disturbances were also an expression of solidarity with 
the uprisings in Soweto. The South African Students' 
Organization was largely responsible for engineering the whole 
episode which was seen as a fight against the white 
oppressors. The reason behind the burning of the chapel was 
because it had been a gift from the NGK. The administration 
building was gutted because it was perceived as a symbol of 
the white establishment. 205 
For some of these reasons black academics have advocated the 
Africanisation of the black universities. 2~ In 1975 Dr R E van 
der Ross, a distinguished scholar of the coloured community 
was appointed rector of the University of the Western Cape.w-
Prof A C Nkabinde was appointed the first black rector of the 
University of Zululand in 1978 and Prof W M Kgware was 
appointed as the first black rector of the University of the 
North. These appointments have been followed by the rapid 
increase in the number of black senior staff at historically 
black universities. These developments demonstrate that the 
earlier policy of the government was short-sighted. Even 
Viljoen pointed out that it was wrong in the first instance to 
have vested the control of the black universities in white 
hands. He felt that in order for the university to be 
legitimized in the eyes and experience of the group concerned, 
two vital elements must be met: firstly, the university should 
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visibly be seen to be controlled by the group concerned 
itself; and secondly, members of the group should go to their 
university of their own free will and volition because they 
want to. 208 This is what the Afrika:::-1e;:- did when it came tc the 
Afrikaans universities. There was no compulsion. When black 
leaders were appointed as rectors of these universities, they 
could, however, not be wholly accepted because they were 
perceived as being part of the "establishment 11209 and had to 
contend with many difficulties. 
3.6 FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO WHITE UNIVERSITIES 
While various developments were taking place in the 
historically black universities, a different kind of 
development took place among historically white universities. 
In 1968 the government appointed a Commission of Enquiry into 
Universities in South Africa. 210 This commission was chaired by 
Mr Justice J van Wyk de Vries. Its terms of reference were "to 
inquire into and report, in so far as universities for Whites 
in the Republic of South Africa are concerned, on the 
educational, academic, financial and developmental aspects of 
universities, and on any other matters which the Commission 
deemed to be of importance ... " 
The commission had a very wide brief. Although the commission 
published an interim report in 1969 dealing with the 
subsidization scheme for financing universities and a second 
interim report in 1972 on certain non-academic activities of 
students, largely relating to student unrest, the main report 
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of the commission was published in 1974. .m Admittedly the 
commission was supposed to inquire into the position of white 
universities and not black universities. Its +: • " • .1...inaings and 
recommendations were, however, equally relevant to the black 
universities. 
The commission dealt with various aspects of universities 
under different headings. These included the nature and 
functioning of a university as an institution, student 
involvement, and finance and future policy in connection with 
the development of universities. It will not be possible to 
have a detailed discussion of all the findings and 
recommendations of the commission. Only the salient features 
thereof will be alluded to. 
3.6.1 The definition and nature of a university 
In giving attention to the definition of a university, the 
commission was confronted with two views. There was the view 
of the English-language universities which regarded a 
university as an autonomous community of teachers and students 
dedicated to "the search for or service of truth". According 
to the Commission this view exalted the university to a 
supra-national institution with its relationship with the 
state and society being purely incidental. A contrary view 
that emanated from especially the Afrikaans-language 
universities was to the effect that a university is very much 
part of the community and the relationship between the 
community, the state and academics was inextricably 
212. 
interwoven. ]1.fter an intensive consideration of these 
viewpoints, the commission concluded that a university is not 
a supranational institution that stands apart from the 
community and the state. On the contrary, i~ is an entity that 
comprises scholars, the community in which it is situated, 
society and the state. 211 It would appear that in making this 
evaluation the commission omitted to take into account the 
historical background to the universities especially in the 
Western world. The independence or autonomy of universities 
can be traced to the autonomy of the monasteries arid this 
autonomy was inherited by the universities in the Middle 
Ages. 213 
According to the commission, the nature of the university 
determines its function. The function of the university is 
essentially to advance learning by bringing to light the 
knowledge amassed through the ages, by systematising it, and 
by incorporating every facet into the various disciplines as a 
component of the whole structure of knowledge, and by new 
discoveries through investigation and research. This knowledge 
and research must be applied in society.™ 
3.6.2 The conscience clause 
The commission also considered the conscience clause which 
appears in the acts of a number of white universities. It 
stipulates that no test whatever of religious belief should be 
imposed on any person as a precondition to his becoming or 
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continuing to be a member of staff or student of the 
university. 
Although a number of submissions were made to the commission 
and advocated its abolition, the commission felt that the 
universities in South Africa did not take any action against 
teaching staff and students on r.he grounds of religious 
belief. In practice the conscience clause was an ineffectual 
measure that could easily be circumvented. 
The commission consequently concluded that a university should 
be free to determine its own character and direction. For that 
reason it should have the right to retain the conscience 
clause or to replace it with a modified or amended provision. 
If the conscience clause is replaced by another formula, a 
provision should be included to the effect that no person may 
be refused admission as a student on the grounds of his 
religious belief. 215 
3.6.3 University autonomy and academic freedom 
The commission also considered university autonomy and 
academic freedom. It defined university autonomy as involving 
the powers of self-government by the university in respect of 
its affairs free from extraneous regulation. It includes the 
academic, managerial and administrative aspects of the 
university. Academic freedom, on the other hand, is concerned 
with the working conditions and conditions of service of staff 
and students as regards teaching and learning, research, the 
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expression of opinions and publication. "'6 .Z;.ccording to the 
commission the autonomy of che university is not absolute. In 
South Africa in particular university autonomy is qualified by 
the nature of the university which circumscribes its capacity 
and function. It is also qualified by the fact that its 
essential structure unites scholars, ::he cornmuni ty, society 
and the state, all of which have to be taken into account in 
the exercise of all self-governing powers in order to preserve 
a harmonious equilibrium between them. It may further be 
qualified by the general law of the country or statutory law 
relating to its establishment and functioning.~' 
The nature and function of the university determine the 
content of its academic freedom. According to the commission 
this freedom is confined to the academic field. The academic 
freedom of the university as an institution consists of its 
power to regulate, organise and control all the facets of its 
academic function in its discretion without extraneous 
regulation by the state or society. This relates to the powers 
of the university to appoint academic staff, to lay down 
curricula and standards, to decide who must be admitted as 
students, to decide who should be taught and how and to strike 
a balance between teaching and research. 
The academic freedom of a teacher or student entails the 
intellectual freedom for each to exercise his respective 
functions. The teacher is at liberty to perform his teaching 
function according to his own conception of fact and truth, to 
express and publish his views, to study, investigate and do 
research of his own choice and to be free from discriminatory 
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treatment on the grounds of sex or convictions or any other 
impermissible grounds. The student is entitled to study, 
learn, do research and publish in intellectual freedom anc5. 
should not be discriminated against. This freedom, may be 
curtailed by the nature and function of the university or by 
the university itself in order to be able to carry out its 
functions more effectively. 218 
In addition to the views of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission it 
is important to point out that university autonomy and 
academic freedom trace their origin to the Middle Ages and 
they developed at more or less the same time. 219 It is also 
interesting to note that universities have always had to 
struggle to protect their autonomy and academic freedom from 
especially the church and the state.m 
3.6.4 The university and professional councils 
On the issue of the relationship between the university and 
professional councils, the commission was of the opinion that 
while this relationship was sound, the various professional 
councils had gained an increasing hold on the universities and 
were in a position to prescribe the contents of the training 
they require and how it should take place and at what level. 
The university obviously provides training for the various 
professions like accountancy, engineering, medicine, 
dentistry, nursing and surveying to mention a few. The 
professional councils which have been created by these 
professions lay down the basic requirements for admission to 
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their professions and codes of conduct. The commission was of 
the view that while it was necessary for universities to take 
account of the needs of the professional councils, there was a 
real danger of these councils dominating universities 
resulting in the subservience of the universities to these 
professional councils and 
function. The curricula of 
thereby diminishing their true 
the universities could then take 
too practical a bias. This the commission did not support.u1 
3.6.5 The university and the state 
The commission also paid attention to the relationship between 
the university and the state. It noted that while in the past, 
owing to there being few universities, there was less 
interference between the state and the universities, this was 
changed by the increase in the number of universities.m 
After considering a number of submissions on the relationship 
between the university and the state, the commission concluded 
that the two entities are interdependent although the state 
should not dominate the university. Each has a distinct sphere 
of operation. The state has to assist the university 
financially from public funds in order to enable it to carry 
out properly its function of teaching. This does not entitle 
the state to interfere in the university's sphere of activity 
or to prescribe to it what to do or not to do in relation to 
its real function of research and disseminating knowledge and 
information. But the growth of universities is dependent on 
the amount of funding from the government and it is the 
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government that determines this in the light of all the 
relevant factors in the national interest. Al though the 
subventions to universities and the methods of calculating and 
allocating them were sound, the commission felt that there 
were shortcomings and discrepancies. 
The extensive development of universities demanded a new 
approach. Al though bodies such as the university advisory 
commit tee, the commit tee for university principals and the 
joint matriculation board provided a sound and good foundation 
for future development, these bodies had serious shortcomings 
in their functioning which needed to be rectified to cope with 
altered conditions in the field of universities.m 
It was perhaps owing to the recommendations of the commission 
that in 1976 a universities advisory council was 
established. 224 It consisted of a chairman and eight members 
appointed by the minister225 as well as a public servant 
appointed by the minister.ru He would be the executive officer 
of the council. 221 Its main function was to advise the minister 
on the granting of subsidies to universities, the creation of 
faculties and departments and the establishment of study 
courses at universities, the founding, developing and 
extending of universities, the manner in which co-ordination 
on these matters could be achieved, other university matters 
referred to it by the minister, and generally all policy 
questions arising out of the Universities Act. 228 It also had 
the power to inquire of its own accord into matters which were 
of interest to a university or to universities in general.~ 
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The council was empowered to appoint committees to assist it 
in its work. 230 It could also appoint any of its mE:mbers to 
serve on committees of inquiry relat.ing to higher education. 231 
The council was abolished in 1983 by the Universities and 
Technikons Advisory Council Act. 232 This act created an 
adviso~y council representative of all the universities and 
technikons in South Africa. Its function is to advise the 
government on all matters affecting universities and 
technikons, such as the academic fields in which they should 
be active, their financing and general policy. This is 
supposed to ensure greater co-ordination and liaison among the 
institutions at tertiary level.ll3 
3.6.6 The university and other tertiary institutions 
The commission, in considering the relationship between the 
university and other institutions at the tertiary level, felt 
that greater flexibility at the tertiary level should be 
allowed. This would facilitate a freer flow of students 
between the university and the colleges for advanced technical 
education especially in the engineering and technological 
fields. Consequently it recommended the reciprocal granting of 
credits and recognition of qualifications.~ 
3.6.7 Transition from school to university 
The commission examined in detail the various issues connected 
with the transition from school to university and in 
particular the high failure rate of first-year students. The 
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high failure of undergraduates, especially first years was a 
matter of grave concern to the state, the universities, 
parents and students themselves. It is not only a financial 
loss, but it is also a great waste of spiritual and 
intellectual potential. 
Although the commission did not favour stricter admission 
requirements, it considered the remedies to deal with the high 
failure rate. The commission attributed the high failure rate 
to the transition from school to university. The rapid 
adjustment of the student to the life and work at university 
where he found himself freed from the constant supervision and 
the restraint of school discipline was the major problem. At 
university a student has to be independent and 
self-disciplined. He has to adapt to self-study techniques and 
the rapid pace at which university teaching has to take place. 
The commission emphasised that academic standards should not 
be lowered merely in the interest of a smooth transition from 
school to university. It also accepted that the pace of 
teaching had to be more rapid at a university than at school. 
Yet it felt that the· approach to the question of academic 
standards should be more flexible. There should be a greater 
degree of flexibility to enable first-years to bridge the gap 
between the school and the university.m 
The commission made a number of recommendations which 
universities should implement in order to facilitate the 
transition from school to university. It felt that owing to 
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the increasing student numbers, the traditional dialogue 
between student and teache!" is disappearing. Consequently 
there is an urgent need for tuto:?:"ial or small group discussion 
classes. Moreover, 
advocated. It also 
a system of LUtors for 
advocated a guidance 
first years was 
and counselling 
service for students. In addition it recommended that a 
university department of didactics for the teaching staff be 
established which would inst:?:"uct lecturers in teaching 
techniques and thereby improve their ability to impart 
knowledge to their undergraduate students. 
As regards teaching aids, the commission felt that while these 
aids and their further development are important for improving 
the effectiveness of university teaching, they should be used 
with care and discrimination so that their use should not lead 
to superficiality in teaching and neglect of the students' 
capacity for abstract thinking. 
The commission did not find any convincing reason for 
recommending that the minimum periods laid down for degrees at 
South African universities should be extended. On the 
contrary, it was of the view that a larger proportion of 
students than in the past ought to be able to obtain a first 
degree within the minimum prescribed period. 
The commission felt that universities should consider 
lengthening the academic year for first-year students. 
Moreover, well-planned academic work for the vacations should 
receive more consideration. In order to maintain acceptable 
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academic standards a system of external examiners from outside 
the university should be used for final examinations. The use 
of external examiners would ensure that the students are 
assessed fairly and objectively by someone unknown to ~hem. It 
also recommended that at the beginning of each semester and 
for each course, all undergraduates should be provided with a 
programme of the topics to be covered by the lectures in the 
course of the semester, as guidelines for independent study 
and reading in preparation for the lectures. 
On the issue of the training of post-graduate students, the 
commission recommended that owing to the high cost of 
equipment and materials for research, consideration should be 
given to the joint use of resources. A system of 
specialization should be introduced according to which each 
university takes responsibility for a particular field. This 
would enable students to pursue their post-graduate studies at 
a university other than the one at which they pursued their 
undergraduate studies. 236 
As regards unsatisfactory undergraduate students the 
commission recommended that ways and means be devised for 
weeding out, at an early stage, those students who neglect 
their studies. For this reason it advocated the amendment of 
the Universities Actu' so that universities be given the right 
to terminate a student's registration at the end of the first 
half-year on the grounds of unsatisfactory academic progress. 
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As a result of this recommendation the Universities Amendment 
Act of 1977238 was passed. In terms of this amendment every 
person registered as a matriculated st:uden:. of a university is 
registered for one year of study or :or such shorter period as 
the council may determine. At the expiry of the year or said 
period a person must renew his application if he wants to 
remain a student of the university. 239 The council of a 
university has a discretion to prescribe minimum requirements 
of study for the purpose of the renewal of the registration of 
a person as a student of such a university. This the council 
has to do in consultation with the senate of the university. 
The council is also entitled to refuse permission to a student 
who fails to satisfy the minimum requirements of study so 
prescribed to renew his registration.~ 
The Van Wyk de Vries Commission made a number of 
recommendations which have a direct influence on universities. 
Many other recommendations have to do with the subsidy system 
and financing of universities. It would be unnecessary to deal 
with them here. Many of these recommendations have been 
implemented and affect all universities in the country. Judged 
on the whole, the report may be criticised on the grounds that 
it sought to justify past and future governmental interference 
into the operation of universities and thus to limit 
university autonomy. 
The report has also been criticized for assuming that it holds 
the only correct view about the nature of the university; that 
it attempts to make a logical point about the meaning of the 
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word "university" by looking at certain aspects of the de 
facto institution of universities in South Africa; that it is 
selective in what it takes as reality; that although it 
presumes to be realistic ana sensitive to facts, it does not 
allow the coexistence of two different views of a university 
to count as facts which should be realistically accepted and 
respected; that it is parochial and one-sided in its 
interpretation of university autonomy; that it emphasises 
national ties with the university to the exclusion of 
international links; that it underplays the importance of 
cultivating a critical attitude to the state, to the volk and 
to the values held sacrosanct by members of the ethnic group; 
that it supports the view that the state should decide for the 
different communities what true culture, good citizenship and 
heal thy society amount to; and that it claimed that the 
university is a "mirrored image of society" without analysing 
the controversial concept of society.u1 
3.7 ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
Although there was no law passed by the government during the 
apartheid era to limit academic freedom, there is no doubt 
that during this period academic freedom suffered severe 
restrictions. This is because this was an era where civil 
liberties in general in South Africa were curtailed by a 
plethora of security legislation. As academic freedom is 
closely linked with the other fundamental liberties of a free 
society, when these are restricted, academic freedom is 
similarly restricted. As Beinart et al put it: 
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11 Freedom of academic expression, in the sense of 
freedom of university teache:::-s to teach and to 
pursue research freely, is simply a special 
manifestation of the freedoms of speech, assembly 
and association. These freedoms are meaningless in 
a society which prohibits free inquiry, which 
arbitrarily punishes its citizens for radical 
criticism and the propounding of new ideas, and 
which forbids peaceful protest."~ 
From the fifties the intellectual climate which engenders free 
inquiry was seriously restricted by a spate of legislative 
enactments and administrative actions that violated freedom of 
speech and individual liberty. Although these measures were 
aimed at the general public, they also directly affected the 
universities. It will not be possible to deal with all of them 
here. Only a few most important ones will be discussed and 
their effect on academic freedom as it related to what may be 
taught and how it should be taught.w 
3.7.1 Security legislation and freedom of speech 
Although no law directly restricted a teacher's freedom to 
teach, draconian security legislation such as the Suppression 
of Communism Act, 244 the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953245 
the Suppression of Terrorism Act 246 which were later 
consolidated into the Internal Security Act, 247 provided severe 
penalties for anyone inciting anyone to commit certain actions 
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which were aimed at bringing about social and political change 
in South Africa. It was not defined what type of social and 
political change was prohibited. Evidently any act that was 
designed to change the then prevailing political dispensation 
was proscribed. One could not even freely discuss the 
oppressive nature of this security legislation. These statutes 
seriously restricted free and open discussion of issues such 
as civil disobedience and the theory and practice of communism 
by members of the academic staff. 
This situation was exacerbated by the fact that although the 
lecturer might be familiar with the provisions of these 
statutes, he could not rely on the students' knowledge and 
discretion. It would therefore be highly imprudent of him to 
give the students an opportunity in a free academic discussion 
to expose themselves to prosecution. Prosecutions demonstrated 
that no clear distinction was sometimes made between 
incitement and free discussion. Moreover, an informer might 
easily misconstrue or distort what a speaker intended in a 
free discussion on a subject relating to social change. There 
was no way of refuting his allegations. The existence of these 
security measures thus engendered an atmosphere of fear of 
prosecution and therefore seriously inhibited free discussion 
and expression of ideas. Although there is no information on 
any student being prosecuted for such discussion, there is no 
doubt that the possibility of such prosecution was the 
proverbial sword of Damocles hanging over the necks of various 
students. Moreover, a classroom informer could distort the 
discussion to his superiors which could result in a student 
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being banned in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act 
instead of being prosecuted. Indeed a number of students and 
staff from especially liberal universities were silenced or 
detained without trial for protracted periods for unknown 
reasons and without being charged with any crime. It is not 
far-fetched to assume that some of them were detained for 
these academic discussions. The Minister of Justice was not 
obliged to disclose the reasons. for detention and where a 
person was detained. The power of the authorities to silence 
opponents in this way resulted in students and staff being 
reluctant to have free debate on the need for and methods to 
bring about peaceful social change in South Africa. Ironically 
this should have been regarded as the primary function of a 
university. It also led to the selection of non-controversial 
courses for teaching and research. Moreover, support for 
social change could be wrongly confused with communism as a 
distinction was sometimes not drawn between communism and 
liberalism, or between opposition and subversion. This 
frequently led to the liberal universities being maliciously 
labelled as subversive "communist" outposts in South African 
society.~ There is therefore no doubt that the presence of 
draconian security legislation seriously undermined and 
limited academic freedom. Universities had to relinquish their 
role of being critics of the prevailing social and political 
order and of being beacons of hope in an otherwise gloomy 
social and political environment. 
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3.7.2. Contempt of court 
Besides security legislation, the contempt of court 
proceedings in South Africa were in the past sometimes used to 
inhibit the freedom of academic discussion of especially 
sensitive and controversial issues relat.ing to race and 
security. A typical example is the case of the late Barend van 
Niekerk, then at the University of the Witwatersrand, who was 
prosecuted for contempt of court in that he had published an 
article in the South African Law Journal 249 where he had 
critically discussed the influence of race on the imposition 
of the death penalty in South Africa. Al though he was 
acquitted on the grounds that he had not intended to be 
contemptuous of the courts of the land, this prosecution was 
not at all encouraging free academic discourse. 250 The judgment 
implied that anyone embarking on scientific research in this 
area could face contempt proceedings. In this way the courts 
also did not support free academic discussion of issues. This 
was regarded as an attempt on the part of the authorities to 
discourage critical examination of the judicial process. 251 
This judgment was severely criticised by the Council of the 
Society of the University Teachers of Law of South Africa.~ 
The threat of contempt of court proceedings was further 
emphasized by a subsequent prosecution of Professor Van 
Niekerk for contempt of court and attempting to obstruct the 
course of justice in that he had called upon judges, at a 
public protest meeting over detention without trial, to reject 
evidence elicited from witnesses who had been held in 
228. 
detention for lengthy periods in terms of the Terrorism Act. 
This time the Appellate Divisior.. upheld the conviction. 253 This 
was evidence that the issue of con~empt of court was not an 
idle threat. After this case only brave academics could have 
continued to discuss something that could have been regarded 
as bordering on contempt of court. 
3.7.3 Censorship laws 
Academic freedom was also limited by the censorship laws of 
this country. The two most important ones were the 
Publications and Entertainments Act2~ and the Suppression of 
Communism Act . 255 In terms of the Publications and 
Entertainments Act a publications control board was 
established and empowered to declare any literary work 
"undesirable". Once a work was declared "undesirable", it 
would be banned. Indeed thousands of literary works, many of 
which were books of high literary quality, were banned. 
Possession of such works was later prohibited.~ 
In terms of the Suppression of Communism Act (later the 
Internal Security Act) the writings of any person listed or 
prohibited from attending any gathering or who had been 
resident in South Africa and who the Minister of Justice was 
satisfied was directly or indirectly furthering any object of 
communism, could not be lawfully used either as references for 
teaching purposes or as sources for scholarly writings. As a 
result of this, the works of well-known scholars who fell in 
this category such as Prof H J Simons and many others, could 
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not be distributed, discussed in the lecture room or cited in 
any writings. What was disturbing was that, even if the work 
did not deal with a politically sensitive issue, it was still 
censored. Even if it dealt with non-contentious subjects such 
as zoology or non-political controversial legal issues, it 
fell foul of the law. The book by Simons on the Leoal Status 
of African Women was a unique and excellent piece of work on 
this subject and yet for many years it was banned. The effect 
of this was that a scholar who wished to use the ideas 
expressed by a banned author had either to risk prosecution or 
ignore these ideas, thus exposing himself to criticism that he 
had not taken cognizance of them, or use them without 
acknowledgement, in which case he could be accused of 
plagiarism. 2s1 There is no doubt that such censorship laws had 
a deleterious effect on open debate at university and 
seriously inhibited the free flow of ideas and scholarly 
inquiry. "Censorship tends to cast a pall of orthodoxy over 
the classroom in South African universities and to undermine 
high standards of scholarship." 258 
3.7.4 Restrictions on freedom of research 
In addition to the above restrictions on research, the 
government prohibited certain academics from pursuing research 
or publishing without the consent of the minister. Many of the 
academics restricted under security legislation, were 
precluded from both teaching and research in terms of their 
restriction orders. Others were allowed to continue teaching 
but were prohibited to publish without ministerial consent. 
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The restrictions on research and publishing had negative 
consequences, in particular in the social sciences where many 
of the topics for investigation and scholarly research were 
politically unpopular. This obviously deterred some scholars 
from pursuing research in these areas and diverted their 
attention to less sensitive areas. Others left South Africa 
rather than work under these conditions. Those who nonetheless 
persisted in doing research in these areas had to overcome 
many obstacles. The government sometimes did not permit 
research workers to enter African areas to do field work. A 
number of foreign scholars were either refused visas to come 
and do research here or found it impossible to pursue research 
in the stifling environment. 159 The effect of this was to 
iso~ate South Africa academically and to stifle free academic 
inquiry. 
3.7.5 Restrictions on freedom of assembly and the right to 
protest 
Although freedom of assembly and the right to protest are 
regarded 
society, 
as fundamental rights in a 
in South Africa during the 
free and democratic 
apartheid era these 
suffered severe restrictions. When students protested and 
demonstrated against the government's invasions of educational 
and civil liberty, the government became irritated by this. 
Previously a protest march required the consent of the local 
authority and this was usually granted. But in the late 
sixties the local authorities became less willing to grant 
permission and in 1970 the power to grant it was virtually 
-
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removed from them and vested in the chief magistrate of the 
district in question for any procession that had been 
authorized by the local authority.™ This did not mean the end 
of protests. Sporadic but unlawful protest marches by students 
did take place.™ 
A typical example is that of the nation-wide student 
demonstrations in support of the cause of free and compulsory 
school education for all races in South Africa. These protests 
arose in part as a result of the rustication of the students 
of the University of the North after they had protested 
against the expulsion of Mr Abraham Tiro, who had condemned 
the system of bantu education at a graduation ceremony. This 
country-wide protest commenced on 1 June 1972. The government 
moved to stop these picket demonstrations. Students were 
arrested from contravening municipal regulations in Cape Town, 
for which they paid admission-of-guilt fines. Police moved in 
and broke a peaceful demonstration on St George's Cathedral by 
means of baton charges. Further protests ensued in Cape Town 
and Johannesburg. Picket protests on the steps of St George's 
Cathedral, for which the permission of the church authorities 
had been obtained, were banned in terms of the Riotous 
Assemblies Act.~ Those who had gathered there were dispersed 
with tear gas and baton charges. Similar action took place in 
Johannesburg. 263 
On 7 June 1972 the Minister of Justice, acting in terms of 
section 2 ( 3) of the Riotous Assemblies Act, banned "the 
assembly in any public place of any public gathering of a 
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political nature, that is to say, a public gathering at which 
any form of state or any principle or policy of the government 
of a state is propagated, defended, attacked, criticized or 
discussed, or which is held in protest against anything; with 
the exception of such a public gathering which, for as long as 
it lasts, takes place within the walls of a building." This 
prohibition was made applicable to all towns where there was a 
university and was in force for a month.™ 
Protests continued on university property. At the University 
of the Witwatersrand 7 o o O people assembled indoors at a 
general assembly of the University where the following 
resolution was adopted. 
"We here present at this Assembly of the University 
do solemnly resolve to, 
affirm that it is the right of university students 
as of other bodies of citizens to express 
peacefully by public assembly and procession, their 
opinions on matters of public policy and their 
right thereby to seek public support for the 
opinions thus expressed 
record our conviction that it is particularly 
appropriate for university students as a privileged 
educational group to concern themselves with the 
inequities, deprivations and other shortcomings 
resulting from policies which affect the education 
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of less privileged sections of the peoples of South 
Africa 
express our extreme distress and indignation at the 
violent measures taken by t,he Government to 
suppress the peaceful public assemblies and 
processions of university students, and at the 
exercise by the Government of extreme powers to 
restrict the free expression of opinion on matters 
of public policy in circumstances which do not 
constitute an emergency endangering the security of 
the State. "265 
Professor G R Bozzoli, Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the 
University of the Witwatersrand, on the same day, addressed an 
open letter to the then Prime Minister, Mr B J Vorster wherein 
he called upon the government to have a thorough investigation 
of the student grievances over the inequality in educational 
facilities among the various racial groups. 266 
The actions of the police in dealing with student protests in 
Cape Town and Johannesburg were open to serious criticism. 
Peaceful protests were dispersed with teargas and baton 
charges. In order to forestall the recurrence of this in 
future the University of Cape Town applied for and obtained a 
temporary interdict from the Supreme Court in order to prevent 
future invasions of the university campus under the Riotous 
Assemblies Act. 267 A large number of students and members of 
the public was arrested during these raids and charged under 
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the Riotous Assemblies Act. In Cape Town fourteen people were 
convicted in the magistrate's court. On appeal, however, they 
were acquitted. In the case of S v Turre 1 and Others268 the 
court stated that freedom of assembly forms part of the 
democratic rights of every South African citizen. And as Van 
Zijl A J P further said: 
"Free assembly is a most important right, for it is 
generally only organized public opinion that 
carries weight and it is extremely difficult to 
organize it if there is no right of public 
assembly. 11269 
After this decision 3 8 students of the University of the 
Witwatersrand were found not guilty on charges under the 
Riotous Assemblies Act and discharged. Various charges against 
many students were withdrawn. But this apparently did not 
alter the attitude of the government towards student protests. 
In 1974 the Minister of Police reported that R34 280 had been 
paid in out-of ~court settlements to 43 persons unlawfully 
arrested or assaulted in Johannesburg and Cape Town during the 
confrontations between the police and the students in 1972. 
This precipitated the amendment of the Riotous Assemblies Act 
to widen the powers of the authorities to prohibit meetings on 
both private and public property.m The 1974 restriction of 
the right to protest did not stop the protests because, in 
1976 the country experienced another student uprising in 
Soweto schools and in historically black universities against 
bantu education.m 
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3.7.6 Restrictions on individual liberty 
Since 1957 there was a proliferation of the number of 
arbitrary measures and the use of existing measures that had 
the effect of muzzling political dissent. These measures were 
also used against staff and students especially from the 
liberal universities. Although they did not effectively 
silence the universities, they created a climate of fear which 
is inimical to free academic inquiry, especially in socially 
sensitive areas.ru Some of these measures have been referred 
to, but it will be necessary to discuss them in some depth. 
The effect of these measures was to limit personal freedom of 
citizens in general and of university staff and students in 
particular. 
In terms of the Suppression of Communism Act, the Minister of 
Justice was empowered to restrict the freedom of movement and 
speech of a person whom he believed to be encouraging the 
attainment of any of the objects of communism or engaged in 
activities which might further the attainment of any of these. 
The banning order entailed that a person should be confined to 
a particular place and would be prevented from attending any 
gathering (in practice consisting of more that two persons), 
would be prohibited from entering the premises of any 
educational institution and would be barred from publishing or 
preparing for publication, in any form, anything on any 
subject without ministerial consent.m 
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A number of academics and students, especially from liberal 
universities were banned. Some of them were prohibited by 
their banning orders from teaching and research. The effect of 
these was to deprive a university of its right to retain staff 
and was a drastic interference with academic freedom. The 
banning of university teachers was condemned by the 
authorities and students of the liberal universities and led 
to widespread protests.m 
The provision in security legislation for detention without 
trial for prolonged periodsm was also used to detain persons 
among whom were students and staff of universities. Some of 
the detainees were brought to trial and certain of them were 
convicted of offences under the security laws, but a number of 
them were released without any charges being preferred against 
them. These actions created the impression that some persons 
were punished for their views rather than their unlawful 
acts. 276 Moreover, detention without trial is incompatible with 
a free and democratic society. It therefore undermined 
academic freedom in this country. 
In addition to these, the government had unrestricted powers 
to deport or refuse residence visas to foreigners and to 
prohibit the travel abroad of South Africans or to insist that 
if they left the country they should not return. These powers 
were used against a variety of persons including staff and 
students of universities. This had the effect of isolating 
South African scholars from the international community of 
scholars. 271 
---------------------
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As has been said the government also used informers on various 
campuses. The knowledge or suspicion of the presence of 
informers in lectures and student meetings created insecurity 
and inhibited free academic discussion of sensitive issues for 
fear of being reported or misreported by informers to the 
authorities who could act on this information without recourse 
to a court of law. This was condemned by university 
authorities as being interference with academic freedom. 2~ 
From the above discussion it is clear that during the 
apartheid era academic freedom among universities in this 
country suffered severe attacks and restrictions where formal 
and informal measures of restricting this on the part of the 
government were used. Under such conditions only the brave 
continued to engage in free academic discourse. 
3.8 THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION 
This discussion would be incomplete without a discussion of 
the report of the National Commission on Higher Education on 
this issue. The Commission acknowledged that academic freedom 
is important to the functioning of the university system. 
They regarded academic freedom as a precondition for critical, 
experimental and creative thinking and therefore, for the 
advancement of intellectual inquiry, knowledge and 
understanding. The Commission further acknowledged that 
academic freedom can only be upheld in institutions with a 
certain degree of autonomy. While the Commission conceded 
that neither individual academic freedom nor institutional 
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autonomy can be absolute because they have to be balanced with 
accountability, it nonetheless stressed the importance of 
upholding the principles of academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy as key conditions of a well-functioning system of 
higher education279 • 
The Commission also advocated the concept of co-operative 
governance, which should ensure that the different interests 
are acknowledged and that all stakeholders should be committed 
to a code of conduct based on the acceptance of joint 
responsibility for the future of higher education in South 
Africa280 • One of the main role players is the government 
which, in terms of this idea of co-operative governance should 
exercise its authority and its powers over the higher 
education system in a transparent equitable and accountable 
manner, and in a discernible pursuit of the public good. In 
its relations to institutions and to the system as a whole, 
the Commission felt that there should be a recognition of the 
maximum degree of practicable autonomy and a commitment to 
consultation and negotiated solution to problems~1 • 
Although the Commission advocated the idea of co-operative 
governance, it was of the view that this should be implemented 
with due regard to the principles of academic freedom and 
institutional autonomy. The Commission noted the provisions 
of the Constitution on academic freedom and concluded that the 
Constitution makes the principle of co-operative government 
and inter-governmental relations applicable to all spheres of 
government and all organs of state within each sphere. The 
I 
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Commission also noted that higher education institutions could 
be regarded as falling within the ambit of the definition of 
"organs of state"w. 
The inclusion of higher education structures in the definition 
of "organs of state", the Commission further noted, would 
imply the compulsory application of the 
principles governing public administration. 
basic values and 
This would result 
in the adoption of national legislation to facilitate the 
promotion of these values and principles affecting higher 
education institutions. These principles include 
responsiveness to public needs and encouraging the public to 
participate in policy making, accountability and transparency, 
fostered by providing the public with accurate information. 
The Commission was of the opinion that while these principles 
are closely linked, they should be differentiated in 
understanding academic freedom to mean the right of 
individuals to pursue the goals and procedures of academic 
thinking without outside interference or censure based on any 
political, religious or social orthodoxy. Such freedom is the 
prerequisite for the effective advancement of teaching, 
learning and creative researchw. 
Taking into account the meaning of institutional autonomy and 
individual academic freedom, and the limitation thereof by the 
demands of accountability, the Committee proposed that the 
principles of academic freedom and institutional autonomy be 
retained as key conditions for a vibrant higher education 
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system. It emphasized that the proposals on co-operative 
governance preclude any form of state control over, or 
arbitrary state interference in the affairs of institutions. 
It was quick to add that co-operative governance does not mean 
government indifference to l:igher education, but was based on 
the assumption that both government and higher education 
institutions are committed to the same societal goalsw. 
In order to attain these goals, the Commission proposed a new 
configuration of fun ct ions and respons ibi 1 it ies for the 
relationship between government and institutions. This new 
configuration, would reql;ire from institutions adequate 
provision for stakeholder consultation, sensitivity to the 
changing needs and expectations of society and appropriate 
consideration of the public interest. On the part of the 
government this will require the creation of a new 
organizational and regulatory framework which can facilitate 
negotiated planning, responsible interaction and productive 
partnerships. 
These will undoubtedly have an impact on the scope of 
institutional autonomy in that they will require a culture of 
co-operation and will lead to increased accountability. 
Increased accountability will, however, not be the product of 
repressive external control, but would be the counterpart of a 
greater interest in and estimation of the social role of 
higher education institutions, involving not only political 
authorities but society in general. "Within the framework of 
negotiated planning and responsible interaction, institutional 
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autonomy might indeed be enhanced as a dynamic achievement 
through imaginative mission development and operational 
initiatives, inspiring the trust and confidence of organised 
society and ensuring the indispensability of higher 
education" 284 
The effect of the Commission's proposals would be that certain 
things in higher education institutions would change while 
others remained as they are. There would for instance be no 
change in the structures for the day-to-day management of 
institutions. The system of funding would also remain largely 
the same except that there could be earmarked funding which 
would have to be spent on designated areas. The issues of 
staff and staffing, their conditions of services and 
appointments would still remain in the hands of the individual 
institutions, except that equity demands should be met and all 
forms of discrimination on grounds of race or gender should be 
eliminated285 • 
There would be some changes when it comes to student 
recruitment where external authorities will have a say. 
Individual institutions would still be free to set their own 
entrance requirements beyond statutory minimums for specific 
courses and to decide on which students are offered the 
allocated and available places. On course or curriculum 
planning, the proposals on_ accreditation and incorporating 
higher education qualification programmes into a national 
qualifications framework would entail a degree of curtailment 
of existing autonomy. Autonomy would be extended on the modes 
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of teaching and learning, by the proposals on the freedom to 
introduce distance learning traditionally contact 
institutions. Institutional autonomy would, however, no 
longer be the final word in assessing academic freedom~. 
The Commission felt that the best safeguard of academic and 
educational standards is not external validation and control, 
but the development of a responsible, self-critical academic 
community. A realistic quality assurance policy would require 
a combination of internal and external valuation and control. 
For these reasons the Commission recommended that all 
authorities should recognize the right to academic freedom for 
all individuals engaged in responsible academic work, and the 
right to autonomy for higher education institutions in 
fulfilling their educational and academic roles, within the 
context of an increased accountability implied by the 
principle and system of co-operative governance~. 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
Although South African universities were largely modelled on 
the British and German systems which allowed a measure of 
autonomy and academic freedom, these freedoms were seriously 
violated especially during the apartheid era. This had a 
negative effect on universities in general and on their role 
in teaching, learning and research. Although even before the 
adoption of the new Constitution, the situation had 
considerably improved, the new Constitution which protects 
academic freedom and the recommendations of the National 
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Commission on Higher Education are likely to safeguard and 
strengthen academic freedom and institutional autonomy, 
without derogating from accountability and responsibility. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY AND 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically analyse and 
discuss the constitutional protection of university autonomy 
and academic freedom in South Africa today and the 
implications of that protection. This is obviously a novel 
situation in this country in the light of our new Constitution 
and therefore merits closer scrutiny. A constitution has been 
regarded as an attempt by a nation to come to grips with the 
problems of the past and to create a better and securer 
future. It has been characterised as "a snapshot at a moment 
in time, reflecting the hopes and fears of the nation at a 
specific moment between its misfortunes of the past and its 
aspirations for the future. 111 This is what the South African 
Constitution is designed to attain. The portion on 
fundamental rights in particular is aimed at achieving this 
goal. It is also significant to note that the "postamble" to 
our interim Constitution regards the Constitution as an 
"historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and 
injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human 
rights, democracy and peaceful coexistence and development 
opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of race, 
class, belief or sex". A bill of rights has been defined as 
"a legislative enactment primarily.designed to safeguard the 
263. 
fundamental rights and freedoms of tne subject by restricting 
the competence of persons in authority to curtail those rights 
and freedoms by means of legislative or administrative 
interference. 112 
If the role of a bill of rights is to protect fundamental 
rights of the individual from easy violation by the executive 
or legislature, it becomes understandable why the South 
African bill of rights specifically protects academic freedom. 
In the previous chapter the various ways whereby the 
government seriously violated academic freedom in the past 
were narrated. It is obvious that to prevent that from 
happening in future provision had to be made in the 
Cons ti tut ion for the protection of academic freedom. This 
explains why sections 14 and 15 of the interim Constitution 
make provision for the protection of academic freedom and the 
right to artistic creativity and scientific research. The 
protection of academic freedom in the Constitution is evidence 
that we have passed from an era where universities were at the 
mercy of the government into an era where they can truly have 
academic freedom and autonomy. 
It is essential not only to analyse critically both sections 
14 and 15 and the impact they are going to have, but also to 
look at various factors and other competing rights which could 
impinge upon university autonomy and academic freedom because 
these sections do not exist in isolation. Although there was 
in the past interference not only with academic freedom but 
also with university autonomy, there is no specific provision 
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in the interim Constitution which expressly protects 
university autonomy by name. Part of the reason for that could 
be that politicians do not like tc emphasise the autonomy of 
universities because they feel that they should be entitled to 
interfere with universities as the government is responsible 
for subsidising uni versi t.ies. This explains why the word 
"autonomy" 
protects 
is not used in this context. 
academic freedom, however, 
The provision that 
is regarded as 
encompassing not only the freedom of an individual academic, 
to pursue his job of teaching and research without constraints 
but also institutional autonomy. Moreover, section 247 (2) 
protects the controlling bodies of universities and technikons 
from interference by the national government through the 
alteration of their rights and powers before there are bona 
fide negotiations. This may also be interpreted as protecting 
institutional autonomy as these governing bodies are the 
policy makers of these institutions. 
4.2 PROTECTION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE CONSTITUTION 
Section 14(1) of the interim Constitution provides as follows: 
"Every person shall have the right to freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, 
which shall include academic freedom in 
institutions of higher learning". 
Section 15(1) stipulates: 
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"Every person shall have the right to freedom of 
speech and expression, which shall include freedom 
of the press and other media, and the freedom of 
artistic creativity and scientific research". 
It is not clear why the rights to academic freedom and 
artistic creativity were regarded as separate appendages to 
other rights, 
and freedom 
namely freedom of religion, thought and opinion 
of speech and expression. Al though academic 
freedom is closely related to freedom of conscience, religion, 
thought, belief and opinion, it is entirely distinguishable 
from these. Not only did it develop separately from these, but 
it also entails more than what these rights cover. As already 
stated, academic freedom not only involves freedom of speech 
and opinion, but also the duty to subject whatever views so 
expressed to critical scrutiny. Similarly, while the right to 
artistic creativity and scientific research may be closely 
related to freedom of thought, speech and expression, it 
includes more than what these rights entail. 
One may speculate as to the reason behind the approach of 
lumping academic freedom together with the other related 
rights. The one reason may be historical. As was demonstrated 
in chapter 3 above, the South African government of the past 
restricted not only academic freedom in the form of freedom of 
thought, belief, conscience, opinion and critical inquiry of 
academics, but it also restricted scientific research and 
artistic creativity. It may therefore have been felt that 
these needed to be protected as separate rights as well. This 
255. 
buttresses the view that a bill of rights has to reckon with 
what has happened in the past:. The other reason may be 
conceptual, or a matter of t:echr:ique. Mcst of the rights that 
are protected in the interim Cor.stitution are individual and 
not institutional rights although provision is made that 
juristic persons can also enjoy these rights3 • 
As the interim Constitution was a product of compromise by the 
political parties involved in negotiations, this often meant 
that on certain issues there had to be give and take4 • Some 
political negotiators may have felt uncomfortable with 
providing for the protection of academic freedom as an 
independent right which could be regarded as elitist. 
Moreover, academic freedom is not protected as a fundamental 
right in most of the constitutions of the world. It is only 
in the German5 and Namibian6 constitutions that academic 
freedom is specifically protected. Furthermore, some 
politicians may generally not be impressed by academic freedom 
which they may consider not only elitist but also a luxury 
which they may construe as an obstruction to their dealing 
with the operation of universities. 
To have attempted to stipulate for academic freedom as an 
independent and separate right would therefore not have gone 
down well with certain politicians and this could have led to 
such a right not being protected at all which would have been 
a greater evil than the present situation'. A tactical move 
was therefore to lump it together with other fundamental 
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rights which could not be excluded from a respectable bill of 
rights. 
As already pointed out:, acaderr,ic freedom is usually not 
protected as a separate right in many constitutions of the 
world, but it is subsumed under freedom of speech. Some would 
even argue that it is unnecessary to protect academic freedom 
as long as freedom of speech is protected. This view is, 
however, misconceived as it was pointed out earlier that 
academic freedom not only entails freedom of expression, but 
also the aspect of critical inquiry. Those who believe that 
academic freedom is contained in freedom of expression, 
conscience and religion contend that it is unnecessary to 
protect it expressly as a separate right. If in any case it is 
considered necessary to do so, as in the South African bill of 
rights, a casual and clumsy reference to various aspects of 
academic freedom can be avoided by at least providing for its 
separate protection. 8 
It also appears to have been unnecessary to separate the right 
to artistic creativity and scientific research from academic 
freedom as these form part of academic freedom. The reason may 
be that artistic creativity and scientific research are not 
confined to universities or what can be regarded as 
institutions of higher learning. There are individuals and 
other institutions which are not universities which engage in 
scientific research and artistic creativity. Perhaps a better 
formulation would have been one analogous to the German 
constitution which includes the protection of freedom to 
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pursue science, research. and tuition. This would have 
eliminated a separate provision for scientific research in 
section 15 (1) in addition to the protection of academic 
freedom in section 14(1) . 9 
Apart from this, there is no doub~ that academic freedom is 
germane to the category of free speech. As stated earlier on, 
academic freedom entails freedom of inquiry which includes not 
only the search for truth but also the freedom to be critical 
and to publish one's views. No doubt the search for truth 
implies that one should be able to follow truth wherever it 
leads him or her. Thus freedom of belief and of conscience 
also come into play as well. 
According to the formulation of the South African Law 
Commission there should be a broad general clause to protect 
freedom of speech and expression, which includes academic 
freedom. This should read as follows: 
"Every person shall have the right to freedom of 
speech and expression, which shall include freedom 
of the press and other media and academic freedom 
in institutions of higher learning."w 
The Law Commission also points out that the approach of 
combining freedom of expression with artistic creativity and 
scientific research is not generally followed in international 
law. On the contrary, international law prefers to treat the 
freedom of artistic creativity and scientific research 
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separately from freedom of expression and to combine the said 
freedoms with the right to participation in the cultural life 
of the community. 11 These may also be regarded as forming part 
of academic freedom. 
The proposals of the South African Law Commission have been 
overshadowed by the provisions of the interim Constitution and 
the final Constitution. The provisions of the interim 
Constitution have already been referred to. Section 16(1) of 
the final Constitution stipulates that everyone has the right 
to freedom of expression which includes, inter alia, freedom 
of artistic creativity and academic freedom and freedom of 
scientific research.u This demonstrates that academic freedom 
is regarded as an element of freedom of expression. Moreover, 
academic freedom, freedom of artistic creativity and freedom 
of scientific research have been brought together. Be that as 
it may, what is important is that at least academic freedom is 
protected. 
A fundamental question is: on what basis is the university 
bound by the law and especially chapter 3 of the interim 
Constitution as against its staff and students? Two 
provisions of the interim Constitution are of relevance here. 
Firstly, the interim Constitution provides that the bill of 
rights is binding on all legislative and executive organs of 
state on all levels of government. 13 A state organ is defined 
as a statutory body or functionary.~ This is interpreted as 
referring to a body which performs an authority function and 
not simply a body established by law. 15 Although a university 
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is a statutory body established by law, it cannot be regarded 
as a state organ. 16 There are no doubt cases where the courts 
have been prepared to regard a university as a state organ. ii 
The preferable view is, however, that a university is strictly 
speaking not a state organ.u 
Secondly, section 35 (3) stipulates that when 'interpreting a 
law, common or customary, a court should take into account the 
spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights. What this 
means has not yet been interpreted by the courts. This may 
make the bill of rights applicable to individuals. In the 
recent case of Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another19 , 
however, the Constitutional Court held that chapter 3 could 
not be directly applied to the common law in actions between 
private parties. The effect of this decision is made 
uncertain by the provisions of the final Constitution. Clause 
8(1) of the Constitution states that the bill of rights is 
applicable to all law and binds the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary and all organs of state. 
Higher education institutions provide education which is 
strictly speaking a function of government. This is so 
although these institutions are autonomous and can even act 
against the government. They are nonetheless established by 
the state to perform this function. In the performance of 
this function they ought to be bound by the provisions of the 
bill of rights. In the United States the Supreme Court 
developed the 11 doctrine of state action 11 which led to 
constitutional norms being applicable where private persons or 
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institutions performed governmental functions. What is meant 
by governmental functions has been debatable. The Supreme 
Court tried to restrict the scope of this category of 
activities to those that are traditionally associated with the 
organs of state20 • As has been said, education is strictly 
speaking a function of government. Moreover, universities and 
other institutions of higher education stand in a relationship 
of inequality with their staff, and even if they are not 
regarded as organs of government, they ought, in the 
performance of their functions or the exercise of their 
authority, to be bound by the provisions of the bill of rights 
because of this. The academic freedom of an individual would 
mean little or nothing, even if it could be enforced against 
the state, if individual universities would be entitled to 
violate it with impunity21 • Van der V-yver, however, is of the 
opinion that if universities are bound by chapter 3 their 
rights to autonomy as juristic persons would be threatened~. 
A question that has of ten been asked is why rights entrenched 
in the constitution should bind a democratically elected 
parliament. The reason behind this question is that it is 
regarded as anti-democratic for a group of unelected judges to 
bind the majority of the people's elected representatives. 
The answer to this is that a bill of rights encapsulates the 
rights and interests of the people. By elevating these rights 
to the status of being constitutional rights, the people bind 
their elected representatives to defer to these rights so that 
transient majorities should not violate them. After all the 
majority can also be wrong. this is implicit in the mandate 
272. 
of the elected representatives. Strictly speaking the elected 
representations are supposed to execute the mandate of the 
people. No person would manda::.e a representative to ac'C 
against his interests. This is also implicit in the prac~ice 
of regular elections in terms of which the electorate can vote 
a government with which they are not satisfied out of power. 
Elections take place at certain intervals. In the meantime 
something should keep the elected representatives in check. 
That is the role of, inter alia, a bill of rights. The role 
of the judges is merely to call to order the elected 
representatives so that they do not violate the rights of the 
people. This obviously assumes that the judges will always be 
right in their interpretation which is highly doubtful. 
Nonetheless the rationale is that the people regard these 
rights as being so fundamental that they should not be easily 
violated23 • There is no doubt that there will always be those 
who will not be satisfied with this arrangement. 
The scope of academic freedom as a constitutional right will 
largely depend on how it is interpreted by the courts and on 
the powers of the university in terms of autonomy and 
self-governance. This is usually determined by the Act of each 
university which determines the powers of the university as a 
public-law corporation and which also determines the 
parameters of academic freedom. Although it has been said that 
academic freedom is the composite term for independent basic 
freedoms which vest in an individual as a member of a 
university community, which include freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and vocational freedom,u it is better 
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to regard it as a distinct institutional right which includes 
not:. only freedom of inquiry but also the right to subject any 
view to critical scrutiny and in the process advance 
knowledge. That is only possible in a free and democratic 
constitutional dispensation. 
Apart from what is said above, the constitutionalization of 
academic freedom does not create a new right. It merely 
entrenches a right that has existed over the years and makes 
it more secure. After all the greatest function of a bill of 
rights is not necessarily to create new rights but to protect 
existing rights from easy violation by the government or other 
powerful interests. Although the content of that right may be 
adjusted according to the exigencies of the situation, one can 
have recourse to history to determine what the content of that 
right is. 
Academic freedom generally entails that the university as an 
autonomous employer, is free to enter into contracts and may 
determine its own conditions of service, subject to the 
recognition of the freedom of vocation as acknowledged by 
virtue of its autonomy. This means that an academic member is 
entitled to membership of the university and to participate in 
its governance. He is relatively free to choose his field of 
study and research and may continue his academic work without 
undue influence from the employer or the government, and 
subject to the university's syllabi, curricula and 
regulations. Once he has become permanent, he enjoys all the 
benefits of that position and is entitled to hold office until 
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he reaches the age of retirement. He may only be dismissed for 
misconduct, but only after he has received a fair hearing.~ 
The freedoms of the academic staff are, however, limited by 
the fact that the employer is free to select and appoint its 
members and employees who have to act in the best interests of 
the university. Obviously once selected or appointed, they may 
be entitled to membership of and participation in the 
structures of governance, albeit in accordance with the 
guidelines provided by the university. Although they are free 
to pursue their own independent studies and research, these 
may be affected by rationalisation and specialisation within 
the university. There is no doubt that academic tenure and 
security depend on the financial resources of the employer, 
rationalisation within the system and the possible 
retrenchment of staff. 26 The employer also determines the 
grounds for misconduct and disciplinary procedures although 
the court may intervene where the university has acted in an 
illegal or irregular manner. 27 
The principle of academic freedom also entails that the 
academic should be entitled to associate with other academics 
or academic groups inside and outside the country. This also 
encompasses freedom of association. Institutional autonomy may 
also have an impact on these.u 
Academic freedom also encompasses that the academic should 
work relatively free from internal and external intervention 
and enables him to express and def end his own views and 
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beliefs and to question and differ without authoritative 
repression or victimisation. This, however, does not entitle 
him to violate the rules and regulations of the university. In 
this way restrictions may be placed on the publications which 
may harm the good name of the university especially if they 
have no scientific or academic merit. This demonstrates that 
academic freedom is not an end in itself. On the other hand, 
it is impermissible for the university to use its autonomous 
powers to restrict academic freedom simply because it is 
over-sensitive to free political expression, or because it 
wants to ensure smooth management only. 29 In that case the 
freedom of the academic should prevail. 
In the 1960's the prevalent view in South Africa, like that in 
America, was that academic freedom was the exclusive preserve 
of academics only and that students had no claim to it. This 
was in contrast with the position in Germany where academic 
freedom was regarded as involving both Lern and Lehrfreiheit 
for both students and academics.~ This was partly due to the 
principle of in loco parentis upheld by Anglo-American 
universities, in terms of which university authorities had to 
exercise control over the training of (minor) students in the 
place of parents. Moreover, university autonomy guaranteed 
freedom from arbitrary or excessive interference by external 
bodies especially the state. This led to student revolts 
during the 1960's in the United States of America and Europe. 
Students rebelled against autonomous universities, which 
although they granted substantial academic freedom to their 
academic staff, gave none to their students.m 
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There is no doubt today that students are also entitled co 
academic freedom. They are entitled to the same academic 
freedom as that to which academics are entitled mutatis 
mutandis. They are entitled to choose a universicy of their 
choice and the course of study, orovided they meet the 
admission requirements of the university concerned. A student 
is, however, bound by the university rules and regulations in 
terms of his contractual relationship with the university. The 
university is not entitled to curtail the academic freedom of 
a student arbitrarily. If it does, the student can appeal to 
the courts for redress. Academic freedom also entails that the 
student is entitled to the pursuit of knowledge and truth 
through teaching and research. He is entitled to freedom of 
expression and freedom from victimisation in class or 
examinations because of the reasoned views he may have 
expressed even though they may not be favoured by the teacher. 
The teacher is supposed to teach a student how to think and 
not what to think. Students may also express their views 
through their newspapers which may encourage responsible 
discussion on campus and the stimulation of a sense of 
community. These publications may also be useful to staff and 
governing bodies as a source of information about students' 
concerns and attitudes, as long as there are sufficient 
safeguards against the abuse of freedom of expression.~ 
Students are free to criticise any aspect of the university 
affairs. If there is merit in such criticism, even if it may 
be damaging to the university, this should not lead to its 
being barred from publication. Students should be free to 
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express themselves not only on matters of university 
governance, but also on matters of the government of the 
country as a whole. They are entitled to freedom of expression 
guaranteed by the ConstiLution. Not only are students free to 
express themselves on matters of university governance, they 
may also participate in university governance and may act in 
the name of the university, sometimes as individuals and at 
other times through the intermediary of the Students' 
Representative Council (SRC). There is today increasing 
recognition of student participation in the universities' 
structures of governance as part of the democratisation 
process although there is no uniformity in all universities.~ 
Academic freedom for students also involves fair treatment. 
Although the student is subject to disciplinary action by the 
university for misconduct, he is entitled to fair treatment 
which includes the observance of the principles of natural 
justice. These principles are not excluded by the contractual 
nature of the relationship between the student and the 
university.~ Fairness should therefore be the corner-stone for 
all university activities between students and the university 
and between students inter se.~ 
The entrenchment of academic freedom in the Constitution means 
that both the government and the individual university cannot 
violate it with impunity. The individual academic can 
challenge both the institution or the government should they 
interfere with his academic freedom. The government cannot 
either by administrative or legislative fiat violate this 
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right. This effectively protects chis right from arbitrary 
action by the institution or the government. 
Although academic freedom is a fundamental right entrenched in 
the interim and final Constitutions, it is not absolute. 
can be limited in certain circumstances in the light of 
overriding imperatives. Such limitation, however, should 
comply with certain requirements; it must be reasonable, 
necessary and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality and such limitation should not 
violate the essential nature of the right.~ These requirements 
imply that the government cannot simply limit academic freedom 
at its whim. Should it attempt to do so, the individual 
academic can challenge it in court where the government will 
have to prove that the limitation was reasonable and 
justifiable in a democratic society based on freedom and 
equali ty37 • Moreover, academic freedom does not exist in a 
vacuum. There may be a need to strike a balance between such 
academic freedom and other competing rights. In the case of a 
clash between academic freedom and other rights, the courts 
may be the ultimate authority to decide where the balance 
should be struck. 
4.3 UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN THE CONSTITUTION 
As was already pointed out above, the academic freedom of any 
university teacher usually depends on the autonomy of that 
university although even an autonomous university may 
nonetheless restrict the academic freedom of its staff 
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members. This underscores that university autonomy is a 
necessary though not a sufficient condition for academic 
freedom. Academic freedom is therefore distinguishable from 
university autonomy. 
As already pointed out, the interim Constitution does not make 
separate provision for university autonomy by name. It is 
generally subsumed under academic freedom. This can be 
construed from the fact that in section 14(1) academic freedom 
is protected "in ins ti tut ions of higher learning". If the 
purpose was merely to protect the freedom of an individual 
academic, it would not be necessary to mention "institutions 
of higher learning". Moreover, section 247(2) protects the 
rights and powers of the governing bodies of universities and 
technikons. The academic freedom of an individual academic 
cannot be effectively protected if an institution to which he 
is attached cannot take independent decisions regarding 
teaching and research. The fact that academic freedom concerns 
not only academics but also institutions of higher learning to 
which they are attached, implies that such institutions can 
assert their autonomy against the state whereas individual 
academics can assert their freedom not only against the state, 
but also against their university or other institutions of 
higher learning.~ 
University autonomy is also generally recognized by virtue of 
tradition as involving self-governance on the part of the 
university. This has been the case, with exceptions, 
throughout the history of universities. It further refers to 
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the freedom cf the institution to govern itself while academic 
freedom relates to the individual academic who exercises this 
freedom in the university milieu in terms cf academic-related 
activities. 39 In the Constitution, however, no clear 
distinction is made. 
A crucial 
compatible 
question is whether 
with democracy. The 
university autonomy is 
answer is obviously that 
autonomous institutions in general, and a university in 
particular, are compatible with a democracy and specifically a 
pluralist democracy. 40 The reason behind this, is that 
autonomous universities constitute an essential ingredient of 
democracy; university autonomy is regarded as an integral 
feature of democracy because it is a way of institutionalizing 
freedom of research and teaching. This does not mean that 
there may be no tensions and even conflicts between democracy 
and academic freedom in general. There may well be such 
conflicts. There is no doubt that there is interdependence 
between freedom and truth. Totalitarian systems have 
demonstrated that in order to abolish freedom it is necessary 
to control thought. In this way academic freedom is a 
necessary ingredient of democracy and constitutional democracy 
offers a better guarantee than any other political system that 
academic freedom will be respected and protected. This 
interdependence, however, does not preclude friction. As an 
institution that is subsidized by the government, some feel 
the government and society should have a greater say and 
influence over the conduct of universities. Moreover, it has 
been also contended, as the institution that provides 
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professional training at the highest level the university 
should not have exclusive right to determine what kinds of 
knowledge and what professional skills are required by society 
and the economy41 • 
There are those who would have a fundamental problem with a 
democratically elected government giving money to unelected 
officials of autonomous institutions to spend as those 
officials and institutions see fit. This can be justified on 
the grounds that good universities produce good knowledge and 
reliable information as well as analytical skills which the 
citizens may find useful in order to participate effectively 
in the ordering of society. Universities cannot do this 
effectively if they have to be restrained by the political 
agenda of the government in power at a particular time. 
Universities also improve the socio-economic well-being of the 
broader community by generating useful knowledge which may 
lead to the production of useful inventions and the consequent 
improvement of the quality of life of society. They can only 
do this best if they are not prescribed to by a transient 
government on what their research priorities should be.c 
The main mission of the university is to pursue academic 
excellence through teaching and research for the benefit of 
the community. The university staff and students also form 
part of the community so that the university is involved in a 
complex relationship that includes society, the government and 
the community. The university is also dependent on the 
financial resources from the state. The autonomy of the 
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university is therefore not absolute but limited because the 
university is not only dependent on the state for the subsidy, 
but it also has to act within the law. The very fact tha~ 
universities are subsidized by the government have led people 
to believe that a university cannot claim autonomy from the 
government in line with the say~ng that he who pays the piper 
calls the tune. If one considers that the taxpayer is the one 
that subsidizes the university and not strictly speaking the 
government which is merely a trustee, then the picture 
changes. The taxpayer consists of citizens who belong to 
different shades of political opinion, and if the taxpayer is 
regarded as the sponsor of the university, then the university 
has an obligation to be critically analytical of everything 
for the benefit of all members of society. 
The university is generally regarded as autonomous in relation 
to matters such as the appointment of some members of the 
governing body; the composition of its academic bodies (the 
senate and the faculty boards) ; the determination of 
priorities in research and teaching; generation of funds and 
the allocation of funds received; the appointment, dismissal 
and conditions of service of academic and other personnel; 
admission to, selection for and refusal of registration; 
recommendations on the establishment of faculties the creation 
of degrees and the designing of curricula; the determination 
of the contents of curricula; the examination for and 
conferment of degrees; and the general internal management 
administration and discipline.~ 
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There is a definite link between academic freedom, university 
autonomy and university governance. In order to perform all 
these functions effectively, and t:.o justify autonomy, the 
university has to have an effective and efficient management:. 
and administration. It has to have organs and off.icers to 
perform its powers and functions. The university governance 
provides the framework, the authorized mechanisms for the 
realisation of university autonomy and university autonomy is 
the cradle of academic freedom. It is necessary to outline 
these structures of governance so as to determine what role 
they play in effectively upholding university autonomy. 
The organizational structure of universities in South Africa 
is generally the same so that it is possi.ble to make a general 
account of them. This is to be ascribed to the fact that 
universities have all have been established by legislation 
which has tended to create uniformity. 
of control is a logical outcome of 
The typical structure 
their nature. 44 As 
Schwartzman puts it: "Since their origins in Western Europe in 
the late Middle Ages, universities emerged by copying each 
other, and adapting their features to local conditions". 45 
Whether or not this organizational structure is a product of 
autonomy or merely of historical development is not an issue.~ 
What is important is that because of the need for autonomy 
universities have developed these structures of governance. A 
university in South Africa is normally created by an act of 
parliament. Its statute defines its powers and functions in 
greater detail. 
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The fact that a university is a statutory corporation implies 
that it has only those powers conferred on it directly or 
indirectly by the statute establishing it. This is in contrast 
to a university established by royal charter in Britain. A 
university established by royal charter has most of the powers 
possessed by an individual natural person. The importance of 
this distinction is that although in colonial times in South 
Africa and even after Union, it was possible for a university 
to be established by royal charter, it seldom happened. The 
reason behind this is that the right to confer academic 
degrees according to English constitutional law was part of 
the royal prerogative which passed to the university by 
privilege or royal grant. Theoretically, in South Africa the 
power to confer degrees vests in the sovereign authority. The 
right to confer degrees is therefore granted to a university 
by legislation. 47 
Universities in South Africa in general are constituted as 
follows: a chancellor; a principal or rector who may also be 
vice-chancellor;~ a council; a vice-rector, vice principal or 
vice-rectors or vice-principals;~ a senate; a convocation;~ 
the professorsn, lecturers~ and students" of the university 
and; a registrar or registrars and the other staff of the 
university. 54 
4.3.1 Chancellor 
The chancellor is the titular head of the university and is 
empowered to confer degrees on behalf of the university. The 
285. 
off ice of chancellor can be traced to the early development of 
universities in the Middle Ages. As the ceremonial head of the 
institution, he has little influence on its internal 
management. 
At most universities the chancellor is elected by the council 
in terms of the statute of the university. At others he is 
elected by an electoral college, and at still others by the 
convocation. He is generally supposed to be somebody who 
upholds values for which a university stands including 
university autonomy and academic freedom. As titular head of 
the ins ti tut ion, he is not supposed to be involved in the 
internal management of the university. He may, however, 
defend the university from attacks by outsiders. He may also 
support it in its quest for autonomy and academic freedom. 
4.3.2 Principal or Rector and Vice-Chancellor and his 
Deputies 
All universities also have a vice-chancellor and deputies. If 
the chancellor is absent or unable to perform his duties and 
functions or to exercise his powers, the vice-chancellor must 
perform those duties and functions and may exercise the powers 
of the chancellor. In some cases the vice-chancellorship is a 
separate office, but in most universities the principal or 
rector is also the vice-chancellor, or he may be eligible as 
such. 
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The term "vice-chancellor" originated in the University of 
Oxford. Initially the chancello:!'." was an official of the 
bishop. Until the fifteenth century it was customary for the 
chancellor to be a resident officer of the university and to 
serve for only two or three years. The practice then developed 
of electing to this office men of noble birth or of 
distinction in the service of the state usually for life. The 
off ice of chancellor therefore "fell to be one of dignity 
divorced from power". Authority came to be vested in a deputy 
who was normally elected for a period of one or two years from 
among the heads of colleges. The title "vice-chancellor" 
became common after 1450. Five hundred years later it was 
agreed that the vice-chancellor of Oxford did not have to be 
chosen from among the college heads and should serve for four 
years instead of two. The first non-college head was appointed 
in 1989. In the same year, it was recommended at Cambridge 
University that the vice-chancellor should hold off ice for 
longer than two years as was customary. 55 The off ice of 
vice-chancellor was adopted in South Africa with minor 
adaptations. 
The principal or rector (hereinafter ref erred to simply as 
rector) is the chief executive officer of the university. By 
virtue of his off ice he is an ex officio member of the council 
and the senate and of every committee of the council or the 
senate as well as of every joint committee of the council and 
the senate. With the concurrence of the council he is entitled 
to designate any person in the employ of the university to 
serve in any particular case, or for such period as he may 
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determine, in his place in any such committee. The rector is 
usually appointed by the council in a manner prescribed by the 
statute and in some cases with the concurrence of the 
minister. 
privileges, 
council. 
His conditions of service and his powe::::-s, 
duties and functions are determined by the 
There is no doubt that the rector is the most important 
official of the university. He is responsible for the overall 
supervision of the functioning of the university. He must 
therefore have considerable national and international stature 
owing to the fact that internally he is both the academic 
leader and chief executive officer of the university and 
externally he is the chief public relations officer of the 
university. 56 Because of this he must have distinguished 
himself academically and must have considerable administrative 
ability and experience. Moreover, he must be able not only to 
defend university autonomy and academic freedom but also to 
promote and advocate them. He should be fair but firm in 
dealing with staff, students and the government as he occupies 
a pivotal position in the whole university administration and 
management. As academic leader he must provide leadership to 
the academics among whom he is a primus inter pares. He is 
also the chairman of the senate and as such can exercise 
considerable influence on the academic performance of the 
university. In brief, he must ensure that the university is in 
a position to attain its goals and objectives. 
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As chief executive officer, the rector must ensure that the 
officers under him execute effectively the policy of the 
university as determined by che council or the senate. He is 
consequently responsible for a~d accountable to the council 
for the efficient operation of che university administrative 
machinery. 57 In addition to this he is the chief liaison 
officer with the public which consists of the students and 
former students, the parents of the students and other 
important stakeholders like the government and the donors. In 
this he must play a crucial role owing to the complexity of 
the relationship between the university and the public as a 
result of socio-economic and political factors. This requires 
insight and knowledge of the operation of the university. 
Obviously in fulfilling his role he has to be assisted by 
various officers. He must advise the council on the type of 
officers to be appointed to assist him and the expertise they 
should possess. The council relies heavily on him in the 
decisions it takes~. 
In the case of Schoeman v Fourie59 De Wet CJ described the 
important role of the rector as follows: 
As hoof van die inrigting is hy 'n beampte van die 
regspersoon d. i. die Raad. . . Hy is die man in 
onmiddellike bevel; hy is nie daar as 'n blote 
bystander of belangelose toeskouer nie maar as die 
vernaamste beampte van die Raad wat in geval van 
nood namens sy prinsipaal behoort op te tree en 
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enige redelike tussentydse s~appe ter beskerming 
van die belange van die inrigting te neem." 
In the execution of his duties the :!'.'ector must have 
considerable expertise in the handling of people, and he must 
also possess administrative acumen to be able to co-ordinate 
and integrate the activities of experts with differing 
backgrounds.~ In the performance of his duties he must not 
violate or threaten the academic freedom of his academic 
staff. There are various ways whereby the rector can violate 
or threaten the academic freedom of his staff. He may align 
himself with a particular political party or the government of 
the day and may not tolerate staff that is critical of 
government policy. He may also stifle any debate on 
government-related issues. When it comes to appointments, he 
may not support the appointment of people whose views he 
considers unacceptable. 
Most universities make provision for the appointment of one or 
more vice-principals or vice-rectors or deputy vice-
chancellors. They are appointed by the council and, in some 
cases, with the concurrence of the minister. A vice-rector's 
conditions of service and powers, privileges, duties and 
functions are determined by the council. Usually the rector is 
entitled to delegate to a vice-rector any of his powers. 
Owing to the complexity of the duties and functions of the 
rector, he needs assistance as no person, however capable, can 
do justice to all these. He must therefore be assisted by the 
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vice-rector who must also act during his absence. He 
nonetheless bears ultimate responsibility to the council for 
the performance of those duties. 61 Moreover, in order to be 
effective, the spanner of control of the rector shoulci be 
narrow and not too wide.~ 
The rector and his deputies form the executive management of 
the university which is responsible for providing leadership 
to the institution. This distinguishes it from the 
administration which deals with the administering of decisions 
taken by the appropriate organs of the university. Through 
their collective leadership, the management of a university 
can exert considerable influence on university autonomy and 
academic freedom. 
4.3.3 The Registrar(s) 
Most universities have one or more registrars although some 
acts and statutes may not mention this officer expressly. The 
registrar is the chief administrative officer of the 
university. He is usually the secretary to the council and the 
senate although he is entitled to designate any other officer 
of the administrative staff to assist him. As secretary to the 
council and the senate, he must attend all meetings of the 
committees of the council and the senate although he has the 
discretion to designate any other officer of the 
administrative staff to assist him. 
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Sometimes the question is raised as to what the difference is 
between the function of the registrar and that of vice-rector. 
The major distinction is that the vice-rector has an executive 
function and assists the rector in providing leadership for 
the university. The registrar's function, on the other hand, 
is administrative. It is to administer the policies and 
decisions taken by the appropriate organs of the university. 
In that capacity, however, the registrar can exert an 
influence on university autonomy and academic freedom. 
4.3.4 The Council 
All universities have a council. The council is the supreme 
policy-making body of the university. Most acts stipulate that 
the control government and executive power of the university 
vest in the council. Al though councils may have been 
established for different reasons than to foster institutional 
autonomy, there is no doubt that the existence of the council 
as a government of a university, reinforces such institutional 
autonomy. Its powers and competences to take policy decisions 
and to make the necessary appointments render it unnecessary 
for the government to be involved in this. As the government 
and policy maker for the university, the council can exercise 
a decisive 
freedom. 
influence on university autonomy 
By the decisions it takes and 
and 
the 
academic 
type of 
relationship it encourages between the university and the 
government, it can either promote or stifle university 
autonomy and academic freedom. 
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Although the composition of the council differs from 
university to university, the following are, with some minor 
variations, generally the members of each council: The rector 
of the university; the vice-rector or vice-rectors; not less 
than four and not more than seven members appointed by the 
minister;~ between two and seven members of the senate elected 
by the university senate; 6-l two or more persons elected by 
convocation from among its members; 65 two or three 
representatives of donors, elected by the donors themselves in 
a manner prescribed by the statute;~ one or more members of 
the municipal council or councils most intimately connected 
with the university concerned;~ some include representatives 
of bodies or institutions, usually situated within the area of 
the university's activities, which have historical, religious, 
educational or other links with the university;~ some have 
student representatives;~ one or more representative of the 
provincial government; some include representatives of the 
administrative staff of the university;~ and members co-opted 
or elected by the council.n 
The general rule is that, apart from the rector or 
vice-rectors and representatives of the senate and some 
administrative members, no member of the council should be a 
member of the university staff. There are, however, recent 
exceptions or deviations from this rule. The increasing 
representation of staff may pose some problems especially when 
junior staff members are represented on the council whereas 
their seniors are not. It may be difficult for senior staff 
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to maintain discipline over or to give instructions to junior 
staff who may be members of the council. 
The council represents the major stakeholders of the 
university. These include the government, the community, the 
particular section of the community produced by the university 
and the scholars or academic staff. While these members are 
members of the council, they are not necessarily supposed to 
represent their various constituencies but are supposed to 
apply their minds to the affairs and interests of the 
university concerned objectively. The way in which members of 
the council are appointed should ensure an element of balance 
and an even distribution of expertise. 
The council generally has a discretion to appoint committees 
of the council consisting of members of the council or of 
members of the council as well as other persons. It may 
delegate any of its powers or functions to any such committee. 
Such delegation will, however, not completely di vest the 
council of any of its powers and functions. Delegation is 
always important for purposes of di vision of labour and 
expediting the taking of decisions. The council may at its 
first meeting alter or set aside any decision taken by such a 
committee. 
The most important of these commit tees is the executive 
committee of the council. Generally this committee consists of 
the rector, the vice-rector or vice-rectors, the chairman of 
the council and a few other members of the council. The 
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executive committee of the councJ.l may, in addition to any 
other powers it has, exercise and/or dispose on behalf of the 
council, urgent business which cannot be postponed till the 
next meeting of the council. Particulars of the business so 
disposed must be submitted at the next ensuing meeting of the 
council for its information. It also has to advise and make 
recommendations to the council on policy matters. Moreover, it 
has to consider the reports of all committees of the council 
and to submit recommendations thereon to the council. 
At all universities the council administers the property of 
the university and is generally in control of the university 
and of all its affairs and functions. It has to appoint the 
university staff it considers necessary for the efficient 
running of the university. In the appointment of staff, some 
universities adopt affirmative action as a policy to redress 
imbalances created by the apartheid policy of the past. Others 
have structures which deal with the issue of race and gender 
equity in the appointment and advancement of staff. Being 
responsible for the appointment of staff means that the 
council is responsible for one of the important legs of 
academic freedom in the form of institutional autonomy, namely 
to determine who should teach. In this way it can exercise 
considerable influence on academic freedom through the type of 
academics it appoints. 
Although this is generally not mentioned in the acts or 
statutes, except a few, it is obvious that the council is 
responsible for policy formulation. In doing this, however, 
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the council has to rely on a :nu7:1.ber .:)f committees, structures 
and officials. The most important structure of governance on 
which it relies for academic matters and the establishment of 
new departments and faculties is the senate. There are 
obviously other bodies, but the senate is the most important 
one. The council also relies heavily on the rector and his 
deputies in matters of policy.n This implies that management, 
not only as management, but also as part of the council, can 
have an influence on university autonomy and academic freedom. 
Being responsible for policy formulation, the council can 
decide that the university will have a particular character. 
Although freedom of religion is for instance guaranteed in the 
interim Constitution73 , there is no doubt that a university 
through its council can decide that the said university will 
have a Christian character. 
autonomous institution. 
This is part of its powers as an 
A typical example is the 
Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education. The 
fact that a university may have a Christian character for 
instance does not mean that it has to discriminate against 
those who do not believe in Christianity. Autonomy has to be 
exercised responsibly and not as a pretext for discrimination. 
In addition to this, the council has to be responsible for 
determining the organisational structure of the university, 
for financing the projects and programmes of the university, 
for provision of personnel, for determining work procedures 
and for control.H A council that supports academic freedom 
~ill not appoint academic staff that only espouses particular 
political views or only views that it supports, but will 
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appoint staff L"i.at is cornpete:1': anC. well qualified in order t.o 
enable ~he university to fulfil its function of teaching and 
research. It should base its decision on academic grounds 
only. By virtue of their cJ..ose relationship with the 
university, members of the council are in an ideal position to 
take appropriate decisions and to make approp:!'.'iate 
appointments for the university. 
4.3.5 The Senate 
The senate of a university may be defined as the academic 
governing body of a university. 75 Its composition varies 
slightly from university to university. In general it consists 
of the following: The rector of the university, who is also 
its chairman; the vice-rectors; 76not more than two council 
representatives usually elected by the council in a manner and 
for a period prescribed by the statute concerned;n professors 
of the university; 78 senior lecturers of the university who are 
also heads of departments; 79 lecturers of the university 
designated from time to time by the council after consultation 
with the senate;~ some university acts specify certain other 
university staff members such as the university librarian81 or 
heads of research institutes;n and such other members of the 
administrative staff of the university, who will not be more 
than three, whom the council may from time to time designate 
on the recommendation of the senate." 
The senate has to supervise and regulate the instruction of 
the several faculties, departments, lectures and classes of 
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the university. It has also -co o:.::-ganise and control the 
curricula and examinations of the university. In this way the 
senate is responsible f c~ the two legs of academic freedom in 
t~e form of ins-citutional autonomy, namely, to determine what 
to teach and how it shall be taught. By supervising what the 
faculties and departments have to do, the senate has to see to 
it that the university attains its goals of teaching and 
research and thus the generation and transmission of knowledge 
for the benefit of society. From time to time the senate must 
submit to the council reports on the work of the senate, such 
recommendations on matters of importance to the university as 
it may deem expedient and recommendations on matters referred 
to it by the council. Being the main organs of governance of 
the university, the senate and the council have to work in 
close collaboration. 
To facilitate the performance of its functions, the senate is 
empowered to appoint committees of the senate consisting of 
members of the senate or of members of the senate as well as 
other persons. It may delegate any of its powers and functions 
to any such committee. Such delegation does not imply that the 
senate is divested of any power or function which it has 
assigned to any committee. For this reason the senate at its 
first meeting after the decision in question may alter or set 
aside such decision. 
At most universities the act or statute or both make provision 
for the establishment of an executive committee which is 
vested with all the powers of the senate if the senate is not 
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in session. The executive committee usually consists of the 
rector, the deans of the faculties, the representatives of the 
council on the senate, and one or more other members of the 
senate appointed by the senate. The role of the executive 
committee is to make recommendations to the senate or to take 
emergency decisions on behalf of the senate with subsequent 
reporting duties to the senate. 
Most acts provide that the council and the senate can 
establish joint committees of the council and the senate for 
such purposes as the council may determine. Such committees 
must consist of members appointed by the council and the 
senate, respectively, from among their members. The council or 
senate may delegate any of its powers or functions to such a 
committee. Such delegation, however, will not have the effect 
of divesting them of any power or function so delegated to 
such a committee and they may alter or set aside any decision 
of such a committee at the first subsequent meeting of the 
council or the senate as the case may be. 
The senate consists of people who are experts and experienced 
in university education. This qualifies them to take 
appropriate decisions on curricula, syllabi and examinations. 
They are also able to assess and monitor the academic 
standards of the university. The fact that many of the 
professors who are members of the senate are also members of 
an international community of scholars, by vi.rtue of being 
involved in research and in exchange programmes and by virtue 
of exposure to other universities in the country and abroad, 
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makes them eminently qualif~ed to do this job effectively. 
Some universities make use o~ external examiners to ensure the 
maintenance of academic standards and that university autonomy 
does not lead to isolation and the lowering of standards. 
The professors 
generation of 
the ref ore the 
are the main people responsible for the 
new knowledge through research. They are 
beneficiaries of the protection afforded by 
academic freedom. It stands to reason that they should be the 
foremost defenders of such freedom and jealously guard it. In 
theory that is so, but in practice the situation may be 
different as particular universities may tend to have a 
particular character which even professors may want to retain. 
This means that a professor who does not share this view may 
not be popular. The fact that individual academics are 
entitled to academic freedom means that a university senate is 
not entitled to debar any academic from propagating any theory 
or view on the grounds that it is not acceptable to it or to 
society in general. Because the university would be bound by 
the bill of rights, the individual academic can assert his 
academic freedom against the university as well.~ 
4.3.6 The Convocation 
Generally the convocation consists of the graduates of the 
university concerned. The purpose thereof is no doubt to 
maintain a link between the university and its graduates so 
that they can make some meaningful contribution towards the 
further development of the university. The contribution may 
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take the form of participation in the decision making of the 
university or in financial contrib~tions towards the projects 
cf the university. Former studencs are in an ideal position tc 
advise the university authorities on where they fall shcrt. 
They themselves know the set-up of the university after having 
been students there. Practical experience may contribute to 
their offering sound and mature advice. 
In addition to the graduates of the university various acts 
provide for the membership of the rector, the vice-rectors, 
the teaching staff of the university and in some cases other 
officials of the university such as the registrar and the 
librarian. Many acts provide that persons who had been members 
of convocation in terms of previous acts should be members. 
Similarly, people who are graduates of the university college 
that was the predecessor of the university concerned ar.:: 
entitled to membership. Graduates are often free to indicate 
that they are unwilling to be members. 
Most acts empower the convocation to discuss any matter 
relating to the university and to express its opinion thereon 
as well as on matters referred to it by the council. In some 
universities, as already pointed out, the convocation elects 
the chancellor of the university. Most of them elect 
representatives of the convocation on the university council. 
Through its representation on the council, the convocation may 
influence council decisions including those that may have an 
impact on university autonomy and academic freedom. 
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4.3.7 Faculties and departments 
All universities are divided into faculties and departments. A 
faculty may be defined as a conglomeration of related academic 
departments. Academic departments are administrative units 
which control the teaching of an academic subject or related 
subjects.~ The acts of the various universities make provision 
for various faculties. 
In terms of the Universities Act~ the prior written approval 
of the minister is needed for the creation of a new faculty or 
sub-di vision thereof or a department, except where such 
faculty or department is fully funded from outside. In the 
past the Universities Advisory Council advised the minister on 
the creation of faculties or departments at universities. This 
was so because that decision had financial implications for 
the government through increased subsidy. Al though this 
imposed a limitation on the autonomy of a university, this 
limitation was considered legitimate. Moreover, the fact that 
the decision has to be taken on the advice of a buffer body 
was aimed at ensuring that the decision was as far as 
possible, objective and justifiable. This would prevent 
improper motives influencing the decision. 
Most university acts or statutes, or both, provide for the 
establishment of governing bodies of the faculties, namely, 
the faculty boards. They are usually designated as committees 
of the senate, and generally consist of the professors of the 
departments in the faculty, and such other lecturers and 
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members as the council may det:.ermine on the recommendation of 
the senate. 
According to most. statut:.es the dean of the faculty is the 
chairman of the faculty board. In his absence the meeting of 
the faculty board may elect its own chairman. The dean is in 
general control of the faculty. He may therefore be regarded 
as the general manager of the faculty. In this capacity he 
influences the teaching and research in the faculty. It is 
important to bear in mind that the object of university 
autonomy and academic freedom is the generation and 
dissemination of knowledge through research and teaching. The 
decisions of the faculty boards have therefore an impact on 
these. 
As a committee of the senate, the functions of the faculty 
board are regulated by the general provisions regarding such 
committees. Moreover, many statutes enumerate certain specific 
functions of the faculty board which include the making of 
recommendations to the senate on syllabi, courses of study and 
examinations, and the submission to the senate of the names of 
persons who have complied with the requirements prescribed for 
degrees, diplomas and certificates of that faculty. This 
ensures that the decisions of the senate are well considered 
and informed. 
At the head of each department is a head of the department who 
is generally a professor. He can be regarded as the manager of 
the department concerned. By virtue of this he is a member of 
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the faculty board and of the senate. The head of the 
department occupies an important leadership position in the 
middle management of the university. He is a key figure in the 
execution of the university's policy. Not only does he serve 
as a liaison between the senate and the faculty board on the 
one hand and lecturers and students on t:he other-, when it 
comes to the execution of the decisions and the implementation 
of policy, but he also occupies a key position in the 
communication of the wishes, ideas and aspirations of the 
lecturers and students in his department to the faculty board 
and the senate. There is therefore no doubt that the head of 
the department is the academic leader in the department. The 
academic department is the basic unit of the university. This 
is where most of the activities take place. In an era where 
productivity at the university is emphasised, it is clear that 
the head of the department has a pivotal role to play. The 
functions he has to perform are multifarious and 
comprehensive. He should teach, do research, do community 
service, be involved in continuing education and manage the 
academic department.n This further strengthens university 
autonomy as in the departments are the beneficiaries of 
university autonomy and academic freedom. 
4.3.8 Staff of the University 
It is the prerogative of the council to determine the staff 
establishment of the university. The council has power to 
appoint any person as a member of the teaching, 
administrative, clerical or other staff of the university, or 
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to promote, transfer, second er discharge any such membe;:-. If 
it transfers or discharges a member of staff, it must observe 
the principles of natural justice. 
The staff of the university can broadly be divided into the 
academic, administrative and clerical staff. The academic 
staff falls within various faculties. These are the people who 
are largely protected by university autonomy and academic 
freedom. All university acts provide that. such staff is 
appointed by the council after consultation with the senate or 
a committee of the senate appointed for that purpose by the 
senate. As the work of the university is to generate and 
disseminate knowledge through teaching and research, it has to 
appoint staff to do this. The other staff has to provide 
support services so that the work of teaching and research is 
done effectively. They may also be responsible for carrying 
out the decisions of the main organs of the university. All 
these decisions are ultimately aimed at ensuring that the 
university, through its academics, can effectively do its work 
of the generation and transmission of knowledge for the 
benefit of society. 
The Universities Act provides generally that the conditions of 
service of the members of the teaching and administrative 
staff of a university must be prescribed by the council 
concerned. aa These conditions are aimed at creating optimum 
conditions under which the staff have to do their work. They 
are also intended to ensure that academic and other staff 
perform their duties accordina to certain norms and standards. 
_, 
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These condi tio:1s should :iot stifle academic freedom in 
teaching and research which constitute the main goals of a 
university. That why the council has to promote or 
discipline staff. Those who do their work effectively have to 
be rewarded and those who do not do it effectively have to be 
denied such reward. If a member who has been permanently 
appointed to the staff is discharged from off ice, he has the 
right of appeal to the minister. Notice of such appeal must be 
given to the council concerned and to the minister within 
fourteen days after the person has received notice of 
discharge. 89 The aim of such an appeal is to prevent the 
council from imposing a sentence that may be harsher than the 
offence committed. The fact that the minister can veto the 
decision of the council is a further indication that the 
autonomy of the university is limited. 
In appointing staff each university council is entitled, in 
terms of its autonomy, to stipulate whatever requirements it 
deems appropriate. These requirements, however, have to be 
academic and not arbitrary. This is in accordance with one 
of the core pillars of academic freedom in the broad sense, 
namely, to determine for itself on academic grounds only who 
to teach. Al though the council is free to prescribe any 
requirements it deems appropriate, it cannot prescribe 
requirements which are discriminatory on the grounds of sex, 
gender, race, religion or any other irrelevant consideration. 
Section 8 of the interim Constitution provides for equality 
before the law and for the equal protection of the law and it 
also proscribes invidious discrimination. Provision is, 
-----------------~-
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however, made for affirma~ive act1on which includes measures 
designed to achieve adequate protection and advancement of 
persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. Although affirmative 
action is quite controversial, it is nonetheless topical, and 
it impinges on the autonomy of a university in its appointment 
policy.~ Failure to apply affirmative action cannot, however, 
lead to the decision of a university being successfully 
challenged as long as the university can prove that in 
addition to race, the person did not qualify in terms of 
academic criteria to be appointed. Despite its autonomy a 
university is also not supposed to discriminate against its 
employees for exercising rights conferred by the labour 
legislation. This includes prejudicing an employee or person 
seeking employment for being a member of a trade • 91 unJ.on . 
Unlike previous labour legislation, the present one does not 
exclude universities from its operation~. 
4.3.9 Students 
As indicated above, students are regarded as a further 
component of a university. From the Middle Ages it has been 
recognized that a university exists for students. Without them 
it is not a university. It may be a research institute or 
something else. "While it has always been agreed that we could 
not have a university without students, there have been quite 
different opinions - and never more so than in the past two 
decades - about the role of the studen~ in the university."" 
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As further indicated c..bove, most universities provide for 
representation cf students in the various decision-making 
bodies of the university. Others are still investigating the 
feasibility thereof. The effect of student representation may 
be symbolical, but it is necessary to dispel any suspicion on 
the part of students as to what the university organs do. 
The fundamental question is what the role of the student is in 
the autonomy of the university. The legal position of a 
student in a university has always been debatable. According 
to one approach a student is regarded as an apprentice who 
works closely with a master with the purpose of becoming a 
master. Alternatively a student is also seen as a ward of the 
university placed in the custody of the university by the 
parents. The university is then responsible for his welfare 
and moral and intellectual training. A student has also been 
viewed as a client or customer who seeks the services of 
professors to satisfy his needs. A further view sees a student 
as a member of the university community with rights and 
obligations like all other members. The truth of the matter is 
that the status of a student has all elements of these.~ 
A contract which a student concludes with the university gives 
rise to certain rights and obligations. He acquires a variety 
of rights including a right to tuition and he must pay the 
fees of the university and be subject to the rules and 
regulations of the university.~ Although the traditional role 
of a student in the university was that of a child learner. 
the idea of a student being under the guardianship of the 
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university is almost obsolete.% The fact that a student has a 
contract with the university may be evidence of this. The 
student's contractual relationship with the university, is not 
a simple one. Because of che position of a university, the 
relationship between the university and a student is regulated 
by administrative law. That is why the principles of natural 
justice are applicable in disputes between the student and the 
university," which is not the case with normal contracts. In 
this way a university cannot do just as it pleases with a 
student. It cannot use its autonomy as justification for 
treating its student anyhow. This is further evidence that 
the autonomy of a university is limited and that it is for a 
specific purpose. As pointed out earlier, students are also 
entitled to academic freedom. 
Universities are generally free to stipulate what type of 
students to admit. The fourth leg of academic freedom in the 
form of institutional autonomy entitles the university, 
through its appropriate organ and in particular the council, 
to determine who should be admitted as students. This 
decision should be based on academic grounds only. As a 
general rule students with the requisite intellectual ability 
and development are admitted to the university. University 
education is both costly and demanding. It is costly to the 
student and to the taxpayer; it demands a lot of dedication 
and discipline on the part of the student. For this reason it 
is essential that a person who comes to the university should 
have the potential to pursue university studies successfully. 
A person's potential for success at university may be judged, 
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among other things, by his ability to obtain matriculation 
exemption. 
As pointed out earlier, when universities were established 
during the Middle Ages there were no admission requirements as 
we have them today. If a person could speak Latin, he could be 
enrolled at university. At Bologna, for instance, a student 
could register by writing his name on the matricula. This was 
a list of the names of the members of the university. At 
Oxford and Paris, where only masters formed part of the 
university as a corporate entity, there was no such matricula. 
If a student matriculated at Bologna, that is where he put his 
name on the matricula, he had to make an oath of allegiance to 
the university and had to pay the fee prescribed for 
registration. 
In South .~frica when universities were established, the joint 
matriculation board was created. It had the function of 
controlling the entrance examination which admitted students 
to the South African universities. This board performed this 
function until it was decided that the Committee of University 
Principals (CUP) should assume this function. The joint 
matriculation board was reconstituted as a sub-committee of 
the CUP. 98 
Some universities stipulate a specific symbol at matriculation 
for a student to be admitted to university studies. Moreover, 
a council may, as a prerequisite to admission to a particular 
university course, prescribe that a student should have 
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attained a specified standard in specified subjects at the 
matriculation examination or i :.s equivalent. 99 It may be 
provided that the student must be a graduate of a university 
or must have been admitted to the status of a graduate. This 
will be the case if a student applies ~or post-graduate study. 
For this reason many university statutes contain provisions on 
the requirements of a prior degree and provisions relating to 
the recognition of degrees obtained in other faculties or in 
other universities. 100 
The reason behind this is to ensure that only students who are 
capable of performing well are admitted to the university. 
Students who have lower matric symbols are often regarded as 
students at risk. 101 If the students do not perform well, the 
university stands to lose subsidy. Government subsidy is 
indispensable for the university's performance o-.: its 
functions and. attainment of its objectives. The use C,.;: ,~ 
academic performance to determine subsidy on the part of the 
government may generally be regarded as unfair because it is 
well known that in the past it was never government policy to 
have black students on an equal footing with white students. 
Bantu education was designed for the purpose of creating an 
educational gap between black and white students . 102 It may 
therefore seem unfair to use performance to determine subsidy 
which prejudices historically black universities. 
It is often said that the matriculation results for black 
students are hopelessly unreliable as a yardstick for 
determining a student's potential. There is, however, no magic 
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formula for determining beforehand what the student's 
potential will be. Various tests have been used, but none is 
beyond reproach. The matriculation results appear to have been 
the only workable standard. The:::-e are, however, current 
attempts to devise strategies for determining student 
potential other than matriculation exemption. 
Although universities are free to prescribe admission 
criteria, the prescription of these stringent admission 
criteria may, however, be criticised on the ground that it 
provides for unwarranted restriction of the right of access 
to tertiary education. If these are stipulated by historically 
white universities, they may be interpreted as a strategy for 
excluding black students who are often regarded as deficient 
in essential study skills and who are considered to be 
disadvantaged. An unfortunate inference to be drawn from this 
may be that this is a form of subtle discrimination against 
black students who once again are regarded as a problem. 
Admittedly the right to education, is not an unlimited one. In 
the South African Law Commission's proposed bill of rights the 
right to education was limited to the primary school level.w 
As universities are entitled to exclude students if they 
consider it to be in the interests of the university, 104 it 
might be contended that this exclusion is based on the 
protection of the interests of the university. The exclusion 
based on failure to comply with admission criteria does not, 
however, appear to fall within this category. No doubt 
universities regard themselves as being entitled to stipulate 
these admission criteria. This practice might be challenged in 
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terms of the bill .:= .: ...... O.L r..Lgn1...s. The fact that the university has 
had the power to determine on academic grounds who should be 
admitted as students has been regarded as an essential 
ingredient of university autonomy. That other considerations 
than academic merit can play a role may be construed to mean 
that university autonomy is not unlimited. 
The interim Cons ti tut ion provides for the right to basic 
education and to equal access to educational institutions. 1~ 
Al though this provision guarantees the right to basic 
education, it does not guarantee the right to university 
education. University education cannot be regarded as 
synonymous with basic education. This provision is complicated 
by the fact that it guarantees not only the right to basic 
education but also equal access to educational institutions. 
Educational institutions are not specified but the provision 
generalizes on them. It might therefore be contended that 
educational institutions include institutions of higher 
learning like universities and technikons. Prescribing 
admission requirements which exclude some who want to be 
admitted to universities might be regarded as 
unconstitutional. It is, however, impracticable to admit 
everyone. 
It could also be argued that the phrase "equal access to 
educational institutions" relates to educational institutions 
providing basic education. But if the earlier view is upheld, 
namely that all educational institutions are intended, then 
the exclusion may still be regarded as unconstitutional. It 
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may further be contended that in accordance with the concept 
of university autonomy and academic freedom a university is 
entitled to decide on who should be its studem:s. Such a 
decision is not meant to discriminate unfairly against certain 
people, but it is aimed at protecting its academic standards. 
But if the exclusion coincides with race, it could be regarded 
as discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional. 
Some universities are suggest~ng new ways of determining 
potential for success in university studies. These strategies 
provide an alternative to matriculation or conditional 
exemption owing to problems encountered in black education. 
These alternative strategies are still being considered by the 
Committee of University Principals.'~ The purpose thereof is 
to facilitate access ~o tertiary education. 
Owing to the problems in black education, many universities 
have introduced academic support programmes in order to assist 
students with their study skills. The purpose of this is to 
prevent a university from lowering its standards so that what 
is emphasized is not the competence of the student on entry 
but at the exit point. At some universities they have 
introduced academic development programmes. The purpose 
thereof is to facilitate access to tertiary education for the 
poor and historically disadvantaged sectors of South African 
society. 107 
Although some universities have academic support programmes, 
they may not be properly structured within departments, but 
.............. ----------~~ 
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may be fragmented and may not "oe offered by experienced 
teachers but rather by junior and inexperienced ones. As a 
result their impact may not be fe::.t:. But if black students who 
have been disadvantaged by bantu education should be enabled 
to compete effectively and to have equal access to university 
education with their white counterparts, affirmative 
programmes should be provided for them. This entails not only 
restructuring primary and secondary education.. but also 
providing effective programmes that will develop their study 
skills. These programmes should also address the fact that for 
many of these students English and Afrikaans which are 
generally media of instruction at universities are not their 
first languages. Moreover, many of these students are 
disadvantaged financially and this means that bursaries, 
scholarships and loans should be made available to them as 
part of a composite programme to enable especially black 
students to have equal access to university education. 108 
The organizational structure and powers and functions of the 
university ensure that it can take and implement decisions 
effectively and expeditiously. These also ensure that 
decisions are taken by people who have the knowledge and 
expertise and who are conversant with the situation with which 
they are dealing. This further strengthens autonomy in that 
outside interference is rendered nugatory. There are, 
however, checks against the arbitrary exercise of autonomy by 
the institution. Members of the academic staff may challenge 
the university if what it purports to do is in conflict with 
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their academic freedom. The autonomy is nonetheless essential 
for academic freedom. 
4.4 EXTERNAL CONTROL 
Al though universities are generally autonomous, they are 
subject to some external control. This external control is 
attributable to the fact that universities in South Africa in 
general are subsidised by the government. Certain decisions 
taken by the universities are the ref ore subject to the 
approval of the minister. In taking some of the decisions the 
minister is assisted or advised by certain committees. This 
ensures that the decision taken by the minister is not an 
arbitrary but an informed and objective one. 
4.4.1 Powers of the minister 
The Minister of National Education has wide powers in relation 
to universities. Most of these powers are indirect in that for 
a number of acts by a university the approval of the minister 
is required. His approval is for instance required for the 
framing of joint statutes and regulations by the Committee of 
University Principals~ and the framing of the statutes and 
regulations by university councils111). This acts as a further 
check on the various matters that are ordinarily regulated by 
these regulations and statutes such as the election, period of 
off ice, powers and functions of the various university 
of£ ice-bearers, the procedure and quorum at meetings of 
university organs, the designation of degrees, the conferment 
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of degrees and honorary degress, d~sciplinary provisions and 
to the related rqat"C.E:rs. The urc:!-,rersi ties Act and D'.:her 
univers2.'Cy acts co:i.fer certairi specific powers on the 
minister. 1hese include: 
(a) the appointment of the chairman and members o:: 'Che 
university advisory council and the determination of 
their conditions of servicei 111 
(b) the handling of appeals from university staff members 
who have been discharged; 111 
(c) the approval for the creation of faculties and 
departments at universities and for the incurring of 
expenditure under certain circumstances; 113 
(d) the making of regulations, binding all universities, on 
a wide variety of matters; 114 
(e) the granting of loans and subsidies to universities; 1u 
(f) the withholding of loans and subsidies to 
universities; 116 
{g) the presc::-:iption of t:.he time and manner in which the 
university councils must report to him en the 
proceedings and management of the university concerned 
as well as on its financial affairs; 117 and 
(h) the approval for the alienation or hypothecation of its 
immovable property by the univi::rsity.m 
Other than in the exercise of these powers the minister has no 
authority or is not supposed to interfere in the internal 
management of a ur..iversity. Such interference cou2..d be 
challenged on the basis of institutional autonomy. In a few 
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cases the Minis~er of Na:ional Ed~cation has done things which 
could be interpreted as interference in the inter:::ial 
management of the university119 • The problem with such 
intervention is that, unless solicited and however 
well-intentioned, it tends to be selective and therefore to 
reveal political motives rather than a genuine desire to 
assist the ins ti tut ion concerned. Unwarranted political 
intervention in the internal affairs of a university is 
obviously not to the benefit of such institution and may tend 
to compromise its autonomy. 
That the powers exercised by the minister may be liable to 
abuse and may have an impact on university autonomy and 
academic freedom may be seen from the case of the Universitv 
of Cape Town and another v Ministers of Education and Culture 
(House of Assembly and House of Representatives) and others. 120 
In this case the respondent ministers purported to stipulate 
conditions, in terms of section 25 of the Universities Act, 
which had no bearing on higher education but fell within the 
scope of the maintenance of law and order in general. Section 
25 makes provision for the granting of subsidies to 
universities subject to conditions determined by the minister 
and with due regard to the requirements in relation to the 
general requirements of higher education. Section 27 
stipulates, inter alia, that upon failure by the university 
council to comply with certain conditions, the relevant 
minister may withhold all or part of that university's 
subsidy. In terms of the provisions of section 25 the 
respondent ministers imposed certain conditions upon all 
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universities with effect from l9 October 1987. The university 
councils were commanded to take steps aimed at preventing and 
...... pun1s .... 1ng certain conduct of st.af f and students at ':hese 
universities. The minister had ':o be notified of any inciden': 
of unrest or disruption or occurrence to which the preventive 
measures were directed and to rep8rt on the disciplinary st.eps 
taken or intended to be taken to prevent similar incidents in 
future. 
These were challenged on the grounds that they were ultra 
vires the provisions of s25i that they were also regarded as 
so vague that they did not convey with any reasonable 
certainty what the universities were required to do in order 
to avoid non-compliance; and that they entailed unreasonably 
oppressive or gratuitous interference in the applicant 
universities' rights. The court held that as these conditions 
were imposed solely for purposes of maintaining law and order, 
they were ultra vires and invalid. Moreover, the conditions 
were so uncertain and entailed unreasonably gratuitous' 
interference in the rights of the universities. This 
demonstrates that even though the minister has power to 
stipulate conditions for the granting of subsidies this cannot 
be done arbitrarily. The courts will interpret such 
conditions strictly in order to forestall the unnecessary 
restriction of university autonomy. The conditions must be 
necessary and they must relate to the effective provision of 
higher education. Moreover, the conditions must be clear and 
be capable of being understood and being implemented without 
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unnecessary hardship to the institucion. If they are vague or 
unreasonable they may be struck down as being invalid. 
The fact that universities in South Africa are subsidised by 
the government, severely restricts their autonomy. Although 
the courts may be generally relied upon to ensure that the 
conditions stipulated by the minister in granting subsidies 
are not arbitrary, this does noc deprive the minister of the 
power to prescribe such conditions. How the conditions are 
interpreted may depend on the court that is seized of the 
matter. A court that is too sympathetic to the government may 
give the government a greater latitude to interfere with 
university autonomy. 
Although it has previously been averred that the saying that 
he who pays the piper calls the tune has to be applied with 
caution to universities, there is no doubt that there are 
those who feel that the government has the power to prescribe 
whatever conditions it deems appropriate to the universities 
by virtue of subsidising them. Some would even go so far as 
to assert that universities that are subsidised by the 
government have no autonomy at all. Although such views are 
obviously unacceptable, they demonstrate the precarious nature 
of university autonomy. An interventionist government can 
infringe such autonomy. The fact that academic freedom is 
protected by the Constitution obviously implies that the 
university can challenge such intervention. The decision to 
challenge such intervention may be a difficult one to take 
especially if it is against a democratically elected 
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government. The establishment of private universities could be 
the answer to this problem but, as has been shown above, even 
in the case cf private universities, universitv autonomy and 
- ~ 
academic freedom may not be beyond threat from powerf:..:l 
benefactors. It is the universities thernsel ves that must 
remain vigilant and assert their right. 
4.4.2 Committee of University Principals 
The Universities Act provides for the establishment of the 
Committee of University Principals. It consists of the rector 
of each university together with additional advisory members 
appointed by the council of each university if the joint 
statutes prescribe to thac effect.u1 If the post of rector is 
vacant, a university may be represented at a committee meeting 
by another person appointed by the council for that purpose. 122 
Should the rector be unable to attend a meeting, he may 
appoint a member of the university to represent him at the 
meeting. 123 
The functions of the Committee of University Principals are 
those allocated to it under the Universities Act or the joint 
statute. It also has to advise the minister on matters which 
are of common interest to the universities or which are 
referred to it by the minister or the secretary for higher 
education.™ The fact that the CUP has to advise the minister 
implies that it has an important role to play. It may 
strengthen the autonomy of universities in that in advising 
the minister the CUP may serve as a watchdog of the autonomy 
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of universities. The functions vested in it by the act are to 
administer and award certain bursaries, scholarships and 
prizes, 125 and to frame joint statutes and regulations 126 • The 
joint statute further provides that the committee determines 
what annual contribution is to be paid by each university 
council towards the general expenses of the committeem. 
The position and. role of the CUP has been under scrutiny now 
that the whole of higher education has been investigated. The 
National Commission on Higher Education has come up with 
recommendations that various bodies including the CUP, CTP AUT 
and SERTEC be replaced by two bodies, namely, the Higher 
Education Forum and the Higher Education Council. This 
reduces the number of statutory bodies from four to two. This 
means that the CUP will no longer be a statutory body128 • 
According to the proposed bill on universities and technikons 
submitted to the NCHE by the CUP, in addition to the existing 
functions, the CUP has suggested that the CUP should be 
competent to represent, promote and perform such other acts as 
will promote or advance the interests of the university or 
technikon sectors. The NCHE has, however, recommended a 
different higher education structure which will include the 
Higher Education Forum and Higher Education Councilw. 
4.5 LIMITATIONS TO UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY 
Despite many statutory and other legal limitations, 
universities in South Africa enjoy a reasonable measure of 
autonomy and academic freedom. There is no unlimited autonomy 
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anywhere in the world, especially because many universities 
depend on the government for their subsidies 130 • Once a 
university is subsidized by the government, there is an 
implicit expectation that it W ~ 1 1 
-'---'- owe some loyalty to the 
government. This loyalty means that the university should be 
subject to and obey the laws of the country and not 
necessarily that the government should dictate to the 
university what to do in its internal affairs or to the 
academic staff what views to hold. In practice, however, the 
government may be inclined to favour those universities that 
support it and its policies and to be sensitive to the views 
of those universities that are critical of its policies and 
practices. If there is no check against its use of power, the 
government would tend to suppress the views of those 
universities or academics that are critical of its policies 
because they may be seen as embarrassing the government. In 
the absence of critical scrutiny, corruption and arbitrariness 
tend to thrive. University autonomy and academic freedom are 
there to ensure that this does not happen and that both 
universities and academics act as free agents of change and 
renewal. 
The interim Constitution provides for the limitation of 
fundamental rights. Section 33 stipulates that these rights, 
including university autonomy and academic freedom, may be 
limited by a law of general application if this limitation 
would be permissible in an open and democratic society based 
on freedom and equality. Before that limitation can be 
regarded as permissible, it must be proved that it is 
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reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on freedo~ and equality. In respect of certain civil 
and political rights including academic freedom, it is also a 
requiremer,t that the limi tat.ion should be necessary. The 
limitation should also not violate the essential nature of the 
right 131 • 
Besides the constitutional limitation of university autonomy 
mentioned above, there are other forms of limitation of 
university autonomy which demonstrate, as has been stated, 
that university autonomy is not absolute. It has to be 
balanced with the other rights provided for in the 
Constitution. Thus if a university metes out discriminatory 
treatment on the basis of race, gender or sex in violation of 
the equality provision of section 8 (1), the individual so 
affected by discrimination can challenge that in court. If 
the conduct of the university in relation to a staff member is 
challenged in court, the university cannot raise the defence 
of autonomy. Similarly, if a university takes a decision that 
adversely affects the interest of a staff member, it cannot 
act arbitrarily on the pretext of autonomy, but it has to 
observe the principles of administrative j ustice132 • This 
includes giving reasons for its decision if demanded. A 
university cannot refuse to disclose reasons for its decision 
on the grounds of autonomy. Al though the university is 
autonomous, such autonomy is autonomy within the law and it 
has to be exercised in fairness with due regard to the 
interests of others. 
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Although a unive:::-sity is an autonomous institution, it is 
important to point out that a u~iversity is dependent on the 
government for its existence. In South Africa a universi~y 
has to be established by an act of parliamentw. For this 
reason no person or institution is entitled to purport to 
award degrees or diplomas without being recognized as a 
university by the government. It is a criminal of fence to 
purport to be a university, or to purport to award degrees or 
diplomas or to offer courses offered by a university, without 
being recognized as such by the government 134 • This 
demonstrates a decisive dependence of a university on state 
recognition. 
4.6 THREATS TO UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY 
Apart from the constitutional ar..d other limitations to 
university autonomy just mentioned, there are other threats to 
institutional autonomy. These threats may take various forms, 
constitutional, statutory, social or political. They are 
distinguishable from limitations in that they may not be 
operative like limitations, but remain a potential danger to 
institutional autonomy. They may also not be properly 
controlled. 
A disturbing provision in the interim Constitution is the one 
under transitional arrangements. Section 247(2) provides that 
the national government and provincial government are not 
entitled to alter the rights, powers and functions of 
controlling bodies of universities and technikons under the 
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laws existing before the ccming into operation of the 
Constitution unless agreement has been reached with such 
bodies and this emanates from genuine negotiations. If, 
however, agreeme!j_t is not reached as stated, the national 
government and the provincial governments are competent to 
alter the rights, powers and functions of the controlling 
bodies of universities and technikons, although interested 
bodies can always have recourse to the courts to challenge 
such intervention in terms of 'Che bill of rights135 • 
These provisions, as they were initially drafted, caused 
consternation among universities and were regarded as a threat 
of infringement of university autonomy. Even if they are not 
applied, they hang above the necks of universities like the 
proverbial sword of Damocles. There was strong reaction to 
this from university principals and senior academics. The 
provisions were perceived as a pretext to give the government 
the power to interfere with the senates and councils of 
universities, probably with the purpose of packing them with 
its supporters. But reference to the rights, powers and 
functions does not include interference with or alteration of 
the composition of such bodies or their abolition1~. It merely 
means tampering with their competencies. Those who objected to 
this provision felt that the provisions of the bill of rights 
were sufficient to deal with issues of discrimination. This 
threat of government intervention is obviously unwarranted and 
it has been regarded as reminiscent of the negative 
i::1tervention of the National Party government into the 
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universities in the past,u7 which would obviously not be in 
the best interests of universities. 
Despite these protests, the said provisions were retained in 
the interim Constitution albeit in a watered-down form in that 
while they give the national government power to interfere 
with the powers and functions of the structures of governance 
for universities, universities are entitled to challenge such 
act in terms of the bill of rights. For this reason it is 
unlikely that the government will unnecessarily meddle in the 
domestic affairs of universities especially in view of the 
fact that before the government interferes there must be bona 
fide negotiations. Moreover, whatever the government intends 
doing should not be in conflict with the provisions of the 
cons ti tution138 • 
What is meant by bona fide negotiations is not easy to define. 
It has been suggested that the test whether negotiations are 
bona fide can be determined by asking the question whether the 
provisions of section 24 of the interim Constitution 
concerning administrative justice have been complied wit~u. 
This means that the government would have to inf orrn the 
university or technikon concerned that it proposes to alter 
the powers and functions of the governing body of the said 
institution. There must be discussions with the governing 
body concerned on the necessity or reasonableness of the 
proposed changes and these changes should not be in conflict 
with the essential function of the university or technikon. 
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Another threat to university autonomy is the provision on 
public administration in the final Constitution1®. In terms 
of the Constitution, the public administration is subjected to 
a number of principles which may be regarded as being 
incompatible with the idea of university autonomy. This may 
be a threat to institutional autonomy in that al though in 
practice these may not be strictly applied to universities, 
they nonetheless can be applied if universities are regarded 
as organs of state. If they are applied, they would restrict 
institutional autonomy in that legislation may be adopted 
which may ensure the promotion of the values of 
accountability, transparency and responsiveness to public 
needs which may necessitate the public to participate in 
policy making. The only saving factor is that this provision 
will always be treated as subservient to the provisions of the 
bill of rights. 
A further threat to university autonomy is that posed by the 
provisions of section 5 of the South African Qualifications 
Authority Actw. Section 5(2),inter alia, provides that one 
of the functions of the South African Qualifications Authority 
(SAQA) is to pursue the objectives of the National 
Qualifications Framework provided for in section 2 of the Act. 
These objectives are, inter alia, to create an integrated 
national framework for learning achievements; to facilitate 
access to, and mobility and progression within education, 
training and career paths; to enhance the quality of education 
and training; to accelerate the redress of past unfair 
discrimination in education, training and employment 
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opportunities; and thereby co ccn~ribute to the full personal 
development of t~e nation at large. 
These objectives are in themselves laudable. The only threat 
is that this external body, the South African Qualifications 
Authority, is empowered to pursue the objectives of the 
National Qualifications Framework mentioned above and to 
execute the functions mentioned in section 5(1), inter alia, 
"with due regard for the respective competence of Parliament 
and the provincial legislature ... and the rights, powers and 
functions of the governing bodies of a university or 
universities and a technikon or technikons as provided in any 
Act of Parliament". The effect of the phrase "with due 
regard" is uncertain. It does not necessarily mean that it 
will be bound to respect those powers and functions, but if 
one bears in mind the provisions of section 247(2) of the 
interim Constitution, it does not seem as if this threat is 
serious. Moreover, that provision will always be interpreted 
subject to the bill of rights which entrenches academic 
freedom. But the incorporation of higher education 
qualification programmes into the national qualifications 
framework will entail a degree of curtailment of insicutional 
autonomy. 
In addition to constitutional and statutory limitations, there 
are various other social and political threats to university 
autonomy to which universities are today exposed. These are 
precipitated by the social transformation that is taking place 
in the country. The university is called upon to descend from 
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the ivory tower and to be accive in 
the social problems in society. 
the solution of many of 
These problems include 
poverty, unemployment, urbanisation and illiteracy. 
Universities are also required to turn themse1ves into 
people's uni versi ties142 • In addition to these, the issue of 
access to tertiary education, especially on the part of black 
people largely as a result of poor secondary-school education, 
the language problem and the Western-orientated curricula 
require attention143 • 
There is also a growing call for the democratization of 
university structures of governance with the purpose of 
enabling students and junior staff to have a greater say in 
the governance of universities. The call for democratisation 
of universities is part of a broader mission to introduce 
democratic governance in all social institutions. The 
underlying reason is that now that the political situation in 
South Africa has been democratized, the rest of society 
including universities, should follow that example 144 • 
Attempts by the government to introduce stricter applications 
of democracy in universities, however, could be resisted or 
challenged as unconstitutional in the sense that they cannot 
be regarded as justifiable or reasonable especially if they 
limit the number of academics as against students on all 
bodies that take academic decisions. This may constitute an 
unwarranted limitation of university autonomy in that students 
lack both the knowledge and expertise to take inf orrned 
decisions on these matters. This does not necessarily mean 
that students may not make a contribution in that regard. All 
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it means is that their views canncL ce decisive and have to be 
subject to those of teachers, o':.herwise it would make no 
difference to know and not to knoww. 
A university as an academic institution places the highest 
premium on knowledge and expe:::-tise. That is why when 
appointing academic and administrative staff, a university has 
to consider knowledge and expertise as a precondition. 
Democracy, on the other hand, may not emphasize this. 
Consequently democracy may not be the best way of governing a 
university. Democracy has been defined as "any form of 
governance in which the ultimate power of decision belongs to 
and is divided equally amongst members (or the full members) 
of the relevant institution" 146 • 
Democracy is regarded as an appropriate form of governance if 
"the main purpose of the institution in question is to serve 
certain interests of its members, providing that they have an 
equal claim to consideration and may be presumed the best 
judges and therefore equal judges of the relevant 
interests'~. This is the case in the political arena where we 
regard ourselves as the best judge. The problem is that when 
reference is made to democracy in university governance it may 
mean a variety of things. Sometimes what may be required is 
consultation on certain issues. At other times there may be a 
need for a negotiated settlement of a certain conflict and at 
yet other times "plain equal representation on the political 
model" may be the goal~ . 
............... ------------~~ 
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Consultation and negotiation may play an important role in 
certain institutions because these practices may be "valuable 
and effective when focused on important points of principle, 
policy and potential conflict, for they are apt not only t:.o 
promote co-operation and cohesion, but also to increase the 
range of possible alternatives which are considered 111•. But 
these cannot be regarded as democratic in the sense described 
above. 
Democracy may also be regarded as valuable when an institution 
does not exist to serve the interests of its members as long 
as its members are the equal and best judges of the interests 
the institution is supposed to serve and they are committed to 
serving those interests. For this reason members of an 
academic department are regarded as falling within t:.his 
category because they "might be highly motivated to pursue 
relevant interests of their students and their discipline 
because of the possible adverse effects on their careers if 
they do not do so". Consequently, democracy could be 
appropriate in an academic department if all its members are 
more or less equally competent to judge whether the department 
is meeting the relevant interests. This may, however, not be 
the case in many academic departments in South Africa which 
may be "dominated by inexperienced and poorly qualified junior 
members". In such a case democracy may not be appropriate 
although it may be necessary to consult both junior members 
and students150 • 
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The problem of democracy at university in general is made more 
difficult by the membership of the university which is 
regarded as being "extremely muddy". While in the country the 
members of the relevant institu~ion are its adult citizens who 
should have equal votes, at a university this may not be 
clear. In the words of Pendlebury: 
"No doubt the academic staff of a university 
(including the Vice-Chancellor and other academic 
leaders) have a claim to membership, but the case 
becomes progressively less obvious when we consider 
semi-academic support staff (such as librarians, 
laboratory technicians and computer experts), 
students, senior non-academic administrators, lower 
level administrators and maintenance and cleaning 
staff "151 • 
It is quite clear that these groups should not have an equal 
say in the governance of the university "not only because they 
are unequal in judgement with respect to its main purposes, 
but also because their commitment to those purposes is unequal 
and in many cases extremely weak"~. This obviously does not 
mean that academics have exclusive knowledge on higher 
education issues and the others have nothing to contribute. 
Senior students may have a contribution to make, but in most 
cases they will not be so qualified to make a contribution 
until they have completed their studies and are no longer 
students. Moreover, students cannot be expected to have the 
same kind of commitment to academic standards as academics. 
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This therefore demons~rates that ~hey cannot have the same say 
in university governance as academics although it is necessary 
to consult them and to have them represented in the university 
structures of governc..nce153 • 
The issue of democratisation is regarded as a threat to 
university autonomy because ...... J... L. is extremely popular, 
especially in black society, and any university which is 
critical of it as being inapplicable to university governance 
in its purest form is liable to attack as being resistant to 
transformation. Once a university is attached on the 
grounds that it is conservative and opposed to transformation, 
this tends to eclipse whatever good the university is doing. 
In order not to be seen as conservative and resistant to 
transformation, universities may simply give in to the 
pressure for democratisation. The consequences of such 
uncritical democratisation may be disastrous. 
Many of the issues and challenges that face universities may 
necessitate state intervention in the affairs of the 
university by way of rationalisation, financing and 
transformation. Transformation in itself is a positive 
phenomenon which should be encouraged. The main problem with 
transformation is that it is more difficult to define or to 
unpack. Transformation simply means change, or rather 
fundamental change of any institution. In South Africa it is 
mostly used in relation to institutions of higher learning~. 
There is a tendency to define it according to a person's 
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predilections. 
less objective. 
This ~akes transformation idiosyncratic and 
The fact tha::: both democ:::-atization and transformation are 
advocated implies that transformation is not necessarily 
treated as a generic term for both. From popular and 
scholarly discourse it would appear that transformation 
entails an accelerated programme of affirmative action which 
is aimed at ensuring representative governing bodies for 
institutions of higher learning. They should be 
representative in terms of race and gender™. While this may 
be commendable in that it may demonstrate that past 
discriminatory practices have been discarded and therefore 
engender confidence in the new dispensation, what may be less 
appealing are the methods used to achieve this objective or 
the pace at which it is done. Moreover, the pressure may not 
be coming from universities themselves but from outside, 
although students may have a considerable impact on 
transformation as well. 
Over the years students have contributed in no small measure 
to the transformation of tertiary education and this is what 
may motivate them to continue to exert pressure on 
universities. They have clamoured for greater access and 
consequently the relaxation of admission criteria. They have 
also agitated for democratization of tertiary institutions™. 
What has been disturbing is their method of doing this. They 
have made use of student powerm which has entailed resorting 
to class boycotts, sit- ins in administration buildings, 
destructior: 0£ property, the trashing of campuses and to 
hostage taking. 
Recently, there has been a stronger call for -- . . ar:r:irmatlve 
action. There may be no quarrel with affirmative action as it 
is provided for in the interim Constitution158 • What is 
important is that this should not be imposed by the 
government 19 or outside people on universities. Even if the 
government were to introduce affirmative action by ordinary 
legislation, as the present provision in the Constitution does 
not create a right, this would still be subservient to the 
provisions of a bill of rights. The constitutional right of 
academic freedom must be weighed up against and override 
affirmative action legislation~. 
Although it may be understandable that the government might 
want to see more demographic representation in student and 
staff numbers, it is not recommended that this should be done 
in a rash manner as it could lead to other problems. Such 
pressure f rorn the government may compromise university 
autonomy in that universities may not be allowed the 
opportunity to plan and to consider policies before they are 
implemented. Moreover, the university may be forced either to 
appoint or not to appoint a particular person not because of 
his qualifications and competence or lack of these, but 
because of his or her colour. This would be a sad reversal to 
a new form of apartheid. Some policies which are dictated 
upon by politicians may be short sighted even if they may be 
appealing to certain sections of the population. This is 
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exactly what the National Party government did in its policy 
of apartheid. Universities were compelled by legislation to 
restrict student admission by race and colour with disastrous 
effects. We now have the thankless task of reversing the 
effects of the past policies and this is cos~ing the country 
dearly in terms of human and financial resources. There is no 
doubt that when the government did this, it thought it was 
doing the right thing and that this was in the national 
interest. 
It could be contended that it is highly improper or even 
irresponsible to compare the policies of the present 
democratic government with the discredited apartheid policies 
of the past. A rejoinder to this would be that university 
autonomy and academic freedom are so important that they 
should not be sacrificed for whatever political motive to a 
transient governmen::.. Academic freedom .in the sense of 
institutional autonomy implies that even an elected government 
sometimes has to defer to the rights of the individual 
institution. Thus even the argument that a democratically 
elected government cannot be obstructed by an unelected group 
of individuals or institutions does not hold water. If we 
uphold academic freedom, the government should recommend and 
not be prescriptive about such transformation. 
It should also be remembered that the National Party 
government of the past was sincere in its policies. It 
thought it had the answer to the political problems of the 
country and had the mandate to solve them. But, as we now 
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know, it was sincerely wrong. If direct government 
intervention in the past was wrong, it should be wrong today 
whatever the motive. This is not to render inadvertent 
support to discrimina~ion which may be the target of those who 
advocate transformation. Any discriminatory practice can 
always be challenged in terms of the bill of rights 161 • What 
is not supported is ill-conceived action .. on the part of the 
government which may do the universities great harm. What 
should also be emphasized is that transformation is a process 
and contrary to the views of many, not a cataclysmic act. 
What cannot be accepted is the destructive way that students 
sometimes adopt in forcing universities and technikons to 
transform. The destruction of property, the disruption of 
academic activities and the holding of administrators hostage 
are clearly criminal activities that do not belong to 
universities. They not only threaten university autonomy but 
they clearly create a state of lawlessness which cannot be 
tolerated in a decent society. These criminal acts should be 
dealt with sternly. While freedom of every individual should 
be protected, "the freedom of the just man'', as Dening once 
put it, "is worth little to him if he can be preyed upon by 
the murderer or thief" 1112 • Powers to arrest and detain may be 
necessary and can reinforce and guarantee freedom if properly 
used. 
It could be argued that if the government is not allowed to 
intervene, it could make universities a law unto themselves. 
They might therefore resist transformation. Moreover, the 
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argument may further go, they may not have the will and the 
ability to transform because some of them may have vested 
interests in the status quo. After all no leopard can change 
its spots. This could meaL that autonomy could be used or 
abused to obstruct transformation. Furthermore, it could be 
doubtful whether universities are the best judges of whether 
or not they are sufficiently transformed. 
As an answer to this contention, i~ is necessary to reassert 
that university autonomy is regarded as good in itself. That 
university autonomy is a good, does not mean that it is 
perfect. Moreover, what is advocated is not absolute autonomy. 
What is supported is autonomy relating to the core functions 
of the university. It would be a contradiction in terms to 
assert on the one hand that autonomy is a good thing and on 
the other that it is not good. In any case, even the abuse of 
university autonomy may be a lesser evil than government 
intervention into the internal affairs of the university. 
Abuse here is used for want of a better term to describe the 
defence of autonomy to slow down the process of change because 
any attempts to stifle change cannot succeed. 
It is not possible for the university to be totally impervious 
to transformation because members of the university themselves 
may be divided on this issue. Division may tend to encourage 
debate. The debate on transformation may therefore continue, 
and when this debate is continuing this may take the process 
of transformation a step further. What should also be 
emphasized is that transformation as such is ~ot opposed; on 
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the contrary it is supported. But transformation should be 
principled; it should be orderly and should not disrupt the 
main activities of the university or frustrate the attainment 
of its objectives. It should be aimed at improving t.he 
situation and not degenerate into reverse discrimination or 
anarchy. Moreover, it should take place with the full 
participation and analysis of the university community. It 
should not just be imposed on universities. 
The position of those who are not satisfied with the pace of 
change among tertiary institutions may be entirely 
understandable. They may be impatient with the situation of 
apparent change without real change. Another problem with 
transformation is that it may be interpreted by some as a 
change to control the universities more than to genuinely 
improve their quality and performance. The call for 
democratisation may be construed as a way of packing the 
structures of governance with people who are sympathetic or 
who belong to the majority party in the government which would 
ensure that the government maintains effective control over 
universities. This may be construed from certain universities 
that are regarded as "progressive". If transformation is 
meant to achieve this, then it is a threat to academic freedom 
as well as institutional autonomy. 
A subtle threat to university autonomy may come from those who 
believe that now that we have a democratic government in South 
Africa, university autonomy is no longer important because the 
democratic government will not be a threat to university 
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autonomy. In c.ny case the government may be trusted to do the 
right thing. In this sense, what is important to emphasize is 
not university autonomy but more co-operation and a sense 
partnership between the government and the university. 
According to that line of reasoning what the universities 
should emphasize is not autonomy but much more participation 
in the Reconstruction and Development Programme {RDP) . In a 
sense this is the line of thought followed by the National 
Commission on Higher Education163 • 
In response to this type of contention, it should be pointed 
out that university autonomy does not entail hostility to the 
government. Autonomy implies that the university should 
remain critical of the policies of the government including 
the RDP. But this should be constructive critic ism for 
renewal and effective reconstruction. Moreover, autonomy is 
not emphasized only vis-a-vis undemocratic governments. It is 
also emphasized vis-a-vis democratically elected governments 
because even a democratically elected government can abuse 
power and threaten university autonomy. Moreover, autonomy is 
much more compatible with democracy. The university can 
participate in the RDP and still remain critical of it or the 
government policy. Obviously the university should maintain a 
neutral stand and only allow its members to take particular 
positions on this. In response to the blind faith in a 
democratically elected government, one can only say, in the 
words of Cowen: "When entrusting power to human hands, it is 
essential not to believe in the sweet reasonableness of 
man"~. History teaches us this. 
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It has also been argued that some of the universities that are 
now strong supporters of autonomy did not support autonomy 
during the era o:: apartheid, and that they were much more 
prepared to support the erstwhile government's policy whilst 
neglecting university autonomy. This may render their support 
of university autonomy spurious in that it is not based on 
genuine convictior.., but may rather be a reaction to 
transformation and to the fact that we now have a "black" 
majority government. Undoubtedly that may be true. Whatever 
the merits of this argument, it is always good to remember 
that it was even good for the prodigal son to come back home. 
In any case those universities which wrongly supported the 
government policies of the past did the government a 
disservice. Moreover, the truth remains the truth and the 
correct statement remains correct irrespective of who asserts 
it and irrespective of the motive. Even those universities 
that are not supporting autonomy these days are not doing it 
without motive or they may not be doing it with altruistic 
motives. It may be a question of enlightened self interest. 
There is obviously nothing wrong with enlightened self-
interest provided you are going to allow room for others to 
have their own enlightened self-interest. Authoritarianism 
thrives only where one group feels that it has the right to 
prescribe to others what to do and those being prescribed to 
have to accept the prescription without a whimper. 
The very fact that those who were earlier opposed to 
university 
supporting 
autonomy for 
the concept, 
political reasons, may now be 
may be evidence that those who 
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supported it in the past were correct after all. This should 
strengthen their support rather than weaken it. What may 
weaken the support for university autonomy may be the fact 
that once again universities may, for political reasons, be 
divided and may not speak with one voice on this important 
issue. 
Once again it is essential to reiterate that university 
autonomy should be used for good ends and not be abused. If it 
is abused, the government could have a pretext for intervening 
into the internal management of the universities. As already 
stated, government intervention may be a greater evil. 
Moreover, university autonomy should not be regarded as 
providing immunity to universities against criticism or as a 
shield against accountability. University autonomy should go 
along with responsibility and accountability. It should also 
not be an obstruction to transformation, but transformation 
should not be imposed from above. It should take place with 
the full and active participation of university stakeholders. 
Moreover, it should be aimed at enabling universities to 
attain their roles and goals more effectively rather than 
simply to foster a particular ideology. 
Although some campuses may have established transformation 
fora to discuss the whole issue of transformation, there may 
not be unanimity on the role and powers of such fora. Some 
students may be of the opinion that transformation fora, owing 
to their being representative of all the major stakeholders, 
may be entitled to take decisions binding even on the organs 
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of governance of the university like the council and the 
senate. This is a misconception since transformation fora are 
not statutory bodies. They only have to make recommendations 
to these bodies. They are in the same position as committees 
formed by the senate or the council to attend to particular 
issues. 
It may be necessary to point out that some of the views on 
transformation are simplistic. They create the false 
impression that once a university is transformed, it will not 
experience any turbulence but would be completely peaceful. 
This view is not borne out by the facts. Even universities 
that have transformed will still experience a certain measure 
of turbulence especially during this era of transition. Not 
everything has become new and the old is still coexisting 
uncomfortably with the new. We still have the legacy of the 
past. One of the problems of our universities is that many 
black students come from a poor background and cannot afford 
to pay fees. This is exacerbated by the culture of 
entitlement that was created in the past and that is still so 
pervasive in our society. It is further compounded by the 
expectations that were created before the election of the 
present government that there would be free tertiary 
education. 
This is why students have been insisting on a moratorium on 
"financial exclusions" in the hope that those universities 
which have huge student debts will write them off. Such 
universities have no authority to write off these debts. They 
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may, however, have difficulty in recovering them. This makes 
their financial position all the more precarious. Some of 
these universities, especially historically black 
universities, have student debts running into millions of 
rands. Although the government has introduced the student loan 
scheme, this scheme does not help all students. Moreover, it 
is not unconditional, but has good performance as a 
precondition. Many of the historically black universities 
face this problem more acutely because of the poor secondary 
education that black students have acquired which has ill 
prepared them for rigorous university studies. As a result, 
they may not qualify for financial assistance. This may 
further weaken their performance. Yet they may be unwilling 
to leave the institutions, hence the call for a moratorium on 
"financial exclusions". 
When university administrators insist on students to pay 
before registration, or be excluded, students have resisted 
this to the extent of boycotting classes and disrupting 
academic activities. They have used the confrontational 
approach of the past instead of negotiating in good faith. 
Moreover, the attitude of the students has demonstrated that 
transformation cannot take place overnight. What is more, it 
has demonstrated that we need not only structural 
transformation but also mental or attitudinal transformation. 
Universities can play an important role in bringing about 
proper transformation through rational debate and analysis of 
the situation. If they exercise their autonomy effectively 
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they can chal~.enge some o:f the simplistic views on 
transformation and thus spearhead effective transformation. 
In any case universities are in a better position to deal with 
this because they are affected by the outcome. It is alsc 
important to point out that even a transformed council cannot 
always take popular decisions. Transformation of councils and 
other structures of governance is important for purposes of 
legitimacy, but it is not a panacea for all the ills of 
universities. 
Although government intervention in the internal affairs and 
management of universities is not supported, the government 
may have to intervene into universities to restore law and 
order if there is lawlessness and students are posing a threat 
to property, life and limb. As has been said, while 
transformation is supported, certain methods of bringing about 
such transformation may be insupportable. The philosophy of 
the ends justifying the means has long been discredited and 
does not belong to universities. 
4.7 MANAGEMENT STYLE OF UNIVERSITIES 
Al though it has been said that true democracy may be 
inappropriate for universities, universities follow a certain 
management style that is aimed at striking a balance between 
democratisation and efficiency. They make use of the committee 
system. Although the committee system has certain 
disadvantages, it also has decided advantages. Among the 
advantages may be mentioned the fact that it facilitates 
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participatory decision-making and the consequent acceptance of 
decisions by members of staff. T'--'-- may be regarded as 
democratic in the sense that members have an . .- . inpu .... in t:he 
decisions that affect them although, as it was pointed oi...:t 
above, this is not really democracy. This ensures legitimacy. 
Moreover, it ensures co-opera ti on, co-ordination and the 
striking of compromises in the making of decisions that affect 
the university. It also tends to limit the abuse of power and 
facilitates collective decision-making'•. Although there are 
officers with power, these are restrained by the element of 
accountability to these committees. 
Among the disadvantages of the commit tee system may be 
mentioned the fact that it entails interminable delays in the 
taking of decisions. This is costly in terms of time and 
money. This is so because individuals should be allowed to 
express their views on the matter at issue. Another 
disadvantage of the committee system is that owing to 
differing opinions the decision that is taken may be an 
attempt to reach a compromise. As a result it may not be the 
best decision. Moreover, the situation may be exacerbated by 
the control of a committee by a small minority. Committees do 
not execute their decisions. These have to be implemented by 
administrative officers. Consequently committees are not 
strictly accountable for the implementation of decisions. 
Further delays occur1~. On the balance, however, advantages of 
the committee system outweigh disadvantages especially at a 
university because generally academics are sensitive to the 
use of power. They would like to feel that they are not under 
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the authority cf a dictator but have collective responsibility 
for the taking of decisions that affect them. This may be 
further evidence that they jealously guard their academic 
freedom. 
From the above, it is quite clear that South African 
universities have a unitary system of governance with a 
distinct academic and administrative structure in which 
democratic and hierarchical principles apply167 • This system 
should ensure both academic freedom without sacrificing 
responsibility and accountability. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
The principle of university autonomy is buttressed by the fact 
that the organizational structure of universities is aimed at 
facilitating self-governance by the university. Any 
unwarranted interference by the government can be challenged 
by the university not only as a violation of the principle of 
autonomy or academic freedom, but also as being ultra vires. 
There are certain defined areas where the Minister of 
Education has some control over the operation of universities. 
This, however, leaves sufficient autonomy for universities to 
conduct their internal affairs without undue interference. Any 
attempt to interfere with these by legislation can be 
challenged as an infringement of university autonomy which is 
directly and indirectly guaranteed by the Constitution. 
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The idea of university autonomy is based on the assumption 
that those employed and managing the affairs of universi~ies 
are best qualified by training and experience to run the 
affairs of universities. It further prevents the abuse of 
power by politicians which may adversely affect the role of 
the university in society. Although members of universities 
are not necessarily altruistic, politicians tend to be less so 
because politicians tend to be more concerned with retaining 
power. One of the ways of ensuring the retention of power is 
to silence criticism especially from universities. 
University autonomy is essential for the protection of 
academic freedom and academic freedom is essential if the 
university is to attain its objective of pursuing knowledge 
and truth without interference to the benefit of society. As 
even an autonomous university can unnecessarily restrict 
academic freedom of its individual academics, it is 
commendable that academic freedom is expressly guaranteed by 
the interim Consti tution168 • If the academic freedom of an 
individual academic is infringed by either the university or 
the government that academic may be entitled to appeal to the 
courts for redress. Needless to say the university is entitled 
to protect its institutional autonomy from interference by the 
government. 
The fact that academic freedom is procected in the bill of 
rights means that it enjoys preferential treatment and is 
secure against whatever threats it may be exposed to. Whoever 
threatens it or violates it may be challenged in court. The 
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entrenchment of academic freedom means that it belongs to that 
category of rights that are regarded as fundamental. Not only 
are they protected against unwarranted infringement, but they 
are also put beyond the reach of simple majorities in 
parliament. They cannot be affected by ordinary legislation, 
but they can only be amended by a cumbersome procedure which 
requires a two thirds majority. Academic freedom has also a 
material aspect; it safeguards the pursuit of truth and the 
maintenance of societal values. 
Although the Constitution protects academic freedom in 
institutions of higher learning, it is not certain what is 
going to happen in practice. Little can be construed from the 
views of the courts at the moment. For this reason it is 
necessary to make a comparative study of what has happened in 
other countries. This may assist our courts in dealing with 
similar cases in future~ 
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CHAPTER 5 
UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A discussion of university autonomy and academic freedom in 
So'Ll.th Africa would be incomplete without a comparative 
analysis of what has happened in other countries. South 
Africa is not an island and may have something to learn from 
the experiences of other countries. These lessons may either 
be positive or negative. 
From positive lessons we learn what we have to do and for 
negative lessons we learn what we should not do. Those who do 
not learn from the mistakes of others are condemned to repeat 
them with the same disastrous consequences. Another reason 
for looking at the experiences of other countries is that what 
we shall be dealing with in South Africa is nothing new. 
is sorneching that other countries have dealt with. It may 
therefore no~ be necessary to re-invent the wheel but it would 
be enriching to benefit from the experience of other 
countries. Even our interim Constitution stipulates that in 
inteYpreting t:he provisions on fundamental rights, the courts 
should, inter alia, have regard to comparable foreign 
jurisprudence1 • 
This does not mean that we have to follow everything ·~hat has 
happened in other countries, but that g~ven the same circum-
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stances we have to consider quite seriously what has happened 
there. While the comparative perspective may be 
jurisprudentially illuminating and enriching, it does not mean 
that within the car.fines of this thesis it will be possible to 
examine the experiences of all countries of the world. A few 
selected ones will be considered. These include Britain, the 
United States, Germany and a few African countries. The 
choice of these countries is based on the fact that they 
examplify different constitutional dispensations. Brita in 
does not have a written constitution whereas the USA and 
Germany have written and rigid constitutions. 
African countries have written constitutions, 
While the 
it may be 
illuminating to see what factors have influenced academic 
freedom there. 
5.2 BRITAIN 
5.2.1 University autonomy in general 
In an earlier chapter the concept of university autonomy was 
discussed in some detail. It would therefore be unnecessary 
to do it again here. University autonomy in Britain existed 
by virtue of tradition and not because of any constitutional 
provision protecting it. Although as it was pointed out 
above2 , that the concept of autonomy had its origins in the 
medieval universities, various models developed from this. 
One can identify the Kantian model, Napoleonic model and the 
British and German models3 • The British model recognized the 
universities as property-owning corporations of scholars, 
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supported by the state but largely responsible for the running 
of their affairs. Academic autonomy therefore did not derive 
from the action of the state defining a n reserve area" of 
non-intervention, but rather from the absence of a concept of 
the role of the state which itself emphasised its legitimacy. 
Although the British and German models shared the idea of a 
facilitatory state, British autonomy largely rested on 
individual and institutional autonomy, both of which were in 
turn based on the university charter and the collegial style 
of self-governance. The charter secured institutional 
autonomy and the "zone of negotiations" between the university 
and the government was not based on any detailed code of 
regulations, but rested on the "establishment and maintenance 
of trust and confidence" between the part~es4 • 
The British system was therefore based on a "gentlemen's 
agreement" which is derived from the vagaries of an unwritten 
constitution. The fact that university autonomy was based on 
tradition or convention did not necessarily imply that it was 
ineffective. Conventions can sometimes be more effective than 
provisions in written constitutions. Van der Vyver once 
remarked in relation to the conventional restraints which 
limited the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as follows: 
"Those restraints find expression in a conventional pattern of 
exemplary conduct, focused upon the rights and interests of 
the citizen, and which has not so much been upheld on account 
of legal compulsion as having been maintained by reason of 
profound traditionalism and the proverbial Englishman's 
pride" 5 • 
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Although there is some element of truth in this statement, it 
is not the whole trutt. Neave ~1as warned that: "This, as 
recent British experience and the visit of George Bernard 
Shaw, ought to remind us, is risky. 'The English gentleman 
always plays fair. Until he loses. And then he changes the 
rules of the game' And this the less charitable might say, 
is precisely what, over the past few years, he has been busily 
doing in the name of . the national ir ... terest 116 • This may be one 
of the reasons why some have doubted whether it is wise to 
continue to place confidence in unwritten conventions in 
Britain. For this reason some have advocated the adoption of 
a bill of rights'. 
Although reference has been made to university autonomy in 
British history as if it is fixed and immutable, it does not 
mean that this concept is static. On the contrary, it has 
undergone various shifts as a result of a variety of economic 
and political factors. In order to put the matter in proper 
perspective it will be necessary to sketch a brief historical 
background to the evolution of autonomy in Britain. 
5.2.2. Historical development of university autonomy 
Early British universities were established as religious 
institutions, which were under the direct control of the 
church. Early academics were primarily ecclesiastics, and it 
was from this profession of life-long service that the 
academic profession originated. When they were later 
emancipated from the church's influence, universities evolved 
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into self-governing institutions. ?hey were therefore not 
under the direct control of the state. It was only since 
World War II that che state gained a great measure of control 
over British hig-her education8 • But in the mid-nineteenth 
century, for inst:ance, the universities experienced more 
danger from religious than from state pressure. At that time 
both Oxford and Cambridge were engaged in a struggle for 
religious freedom. The struggle, however, involved university 
independence more than academic freedom9 • 
When it successfully emerged from the struggle to liberate 
itself from religious control, the British university became a 
public institution with a lay governing board. To ensure 
independence, the charters of all universities were drafted to 
establish autonomous self-governing institutions. Although a 
relatively small group governed the modern universities 
neither the vice-chancellor nor the lay governing board 
dominated10 • 
In the early twentieth century British universities 
experienced considerable financial needs. When they observed 
the subordination of the German universities to the state 
during World War I, the British academics were reluctant to 
appeal to the Board of Education, a state political 
department, because they feared that they might lose their 
autonomy. Instead, they established the University Grants 
Committee (UGC) in 1919. The positions of the UGC were filled 
by prominent university members. Under this new arrangement, 
the Treasury made block grants to the UGC, which then 
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allocated these, free from supervision or control by the 
Treasury as to how the money was spent. In this way, Treasury 
funds were not controlled by civil servants who were not 
versed in education, and the universities autonomy was 
therefore protected. In later years, especially after World 
War II, the UGC gained considerable power and influence, and 
the prized university autonomy began slowly to be eroded11 • 
"Academic freedom, at one time blithely taken for granted, was 
perceived as threatened"u. 
This demonstrated that university autonomy was always exposed 
to threats. As Brook puts it, these threats did not come 
"from malevolent schemers, whom it would be a pleasure to 
oppose, but from well-disposed persons with a genuine interest 
in education, who would never in so many words declare 
themselves as enemies of academic freedom, but who happen to 
value other things more highly and would consequently be 
willing to sacrifice the freedom of universities in pursuit of 
what they believe to be noble ends. The threat to academic 
freedom comes both from outside the university and from 
within" 13 • 
The greatest single threat to academic freedom in the form of 
institutional autonomy has been regarded as the dependence of 
the university on the state for a large proportion of its 
income. In the past the threat was regarded as largely 
potential because the UGC served to a large extent as a buff er 
between the government and the universities. It was therefore 
felt that if the UGC was replaced by a body less anxious to 
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preserve the autonomy of the separate universities than the 
UGC this would spell the death of ur.i versi ty autonomy14 • 
As stated earlier, one of the interesting features of the 
relationship between the government and universities was its 
flexibility which was no doubt 
unwritten constitution. As 
one of the advantages of an 
long as mutual "trust and 
confidence" lasted, the flexibility went far in conferring 
upon the British university system an adaptability to growth 
and change which other universities, burdened by the 
formalities of administrative procedures noted and some 
emulated. But similarly, the absence of any formal 
administrative or constitutional definition of academic 
autonomy was its Achilles heel because there was no way of 
defending established procedures in the "zone of negotiation" 
should the government "like Shaw's gentleman, decide to change 
the rules of the game". Nonetheless the outstanding feature 
of the British model of autonomy is that it survived for so 
long based simply on the unspoken convention, understanding 
and agreement reached within the "zone of negotiation". A 
second feature was that the "zone of negotiation" was itself 
an "extension into central government of that style of 
collegiality and relative informality which existed at the 
level of the individual establishment" 15 • 
As already said, this model of autonomy did not remain static. 
In continental Europe, though not in Britain, the expansion of 
higher education contributed immensely to the redefinition of 
the nature of academic autonomy. From the latter part of the 
371. 
1960's established models, were revised, often in great haste. 
From that moment on, the idea of autonomy took on an 
instability and a political centrality that it had not had 
before. The emergence of these policies resulted in the 
"redrawing of the boundary between the university and the 
state" 16 • 
The implications of this change and adaptability have an 
impact on the nature of academic autonomy. For this reason 
Neave feels that the idea of academic autonomy needs to be 
replaced with that of "boundary". His motivation is that 
autonomy carries with it certain overtones which stress 
continuity in the relationship between university and state. 
"It implies a certain enduring consensus as to those areas in 
which the state, chose not to intervene. It also carries 
with it a certain fixity". But any observer of higher 
education in western Europe of over the past decades would 
notice the break with the previous practice. What has emerged 
is a situation of conflict over the part that the university 
has to play in society, between "socially" or "economically 
relevant" or "economically necessary" fields of study. There 
has also been conflict on the part of the internal 
redefinition of management and governance, over who should 
participate in the affairs of the university. The concept of 
boundary has therefore been regarded as dynamic in that it 
undergoes considerable shifts "sometimes in the direction of 
closer external oversight by government, sometimes in the 
direction of enhanced internal participation"n. 
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The growing needs of an industrialised Britain necessitated a 
sound legal political and financial structure and led to the 
position of the state vis-a-vis the university being 
strengthened. This resulted in the nationalisation of higher 
educationu. It soon became clear that the uniform university 
sector of higher education had become out of touch with 
reality and that a binary system which could address both 
academic teaching and technical training had to be 
implemented. As compared with the technical sector, 
universities were rather tardy to adapt and the subsequent 
years were turbulent and marked by student riots, increased 
state control and severe cuts in university grants. This led 
to intensive rationalisation programmes which in turn resulted 
in the improved utilisation of human and physical resources 
and stricter co-ordinated control by the state. In 1988 the 
Education Reform Act brought about far-reaching changes to the 
higher education system and increased statutory control over 
the university-state relationship~. 
The Secretary of State for Education and Science is 
responsible for the whole education system. He has to submit 
his annual report on education to parliament. In terms of the 
Education Reform Act of 1988, he now has direct and indirect 
legal and administrative control over the universities. The 
Department of Education and Science is now more actively 
involved in policy-making which was previously left in the 
hands of universities themselves. In terms of the Act, there 
has been a considerable shift in the balance of power and 
there is greater emphasis on market-oriented decision-making. 
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It is unlikely that the department's powers over higher 
education will diminish. The likelihood is that higher 
education will develop as an egalitarian system based largely 
on function and the institutional initiative and diversity 
will be promoted. This could result in stronger mechanisms of 
institutional self-governance and the gradual phasing out of 
the binary policy26. 
Before the passing of the 1988 Act, the government had never 
. .• 
exercised direct legal control over the universities, except 
via the general legislation relating to control over finance 
and advice via the UGC. When the 1988 Act was passed, it 
dealt with education in general and university education in 
particular21 • 
5.2.3 The Education Reform Act 
There are basically three main topics which have an impact on 
the relationship between the university and the government. 
These are the replacement of the UGC by the University Funding 
Council (UFC); the establishment of University Commissioners 
(UC) to modify university statutes; and the exclusion of the 
jurisdiction of the visitor in employment contracts. 
When the government's White Paper on Higher Education 
Meeting the Challengen and the Education Reform Bill were both 
published in 1987, they received extensive publicity because 
of the inte~sive lobbying on highe~.~d~cation both inside and 
outside parliamenc. Sections 131 and 134 of the Act deal with 
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the establishment and the functions of the UFC and its 
appointment by the secretary of state. Its main function is 
to administer funds made available to the universities by the 
secretary of state for the provision of education and research 
and the facilities needed for such education and researchn. 
The secretary of state has a discretion to assign 
supplementary functions on the UFC which will be regarded as 
ordinary functionsu. 
Sections 202 to 208 of the Act deal with the powers and duties 
of the UC25 • The UC is empowered to oversee and modify 
university statutes and matters relating to academic tenure. 
In this way it serves as a watchdog over the universities. In 
performing its functions it has to ensure that academic staff 
have their academic freedom within the law, inter alia, to 
question and test certain facts, put forward new ideas and 
controversial and unpopular opinions without fear of 
jeopardising or losing their position or privileges at the 
institution. It has also to enable qualifying institutions to 
provide education, promote learning and engage in research 
efficiently and economically and apply the principles of 
fairness and justice. 
In terms of section 203, the UC has certain duties that derive 
from its power of modifying university statutes. In terms of 
these modifications, governing bodies are now entitled to 
dismiss academic staff on good cause shown. No dismissal may 
take place unless sufficient reasons have been givenu. 
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Section 206 of the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the 
visitor in disputes concerning the appointment or employment 
or termination of employment of academic staff where full 
protection is now provided by the general laws. Most 
universities in England and Wales provide in their royal 
charters for a visitor with jurisdiction to supervise and 
govern the foundation on behalf of the founder'. The visitor 
has no jurisdiction in any matter governed by the general laws 
of the realm. Although his exclusive jurisdiction over the 
members of and matters dealing with the domestic laws of the 
corporation is recognized, it is subject to review by the 
supreme court on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and 
procedural irregulari ty28 • Although visitorial jurisdiction 
has been ousted, where the disputes were referred to the 
visitor before the date on which modifications were made by 
the UC to the university statutes, or where such modifications 
now make provision for hearing and determining appeals and 
grievances by the visitor, then the visitor's jurisdiction 
will remain29 • 
5.2.4 Other persons/bodies in the university-government 
relationship 
There are other persons and bodies that have an influence on 
the autonomy of universities in Britain. These bodies include 
the Charity Commissioners (CC), the National Audit Office, 
research and professional bodies, the Committee of 
Vice-Chancellors and Principals and the Association of 
University Teachers. It will not be necessary nor feasible to 
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have a detailed discussion of these. 
remarks will suffice. 
Only a few cursory 
The need for the appointment of CC's stemmed from the fact 
that charitable endowments were not always used for the 
purposes intended by the founders, and the crown as supreme 
guardian could not grant protection via the chancery courts. 
In terms of the Charities Act of 1960, universities in England 
and Wales are classified under "excepted" and "exempted" 
charities, and although they do not have to register, the CC's 
have certain general powers over charities. These 
universities are also subject to the court's jurisdiction 
regarding an application to alter or modify the original 
purpose of their charitable gifts in terms of the cy-pres 
principle. The CC' s also have powers to control the 
institution of legal proceedings in charity proceedings by 
universities falling within the "excepted" category1°. 
Originally universities as autonomous institutions were not 
accountable to the treasury or the Controller and Auditor 
General for grants received from the state. During the 
sixties, however, owing to increased needs for personpower and 
under the influence of political pressure, universities became 
more dependent on state funding. This gave the government a 
powerful tool of control over them. This state of affairs 
led, inter alia, to the termination of the UGC's relationship 
with the treasury and the trans£ er of supervision to the 
Department of Education and Science. The accounts of the UGC 
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(now UFC) and universities since then became open to 
inspection by the Auditor-General. 
Various state-aided research councils were established over 
the years to advise the Department of Education and Science on 
the financing of worthwhile research proposals and the award 
of research fellowships and to encourage the development of 
research associations in private industry and research 
facilities in university departments. The councils later 
acquired a critical role in co-ordinating government aid to 
university researchn. 
In 1987 the Advisory Board for Research Councils published its 
report stating that 
full-time research 
there was not enough money to finance 
at all universities. It proposed a 
"three-tier" system for university teaching, research and 
funding. The department, on the other hand, pref erred a 
simpler division into research-led and teaching,-led 
universities. As no agreement has been reached on this issue, 
the future organisation of research in British universities is 
uncertain. The government and the Treasury seemingly support 
a total transfer of responsibility for research funding from 
the UFC to the research councils. They admit, however, that 
it would interfere with the close relationship between 
teaching and research in the university-33. 
Professional bodies have been formed to represent various 
professions. There is little information on the influence of 
these bodies over universities. The relationship between 
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professional bodies and universities varies quite 
considerably. It would appear, however, that these bodies are 
exerting increasing pressure over universities because their 
main concern is to ensure that universicies produce competent 
members of their profession. In exchange, professions give 
professional advice and invest considerable sums of money in 
the training of professional people~. 
Another body that has some influence on the autonomy of 
universities is the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals (CUCP) The CUCP was formed after World War I. 
Although it acquired a central and influential reputation as 
the body that spoke and listened on behalf of the 
universities, this role was questioned in the late sixties. 
After collective action had been taken, however, the CUCP 
emerged in a role of leadership which completely altered its 
ethos35 • 
Although the CUCP has, over the years been sometimes accused 
of not being united on university matters, it has grown into a 
united body which speaks with authority on the university and 
publishes its reports when common interest dictates~. When 
the new UFC was established under the supervision of the 
secretary of state, the CUCP acquired its new role of 
protecting the universities from political pressure and the 
doctrinaire policies of the government3'. It has a leading 
role in preparing universities for their new role in higher 
education and has also ac~Jired a public relations role~. 
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The Association of University Teachers (AUTJ was established 
after Wcrld Viar I to promote collabo:r:ation among Britis!"l 
academics and to act as their collective rnouthpiecen. It has 
taken a lead in promoting and protecting the public image of 
academic teachers as a professional group and has assumed the 
role of watchdog against government interference i~ ur.iversity 
teaching. When there were drastic cuts in university finance 
and rationalisation, during the eighties, it again fought 
against increasing state control over the universities and the 
methods used in the process. It also played a major role in 
the debate about control by the secretary of state over the 
universities via the UPC and in the promotion of academic 
freedom and the university's unlimited right to dismiss staff 
during and after the passing of the 1988 Act~. As a result of 
the increasing political interference in university education 
and the change in the position of the academic to that of 
employee, the AUT has in addition to its professional role, 
also played the role of a trade union. It has, however, been 
severely criticised for its political affiliations which have 
caused splits in the organization, its ambivalent relationship 
with the CUCP and its inability to produce the collective view 
of academics on the goals of the uni versi ty41 • 
5.2.5 The structure and governance of the university 
It has been said earlier that what has contributed to the 
autonomy of universities, is the structure of governance of 
its university provided for in the charter. The governance 
structure of British universities is broadly similar and 
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generally known so that it is not necessary to narrate it 
here42 • 
5.2.6 Redefining academic autonomy 
There is no doubt that before the 1970's many European 
universities enjoyed a great measure of autonomy. This 
situation, however, changed dramatically in the late 1970's 
and 1980's when the state and its agencies began to play a 
more prominent role in higher education by imposing limits on 
university autonomy~. This also led to the revision of the 
mechanisms of co-ordination to accommodate the new 
administrative, managerial and financial realities of mass 
higher education when the state stepped in to strengthen its 
formal powers of co-ordination within the external frame~. 
This phenomenon demonstrates the shifting of the boundary of 
government control into areas which had previously fall en 
within the "zone of negotiation". 
During the early 1980's, the relationship between university 
and the government with its increased administrative overlay, 
was influenced by the move to enhance "country participation" 
in university affairs. Although the practice of community 
involvement in itself should not have restricted academic 
autonomy it, however, led to the increase in the number of 
stakeholders and gave credence to the view that the university 
is a public service rather than a community of scholars. This 
in turn brought about a subtle alteration in the public 
perception of academic autonomy and precipitated the external 
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redefinition not only of the stakeholders and their influence 
in deciding on academic priorities, but also a redefinition of 
what is regarded as 11 legi tirnate 11 academic autonomy45 • In this 
new approach lies not only the conflict between public and 
utilitarianism and private disciplinary identity, but the real 
danger that the defence of the private concept of autonomy is 
perceived negatively as the simple restatement of corporate 
self-interest46 • 
The administrative overlay enhanced by community involvement 
started at regional and local level, but soon spread to 
national level and gave rise to the establishment of national 
bodies within the scope of the appropriate ministries as 
instruments of public purpose47 • In the British system, in 
which institutional autonomy has been almost complete over the 
years, any increases in central control meant a decrease in 
the degree of autonomy. The question of the extent to which 
these instruments of public purpose changed the British idea 
of university autonomy, is found in the way whereby central 
government brought the higher education system and the labour 
market into closer co-operation. 
When bodies like the UFC and the PCFC were established, it 
became clear that the kind of public service the universities 
were expected to perform was no longer negotiable. This meant 
that the main task of the university was being redefined in 
terms of a commitment to one predominant sector of the 
national community (namely industry and national productivity) 
and autonomy itself (self-governance or a particular degree of 
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self-governance) became negociable, depending on the 
time-scale of strategic planning. In this way the autonomy or 
degree of self-governance ... "! .... L..na~ universities now have is 
11 conditional 1148 • 
~he change in the concept of autonomy took place quite rapidly 
in Britain (over a period of two decades) and without the 
complexities of redefining the nature of academic autonomy 
internally or in terms of regionalisation, as happened 
elsewhere in Europe. In terms of the notion of "facilitator 
state 11 , the British central government underwrote the 
financial needs of the university sector, leaving the 
questions of quality, maintenance, governance, degree 
validation and staff appointments in the hands of the 
individual institutions. Since 1981, however, a reversal in 
the purpose of the "zone of negotiation" took place. Instead 
of this zone being an extension of the university into central 
government, it became a "zone of penetration" of central 
government into the university world. This situation provided 
the vehicle for the settling of an increasing number of norms 
(i.e. subject viability, differential resource allocation, 
efficiency or the creation of internal cost/accountability 
structures). Although 11 conditional 11 autonomy has not directly 
attacked autonomy and its exercise at institutional level, the 
overall impact is that autonomy can be exercised only on 
condition that the individual institution or department meets 
national or established norms which are continually negotiated 
in the light of public policyt9. 
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The empirical development of academic 
concept of academic autonomy in 
authorities) and private (inside 
behaviour in the dual 
its public (public 
academic circles) 
interpretation requires further attention, since the former 
has removed a great deal o:: "legitimacy" from traditionally 
based arguments in favour of 11 autonomy". In this sense the 
aim of "conditional" autonomy is to shift the conditions 
governing competition from those defined according to internal 
norms of the academia, to the external norms of the treasury 
and financial experts, thereby increasing the public 
visibility of the process of competition. 
There are undoubtedly various interpretations of autonomy. In 
most western European countries, however, it is not defined by 
academics, but by government. "Autonomy exists as a state of 
tension between various interests (those of the external and 
the academic community) and between knowledge as an element of 
exploration". In the UK the term 11 conditional 11 autonomy 
describes the role of a highly interventionary state in higher 
education, a situation which has developed rapidly since there 
were few constitutional devices to prevent it. Various 
changes have been brought about by the Education Reform Act of 
1988, which now provides a legislative framework for all 
higher education sectors, but the extent to which university 
autonomy will remain a "reserve domain" remains to be seen" 50 • 
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5.2.7 Academic freedom 
There is no constitutional provision for the protection of 
academic freedom in Britain. Just like university autocomy, 
it merely existed by virtue of tradition. For a long time 
academic freedom was never a major concern to Bri tisi: 
academics for a variety of reasons. A genuinely tolerant 
public opinion, and a far-reaching self-government by 
academics in their own institutions ensured that those who 
exercised their academic freedom and who expressed their 
beliefs and deviated from the norm did not place themselves at 
risk. As one British scholar once observed; "where there 
appeared to be no danger to academic freedom, there was no 
need to insist on permanence of academic appointment to 
protect that freedom". 51 
This situation changed when there was greater government 
intervention into the university affairs. For a long time 
academic freedom was taken for granted52 • It was only in the 
eighties that attention was poignantly paid to the definition 
of academic freedom. In 1987 CVCP defined it in their 
lobbying against the Education Reform Bill: "not as protection 
for life but as the freedom within the law for academic staff 
to question and to test received wisdom and to put forward new 
and controversial or unpopular opinions without placing 
individuals in jeopardy of losing their jobs"s:1. 
In the Education Reform Act of 1988, academic freedom is 
described in section 202 as follows: 
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"(a) to ensure that the academic staff have freedom within the 
law to question and test received wisdom, and to put 
forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular 
opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of 
losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their 
institutions; 
(b) to enable qualifying institutions to provide education, 
promote learning and engage in research efficiently and 
economically; and 
(c) to apply the principles of justice and fairness". 
Although it has been said that academic freedom has been used 
in support of many conflicting causes~, there is no doubt that 
the purpose thereof is to enable both the academic and the 
student to do their job effectively. The academic has to 
teach and do research. In the course of this he has to 
express certain views which may not be popular but which may 
nonetheless be valid. He should pursue the truth without any 
fear of reprisals. Equally a student has to learn and in the 
process ask questions and express certain views. He should 
not be punished for asking those questions and expressing 
those views55 • In the exercise of his academic freedom, each 
individual academic has to have due regard to the rights of 
others, because academic freedom has to be weighed against the 
competing rights. Moreover, as an ordinary citizen an 
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academic is entitled to other civil liberties to which other 
citizens are entitled~. 
5.2.7.1 Academic freedom and tenure 
When members of the academic staff are appointed, they assume 
a particular status as members of the academic community. 
Once they have completed a period of probation, they acquire 
tenure which is a form of vocational security to protect their 
intellectual activity and from being subjected to undue 
external and institutional pressure. 
Historically academic tenure was never at issue in Great 
Britain and there was no public debate about tenure among 
British academics. It was simply accepted as a matter of 
course58 • 
When British universities became strapped for cash, the 
government perceived tenure as an obstacle t.o flexibility 
especially when the government was attempting to respond to 
the needs of higher education, while reducing university 
funding. When attempting to implement spending cuts in higher 
education, the Conservative Government since 1981 put 
considerable pressure on universities to abandon tenure. This 
pressure gained momentum in 1986 when the Secretary of State 
for Education and Science expressed to the vice-chancellors 
his hope that all new academic appointments would be made 
without tenure. The Treasury also informed the CNCP that 
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while the Treasury would be willing to agree to more money for 
staff salaries, it would ~ot accept tenure~. 
Academic tenure was also criticized on the grounds . . tnat it 
discriminated against the majority of academics without 
tenure. Academic tenure has, however, been defended on the 
basis that the academic is an off ice-bearer rather than an 
employee, a.nd that academic freedom can only flourish in 
conditions where there is freedom of speech and of thought. 
For this reason universities must be exempt from some of the 
requirements of close public accountability. This has, 
however, altered considerably as a result of increased state 
intervention, financial pressure, competition and performance 
evaluation60 • 
5.2.7.2 The Education Reform Act and the abolition of tenure 
Even apart from government pressure some universities started 
to abandon tenure because of reduced funding and the 
concomitant financial constraints. Even before parliament 
started to draft and to debate the 1988 Education Reform Act, 
therefore, many academics especially those recently appointed, 
did not have jobs guaranteed for life by tenure. Although in 
the minds of the government there was a clear connection 
between tenure and the financial security and flexibility of 
British universities, which connection was deemed to justify 
the abolition of tenure, some felt that the government's 
motivation was unclear. The feeling was that this probably 
had more to do with a mistaken belief that tenure is a 
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privilege that could no longer be afforded rather than arising 
from a conscious and deliberate disregard for the fundamental 
principles at stakeQ. 
During the second reading of the Education Reform Bill before 
the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Education and 
Science stated that traditional tenure arrangements "severely 
circumscribe the flexibility and responsiveness of 
universities. The Bill proposes that all universities should 
be able to appoint new permanent staff without offering 
tenure. Independent commissioners will revise university 
charters to give effect to this and to safeguard academic 
freedom"c. Universities were therefore enjoined to abolish 
tenure for incoming staff. Tenure was also abolished for 
those receiving promotions who were already enjoying tenure~. 
Since the passing of the 1988 Act, no new academic appointment 
has tenure and academic staff may now be dismissed on good 
cause. The UC amended university statutes to allow for the 
dismissal of academic staff on the grounds of redundancy or on 
good cause and they also had to deal with disciplinary 
procedures, complaints and grievances and procedures for 
hearing appeals against disciplinary decisions and dismissals. 
In modifying these statutes they were bound by section 202(2) 
of the Act to uphold academic freedom as set out above, 
including the basic common-law right to fair treatment. 
Under the Education Reform act, good cause in section 203{6) 
is related to the conduct, capability or qualifications for 
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performing the work fo:::- which the ac:adernic was employed or 
appointed. The Act expressly provides that "capability" 
refers to "skill, aptitude, health or any other physical or 
mental quality" 65 • 11 Q1.:.alifications 11 refers to any "degree, 
diploma or other academic, technical or professional 
qualification" relevant to the office or position in 
question" 66 • "Conduct", on the other hand, is not further 
explained in the Act itself. Instead, the annotation to the 
statute suggests looking to a particular university's charter 
and statutes in which, in most cases, ·the recognized 
definition of "conduct" is expressly mentioned. Although the 
Act provides a general understanding of the ingredients of 
good cause, parties to disputes will find no precise 
definition for conduct, capability and qualifications because 
of the paucity of case law in the area. The reason behind 
this is that traditionally the visitor possessed exclusive 
jurisdiction to settle disputes between members of the 
university67. 
5.2.7.3 Academic freedom debates and the amendment 
When the government first introduced the Education Reform 
Bill, academic freedom was the main issue, and tenure as its 
protector, became the centre of the debate. The government, 
on the one hand, led by the Secretary of State for Education 
and Science, contended that tenure was not necessary to 
preserve academic freedom. Academic freedom, as it claimed, 
would not be protected by "jobs for life" under the practice 
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of tenure, but by tb.e due processes ;:i.nd provisions established 
by the Commissioners at each university68 • 
Those who supported tenure, on the other hand, took a 
different view as a result of a university system that was 
increasingly dependent on government funding. They argued 
that the abolition of tenure would mean the death of academic 
freedom as academics fearing the loss of funding or even 
dismissal, would be forced to stick to "safe" subjects and 
orthodox lines of research. This would have the effect of 
narrowing the debate and the best universities would be 
severely affected by this and this is where the best and 
innovative research was done. Moreover, it was further 
contended, university research could become limited to those 
projects proposed by the UFC and heads of department would 
only be able to assign lecturers to specific research 
projects. The abolition of tenure would therefore allow 
dismissals for failure to comply with research assignments~. 
These contentions fell on deaf ears and the government refused 
to abandon its plan to abolish tenure and the focus of the 
debate shifted. An amendment specifically protecting academic 
freedom became the centre of attention. This amendment, which 
was eventually adopted, was sponsored by Lord Jenkins of 
Hillhead. Although the government appeared to recognize the 
validity and importance of academic freedom, it resisted an 
amendment specifically protecting academic freedom for two 
reasons. Firstly, 
unnecessary because 
it believed that explicit protection was 
Britain, as a free country, already 
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allowed academics, like any citizen, to express themselves in 
any way they chose. Secondly, academic freedom would be too 
difficult to define prec~sely in a manner that would cover all 
conceivable circumstances. The cour~s would have to interpret 
it thus making it a justiciable issue for the first time. 
These arguments, were indeed specious. In essence the 
government was opposed to any amendment protecting academic 
freedom because tenure having been abolished, should not be 
smuggled in again through the back door disguised as the 
statutory protection of academic freedom. The government was 
confident that the procedural provisions that the 
Commissioners would establish in the light of the principles 
of justice and fairness under section 202 (2) (c) would be 
sufficient to protect academic freedom70 • It is, however, 
strange why the government had confidence in those procedures 
and not in the way academic freedom had been protected before. 
Ultimately, an amendment proposed by Lord Jenkins of Hillhead 
was approved and included as section 202 (2) (a) of che 
Education Reform Act. It instructs the Commissioners to 
"ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to 
question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new 
ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing 
themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they 
may have at their institutions". Although the amendment does 
not expressly state that it is speaking of academic freedom, 
its passage apparently pacified many of those concerned about 
the protection of academic freedomn. 
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This brief exposition amply demonst:!'."ates that even in Britain 
it is no longer possible to rely on the common law for the 
protection of certain fundamen~al rights. It is for this 
reason that some have advocated the adoption of a bill of 
rights even for Bri tain72 • There are, however, various 
mechanisms with the Education Reform Act which may be invoked 
to further protect academic freedom against violations which 
may pass through the amendment. These include the 
disciplinary, dismissal and grievance procedures designed by 
Commissioners, recourse to the courts and the requirement that 
any modification of the disciplinary, dismissal and grievance 
procedures, as well as the provisions allowing dismissal for 
redundancy and good cause, be approved by the Privy Counciln. 
5.2.7.4 Academic freedom and responsibility 
From the above discussion it is clear that academic freedom in 
Britain is still regarded as important. Like the concept of 
university autonomy, however, it cannot be regarded as fixed 
and immutable. There appears to be a greater shift from 
academic freedom to the emphasis of accountability. The 
critical question is how to strike a balance between the two. 
Academic freedom therefore does not mean that academics should 
not be expected to account for how they expend the enormous 
financial resources that are put into university education. 
What they should not be subjected to is how they do their 
teaching and research and what they should teach or research. 
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It has therefore been stated that as a auid pro quo academic 
freedom demands responsibility or accountability. 
responsibility requires utmost responsibility 
academics, students and the ins ti tut ion and 
Academic 
to other 
should be 
encouraged through positive development, encouragement and 
acceptance of the procedures f o:::- safeguarding academic 
freedom73 • 
External responsibility may either be formal or informal. In 
a broad sense, responsibility is owed to society which is the 
major funder of higher education and its primary beneficiary. 
Much tension has been experienced in this area over the years 
and in particular the demands of academic freedom as against 
the demands of the funder for accountability. What is 
debatable, however, is where the boundary should be drawn 
between the funder and funded and to what extent higter 
education should be accountable to the government or whether 
such responsibility should be direct or mediated through some 
intermediary. 
In more recent years, the boundaries have shifted and the 
government requires a greater degree of accountability. 
Whether or not the increased accountability which is now being 
demanded is reasonable or is itself an infringement of 
academic freedom is quite debatable. What is important to 
emphasise is that accountability, if properly handled, can and 
should be positive, useful and encouraging74 • 
The words of Brook are apposite: 
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II If . . ,._ un1vers1~y teachers retire into their 
ivory towers, they will find that they have 
lost the freedom that they have taken for 
granted. The best safeguards of academic 
freedom are: first, the conviction on the part 
of university teachers that it is worth 
preserving; second, their ability to convince 
laymen, whether in the government or the 
general public, that they are competent to 
control their own affairs; third, their 
willingness, in the last resort, to give up 
their posts if freedom is denied to them; and 
lastly, the ability to do their job so well 
that this willingness is a threat that will 
carry weight "75 • 
5.3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
5.3.1 The evolution of constitutional academic freedom 
There is no doubt that academic freedom is regarded as an 
important feature of universities and colleges in the United 
States of America76 , although not everyone shares this belief 
and enthusiasm because academic freedom for the ordinary 
person seems to be an esoteric concern of university 
personnel77 • There is, however, no express constitutional 
provision for the protection of academic freedom in the USA. 
In a few cases the Supreme Cour-t has dubbed academic freedom a 
special concern of the first amendment which protects free 
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speech and assembly (Sweezy and !<eyishia.n Bakke) . The primary 
concern of the first amendment is the protection of free 
speech and assembly. This has resulted in the judicial 
incorporacion of academic freedom into the first amendment. 
Despite this incorporation there has been no satisfactory 
definition, justification or doctrinal explanation of academic 
freedom as a special concern of the first amendment. For this 
reason it has been said: "Lacking definition or guiding 
principle, the doctrine floats in the law, picking up 
decisions as a hull does barnacles"~. 
The rationale for this is that the definition of academic 
freedom in the USA developed as a response to actual 
hiscorical circumstances, hence its schizophrenic nature. The 
definition of academic freedom produced by the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) arose from the 
threats to which professors were exposed from university 
boards of trustees~. Threats to universities from the state 
in the 1940's and 1950's as a result of the scare of communism 
led to the case that prompted the Supreme Court to regard 
academic freedom as a first amendment right~. This was the 
era of McCarthyism where universities were supposed to require 
their staff to take loyalty oaths that they had not been 
members of subversive organizations81 • 
Although both professional and constitutional definitions of 
academic freedom emphasised the value of critical inquiry of 
universities, each definition focused on the peculiar 
contemporary threats to this value. The AAUP definition 
stressed the protection of the individual professors against 
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any trustees, whereas the constituticnal definition emphasized 
the protection of the entire university community against 
state intervention82 • 
The Supreme Court, however, never explained systematically the 
legal and theoretical foundation for its incorporation of 
academic freedom into the first amendment. Academic freedom 
is more than a desirable policy promoted by the AAUP. For 
this reason core first amendment values such as critical 
inquiry, the search for knowledge and the toleration of 
dissent support constitutionalizing some, even though not all, 
of the speech covered by the professional definition of 
academic freedom. This is the definition offered by the AAUP. 
These first amendment values justify protecting both the 
professional speech of academics and the autonomy of 
universities to make decisions on educational policy. In 
order to engage in critical inquiry, professors need some 
measure of independence from their university employers, and 
universities need some measure of independence from the state. 
To assert constitutional protection for professors and 
universities is therefore not simply a type of special 
treatment meant to lift the job-related concerns of a 
particular profession or the institutional interests of a 
particular enterprise. On the contrary, constitutional 
academic freedom promotes first amendment values of general 
concern to all citizens in a democracy'3. 
First amendment academic freedom can be regarded doctrinally 
as an aspect of a developing but insufficiently appreciated 
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judicial trend to construe the first amendment in 
institutional contextu. There are three areas that are 
protected by this. These include claims of professors against 
faculty colleagues, administrators or trustees; claims by 
professors against the state; and claims by universities 
against the state. State action necessary to invoke the first 
amendment exists in all three at public universities. At 
private universities state action exists in claims by 
professors and universities against the state. Claims by 
professors at private institutions against faculty colleagues, 
administrators, or trustees cannot raise first amendment 
issues because no state action is involved. A private 
university can assert institutional academic freedom as a 
defence to judicial review of faculty claims that the 
university violated its contractual commitments of academic 
freedom85 • 
Public universities may invoke the first amendment to assert 
independence from the states that created them and 
simultaneously are themselves state institutions constrained 
by the first amendment86 • The 1915 Declaration by the AAUP 
emphasized that the university should be an intellectual 
experiment station, where new ideas could germinate and where 
their fruit though still distasteful to the community as a 
whole could be allowed to ripen until finally, perchance, it 
became a part of the accepted intellectual food of the nation 
or the world. Although the 1915 Declaration focused on 
trustees, it also identified the threat posed by legislators 
to academic freedom in state universities. The 1915 
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Declaration foresaw the possibility =~a= legislators might try 
to use the state's purse strings to manipulate the academic 
inquiries of professors, especially where scholarly views 
deviated fror.l strong public opir-1ions or from established 
government policies. While the interference of trustees with 
academic freedom would typically derive from opposition of 
businessmen to the more liberal social and economic views of 
professors, state and public pressure would inevitably 
threaten conservative professors who disagreed with a 
political programme of reform. Whatever the ideological 
source of these pressures on academic freedom, the 1915 
Declaration emphasized that the university should be an 
"inviolable refuge" for independent scholarly investigation" 87 • 
5.3.2 Towards a definition of constitutional academic 
freedom 
Even the Supreme Court decisions that mentioned academic 
freedom in the 1950's did not focus on its meaning. The views 
expressed in those cases were based on traditional 
constitutional doctrines involving political expression, due 
process and the privilege against self-incrimination. Some of 
the opinions identified academic freedom as a distinctive 
right within the first amendment and applied the concept to 
both individuals and ins ti tutions88 • In Adler v Board of 
Education~ although the court upheld the constitutionality of 
a section of the New York Civil Service Law, implemented by 
the so-called "Feinberg Law", certain statements were made by 
some of the Justices which concerned academic freedom. The 
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sections concerned provided for '.:he disqualification and 
removal from the public school system of teachers and other 
employees who advocated the overthrow of the government by 
unlawful means or whc belonged to organizations which had such 
a purpose. In his majority opinion Justice Menton had to say: 
"A teacher works in a sensitive area in a 
schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of 
young minds towards the society in which they 
live. In this, the state has a vital concern. 
It must preserve the integrity of the schools. 
That the school authorities have the right and 
the duty to screen the officials, teachers and 
employees as to their fitness to maintain the 
integrity of the schools as a part of ordered 
society, cannot be doubted"~. 
Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion with which ,Justice 
Black concurred. In his opinion Douglas J was the first. 
Supreme Court Justice to expressly recognize academic freedom 
as a constitutional right. In his words he said inter alia: 
"The Constitution guarantees freedom of 
thought and expression to everyone in our 
society. All are entitled to it; and none 
needs it more than the teacher. 
The public school is in most respects the 
cradle of our democracy ... the impact of this 
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kind of censorship in the public schools 
system illustrates the high purpose of the 
First Amendment in freeing speech and thought 
from censorship ... 
The very threat of such a procedure is certain 
to raise havoc with academic freedom ... 
Fearing condemnation, (the teacher) will tend 
to shrink from 
controversy. 
any 
In 
association that stirs 
that manner freedom of 
expression will be stifled ... 
There can be no real academic freedom in that 
environment. Where suspicion fills the air 
and holds scholars in line for fear of their 
jobs, there can be no exercise of the free 
intellect ... 
This system of spying and surveillance with 
its accompanying reports and trials cannot go 
hand in hand with academic freedom. It 
produces standardized thought, not the pursuit 
of truth. Yet it was the pursuit of truth 
that the First Amendment was designed to 
protect. We need to be bold and 
adventuresome in our thinking to survive ... 
The framers knew the danger of dogmatism; they 
also knew the strength that comes when the 
mind is free, when ideas may be pursued 
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wherever they lead. We forgec these teachings 
of the First Amendment when we sustain this 
law" 91 • 
Sweezy v New Hampshire~ was the first Supreme Court case that 
incorporated academic freedom within the first amendment and 
where the recognition of academic freedom as a constitutional 
right moved from dissenting and concurring opinions into 
acceptance by a majority of six members of the Supreme Court. 
In this case Sweezy had refused to disclose the topic of his 
guest lecture at the University of New Hampshire as being an 
infringement of his first amendment academic freedom. In his 
plurality opinion Warren c J attempted to articulate the 
concept of institutional academic freedom in the following 
words. 
"The essentiality of freedom in the community 
of American universities is almost self-
evident. No one should underestimate the 
vital role in a democracy that is played by 
those who guide and train our youth. To 
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual 
leaders in our colleges and universities would 
imperil the future of our Nation. No field of 
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man 
that new discoveries cannot yet be made. 
Particularly is that true in the social 
sciences, where few, if any, principles are 
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot 
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flourish in an atmosp~ere of suspicion and 
distrust. Teachers and students must always 
remain free to inquire, to study and to 
evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will 
stagnate and die"~. 
This extract emphasizes two social benefits of academic 
freedom. Critical inquiry within universities is essential to 
the preservation of a democratic society and, as a somewhat 
independent matter, promotes discoveries and understanding 
necessary for civilization. 
Frankfurter J in his concurring opinion reiterated both 
themes. He circumscribed the value of academic freedom in the 
following elegant words: 
Progress in the natural sciences is remotely 
confined to findings made in the laboratory. 
Insights into the mysteries of nature are born 
of the hypothesis and speculation. The more 
so is this true in the pursuit of 
understanding in the groping endeavours of 
what are called the social sciences, the 
concern of which is man and society. The 
problems that are the respective 
preoccupations of anthropology, economics, 
law, psychology, sociology and related areas 
of scholarship are merely departmentalized 
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dealing, by way of manageable di vision of 
analysis, wit:.h interpe!'J.etra.ting aspects of 
holistic perplexities. For society's good -
if understanding be an essential need of 
society inquiries into these problems, 
speculation about them, stimulation in others 
of reflection upon them, must be left as 
unfettered as possible. Political power must 
abstain from intrusion into this activity of 
freedom, pursued in the interest of wise 
government and the people's well-being, except 
for reasons that are exigent and obviously 
compelling"!).I. 
He further referred to democratic values and stressed "the 
dependence of a free society on free universities" (at 262) 
and "focused primarily on knowledge and understanding in the 
full range of academic disciplines as social goods in 
themselves". He warned that any government intrusion into the 
intellectual life of a university, would jeopardize these 
important functions of professors in universities. According 
to him the dependence of a free society on free universities, 
necessitated the existence of "the four essential freedoms of 
a university - to determine for itself on academic grounds who 
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who 
may be admitted to study"~. This statement quoted from South 
African universities became the most important statement on 
academic freedom in the USA and was quoted with approval in 
many subsequent cases. 
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To fit academic freedom wichin the rubric of the first 
amendment is an extremely difficult 
mentioned in the first amendment. It is 
task as it is 
highly unlikely 
not 
that 
those who debated and ratified the first amendment considered 
academic freedom as before the Civil War, "most institutions 
of higher education were denomination colleges, the problem of 
academic freedom as we now understand it was hardly posed"%. 
These colleges were what the 1915 Declaration labelled as 
"proprietary", concerned with conserving truth rather than 
with searching for it. They did not allow intellectual 
freedom, and their faculties typically did not seek it. 
Notions of academic freedom, to the extent that they existed 
at all, were associated with institutional autonomy from the 
democratic vulgarity of the broader society. Only with the 
emergence of the modern research university in the late 
nineteenth century did a comprehensive theory of academic 
freedom, expressed most thoroughly in the 1915 Declaration, 
emerge in the US. It took an educational revolution following 
the Civil War to produce the commitment to critical inquiry 
central to the modern rationale for academic freedom, and 
which may also be re1ated to general free speech theories 
contained within the first amendment~. 
Accommodating academic freedom within the first amendment has 
meant a special first amendment right unique to professors and 
universities whereas the free speech guaranteed by the first 
amendment is generally thought to apply equally to all 
citizens. In these historical and legal circumstances, it 
would not have been surprising if the Supreme Court had 
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refused to recognize a discrete, though unenumerated, first 
amendment right of ac2d2rr.ic freed8m. Even those who defend 
the extension of first amendment prctection to academic 
freedom would have had diffic~lty cri~icizing the Court had it 
declined to do so~. This is one of the reasons why the AAUP 
did not submit an amicus brief in Sweezy. It was divided on 
this issue as it reasonably concluded that the Court was not 
likely to address the constitutional implications of academic 
freedom for the first time. Moreover, it was also worried 
that there would be a judicial appropriation of a concept the 
AAUP had largely defined and successfully advocated throughout 
the academic world. Even a favourable definition of academic 
freedom under the first amendment would, it further thought, 
be subject to further judicial interpretation. What the Court 
gave, many within the AAUP contended, it could also take away. 
It was also considered that constitutional recognition of 
academic freedom could prompt many within the university 
community to abandon any continuing independent effort to 
define and refine this crucial concept. The constitutional 
meaning of academic freedom, many feared, could displace 
rather than complement the one enunciated in the 1915 
Declaration and accepted in the institutional negotiations of 
many universities99 • Principles of academic freedom not 
incorporated into the first amendment could thereby be 
completely abandoned. For those reasons many within the AAUP 
were concerned that academic freedom would be weakened rather 
than strengthened by judicial constitutionalization100 • 
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When the Supreme Court identified academic freedom as a first 
amendment right in Sweezv, it re~dered nugatory most of the 
AAUP' s reservations whether to advocate this position. 
Subsequent cases have reinforced the incorporation of academic 
freedom into the first amendment "mostly through additional 
rhetorical flourishes 11101 • Some Supreme Court decisions have 
attempted to draw a parallel between the 1915 Declaration and 
the basic themes of general first amendment theory. 
There are further three perculiarities with the Sweezv 
decision. The court had never before suggested that academic 
freedom was protected by the first amendment. Despite this 
fact neither of the concurring opinions acknowledged that the 
Court was creating new law. To compensate for this the 
justices resorted to vehement rhetoric in praising the right. 
The stance that academic freedom had always been a functional 
part of the system of freedom of expression may be regarded as 
an attempt to justify itself by a court that considered itself 
vulnerable in attempting to curb abusive legislative 
investigations. For this reason the court pretended to be 
proceeding upon long-established and agreed-upon norms. Even 
press reports which commented on the controversial decisions 
delivered on "Red Monday" (Sweezy was handed down on the same 
day as the other six cases which made it difficult for 
Congress, administrative agencies and state legislatures to 
expose and to penalize allegedly subversive persons) failed to 
note that a new constitutional right of academic freedom had 
been born1112 • 
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Secondly, Frankfurter J's opinion looked to non-legal sources 
to describe the content of the right of academic freedom. 
This was to be expected as the Court's decision had no legal 
precursors or precedent. The worcis "academic freedom" had no 
meaning apart from their usage in academic contexts. But 
Frankfurter J did not comment on the different meanings words 
could have in different professional social contexts. 
Moreover, the opinions followed the established first 
amendment practice that the rights claimed by Sweezy were 
personal to him as a limitation on state power. Frankfurter 
J, however, repeatedly addressed the right of the university 
itself rather than those of faculty members as individuals. 
Although the distinction was not pertinent here, because the 
culprit was the state itself, the confusion is nonetheless 
critical because academic freedom had traditionally been 
understood as a personal right of the faculty member against 
university administrators and trustees103 • 
Thirdly, although Frankfurter J drew the content of academic 
freedom from available non-legal sources, both he and Warren C 
J, extolled academic freedom by emphasizing the social utility 
of free universities. They contended that continued progress 
in the social sciences requires freedom of inquiry and 
discussion, that impairment of this progress would jeopardize 
democratic government and civilization, and therefore, that 
government should not meddle in academic affairs. Although 
the persuasiveness of this reasoning may be regarded as lying 
at the core of the justification for the constitutional status 
of academic freedom, the problem is that democratic government 
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in the United States was established and even had to thrive 
for one hundred years before departments of social sciences 
were established at any America:-::. universities. The assertion 
of the social utility of academic freedom therefore reflects 
"the faith of an intellectual elite in the centrality of 
neutral reason to the success of the libera';':2,st:E?-t:e "104 • 
5.3.3 The aftermath of Sweezy 
•·-.~"'•· .. :;,.·' 
.r 
Al though Sweezy clothed the new constitutional right of 
academic freedom with a lot of "triumphant rhetoric", it left 
an ambiguous description of the relationship between academic 
custom and positive legal right. It was perhaps for this 
reason that in the case of Barenblatt v United States10' the 
Supreme Court two years later did not follow the Sweezy case. 
On the contrary, it confirmed the conviction of an academic 
for criminal contempt in refusing to answer congressional 
questions concerning communist activities among graduate 
students at the University of Michigan. Harlan J's opinion 
while asserting that the Court would "always be on the alert 
against intrusion by Congress into the constitutionally 
protected domain"~ nonetheless stressed that a university is 
not a "constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into matters that 
may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative 
domain ... " 
Because Barenblatt substantially upheld the investigation of 
the House Un-American Activities Committee into campus 
communism, it could be regarded as a defeat for academic 
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freedom. But the impact of Barenblatt on the development of 
the constitutional . h~ r 1. g-" '- of academ3.c f reedorn has been 
considered to be negligiblem. Harlan J was at pains to make 
a distinction between attempts by Congress to control teaching 
in the universities through investigations, which would 
infringe academic freedom, and efforts by Congress to discover 
traces of the international conspiracy on campuses, which fell 
outside academic freedom. The Court justified Congress' 
investigation on the grounds that the Communist Party was 
dedicated to the violent overthrow of constitutional 
government and by its particular focus on political 
organization. 
The Court next discussed academic freedom as a first amendment 
right in the case of Keyishian v Board of Regents of the State 
of New York108 • This case was based on a refusal to sign a 
certificate that a person was not a Communist or had never 
been a Communist. It st.ruck down the application of New 
York's Feinberg Law to professors of the State University of 
New York on the grounds that it was vague and too widely 
stated. This law consisted of a series of statutes and 
regulations which were intended to bar "subversive" persons 
from employment. The Court read certain sections of the law 
which outlawed advocacy of forceful overthrow of the 
government to embrace potentially sympathetic classroom 
treatment of Marxist or other revolutionary works or ideas. 
The provision was regarded as being unconstitutionally vague 
,. 
because of a professor's fear of the law would distort his 
selection and treatment of the subject. The Court stressed 
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that regulations affecting academic freedom should be 
sufficiently clear so as not to disccurage the exercise of 
constitutional rights. 
Brennan J resorted to stirring rhetoric in praising academic 
freedom in the following words: 
"Our Nation is deeply committed to 
safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely 
to the teachers concerned. That freedom is 
therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that 
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 
'The vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the 
community of American schools'.. The 
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of 
ideas' . The Nation's future depends upon 
leaders trained through wide exposure to that 
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 
'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than 
through any kind of authoritative selection"w 
There was also reference to the Sweezy quote 110 • In this 
passage the Court made a more passionate claim for the social 
utility of academic freedom than it did in Sweezy. By' 
regarding academic freedom as being of "transcendent" value to 
every member of society, the Court did not posit any direct 
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benefit to the average citizen from academic freedom, such as 
higher wages or longer life, but rather considered it valuable 
in that it acculturated future political leaders to a critical 
attitude toward authoritarian dogma and to tolerance of 
dissent. The rhetoric further implies that the elements of 
free inquiry, discussion, dissent and consensus are not 
necessarily important because they lead to truth, although 
this may also be so, but because they express an invaluable 
sense of what kind of society Americans desire111 • 
By regarding the classroom as 11 peculiarly the marketplace of 
ideas", the Court appears to have exaggerated somewhat as it 
falsely suggested that teaching normally involves a free 
exchange of ideas among equals which may not be so. As Byrne 
puts it: "Necessary functions of modern universities include 
the preservation of ideas, the advancement of knowledge to 
which the public is indifferent and the education of students 
in the elite standards of criticism and sophisticated means of 
investigation. Moreover, the careless application of the 
'marketplace' metaphor overlooks delicate issues concerning 
the professor's limited autonomy in the selection of content 
for a particular course" 112 • 
The use by the Court of rhetoric to define the content of 
academic freedom has been criticised in that it has 
exacerbated the ambiguity already created by basing the 
decision of the case upon vagueness. The Court insisted that 
the first amendment does not "tolerate laws that cast a pall 
of orthodoxy over the classroom". This creates the impression 
412. 
that laws are bad when they discourage free and unconstrained 
teaching, and not when they directly prohibit it which is not 
the case113 • 
A further criticism is that the Court's rhetoric praised 
academic freedom as an institutional right to be free from 
orthodoxy prescribed by the government and focussed on the 
classroom, perceived metaphorically as the process of 
institutionalized scholarship and teaching, rather than on the 
rights of any individual teacher or student. The benefits to 
democracy were regarded as emanating from a system of 
education not seriously threatened by isolated injustices. 
The "orthodoxies" feared are not those of academics 
themselves, but rather those imposed by non-academic officials 
seeking to advance their views on various policies which are 
regarded as the only kinds of interference in the "free 
market" of teaching with which the Court was concerned. This 
was a departure from tradition where academic freedom had 
always signified an individual right against interference by 
lay persons114 • 
The passages in Sweezy and Keyishian remain the Court's 
fullest exposition of constitutional academic freedom. Like 
the 1915 Declaration, they emphasized the social importance of 
critical inquiry in universities in promoting knowledge and 
serving democratic values. Similar metaphors were used in the 
1915 Declaration and in the judicial opinions. These include 
descriptions such as that the university is an "intellectual 
experiment station" (in the Declaration) or that it is "a 
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marketplace of ideas" ( Kevishian) As Rabban puts it: 
"Indeed, just as the 1915 Decl.a:r-ation stressed that 
universities should allow 'ideas distasteful to the community 
as a whole' to 'germinate' and perhaps ultimately to become 
generally accepted, Justice Holmes, who created the 
marketplace metaphor for the first amendment involved by the 
Court in Keyishian stressed that society should allow 'the 
expression of opinions that we loathe' because 'the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market" 115 • 
The early Supreme Court opinions on academic freedom left many 
questions unanswered. They never clarified the relationships 
among the "special" constitutional rights of academic freedom 
the Court read into the first amendment, the concept of 
academic freedom expressed in the 1915 Declaration and broadly 
accepted within American universities and the general first 
amendment right of free speech. Al though there were 
significant parallels, these three concepts also differe~~. 
The Supreme Court's cursory discussions of academic freedom, 
whatever their analytical shortcomings and lingering 
ambiguities, reveal sufficient parallels between academic 
freedom and the first amendment generally to justify, even if 
not to require, the Court's constitutionalization of academic 
freedom as "a special concern of the First Amendment" . But 
there are significant differences between free speech and 
academic freedom117 • 
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The requirement of sc::holarly independence for the proper 
performance of academic work entitles the professor to more 
freedom from control by his employer than that enjoyed by the 
ordinary employee. Justification for academic freedom may be 
found in that it does not make sense to expect professors to 
engage in critical inquiry and simultaneously to allow 
punishment for its exercise. First amendment freedom should 
therefore preclude an administrator or trustee at a public 
university from forcing a professor to investigate a 
particular topic or to reach specified conclusions. 
Constitutional academic freedom might conceivably even protect 
professors at both public and private universities from laws 
that would apply to other citizens. Among American 
universities there has been the preoccupation with the 
question whether the academic freedom of professors should 
also encompass extramural speech of professors outside their 
sphere of expertise 118 • 
Constitutionalizing academic freedom, however, seems much less 
like elitist favouritism for a particular profession when it 
is appropriately viewed as, but one example of the general 
proposition that first amendment principles vary with 
institutional context 119 • It has been regretted that in 
retrospect, the term academic freedom, with its many and 
evolving connotations within the university community, became 
constitutionalized. This is because conceptual confusion 
would inevitably result when the same term has different 
meanings in constitutional and academic discourse. The 
difficulties in distinguishing constitutional academic freedon: 
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from general free speech principles are exacerbated by the 
additional problem of untangl:..ng constitutional from 
professional definitions of academic freedom. For this reason 
it has been argued that it would have been wiser for the Court 
to have developed a separate term, such as 'academic speech' 
to refer to distinctive first amendment rights in the 
university context. Academic freedom, however, has acquired 
constitutional significances. Rather ~han abandon this usage 
after more than a generation, it makes more sense to focus on 
how constitutional academic freedom, which can legitimately be 
considered an example of applying the first amendment in 
institutional context, overlaps with and differs from both 
professional definitions of academic freedom and general free 
speech doctrinesrn. 
The two cases of Sweezy and Keyishian represent the Supreme 
Court's exhaustion of the development of a university member's 
academic freedom. Despite their analytical shortcomings, they 
contributed substantially to the virtual extinction of overt 
efforts by non-academic government officials to prescribe 
political orthodoxy in university teaching and research. As a 
result few politicians today seek political capital by 
attacking academics for their political opinions. Those who 
do only give their victims lawsuits that usually strengthen 
their academic positions against more subtle or justifiable 
assault. This does not mean that ideological factors and 
prejudice no longer play any part in academic appointments. 
It only means that the rules of the game are now those of the 
academym. 
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5.3.4 The limits of judicial intervention 
Although it has been said ~hat the case of Sweezy created a 
constitutional right of academic freedom and although it has 
been said that this right effectively put paid to the 
government intervention into internal state university 
affairs, this right has not been unlimited. Initially there 
was a belief that the Supreme Court would eventually provide 
extensive protection for the academic judgments of individuals 
against interference by university administrators. Admittedly 
in a few early cases lower federal courts protected teachers 
against sanctions for using unpopular books in teaching122 • 
Courts soon jettisoned the approach of shielding teachers from 
the sanction of administrators and gave administrators a 
greater latitude to deal with methods by teachers which they 
regarded as unacceptable. Even though courts may agree in 
principle that a teacher's behaviour is constitutionally 
protected, they often hold that antagonism to the protected 
behaviour of the teacher was not the effective cause for a 
teacher's dismissalw. 
In line with this reasoning the courts have held the view that 
administrators are entitled to exercise extensive control over 
curricular judgments as long as they do not penalize a 
professor only for his political views. While this may be so 
in theory, in practice it may be di ff icul t to determine 
whether an academic is dismissed or denied appointment for his 
political views or for something else. For this reason some 
have held the view that the constitutional right to academic 
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freedom in the classroom proclaimed in Sweezy is only a 
myth124 • 
A case which illustrates what the cases of Sweezy and 
Keyishian have been able to achieve and not to achieve is that 
of Ollman v Toll 125 • In this case a search committee at the 
University of Maryland recommended to the administration that 
Bertell Ollman, a Marxist professor then at New York 
University, be appointed as the new chairman of the Department 
of Government and Poli tics. As a result of this a great 
political controversy arose which raised many sensitive 
issues, including the wisdom of appointing a radical Marxist 
chairman, of an ideologically divided department, the 
respective powers of appointment of the search committee, the 
department and the president and the influence of outside 
political pressure. The governor and several legislators were 
against the appointment of a Marxist. Newspapers and 
professional organizations expressed themselves against 
refusal to appoint someone because he was a Marxist. The 
university largely depended on the public support in its 
effort to improve its academic programmes. After a lot of 
discussion, the president declined to appoint Professor 
Ollman. He contended that he was not the right person to 
develop the potential of the department. He disclaimed any 
reliance on Ollman' s political beliefs and promised to 
withstand outside pressure. 
Professor Ollman sued the president for violating his 
constitutional right of academic freedom. Although Professor 
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Ollman was strongly supported by various organs of liberal 
opinion and was represented pro bona oublico by one of the 
premier law firms, the suit :!:ailed. The district court 
accepted the president's testimony that Ollman's beliefs were 
not a "substantial or motivating" factor in refusing to 
appoint him. On that basis the court held that the 
plaintiff's constitutional rights had not been violated. In 
spite of the outcome of the lawsuit, the AAUP had previously 
censured the university for the infringement of academic 
freedom in its handling of the appointment. For this reason 
Maryland remained the most prominent university on the AAUP 
censure list until it was removed in 1988~. 
The Ollman case demonstrates that the right to academic 
freedom has limitations. In order to succeed Professor Ollman 
had to prove that antagonism by public officials to his 
political belief was tta substantial or motivating factor" in 
President Tell's decision not to appoint him. This he could 
not prove and consequently he did not succeed to prove that 
the refusal to appoint him was a violation of his first 
amendment right to academic freedom. Constitutional academic 
freedom requires academic decision-makers to justify their 
decisions on properly academic grounds. University 
administrators, like other public officials, are not entitled 
to. penalize employees solely on the grounds of their political 
beliefs or affiliation. For this reason, in Ollman, the 
president carefully explained his decision solely on the 
academic merits of appointing Ollman and disclaimed any 
reliance on his political beliefs. There is no doubt that it 
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is possible to give ne~tral reasons for decisions taken on 
political grounds. Al :.hough these justifications can be 
tested, these tests are not an indefeasible bulwark. They can 
be frustrated. Nevertheless, they serve as a deterrent to a 
number of university officials who might be tempted to violate 
the academic freedom of many professorsm. 
While courts are willing to test the validity of certain 
justifications for the appointment or non-appointment of 
certain academics, courts are not qualified to make decisions 
on the reasonableness of the merits of academic personnel 
decisions to determine that they were made wholly without a 
taint of ideological bias. The extent to which decisions are 
influenced by political ideology is a matter of disputern. 
Courts are sometimes ill-equipped to resolve these disputes. 
This does not mean that the courts cannot competently decide 
easy cases which patently violate academic freedom. Such 
cases, however, are rare. Constitutional academic freedom 
cannot be violated by any personnel decision based upon 
professional competence and taken by peers in good faith 129 • 
Some courts have been concerned that appropriate judicial 
deference to academic decision making "has been pressed beyond 
all reasonable limits". They have consequently cautioned 
against a policy of judicial "self-abnegation where colleges 
are concerned" which has been considered to be "abdication" of 
responsibility to enforce laws protecting individual rights. 
They have emphasized that academic freedom does not include 
the freedom to engage in discrimination in employment or to 
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violate the free speech protected oy the first amendment 130 • 
Even courts that do not express concern look into the factual 
background of academic decisions ~o de~ermine whether a stated 
academic judgment was a pretext131 • 
Given the complexity of academic disputes, it would be 
difficult for a court to separate legitimate from illegitimate 
academic decision-making. The court would lack a guiding 
principle which would enable it to determine which academic 
grounds are compatible with the first amendment and which are 
not. This is so because the only real and acceptable purpose 
for constitutional academic freedom is to protect academic 
values and practices from conformity 
demands. To impose on academic values, 
from the first amendment generally, 
to general social 
principles deduced 
such as those of 
"compelling state interest" or "public forum", would impose on 
academics popular standards of evaluation and acceptable 
discourse which would be totally incompatible with academic 
freedom. It has also been stressed that judges themselves are 
public officials whom academic freedom strives to exclude from 
interfering in academic affairs. It is therefore highly 
likely that judicial views of civil liberty may infringe 
academic principles just as much as legislative or executive 
views of national securitym. 
Rabban, on the other hand, 
that judicial review of 
disagrees strongly with the view 
disputes between professors and 
universities poses an intolerable threat of state interference 
with academic freedom and there is some merit in his view. He 
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points out that Title VII and first amendment cases at 
universities have show:i that judges can respect academic 
expertise and values while determining whether stated academic 
grounds are pretexts for illegal or unconstitutional 
university decision. He, however, concedes that judges should 
not review debates conducted in good faith within universities 
about the merits of unpopular and unconventional ideasm. 
If courts are confronted with claims by faculty members that 
other academics, usually administrators and heads of 
department, have violated their rights to academic freedom, 
all they should establish is whether the administrators 
rejected the candidate in good faith on academic grounds. 
They should not go further to assess whether the stated 
academic grounds are adequate, because no standards of 
adequacy have been or could be established by academic custom 
that are sufficiently accessible to provide a legal standard 
or test 134 • For this reason the courts are limiting their 
inquiries to satisfying themselves that decisions are truly 
academic in character and that they do not violate some 
independent legal norm such as that against racial 
discrimination. In student cases the Supreme Court has held 
that due process does not require a hearing before a student 
is dismissed from a university for academic reasons 135 , 
although a hearing is required before a student is dismissed 
for disciplinary reasons 136 • The court has contended that 
academic judgments are more subjective and evaluative than 
disciplinary judgments. The court has also held that the 
dismissal of a student from a state university on academic 
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grounds does not violate substantive due process if made on 
bona fide academic grounds 137 • "Even though these cases 
neither explore very incisively the checkered nature of 
academic decisions nor admit the difficulty when 
constitutional values clash with one another, they do provide 
the doctrinal basis for a judicial refusal to review most 
internal academic freedom disputes "138 • 
As has been said, it is not advisable that courts should 
subject academic justifications to the usual first amendment 
tests such as demanding that such rationales be sufficiently 
11 compelling 11 to overcome the academic member's presumptive 
right of free expression as such an approach may tend to 
import norms from political society into the academic context. 
Although the government should not penalize citizens for the 
content of their speech, this is not so with scholarly 
writings or speech. Scholars are generally criticized for 
their academic views and they may even be penalized for these 
through denial of tenure or through receiving smaller rises 
than others. But the important point is that this should be 
done by other academics in terms of the academic rules of the 
game. The academic decisions by academic officers are often 
based on negative evaluations of a professor's views. Denial 
of this would mean a denial of the structural principle of 
collective scholarship on which the university is b~sed. For 
this reason academics have evolved a system of academic 
freedom that preserves substantial professional liberty for 
individual scholars without promoting intellectual anarchy. 
It has consequently been said that academic freedom 
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11 encompasses the tensions inherent in individuality and 
conformity, 
hierarchy'.i39 • 
imag:2.nation and coherence, change and 
5.3.5 The supreme court and institutional academic freedom 
That an individual scholar should enjoy academic freedom is 
understandable, but that the academic institution should also 
enjoy the first amendment right of academic freedom has been 
for some difficult to grasp. The concept of institutional 
academic freedom has been regarded as difficult for many to 
accept because it does not appear to be rooted in the 
traditions of the Constitution or of education. What has been 
more puzzling for some is how both parties could rely on 
academic freedom in a dispute between a university and a 
professor. For them it seems incongruous that both the 
university and the individual can be protected by the same 
concept of academic freedom~. 
Prior to the Sweezy case academic freedom was concerned with 
the position of the individual academic and not with the 
position of the institutionw. Institutional academic freedom 
was therefore a creation of the Supreme Court and started with 
the case of Sweezy. The inquiry of the New Hampshire attorney 
general in the Sweezy case was admittedly a threat to both 
Sweezy and the University of New Hampshire as an institution 
as this was also acknowledged by the opinions of the justices. 
Both Warren C J and Frankfurter J stressed the systemic values 
of academic freed om. Frankfurter J even wrote as if the 
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university were the real party to the case, and not Sweezy, to 
whom he ref erred at or.e point as "the witness" instead of 
petitioner1~. Academic freedom is described by Frankfurter J 
not as a limitation on the grounds er procedures by which 
academics may be sanctioned but as "the exclusion of 
governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a 
university" 143 • 
Frankfurter J's long quotation from the plea for free 
universities in South Africa refers primarily to institutional 
freedom. This is evident from the now famous invocation of 
the "four essential freedoms of a university - to determine 
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught and who may be admitted to study" 144 • There is no doubt 
that Frankfurther J was more concerned with the threat of 
McCarthyism to the autonomy of universities, rather than with 
a violation of any individual professor's rights. Yet 
McCarthyism presented a real threat to institutional autonomy 
and Frankfurter's concern with threats to institutional values 
was therefore pertinent~. 
The right to institutional autonomy was further emphasized by 
Justice Powell in Regents of the University of California v 
Bakke146 , Powell J held that although the fourteenth amendment 
and Title VII prohibited any state instrumentality from 
penalizing any applicant on account of his race, the first 
amendment right of academic freedom gave a state university 
power to take race or national origin into account in 
admitting students when doing so in pursuit of the academic 
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goal of a diverse student body. He relied on the fourth of 
Frankfurter J's "four essential freedoms", namely, the right 
of the unive~sity to determine for itself on academic grounds 
who may be admitted to study. He clearly connected ::::-acial 
diversity with the grounds on which the court in Sweezy 
praised academic freedom. As he put it: "The atmosphere of 
'speculation, experiment and creation - so essential to the 
quality of higher education is widely believed to be 
promoted by a diverse student body 11147 • His accommodation 
between constitutional interests in non-discrimination 
generally and the university's right to create a racially 
diverse student body led to a rejection of racial quotas in 
admission but an acceptance of admission criteria that make 
race one factor among many to be taken into account. 
According to the tradition of academic freedom racial 
diversity was never part of the values upholding it. To the 
drafters of the AAUP's 1915 Statement, to benefit a scholar 
because of his race would have been as repulsive in principle 
as to penalize him. According to them scholars could identify 
the best scholars by using criteria as neutral and as divorced 
from social prejudices and aspirations as science itself. 
Moreover, they had little to say about the rights of students, 
who they considered to be of little significance to the search 
for truth. They would also have been puzzled by the 
suggestion that the search for truth at university would have 
been enhanced by ethnic diversity because they held the view 
that truth would be discovered by the disinterested pursuit of 
the scientific method by trained professionals with high 
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intelligence. Race or ethnic origin had nothing to do with 
the satisfaction of these profess~onal criteria1~. 
This does not mean that racial diversity is of no benefit. A 
racially diverse student body may serve more directly the 
academic values of humanism and democracy by contributing so 
the development of a mature cosmopolitan outlook on the part 
of the student by challenging easy ethnocentrici ty. This 
contributes to development of the value of nurturing the 
student to responsible adulthood. This is in accordance with 
the modern view that the college should strive to develop a 
citizen who is capable of living harmoniously with people of 
different backgrounds by understanding that the perspective of 
each is limited but valid149 • 
The value of Bakke to the development of the constitutional 
right of academic freedom has been regarded as limited and 
ambiguous in that in justifying a university's right to give 
weight to the fact that an applicant is not white, Powell J 
rejected the appropriateness of a university promoting social 
mobility for racial minorities and consequently affirmative 
action, but endorsed the universities' desire for a diverse 
student body. Bakke therefore established a constitutional 
right of academic freedom to develop a policy that is 
essentially irrelevant to the tradition of academic freedom 
and the research values from which it stems~. 
The right of institutional academic freedom was taken a step 
further in Widmar v Vincent151 where the Supreme Court declared 
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unconstitutional a regulation of the University of Missouri 
which prohibited student religious groups from holding prayer 
meetings on school property which was otherwise generally 
available to student organizations. This the university had 
done because it had erroneously believed that the 
establishment clause required such a prohibition. Stevens J 
questioned the court's statement that the University required 
a compelling interest to justify content-based discrimination 
against the students' religious speech. He contended that to 
require a university to justify the regulation with a 
compelling interest might interfere with the university's 
academic freedom to distinguish between academically valuable 
and relatively worthless speech. He further stated that 
substantive decisions of university administrators deserve to 
be protected as academic freedom because they are necessary 
and appropriate in creating the atmosphere of a university. 
The view of Stevens J has been regarded as recognizing that 
academic speech requires social support, that the efforts of 
scholars to advance knowledge and train the youth require 
social structures which support these goals. Through its 
administration, a university makes choices about admissions, 
hiring and expenditures which shape its educational character 
and mission. The core academic administrative decisions of 
determining who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught and who may be admitted to study cannot be interfered 
with by civil authorities without impairing the unique virtues 
of academic speech. Stevens J found this administrative 
liberty to be limited by the principle that the university 
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cannot punish a speaker on the grounds that it disagrees with 
his viewpoint:. 152 • 
In Regents of the University of Michiaan v Ewinorn ~he Supreme 
Court accepted that the university is entitled take 
academic administrative decisions into which the courts will 
not interfere. The court rejected a claim by a medical school 
student that his dismissal from medical school for academic 
reasons violated substantive process because it 
represented an arbitrary departure from a past policy of 
leniency. As Stevens J put it: 
"When judges are asked to review the substance 
of a genuinely academic decision, such as this 
one, they should show great respect for the 
faculty's professional judgement. Plainly, 
they may not override it unless it is such a 
substantial departure from accepted academic 
norms as to demonstrate that the person or 
committee responsible did not actually 
exercise professional judgement" ™ 
Stevens J based this refusal to meddle with academic decisions 
both on lack of judicial standards and on academic freedom: 
"Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and 
uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but 
also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous 
decision-making by the academy itself "w. The Court found 
that academic freedom provided the necessary justification for 
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incerpreting a constitutional provision as not restricting the 
discretion of academic decision-make~s. 
Although it has been said that institutional academic freedom 
is not based on constitutional or educational tradition and 
that there is no precedent on which the Sweezy case and others 
relied for the creation of this right, it does not mean that 
there is no historical justification for institutional 
academic freedom. As discussed earlier, European universities 
of the Middle Ages enjoyed extensive autonomy from both church 
and state 1~. The corporate autonomy which they had resulted 
in free teaching and scholarship. American colleges and 
universities were practically free from government control 
especially since the de-establishment of the state churches in 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. Throughout the 
balance of the nineteenth century, and until the Second World 
War, private universities received virtually no state or 
federal support and were not subjected to many governmentally-
imposed legal duties. Even some state universities were 
placed beyond the control of the political branches of state 
government by constitutional enactments and judicial 
interpretation. The autonomy of universities was therefore 
legally protected. During the nineteenth century, American 
law came to recognize two legal bases for university autonomy. 
These are the common-law idea of academic abstention and state 
constitutional status for state universities1~. 
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5.3.6 Academic abstention 
Academic abstention refers to the traditional refusal of 
courts to extend common law rules of liability to colleges 
where doing so would interfere with the college 
administration's performance of its core functions in good 
and rationale of judicial faith. The practical effect 
abnegation are demonstrated in the early and influential case 
of People ex rel. Pratt v Wheaton College158 where a student 
suspended for belonging to a secret society, sought to be 
reinstated by the courts. After noting the reasonableness of 
a rule prohibiting secret societies, the court explained the 
proper relationship between courts and colleges: 
"But whether the rule be judicious or not, it 
violates neither good morals nor the law of 
the land and is therefore clearly within the 
power of the college authorities to make and 
enforce. A discretionary power has been given 
them to regulate the discipline of their 
college in such a manner as they deem proper, 
and so long as their rules violate neither 
divine or human law, we have no more authority 
to inter£ ere than we have to control the 
domestic discipline of a father in his 
family" 159 • 
The recognition of authority over internal affairs and the 
exclusion of judicial intervention in internal university 
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matters go together. They amour.c to a substantial degree of 
common-law autonomy. 
not prevail against 
Although such common-law autonomy could 
statutes, the fact that few statutes 
affecting universities existed made this an insignificant 
limitation. Most cases that involved some idea of academic 
abstention involve complaints by students against college 
discipline or application of academic standards. Academic 
abstention was also invoked in earlier cases where members of 
faculty complained about dismissal even where they claimed a 
violation of their academic freedom. Although these cases are 
regarded as belonging to "a dark age of faculty dependence", 
they also represent a positive freedom against state control. 
Now· that most universities voluntarily defend the academic 
freedom of their fa cul ties, these cases assume greater 
importance160 • 
Although there is no coherent rationale for cases concerning 
academic abstention, one rationale is that the breadth of the 
responsibility which a university bears in disciplining 
students in loco parentis requires broad powers. Although 
this rationale is no longer regarded as relevant, there are 
other two rationales that seem more relevant to contemporary 
higher education. According to one of these, the courts 
perceive the college or university as a separate realm which 
pursues values different from those of society as a whole. In 
this way it is seen as striving for collegial, pedagogical or 
disciplinary models of personal relations that avoid 
competition. The courts have felt that offering a legal 
remedy for a complaint in those cases will vitiate the 
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consensus of value or proced'tlre within the ins ti tut ion. 
Judges have also fe~.t t!-1at they are !10t competent to evaluate 
the merits of academic decisions™. 
Although the common-law notion of academic abstention may seem 
anachronistic in this modern age, there is no doubt that the 
judicial attitudes embodied therein still persist in similar 
forms. A number of cases demonstrate the judicial deference 
to preserving the discretion of academics that is not seen in 
cases not involving academics. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly warned federal judges against interfering with the 
discretion of academics either on substantive or procedural 
grounds where they make bona fide academic decisions162 • 
Courts have also limited constitutional rights to preserve 
academic values. For this reason universities have been 
regarded as proceeding on assumptions different from society 
as a whole and that an insistence by courts or conforming to 
legal standards or procedures is likely to destroy something 
that is valuable in higher education. 
right of institutional academic freedom 
collateral descendent of the common-law 
The constitutional 
appears to be a 
idea of academic 
abstention163 • Institutional academic freedom can therefore be 
regarded as academic abstention elevated to constitutional 
status164 • 
5.3.7 State constitutional law 
The second source for constitutional academic freedom is found 
in state constitutional provisions which endow state 
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universities with the stat~s of being separate branches of 
government. These previsions can b'e~'tound in several state 
constitutions. The states which have attempted and to some 
extent succeeded in conferring constitutional status on one or 
more of their universities are Michigan, Minnesota, 
California, Colorado, Idaho, Georgia and Oklahoma. Less 
successful in their attempts because the apparent 
constitutional status is heavily qualified by court decisions 
attorneys generals' opinions, or long-established practice are 
Alabama, Arizona and Nevada 165 • The provisions granting 
constitutional status either expressly or impliedly limit the 
power of the state legislature from interfering with the 
internal decision-making process of the university even though 
the university is supported by state appropriations. For this 
reason state courts in various states have held state statutes 
unconstitutional because they reflect attempts by state 
legislatures to interfere with academic decision making166 • 
Rabban167 disputes that the fact that a few states have 
constitutionally provided for university autonomy should be 
regarded as suggesting that similar protection should be read 
into the first amendment 168 • 
The State of Michigan was the first to enact the 
constitutional provision for the separate government of its 
state universities in 1850 169 • The courts gave extensive 
interpretation to the provision. The current provision gives 
the elected Board of Regents of the University of Michigan 
"general supervision of i~s institution and the control and 
direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds 1'°. 
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The courts in Mic.tigan 1:ave consistently construed the 
provision as prohibitin3 all attempts by the legislature to 
interfere with the academic management of the university. This 
gave the university more autonomy. Consequently the courts 
have declared unconstitutional legislative efforts to compel 
appointments to faculty positions 1n, to control the location 
of departmentsm, to determine the percentage of out-of-state 
students 173 , to penalize student radicals and to require 
di vest i ture of securities related to South Africa174 • Even 
attempts by the legislature to tie substantive conditions to 
specific appropriations have been set aside when found to 
interfere with general operations of the University175 • The 
courts have, however, upheld statutes regulating the financial 
practices of the universities and its relations with employees 
where neither of the regulations significantly affected 
academic valuesrn. In this way the courts have construed the 
grant of authority to the regents as "a flexible prohibition 
against legislature meddling, permit ting the courts to 
determine whether a statute interferes with the university's 
autonomy over core academic issues "177 • 
Although some states provide for the autonomy, the rationale 
for provisions such as that of Michigan's is to improve the 
quality of the state university by protecting it from 
political interference and manipulation. When Michigan 
constitutionalized institutional autonomy in 1850: it did that 
against "a history of frustrating failure to establish 
respectable state universities in America" . A Michigan 
legislative report of 1840 stated "thus has State after State, 
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in this American Union, endowed uni v«::rs it ies, and then, by 
repeated contradiction and over legislation, torn them to 
pieces with the same facility as they would do the statute 
book, and for the same reason, because they have the right"m. 
It proved quite difficult for people to control a learned and 
intellectually elite institution without destroying values 
that they as a group could not comprehend or share. The 
legislature was perceived as managing the university for 
practical political ends, rather than for long-term scholarly 
and educational objectives. "The solution adopted the 
election for eight year terms of officials responsible only 
for university governance was an ingenious innovation, 
accommodating conflicting values and fostering a university 
known and admired throughout the world 11179 • 
This solution made use of the traditional American 
constitutional device of separation of powers. The Michigan 
constitution gives power for different purposes to both the 
regents and the legislature. Although their powers may to 
some extent overlap, the regents have certain core powers over 
their internal academic administration of the university which 
the legislature cannot usurp. The courts have enforced this 
division in order to protect the values for which the division 
was made, "even in the absence of an express judicial role in 
restraining legislative intrusions". In this way the courts 
protect those academic values that the legislature might be 
expected to violate™. Not all the states have, of course, 
been as successful as Michigan in having the status they 
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sought to confer by the constitution upon their universities 
recognized by the courts and commentators as autonomous181 • 
The tradition of constitutional autonomy for state 
universities seems to have contributed to the development of 
the federal right of institutional academic freedom. It is 
regarded as affirming the persistence of the view, "inherent 
in academic abstention, that civil authorities ought to 
respect the special needs and values of universities, even 
when erected and supported by the state 11182 • Institutional 
autonomy has also been considered as assisting to explain why 
federal courts seek to protect administrative decisions not 
related directly to speech or exchange of ideas. These state 
constitutional provisions recognize that political control 
over academic administration may forestall the attainment of 
educational and scholarly excellence. Protecting these 
administrative actions on the basis of separation of powers 
makes this seem less anomalous. The state constitutional law 
also explains why federal courts have not doubted that the 
federal right of academic freedom protects state as well as 
private universities. Both have traditionally enjoyed 
autonomy from political interference183 • 
Seen in this light, academic abstention and constitutional 
autonomy can be regarded as precursors of the modern federal 
constitutional protection of institutional autonomy. This 
modern development has been regarded as an adaptation of 
traditional legal rules and judicial attitudes to the 
contemporary legal environment. 11 In this legal environment, 
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universities are subject both to numerous civil norms from 
which they formerly were exempt ana to extensive statutory and 
administrative regulation"™. From 1945, universities have 
educated a far higher percentage of the American population 
for participation in an increasingly complex society and 
economy. This has been increasingly funded by federal and 
state governments which in turn have sought to ensure 
university assistance in fulfilling social and economic goals. 
Statutes and regulations concerning hiring, advancement, 
admissions, financial aid, student records and many other 
operations have been enacted. Courts have insisted that some 
civil rights of individual members be respected by public 
universities. These have greatly complicated relations 
between political officials and universities, "drawing the 
latter out of their prior social position"™. 
Constitutional academic freedom can therefore be regarded as a 
principle which precludes regulation from proceeding so far as 
to deprive the university of control over its academic 
destiny. This principle has been developed by courts which 
have also explained why they restrain themselves from imposing 
far-reaching constitutional or common-law duties on the 
university. "As such it represents academic abstention raised 
to a constitutional level. There, it generates force 
comparable to other constitutional norms, such as due 
process"~. The principle can also be directed to legislatures 
and administrative agencies, and it prohibits them from 
reducing the university "to a passive instrument of political 
or utilitarian calculation". For this reason courts have 
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embedded institutional autonomy im:o the federal constitution 
through judicial construction, nproviding to qualifying 
universities rights against the federal governments long 
enjoyed against state government by universities with state 
constitutional status". 
To recognize this legal develooment is important for 
clarifying the right of academic freedom. For this reason it 
has been contended that the Supreme Court's move to protect 
the institution as a whole should not be viewed as a 
perversion of rights, "based upon an erroneous development of 
Frankfurter's language in his Sweezy concurrence. Nor does it 
represent confusion between property and free speech rights". 
Constitutionalizing academic freedom has not been regarded as 
involving the absorption of a non-legal norm developed by 
faculty activists, but rather as an adaptation of the 
traditional legal supports of the college to preserve 
intellectual independence for the modern university. Academic 
abstention and institutional autonomy have been regarded as 
persisting because they are the legal structures universities 
have developed that most fully recognize the distinctiveness 
of higher education. When confronted by laws that threatened 
this distinctiveness by insisting that the university enter 
completely into the mainstream of democratic culture, courts 
have turned to familiar legal structures originally developed 
in order to prevent political demands from engulfing academic 
values 187 • 
5.3.8 
439. 
Institutional academic freedom and the first 
amend:ment 
Despite the preceding account it could still be contended that 
the whole development has been mistaken and illegitimatem. 
This is entirely understandable as it cannot even be claimed 
that the founders intended to provide any constitutional 
status for higher education. Even if universities should be 
granted constitutional status, there is still a need to 
explain why this may be achieved legitimately through judicial 
interpretation. It could also be disputed that universities 
merit protection from democratic decision making or that they 
espouse values not sufficiently represented in the political 
process189 • 
Notwithstanding these objections it has been contended 
correctly, it is submitted, that constitutional protection of 
academic freedom is justified. This protection is regarded as 
compatible with the first amendment because it protects 
academic values that are compatible with first amendment 
values. The university is regarded as the pre-eminent 
institution in society where knowledge and understanding are 
pursued with detachment or disinterestedness 1'l0. The reasoning 
behind this is that disinterested scholarship and research are 
both good in themselves and benefit society. The 
disinterested search for knowledge promotes a type of 
discourse that is careful, critical and ambitious; society 
needs this. The method of discourse is both a good in itself 
and a benefit to society. While it may be regarded as 
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pleasant to participate in discussio:::: that is intelligent, 
human and to the point, a more importa!lt consideration is that 
scholarly discourse creates the most favourable environment 
where thinkers may formulate ideas that are distinguishable 
from popular opinion or fashionable error. Moreover, 
disinterested and expert thought is also crucial to society as 
a whole because it provides "a standard by which to gauge how 
trivial, debased and false is much public discussion of 
affairs "191 • It is imperative to gain perspective on the mass 
of "information that pours from the print and electronic 
media, drivel that so often merely flatters the ignorance and 
cupidity of its audience" 192 • As Byrne states it "it is 
important to keep vital the possibility of free intellectual 
excellence lest we become lost to technically-proficient 
barbarism" 193 • 
Another value is that the university seeks to instil in those 
who enter adulthood an ability for mature and independent 
judgment. The ingredients of this liberal education, which 
are of ten revised and challenged, inform the student of the 
knowledge valued from the past, convey the methodological 
elements of critical thought and promote the ability to think 
independently and creatively. 
itself, is both pleasant and 
Liberal education is good in 
virtuous, and necessary to 
provide competent leadership in a complex, technocratic and 
democratic society~. 
While a university is also responsible for training young 
people of different intellectual abilities and social 
backgrounds to be competent workers and good citizens, and 
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also conducting research that supports an economically-
beneficial rate of technological growth, it is, however, the 
engagement of learning in the arts and sciences which requires 
unrestricted debate over issues that gives life to higher 
education both in scholarship and in teaching. Moreover, the 
nature and value of liberal studies justifies constitutional 
limits on legislative control while those of practical studies 
do not. Liberal studies have been regarded as central to the 
American idea of the free individual. They have also been 
regarded as necessary for the exchange of ideas which are 
protected by the first amendment and they are always subject 
to threats from majorities. The vision of a democratic 
people, freely and prudently choosing their institutions is 
indispensable to both liberal and classical explanations of 
the virtues of the American Constitution1~. 
Liberal education has also been regarded as being responsible 
for teaching students how to adjust to the clash of opposing 
views by developing an individual perspective based on a just 
appreciation of facts. Some aspects of this analysis can be 
found in Brennan J's opinion in the Keyishian case where he 
stated that 11 ( t) he Nation's future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas 
which discovers truth 11 out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) 
than through any kind of authoritative selection 11196 • Civic 
and educational aims have a common purpose which is to enhance 
the citizens' capacity to exercise reason and judgment freely. 
The critical and informed discourse of a free university might 
be regarded as a "transcendent value 11197 which provides a 
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symbol of reasoned exchange that stands slightly above the 
contentions of political lifem. 
The free exchange of ideas which the first amendment supports 
has to result in insight and understanding of issues rather 
than in 11 manipulati ve persuasion or interpretive ranting". 
The development of a field of knowledge through reasoned 
debate and the advancement of a student to a critical 
perspective are among the most important and fruitful forms of 
expressive activities. This may be the reason behind Brennan 
J's statement that the "classroom is peculiarly the 
marketplace of ideas 11199 • 
It is not the legislative majorities that can effectively 
protect liberal studies, largely because scholarship and 
liberal education are a pursuit of a minority which has an 
inclination to sacrifice immediate material gains for the 
pursuit of knowledge. Constitutional academic freedom can 
only be advanced by judges because they are well qualified by 
background, insulated from political and economic pressures 
and acquainted with constitutional norms to perceive the 
special values of a university and to protect them from 
legislation. The judicial elaboration of academic abstention 
has demonstrated that judges have a high regard for higher 
education. They have also shown themselves willing to 
accommodate civic constitutional norms, such as due process, 
with legitimate needs of academic institutions. It was also 
the judiciary that developed constitutional academic freedom. 
The preservation of the fundamental academic values of 
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disinterested inquiry, reasoned and critical discourse and 
liberal education has been regarded as justifying a 
constitutional right of academic freedom. These objectives 
give intellectual and educational expression to the vision of 
human reason implicit in the Constitution. The emphasis on 
liberal studies has also been regarded as providing limits to 
the scope of constitutional protection. For this reason it 
has been suggested that constitutional academic freedom should 
not protect institutions that resemble universities but which 
do not pursue genuine liberal studies and universities that do 
not respect the academic freedom of professors or the 
essential intellectual freedom of students. The reasoning 
behind this is that they so deviate from the values that 
justify institutional academic freedom that they should lose 
their immunity from judicial review. This would therefore 
reduce fears that institutional academic freedom would cloak 
extensive violations of professors' academic freedom by 
institutions inclined towards intellectual orthodoxy200 • Yet 
this may be easier said than done as universities continue to 
violate individual academic freedom and many of these 
violations take place at universities that ordinarily respect 
individual academic freedom201 • 
These limitations have been regarded as capable of reducing, 
although not eliminating, the tension between institutional 
autonomy and faculty autonomy. It is nonetheless important to 
consider some of the possible tensions between individual and 
institutional academic freedom. 
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5.3.9 Individual versus institutional academic freedom 
Initially 11 individual 11 and "inst:i t:utional" definitions of 
academic freedom seemed complementary and no tension was 
perceived between the two. The AAUP' s first Supreme Court 
brief on academic freedom emphasized that university autonomy 
is a necessary condition for the academic freedom of 
professors20~. The growth of litigation by students and 
professors against universities since 1960 has demonstrated 
the tension between individual and institutional academic 
freedom. Administrators and trustees have frequently raised 
the defence of institutional academic freedom "not as an 
additional layer of protection for professors against the 
state, but as a bar to judicial review of claims against 
universities by professors alleging institutional violations 
of individual academic freedom~. 
There is no doubt that the Court's new exposition of academic 
freedom in the form of institutional autonomy contains some 
anomalies. The reason for this is that the traditional notion 
of academic freedom entails the protection of an individual 
scholar from institutional interference, whereas 
constitutional academic freedom as evolved by the Supreme 
Court protects principally and expressly a first amendment 
right of the university itself from government interference in 
the performance of core educational functions. A further 
problem is that the first amendment does not expressly protect 
institutional decision making which is so indirectly related 
to expression as student admissions or faculty hiring. It may 
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be difficult to poin~ out what speech a university is making 
as an institution apart from tha~ of individual academics, 
students and administrators~. 
Although the Sweezy case constitutionalized academic freedom 
on the basis of first amendment values of critical inquiry and 
the search for knowledge to protect the independence of both 
professors and universities from state intervention, a 
distinctive conception of institutional academic freedom 
remained largely latent throughout the McCarthy-era cases. 
This was due to the fact that these cases involved state 
actions against individual lecturers and professors and not 
direct conflicts between individuals and universities. In 
more recent times, universities have invoked an institutional 
right of academic freedom to defend themselves both against 
the state and against students, professors and members of the 
general public. These cases have led to the courts' 
reconsidering the institutional component of academic 
freedom205 • 
The opinions of the courts did not concentrate on 
institutional academic freedom until 1978 when Powell J in 
Regents of the University of California v Bakke2~ reiterated 
that "academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated 
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special 
concern of the First Amendment". He stated that "'the four 
essential freedoms' of a university", identified in the South 
African statement quoted at length by Frankfurter J in $weezy 
constitute academic freedom. According to the statement a 
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university must be able "to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught and who may be admitted to study". This statement was 
quoted from Sweezv again in Widmar v Vincent 207 • These 
freedoms seem to embrace appointment, promotion, tenuring and 
termination of academic staff as well as curriculum, pedagogy 
and student admissions. By recognizing a university's 
constitutional academic freedom to select a diverse student 
body within the limits of the fourteenth amendment, Powell J's 
opinion in Bakke reinforced the inclusion of student 
admissions within institutional academic freedom~. 
In the Widmar case Powell J may have suggested a fifth 
freedom, "the right of the University to make academic 
judgements as to how best to allocate scarce resources 11209 • 
Because the availability of financial resources obviously 
influences hiring practices, curriculum, pedagogy and 
admission policies, Powell J thoughtfully injected into the 
discussion the reality that the range of managerial decisions 
for any one institution depends upon its resources210 • In 
doing this he demonstrated that the concept of institutional 
academic freedom is elastic and can include more elements 
concerned with the management of a university. Despite the 
earlier developments, a few lat.er cases have demonstrated the 
tensions that exist between individual and institutional 
academic freedom. 
The cases of Princeton University v Schmid211 and of University 
of Pennsylvania v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission212 
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illustrate the conflicts that sometimes arise between 
individual 
and institutio~al academic freedom. It will be 
necessary to analyse these 
determine their significance. 
cases in some detail and to 
The case of Schmid arose when Sch~id, a member of the United 
States Labour Party who had no affiliation with the 
university, distributed and sold on the campus material 
dealing with the party and the mayoral campaign in nearby 
Newark contrary to the Princeton regulations which prohibited 
any person without a university connection or sponsorship from 
entering the campus to solicit support or contributions. For 
this Schmid was arrested and convicted of trespass. The case 
generated an important debate about the meaning of 
institutional academic freedom. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey overturned Schmid' s 
conviction. In doing this it relied on the free speech 
provision of the state constitution. It held that the free 
speech rights in the New Jersey Constitution are enforceable 
against private as well as public bodies. The court al so 
recognized that the New Jersey Constitution protects ownership 
of private property. It therefore considered its task as that 
of balancing Princeton's property rights against Schmid' s 
expressive rights. 
In analyzing these competing interests, the court referred to 
Princeton's own regulations which emphasized the importance of 
free inquiry and free speech in achieving the university's 
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declared purpose of promoting kn~wledge. The court found that 
Schmid's presence on campus was entirely consonant with the 
University's expressed educational mission. While the court 
was prepared to concede that needs, implicating academic 
freedom and development, justify an educational institution in 
controlling those who seek entry into its domain, and require 
substantive judicial deference to university autonomy and 
self-governance, it reversed Schmid' s conviction because 
Princeton's regulations contained no reasonable standards 
relating to limitations on expressive freedoms to legitimate 
educational goals. 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Princeton 
complained that its academic freedom protected by the first 
amendment was violated when the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
arrogated to itself the ancient right of a university 
community to determine how its educational philosophy m~y best 
be implemented. A private university's choice of educational 
philosophy, as Princeton further contended, however broad, 
orthodox, or eccentric, is rendered immune to state 
interference by the first amendment academic freedom. It 
insisted that no governmental body is constitutionally 
entitled to determine whether a private university has acted 
in accordance with its educational objectives. While 
Princeton conceded that the university cannot claim its 
academic freedom as a shield against state rules concerning 
health, safety and similar matters, it also immediately added 
correspondingly that the state cannot use its police powers to 
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control in any way ir:.tel1ectual activities of the 
university. 
Princeton further asserted that first amendment academic 
freedom provides greater protection to private than public 
universities. While the educational judgments of public 
universities, like those of private universities, are 
protected against interference from other entities, public 
universities, are also subject to the constraints on all 
government action imposed by the prohibition in the first and 
fourteenth amendments against the state's adoption of a 
particular religious or ideological viewpoint. Princeton 
maintained that private universities, by contrast, are 
absolutely unrestrained in their choice of educational 
philosophy. As it further contended, the interrelation of 
expressive and property rights, meant that control by 
universities over their property helped to provide an 
educational atmosphere conducive to learning and to the 
interchange of ideas between faculty and students. 
Princeton briefly mentioned that the first amendment protects 
the free speech of professors at public universities from 
state interference. It added in a footnote that academic 
freedom is especially important to those who teach as well as 
to the institutions at which they teach, be they public or 
private. It continued to make clear its own commitment to the 
freedom of its faculty and students to pursue kpowledge in 
their own way without interference by governmental or other 
authority. 
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The argument by Princeton University to the United States 
Supreme Court elicited strong objections from many of its 
faculty members especially those with a professional interest 
in constitutional law. Faculty members persuaded the 
administration not to proceed with the prosecution of Schmid, 
and contended that the decision to prosecute, rather than 
involving purely a matter of administrative discretion, posed 
a policy issue in which the entire university community should 
be involved213 • 
Many professors were concerned that the broad immunity from 
judicial scrutiny claimed by Princeton would give any private 
university unreviewable discretion to restrict the academic 
freedom of its faculty. This distorted concept of academic 
freedom advocated by Princeton was criticized by faculty 
members as posing a far greater threat to intellectual life in 
universities than either Schmid's activities or the decision 
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
of trustees simply asserting 
This could lead to boards 
that faculty ideas are 
incompatible with the university's educational purposes. 
Other faculty members feared that private universities invoke 
institutional academic freedom to preclude judicial review of 
administrative decisions to dismiss a professor doing 
controversial research, to determine the content of courses, 
to revise the grades assigned by faculty to students, and to 
revoke tenure without cause. Professors criticized Princeton 
for confusing its 
faculty's academic 
own institutional 
freedom and stated 
autonomy with 
that to grant 
the 
the 
immunity sought by the university would violate the 
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fundamental principle that no person or institution is above 
the law214 • 
The AAUP was similarly critical o: Princeton in its amicus 
brief to the Supreme Court. It contended that Princeton's 
novel and sweeping claims which combined institutional 
autonomy and academic freedom, if accepted, would effectively 
insulate private universities from any government scrutiny. 
It stressed that although academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy are related, they are essentially different concepts. 
Academic freedom, the AAUP continued, is a scholar's right to 
be free of institutional or governmental control in 
professional utterance, whereas institutional autonomy can be 
derived from academic freedom in the sense that university 
autonomy from external control may be necessary to protect its 
educational functions, including the functions of professors 
covered by academic freedom. Institutional autonomy, however, 
also relates to the general control of private property, 
traditionally protected by the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment which is not different when the property 
owner is a university, the corporate owner of a shopping 
centre, or an individual. The AAUP felt that Princeton made a 
fundamental error by failing to distinguish between these two 
very different forms of institutional autonomy. Only when a 
university's claims of institutional autonomy relate to its 
educational functions, is academic freedom at stake. This was 
not the case with Princeton215 • According to the AAUP, 
Princeton's broad claim of institutional academic freedom 
would effectively preclude judicial review of institutional 
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decisions even in cases where the rights or interests of the 
faculty might be adverse to the institution 1 s administration. 
Princeton disputed this™. 
5.3.10 Institutional autonomy and tenure cases 
Another instance which has demonstrated the tension between 
institutional academic freedom and individual academic freedom 
is that of peer review for tenure. As stated earlier, tenure 
in the United States is regarded as an essential element of 
academic f reedom217 • In order to acquire tenure, professors 
have to be subjected to peer review. For this the university 
depends on the candid views of other professors in the field 
concerned. To be effective these views are regarded as 
conf idential218 • The question that has been posed in a few 
cases is whether an academic who has been denied tenure can 
compel the university to disclose the peer reviews if the 
denial is regarded as motivated by discrimination based on sex 
or race. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964219 prohibits 
discrimination in employment because of race, colour, 
religion, sex or national origin. Although universities were 
originally excluded from the application of the provisions of 
Title VII, Congress removed that exclusion in 1972, thereby 
bringing universities within the ambit of Title vrr 220 • 
Congress realised that the university was equally likely to 
discriminate as any other employer. Congress found 
discrimination in the academic community even more disturbing 
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than in other areas because of the effect on the nation's 
youth221 • 
Since these two different histor~cal progressions converged in 
1972, confrontation between the university, with its concerns 
for confidentiality and autonomy, and the enforcement of Title 
VII were unavoidable. The question has been whether the 
university's desire for confidentiality and autonomy should 
trump the social goal of eradicating discrimination or, 
whether Title VI I concerns should prevail over university 
concerns often presented as cases of academic freedom~. 
In the case of Brown v Trustees of Boston University223, Julia 
Prewett Brown sued Boston University claiming breach of 
contract and violation of Title VII after being denied tenure. 
A jury found that the university had breached the 
antidiscrimination provision of its collective bargaining 
agreement. The district court then applied the jury's finding 
of sex discrimination to the other claims and ordered monetary 
damages, enjoined the university from discriminating against 
Brown and awarded tenure to Brown~. 
In arriving at this decision Campbell C J emphasized that in 
tenure cases courts must take special care to preserve the 
university's autonomy in making lawful tenure decisions. 
These decisions necessarily hinge on subjective judgments 
regarding the applicant's academic excellence, teaching 
ability, creativity, contributions to the university 
community, rapport with the students and colleagues,· and other 
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factors that are not susceptible of quantitative measurement. 
In the absence of discrimination, a university must be given a 
free hand in making such tenure decisions. 
While the Chief Judge was prepared to concede this, he also 
pointed out that an employee's ~ight not to be denied tenure 
for discriminatory reasons, prevents insulating the tenure 
process from any judicial review. As in other forms of 
employment, an inference of discrimination can be construed 
from a demonstration that a university's given reasons for 
denying tenure to the plaintiff were obviously weak or 
implausible or that the tenure standards for prevailing at the 
tenure decisions were manifestly unequally applied. The 
essential words were "obviously" and "manifestly''. A court 
may not simply substitute its own views concerning the 
plaintiff's qualifications for those of the properly 
instituted authorities; the evidence must be of such strength 
and quality as to permit a reasonable finding that the denial 
of tenure was "obviously" or "manifestly" unsupported225 • 
The Supreme Court also addressed the tension between 
confidentiality for evaluators and Title VII discovery rights 
in University of Pennsylvania v Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commissionn6 • The university's argument, as restated by the 
court, was that the first amendment is infringed by disclosure 
of peer review materials because disclosure undermines the 
confidentiality which is central to the peer review process, 
and this in turn is central to the tenure process, which in 
turn is the means by which the university seeks to exercise 
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its asserted academic-freedom right:. of choosing who will 
teach. Disclosure therefore has a chilling effect on peer 
reviews and frustrates the objective of candour which 
confidentiality ensures. 
Rosalie Tung alleged that she was denied tenure by the 
University of Pennsylvania on the basis of her race, sex and 
national origin - in violation of her Title VII rights. Tung 
did not officially receive a reason for her lack of success. 
She learned unofficially, however, that the Wharton School's 
lack of interest in China-related research was why the 
Personnel Committee recommended against her becoming tenured. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") 
subpoenaed confidential letters written by Tung's evaluators, 
the department chairman's evaluation and other documents 
reflecting the deliberations of the faculty committees 
participating in the tenuring process. The subpoena also 
sought comparable portions of the personnel files of five 
males who had been granted tenure, in order to consider Tung's 
allegations that they were equally or less qualified than her. 
The University of Pennsylvania and a number of amici relied on 
a first amendment claim of constitutional academic freedom in 
asking the Supreme Court to recognize a special privilege 
against disclosure of confidential peer review materials to 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Title VI I 
cases. This special privilege could equally apply to a claim 
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that a university imperrnissibly denied appointment or tenure 
in violation of a faculty member's academic freedom. 
Although various federal circuit courts had previously held in 
Title VII cases that constitutional academic freedom requires 
a qualified privilege against disclosure217 as a test balancing 
academic freedom and educational excellence on the one hand 
and individual rights to fair consideration on the other, the 
Third Circuit expressly declined to limit the EEOC's subpoena 
authority to accommodate an academic institution's 
constitutional right to academic freedom. Although the court 
conceded that such disclosure would burden the tenure review 
process and would impact on academic freedom, it rejected both 
qualified privilege and a balancing test because they would 
allow universities to hide evidence of discrimination behind a 
wall of secrecy. 
The University of Pennsylvania complained that the Third 
Circuit failed to consider its first amendment interest in 
institutional academic freedom because a confidential system 
of peer review is essential to determining "who may teach", 
which is one of the core components of first amendment 
academic freedom identified by Frankfurter J in Sweezy. While 
the university readily acknowledged that the EEOC and 
individual litigants might in certain circumstances have 
access to confidential peer review documents in order to 
promote the compelling state interest of eliminating 
employment discrimination, it objected to the Third Circuit's 
automatic disclosure rule which did not give any weight to 
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university interests in academic freedom, and required 
disclosure of confidential material simply on the filing of a 
complaint. The university felt that the party who sought such 
material should have to demonstrate specific reasons for 
disclosure that would outweigh the first amendment interest in 
confidentiality shared by universities and the professors who 
participate in peer review228. 
The AAUP also disagreed with the Third Circuit. It saw a 
precise analogy between EEOC investigations of tenure files 
and the investigations into the contents of university 
lectures conducted by legislative committees concerned about 
communist subversion during the McCarthy era. While the AAUP 
was of the opinion that the court should not immunize 
universities from government scrutiny, it also felt that it 
should strike a balance between the competing investigative 
and academic interests. The A.~UP also took pains to point out 
that the University of Pennsylvania did not pose any tension 
between the academic freedom of the university and the 
academic freedom of the faculty. It emphasized that by giving 
the faculty primary responsibility for the tenure decision, 
the university was pursuing a traditional and well-justified 
academic policy that merited first amendment protectionm. 
The government's brief unequivocally denied that the Third 
Circuit's decision interfered with academic freedom in any 
way. While conceding that prior Supreme Court decisions had 
not clarified the definition of constitutional academic 
freedom, the government was prepared to accept that it 
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included the university's choice cf professors. Yet it 
emphasized that Sweezv itself extended this freedom only to 
decisions made "on academic grounds". According to the 
government, university decisions relating to employment 
motivated by the kind of invidious discrimination prohibited 
by Title VII are not made "on academic grounds 11 and are thus 
not entitled to constitutional protection. It further 
asserted that individual faculty members have a countervailing 
academic freedom interest in being evaluated on the basis of 
their professional performance. The EEOC investigations of 
peer review decisions determine only whether these decisions 
are based on academic considerations or on discriminatory ones 
and thereby reinforce rather than undermine the appropriate 
tradition of judicial deference to university decision making. 
Moreover, the government observed that when it removed the 
exemption of universities from Title VII in 1972, Congress 
rejected the contentions that EEOC investigations would 
violate academic freedom by interfering in the selection and 
promotion of faculty members~. 
The Supreme Court rejected the University of Pennsylvania's 
first amendment claim and accepted the government's position. 
The court distinguished cases such as Sweezy and Keyishian as 
being cases that involved direct governmental restrictions on 
the content of speech and on the right of the university to 
determine who may teach. Unlike Keyishian, where the 
government attempted to substitute its employment criteria for 
those of the university, the EEOC left the University of 
Pennsylvania free to select and apply its own standards as 
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long as they did not violate the proscriptions against 
employment discrimination in Title VII. Although the court 
was prepared to concede that the precise contours of its prior 
academic freedom decisions remained undefined, it considered 
itself fortunate in not having to provide additional guidance 
because the University of Pennsylvania required only the 
rejection of the expanded right of academic freedom to protect 
confidential peer review materials from disclosure. The court 
concluded that the university's concerns about the impact of 
disclosure on academic freedom were extremely attenuated 
remote and speculative. This it did while it expressed its 
continued support for judicial deference to legitimate 
academic decision making. 
The court granted relief in University of Pennsylvania because 
of what might be thought of as a conflict in approach, between 
the Third Circuit's decision in EEOC v Franklin and Marshall 
College~' and what was held in EEOC v University of Notre Dame 
du Lac232 • In Notre Dame, the court found a qualified academic 
freedom privilege, which allowed the university to redact the 
name, address, institutional affiliation and any other 
identifying features of the reporting scholar. 
franklin and Marshall is distinguishable from Notre Dame in 
that while redaction in the former took place as a result of a 
district court order, Notre Dame voluntarily produced redacted 
files to the EEOC. There is apparent agreement in these cases 
on the stage at which or the circumstances under which the 
evaluators must be identified in the course of EEOC 
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investigations. The conflict in approach in these two circuit 
court cases, to which the Supreme Court referred233 appeared to 
lie less in the ultimate access by EEOC to confidential 
information and more in the appropriate role of academic 
freedom as the basis for non disclosure. The Seventh Circuit 
relied on academic freedom to establish a qualified peer 
review privilege, and avoided disclosure of the identity of a 
reviewer until the claimant specifically asked for the 
identity of her evaluator. The Third Circuit, on the other 
hand, rejected the argument that academic freedom was relevant 
to requiring disclosure. The court declined to recognize a 
qualified academic privilege, and refused to adopt any 
balancing approach in determining the EEOC' s right of 
access™. 
The second circuit has also considered the argument that a 
qualified academic freedom privilege protects the 
confidentiality of information generated in the tenuring 
process. In Gray v Board of Higher Education City of New 
York235 although the court recognized a qualified academic 
privilege, it held that the interest in academic freedom did 
not outweigh a black educator's interest in discovering the 
identity of two committee members who recommended against his 
tenure. The court came to the conclusion that the educator's 
need for information to prove discriminatory interest was more 
important than the college's interest in keeping the votes 
confidential236 • 
Those who assert a qualified privilege not to disclose certain 
information during the investigatory stage of the e1nployee's 
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or former employee's claim, emphasize that disclosure has a 
chilling effect on the procurement and quality of evaluators' 
comments and conclusions. In Gray it was contended that 
disclosure of how two tenure committee members voted would 
chill candid peer evaluations and disturb harmony of faculty 
relations. In Franklin and Ma::::-shall, the disclosure of 
documents involving on and off campus evaluators was likely to 
result in less than "candid, honest assessments of the 
candidates under review" as well as embarrassment and 
confrontational situations. In Notre Dame, it was held that 
disclosure would compel the university to break the promise of 
confidentiality given in advance to evaluators and deemed 
critical by the university in obtaining candid and frank 
evaluations in all cases. After University of Pennsylvania, 
it would appear that none of these considerations e..:..ther 
singly or cumulatively, are sufficient to create an 
evidentiary privilege against a rejected tenure applicant who 
alleges impermissible discrimination in the tenure process. 
"Thus, discovery triumphs when pitted against whatever public 
good may transcend from confidentiality of peer-review 
generated views and conclusions 11 m. 
In University of Pennsylvania, Blackmun J noted that the court 
would not decide whether the petitioner could redact 
information from the requested files before giving them to the 
EEOC, because the lower courts had not considered the issue 
fully. Redaction would permit universities to remove certain 
information from the files that would reveal the identity of 
the evaluator. By negating the argument that the disclosure 
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of the evaluator's identity wculd have a chilling effect on 
future evaluation, redaction could be regarded as a viable 
solution capable of meeting the needs of both parties although 
it has some limitations~. 
University of Pennsylvania required a balancing of society's 
interest in academic freedom for institutions and society's 
concern over fairness in tenuring educators with due regard to 
congressional mandates and the law of evidence. The decision 
rejected the use of academic~ freedom as a ground for 
confidentiality for peer review evaluators. From this it 
appears that the societal value of obtaining the truth when 
impermissible discrimination is alleged, is more important to 
society than the anonymity for the evaluators who express 
opinions about or vote on a candidate for tenurem. 
5.3.11 The public-private dichotomy 
There is a debate on whether public or private universities 
and colleges enjoy more institutional academic freedom. The 
fact that there are both private and public universities in 
the United States accounts for the different perceptions on 
the extent of an individual professor's academic freedom. 
According to some scholars the law provides greater protection 
for public-sector academics than it does for their colleagues 
in private universities. This is attributed to the fact that 
academic freedom has been tied to the first amendment's right 
of free speech and assembly and to the fourteenth amendment's 
due process requirements. These federal constitutional 
4 5.: . 
protections are not generally available to an academic of a 
private college or university becat:se the allegations 
institutional impropriety would not involve 11 state action 11 • 
Certain statutory rights, however, are available to faculty 
members of private universities as well as employees of public 
universities. A typical example is Title VII which prohibits 
employment discrimination based on race, colour, religion, sex 
or national origin~. 
Although teachers at private colleges cannot rely on state 
action, it is unlikely that courts will allow these 
institutions to completely disregard their faculty's 
constitutional rights. In Board of Regents of State Colleges 
v Roth241 , Douglas J noted the public-private dichotomy and 
maintained that 11 the First Amendment, applicable to the States 
by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the individual 
against state action when it comes to ... freedoms guaranteed 
by the First Amendment 11242 • Although he acknowledged that 
faculty working in private institutions have less 
government-protected academic freedom, Douglas J did not 
approve of the distinction on the basis of the public-private 
dichotomy. On the contrary he noted that the same problems 
relating to dismissal owing to philosophical, political or 
ideological beliefs may well be true of private universities 
if they become instrumentalities of the state either through 
financing or other umbilical cordsw. For this reason it has 
been contended that these umbilical cords which include 
federal funding, regulation, student aid and tax status 
considerations may be relied upon successfully in future to 
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extend protections of the first and fourteenth amendments to 
academics in private ur-iversities. Private universities will 
no doubt be wary of restricting the academic freedom of their 
academics because this might have a negative impact on their 
image. Universities generally are characterised by the 
fostering of unfettered enquiries and intellectual expression 
of scholars for the benefit of societY44. 
There is no evidence that private colleges and universities 
generally afford their academic staff the same amount of 
academic freedom as that granted by public universities. 
Individual reputations among peer universities and the 
competition to hire the best scholars will obviously induce 
many private institutions to allow their professors the same 
academic freedom granted by public universities to their 
professors245 • 
In the cases that have come before the Supreme Court, the 
Supreme Court has recognized institutional academic freedom at 
both public and private universities. It, however, did not 
resolve the question whether constitutional academic freedom 
has different meanings at private than at public universities 
although it did recognize this issue in University of 
Pennsylvania a private uni versity246. The court noted that 
attempts by government to regulate the selection of academic 
staff or otherwise influence utterances by academics would 
create first amendment problems. The court added that 
analogous attempts at public universities would result in 
465. 
complex first amendment problems because the government would 
be both the regulator and the speakern. 
Rabban is of the view that earlier Supreme Court decisions do 
suggest first amendment restraints on the institutional 
academic freedom of public universities that may be 
inapplicable to their private counterparts. He refers to 
Sweezy and Keyishian where the Court emphasized the value of 
critical inquiry in universities to democracy and civilization 
while it justified first amendment protection of academic 
freedom. Rabban is of the opinion that the democratic 
functions of universities has greater significance for public 
universities than for private universities because, as he 
further contends, the speaker is the speaker as well as the 
regulator. He also feels that public universities themselves 
bound by the first amendment in their relationships with their 
faculty members and students, may have less discretion than 
private universities in choosing educational goals that may 
deviate from democratic values. For this reason the same 
educational choices that might violate the first amendment 
obligations of public universities to diversity of thought 
might be protected by the first amendment academic freedom of 
private universities against state intervention. To 
illustrate this Rabban mentions as an example that a private 
university might have academic freedom to declare itself an 
"ivory tower" which would be committed to the world of ideas 
uncontaminated by influences from the outside world, and 
consequently might be allowed to impose absolute restrictions 
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on public access to the campus that might violate the first 
amendment if adopted by a public university-'8. 
Admittedly private universities may have purposes unrel > .. :.ed to 
education that may enable them to deviate from first am .dment 
limitation or public universities. A typical examp::. is a 
university affiliated to a religious denomination which .ay be 
entitled to make institutional choices for religious ather 
than educational reasons and those choices may be prote:~ed by 
the first amendment. The AAUP expressly recogniz ·~ the 
religious connection as a reason for some limitation ~ the 
exercise of academic freedom~. On the whole, however, it is 
difficult to conclude that either public or F ,_vate 
institutions have more academic freedom. 
5.4 GERMANY 
5.4.1 University autonomy and academic freedom in g,, sral 
1>.rticle 5(3) 
protection 
creativity. 
of the Basic Law of Germany provides f 
of academic freedom, research and ar 
The rights guaranteed in article 5 { 3) 
the 
stic 
the 
Basic Law can be traced to the Constitution of 1849 The 
Frankfurt Parliament which was heavily influen by 
professors and intellectuals declared in article 152 its 
abortive constitution that "the teaching of art and sciE :e is 
free". Article 142 of the Weimar Constitution reinforc~ this 
declaration as follows: "The state guarantees the pro~ ·tion 
and support of research and scholarship". Similarly a· icle 
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5 ( 3) of the Basic Law stipulates that 11 art and learning, 
research and teaching are free". A proviso to this states 
that "freedom of teaching shall not absolve (one) from loyalty 
to the Constitution". These provisions have been regarded as 
expressing the traditional view of the German university as an 
autonomous institution of public life organized primarily to 
train an intellectual elite for service to the state~. 
In an earlier chapter it was made clear how the Humboldtian 
concept of academic freedom developed in Germany, and that it 
involved both Lehr-und Lernfreihei t 251 • Despite the emphasis 
on academic freedom, it is important to point out that German 
universities are state universities, financed by the state. 
Their constitutions or statutes are dependent upon the 
legislation of the state. A member of the government (usually 
a minister) is responsible for university affairs. Moreover, 
professors and junior faculty members are civil servants. 
Full professors are appointed by the state. These 
appointments, however, are normally done according to the 
nomination by the university. Responsibility for university 
education generally rests with the various Lander, although 
the federal government has power to frame some general and 
basic rules which provide a broad framework for the university 
system. Notwithstanding their legal and financial dependence 
on the state, German universities have developed a high degree 
of autonomy in their internal affairsm. 
Before the reforms which were caused by the student unrest of 
the sixties and early seventies, the internal structure of 
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universities was largely dominated by full professors, with 
representatives of the various groups of junior academic staff 
sitting and voting in the councils of acaderr.ic 
self-government. The university was divided into several 
faculties (Fakut~ten) . No dist.inction was made between 
undergraduate colleges and graduate schools. The basic units 
were the institutes or "seminars" mostly administered by one 
full professor as a director3 • 
During the sixties a great need for the reform of this 
university system arose. The reforms were externally 
induced2S4. Great impetus to this was given by the fact that 
the university had become a mass enterprise with a substantial 
increase in student numbers. This also necessitated an 
increase in staff numbers. As a result, 11 the education 
explosion led to a transformation of the university from a 
republic of scholars to an institution of mass instruction". 
Moreover, a university reform was needed which was designed to 
adapt research and teaching to the altered circumstances, to 
solve the problems and to ease the tensions that had developed 
in the meantimem. 
The first problem was to restore the declining effectiveness 
of instruction and learning and to restructure the curriculum. 
Previously the German universities followed a system of open 
admission which meant free access to university to all the 
high school graduates. With the massification of university 
education especially in the fifties, it became necessary to 
limit the number of students (numerus clausus) in certain 
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disciplines like medicine, psychology, pharmacology and some 
other scientific subjects~. 
The second problem that needed reform was that of stattering. 
Roughly the teaching personnel of a German university 
consisted of full professors, DozerrLen a position similar to 
that of a lecturer and assistants. Both professors and 
Dozenten hold a post doctoral degree, the Habilitation which 
is evidence of continuous and successful research activities 
and entitles everyone who has obtained it to give lectures and 
seminars within the university. The distinction between the 
professors and Dozenten was regarded as being obsolete. There 
was discontent among the Dozenten because most of them did not 
have tenure. They also wanted a great say in faculty matters. 
Assistants were supposed to assist professors in his duties, 
give some lectures for beginners and work towards their own 
Habilitation. During the sixties this group was 
disproportionately expanded in order to cope with the rising 
student numbers and to save money by avoiding to appoint more 
professors. This practice had led to some abuses. The 
assistants needed better safeguards for academic freedom and 
independence a certain representation and say in faculty and 
departmental mattersm. 
The third need was for administrative reform. The 
administrative officials could not cope with the problems of 
mass instruction. The traditional divisions (Fakut~ten) had 
grown so much that the introduction of a department system 
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which would improve co-operation within the ranks of 
professors was necessary.258. 
5.4.2 The student unrest 
These were ,the themes that needed attention. There were no 
doubt many other aspects and problems of the crisis of the 
university in Germany. These included the procedures for 
financing; academic freedom as against social accountability, 
or the legitimate claims of society and the legitimate 
autonomy of universities and the relative roles of teaching 
and research. The radical student movement that took place in 
the sixties precipitated state intervention to address these 
issues. There are various reasons behind the student 
uprisings. What provided fertile ground for this was the 
appeal of the new leftist political philosophy which rebelled 
against what was perceived as the repressive principle of 
achievement because some students were living in a situation 
where the principle of achievement had been suspended for an 
indefinite period. This resulted in the "alliance of the 
radicals with the dull and the lazy"~. 
The young people could not reconcile themselves with the 
prevailing political and social cultural and moral values, and 
the institutions of society especially in Germany after World 
War II. The crisis was exacerbated by the search for identity 
and by the questions which young people posed as to what their 
parents had done during the Nazi period or what they had done 
in the fifties. The movement consisted of young men and women 
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of the upper middle class who regarded themselves as 
protagonists of the exploited a:id oppressed masses or the 
people's interests. The Germans were theoretically a:id 
ideologically prepared for taking the revolutionary road 
having had the examples of the American student movement, the 
Persian and Dutch experiences. ~he West German students were 
also much more receptive to political theory than, say, the 
"British". Students were also exposed to Marxism as a result 
of the influence of the Frankfurt School of sociologists. 
Concepts such as exploitation, repression, manipulation and 
liberation were well understood and accepted~. 
The movement was largely spearheaded by the Marxist opposition 
to wicked, capitalist and bourgeois system of the West. The 
ultimate political objective was to abolish liberal and 
constitutional democracy. Within the university context the 
movement advocated the abolition of what was regarded as 
bourgeois scholarship and the introduction of "critical" 
scholarship in the sense of the new left. They intended to 
replace pluralism and diversity within disciplines and 
departments by a scholarship in the service of what they 
regarded as "the people's" interest. This approach pervaded 
all disciplines. Knowledge and the search for knowledge would 
be judged in terms of political principles and the political 
functions of truth. Moreover, they opposed the repressive 
principle of achievement which they regarded as being aimed at 
adapting all human beings to the needs of a capitalistic and 
bureauc:r-atic society. For this reason they opposed 
examinations, any scheme of courses and credits and the mooted 
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curriculum reform. It was in this way that they gained the 
support of the dull and lazy261 • 
What prolonged the crisis of the universities were the 
legislative reforms which resulted in the change of university 
constitutions and brought about new university laws. The 
underlying idea was not only to calm the movement but also to 
implement crucial reforms. For this reason the structure of 
the university, the organization 
institutions had to be modernized. 
of decision-making 
This had to be done 
through the democratization of universities and in particular 
through the introduction of participatory democracy. The 
university was regarded as consisting of four groups, namely, 
professors, assistants (junior staff) , students and non-
academic staff. Although there was controversy as to the 
proportion of representation, the general feeling was that 
full and associate professors, or all tenured academic staff 
were to be in the minority. Democratization was meant to 
deprive professors of their decisive influence over academic 
matters. They had to be stripped of their "power" and 
"privileges". The Berlin University Act of 1969 is a typical 
example. This Act created a university parliament (Konzil) 
consisting of thirty three each of professors, junior staff 
and students as well as fifteen representatives of 
non-academic staff. Its main tasks were the election of the 
president and the vice-presidents and the passing of the 
bylaws. The academic senate consisted of eleven professors, 
six assistants·, five students and two non-academic staff. 
They were responsible for central decision making but had to 
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contend with a strong executive power of the president262 • 
There were also department committees consisting of seven 
professors, four assistants, three students and non- academic 
staff. They were responsible for teaching research, 
examinations and appointments within the department. 
These provisions for democratization of the university 
administration were completed both in Berlin and at other 
L~nder by democratizing the group of professors. This was 
done by promoting a large number of assistants to tenured 
professorships by bureaucratic decree and without taking into 
account their scholarly achievements, which was usually a 
Habilitation, or by requiring an easier Habilitation and 
without the usual requirement of a second publication in the 
form of a book. The underlying reason was that each of the 
groups within a university had its own specific interest and 
the best way of running the university was to combine them on 
boards where no single group would predominate, thus forcing 
them to compromise or to co-operate. Emphasis was placed on 
the equality of the groups and academic qualifications and 
competence were of relative significance. Everyone was 
therefore considered competent to make decisions although in 
varying degrees. The philosophy underlying participatory 
democracy was that those who were affected by decisions should 
have a large say in its making. Moreover, the assumption was 
that democracy could be transferred without modification from 
the political community to any area of society263. 
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The prevalent belief was that the radical movement had been 
caused by abuses and failures of the old system and was 
supposed to be aimed at reasonable reform. It appeared 
natural to force rapid reform and grant the adherents of the 
reform movement an important say within the new structure. It 
was also believed that responsibility within the institution 
would calm certain irresponsible and even violent elements of 
the movement and would separate radical reforms from extreme 
radicals within students. This view seemed to overlook the 
international dimensions of this phenomenon264 • The radical 
student movement received support from the news media 
politicians and even professors. Reports were generally 
biased in favour of students. Excesses were played down and 
their causes were looked for among the reactions of the 
wicked. The ideal goals of the youth were used as excuses for 
certain methods. Unrest was regarded as being reasonable and 
sound and was considered to be the effective instrument for 
reform. The radical attack on the legitimacy of existing 
institutions in the name of the new democracy disclosed not 
only a serious lack of self-confidence but also faith in the 
values, institutions and legitimacy of the system. The 
general reaction was to understand and to justify the attack. 
This was coupled with a desire for appeasement by those in 
charge by weakly consenting to the new democratic 
participation of all groups in academic decisions with less 
power for the professors and more for the students265 • 
The political group that was largely responsible for this was 
the left wing of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) . The 
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left-wingers strongly resented the idea of an elitist 
university and the principle of meritocracy. They therefore 
supported the rebellion of the upper-middle class youth. They 
also advocated participatory democracy. Owing to the fact 
that the working class was no longer the real subject of the 
class struggle, they wanted to use the university as an 
instrument for radical change of the social and political 
order. Al though the majority of the voters were generally 
against the movement, they did not exercise any pressure on 
politicians to deal with it. As a result university reform by 
democratization was promulgated in several L~nder especially 
those with SPD government such as Berlin, Hesse and Lower 
Saxony™. 
5.4.3 Results of legislative reform on academic freedom 
The legislative reforms resulted in the permanent 
institutionalization of the radical student movement. This 
institutionalization ensured its perpetuationm. It further 
entrenched the atmosphere of permanent confrontation and 
conflict. It also led to a difficulty in taking decisions. 
Decisions could only be taken after a struggle for power and 
with due regard for political goals and implications. 
Academic life consisted of conflict and political tactics to 
secure or to prevent majorities to take or prevent certain 
decisions. There was, however, no agreement about the rules 
of conflict as is the case between political parties in a 
democracy. This demonstrated that legislators made a 
fundamental error in thinking that antidemocrats would behave 
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as democrats when ::hey were involved in democratic 
institutions and ''that the appeal to the group interest and 
the claims of different groups for power should result in a 
better co-operation and in . ...... . . maini...aining that measure of 
objectivity which is still needed in academic matters. 
Instead, it ended in confrontation and in abandonment of 
former standards of academic decisions" 268 • Although sometimes 
a compromise could be struck, it would normally be that of the 
lowest common denominator; in other instances the boards would 
be completely paralyzed, or the time-consuming, harsh and 
occasionally violent confrontations ended with a reasonable or 
unreasonable majority decision. As the sessions of all boards 
or councils were open to the public, this exposed these 
meetings to further disturbance or disruption by radical 
elements. This generated a climate of pressure where 
decisions could not be taken rationally. The 
institutionalization of confrontation was much more compatible 
with the interpretation of "class struggle" between the 
"ruling class" of professors, who had conveniently been 
reduced to a minority position, and the "oppressed class" of 
students and junior faculty and non-academic personnel~. 
What facilitated this state of affairs was that professors 
were generally handicapped in this struggle. Being 
individualistic and difficult to organize, they could do 
nothing but defend tolerance and pluralism against the attack 
of the new absolutistic doctrine. As many of them just wanted 
to get on with their job of teaching and research, instead of 
being perpetually molested by university politics, they were 
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physically and psychically ill-equipped to deal with the 
situation. They were fewer in number and they were weakened 
by heterogeneity of interest. There were radical professors 
as well and the assumption that professors would vote as one 
on vital matters proved to be incorrect. What exacerbated the 
situation was that there were few if any German university 
scholars with a Marxist or other "dominant" point of view who 
were prepared to stand for academic freedom, tolerance and 
qualification by achievement270 • 
Al though the majority of the students did not support the 
radical student movement, they were in a weaker position. The 
opponents of radicalism only had some remarkable gains where 
vital interests of the majority of students were endangered by 
permanent disruptions of lectures and examinations and 
strikes. On the whole, however, they could not compete with 
radicals and could not develop a positive platform of their 
own in university politics. They constituted the silent 
majority that weakly consented to what the radicals advocated. 
Moreover, they did not want to be seen to be on the side of 
the "Establishment 11 • In the election of the student 
leadership only a few students voted and mostly the activist 
ones 2 ' 1 • In some universities the combination of 
democratization and the introduction of a presidential system 
proved fatal for the development of the university or academic 
freedom. The election of supporters or sympathisers with the 
radical movement was almost assured. This led in some cases 
to the election as presidents of young assistants with 
unfinished doctoral theses and without administrative and 
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academic experience. They tended to form a generally leftist 
administration bent on appeasing radicalsm. 
The hope that the legislative reforms and consequently the 
participation of radicals would eliminate violence proved to 
be unfounded. Violence and unrest continued albeit to a 
limited extent. These included the disruptions of classes and 
examinations and of board or council sessions. Sometimes 
these resulted in teaching off campus, even in private houses. 
There were also some physical attacks against professors and 
students who wanted to attend lectures or who attempted to 
build a non-radical organization. The weak reaction of the 
administrations towards organized pressure made it seem 
profitable for those who wanted to push through their goals 
through violence. The disciplinary committees of democratized 
universities, were also democratized and became totally 
ineffective. 
lawlessness273 • 
This further encouraged violence and a state of 
The prevailing political climate also influenced appointments. 
Appointments were not made on academic grounds only but on 
political ones. The applicant's political orientation or 
affiliation would predominate even though sometimes councils 
would pretend that the decision was based on scholarly 
qualifications. Almost every important appointment led to 
months of conflict and countless meetings. Younger applicants 
would be tested in hearings on their "quality as appeasers", 
and subjected to questioning which had nothing to do with 
their subject or their teaching competence274 • Where this 
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method of decision making did not serve political ends, it 
tended to promote mediocri ty17~. 
As the radicals opposed the principle of achievement and 
disciplined work as a principle of capitalist repression, and 
enforced adaptation or as a IT\eans of perpetuating 
inequalities, examinations were therefore discredited or it 
was advocated that they be simplified. A thesis had to become 
a collective paper with no way of ascertaining individual 
achievement. Requirements had to be decided upon by 
democratized councils with non-graduates voting. These had a 
vested interest in lowering requirements. All these 
contributed to the lowering of academic standardsm. 
Free academic discourse which is the essence of academic 
freedom was st if led by emphasis on Marxist theory and 
literature. Thus dogmatic indoctrination took the place of 
scholarly instruction277 • There was also emphasis on the 
11 relevance 11 of one's research, discipline and topics. The 
radicals also sought to make all teaching conform to the 
labels of "liberation 11 , 11 emancipation 11 , 11 dialectic critiques 11 
and so on. Those who espoused these were influential in the 
committees on reform of the curriculum. As a result 
scholarship could not flourish in this atmosphere. "The 
struggle for the prerequisite of scholarships and academic 
freedom; endless sessions in the large number of committees 
with at least one caucus for preparation; frequent 
confrontations, intimidation and stress" all meant an immense 
waste of time and energy and preoccupied every scholar during 
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term time278 • An unfortunate consequence was often that once 
an ins ti tut ion has been totally or almost captured by 
radicals, many great scholars, especially among the older 
generation, tended to withdraw from active participation in 
the struggle for academic freedomm. 
Hitherto autonomy had been an instrument for securing academic 
freedom, that is freedom of individual scholars and teachers 
and of the institution from social, political and ideological 
pressures. But autonomy ironically came to be used to 
restrict this freedom and to forestall government intervention 
to uphold this freedom. Whereas radicals had previously 
opposed the traditional idea of the university as an ivory 
tower and had advocated a re-orientation towards active 
involvement with the changing world, they now attempt to 
establish a new ivory tower of their own "painted red". While 
they talked about the responsibility of a university for a 
democratic society, they did not mean the existing society, 
but their own idea of the 11 society of the future". They 
espoused an elitist educational dictatorship where 
universities would be the driving force of social reform 
regardless of professional standards and the scholarly pursuit 
of truth. Having styled themselves as an avant-garde, they 
considered themselves as the spokesperson of the hidden "true" 
consciousness of the masses, which they regarded as having 
been hitherto manipulated in the interest of oppression. It 
is for this reason that they claimed autonomy from parliament 
and society. "A university based upon the ideal of academic 
freedom, which includes the freedom to criticize society as it 
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is now, is nevertheless part of the democratic system and has 
its responsibility for society. Radical democratization 
destroys not only academic freedom as an individual right but 
this responsibility for society in its present form also. It 
is the emancipation of the self-appointed 'democrats' from 
real democracy"~. 
This development has been regarded as dangerous in the long 
run because it would lead to the decline of scholarship or 
scholarship would be given an ideological slant in the service 
of the pretended "objective interest of the people" or the 
"society of the future"u1 • It was for these reasons that in 
1970 an association known as the Bund Freiheit der 
Wissenschaft (Association for Freedom in Science) was 
established. Although it was regarded by some as reactionary, 
it saw itself as having the purpose of defending academic 
freedom, countering pseudoreforms and promoting the 
implementation of a reasonable and necessary reform. Being a 
non-partisan organization with members from all democratic 
political parties, it consisted of university teachers, 
assistants, students and concerned citizens from academic and 
non-academic professions. There were also other similar 
organizations with which it co-operated. Although some of 
them were to the right, the truth of the matter is that many 
people had become tired of the disruptions and anarchy and 
felt that order and discipline had to be re-established. The 
attempt was to inform the public about the "mess" and the 
dangerous tendencies in universities and schools. These 
organizations had to lobby in the legislature, and to organize 
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resistance within single universities where necessary. This 
swayed public opinion and to a large degree inf 1 uenced 
politicians282 • 
5.4.4 Turning point 
A turning point in the legislative reform process was reached 
by the decision of the Group University Caseu3 ; In 1971 the 
Lower Saxony had changed its system of governance for higher 
education. The legislature of Lower Saxony had conferred on 
certain non-professional groups within the university who were 
not entitled to professional status. At some major 
universities, for instance, including G6ttingen University, 
the academic council was to consist of twenty-four professors, 
twenty-four research assistants, twenty-four students and 
sixteen non-academic employees. Other collegial bodies within 
the university were similarly organized. 
About 3 9 8 professors from Lower Saxony claimed in a 
constitutional complaint that the new rules of university 
governance encroached upon the freedom of teaching and 
research in violation of article 5(3) (1) of the Basic Law. 
Federal and state educational officials filed briefs in 
support of the statute, while the West German Rector's 
Conference and other faculty organizations were arrayed 
against it. The latter in alliance with the professoriate, 
argued that the inclusion of insufficiently qualified persons 
in the governing councils of the university threatened the 
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faculty's pre-eminent position as the decision-making 
authority in the areas of science, research and teaching. 
In December 1972 the Constitutional Court presided over three 
days of oral argument in the case. The court decided that in 
questions of the appointment of professors and in questions of 
teaching, professors must have a majority; in questions of 
research, a "sufficient'' majority; and that non-academic staff 
should have no vote at all in such matters. The university 
councils, which elect the president, and enact bylaws, and 
university senates are not bound to such a restriction a 30 
percent minority of professors there was thought to be 
constitutional. 
In coming to the conclusion the Constitutional Court had to 
take into account a number of factors. It is important to 
consider these in some detail 284 • In the opinion of the 
Constitutional Court, the right contained in article 5(3) to 
engage freely in scholarly activities is a right which the 
state is bound to respect. Everyone engaged in science, 
research and teaching enjoys a negative right against state 
encroachment upon the discovery and dissemination of 
knowledge. The world of scholarship is one of personal and 
autonomous responsibility for the individual scholar, and the 
state is not entitled to dictate in this realm. The court 
further contended that article 5 (3) protects no single 
conception or theory of scholarship but rather every form of 
scholarly activity both in the interest of the individual 
scholar's self-realization and for the benefit of society as a 
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whole. For this reason the state is obliged to defend a 
system of free scholarly inquiry and affirmatively to provide 
for an institutional framework in which such inquiry can be 
carried out. 
The Constitutional Court pointed out that the provisions of 
the constitution were particularly important because without a 
satisfactory institutional structure and corresponding 
financial support, which only the state can provide, it would 
be difficult to have scholarly research and teaching in broad 
areas of scholarship and in particular in the field of natural 
science. For this reason the individual scholar has a right 
to state support, including that of an organizational kind, 
necessary to adequately safeguard his constitutionally 
protected sphere of freedom because only such support enables 
him to engage in scholarly activity. This, however, did not 
mean that academic freedom could be achieved only at German 
universities of a traditional nature or that it prescribed how 
scholarly activity in universities is to be organized. The 
legislature had a discretion within certain limits, to 
organize universities in conformity with today's social and 
sociological realities. 
The court recounted the history of the German university and 
its tradition of faculty self-governance. It found that in 
spite of its increasing dependence upon the state, and the 
many changes in university structure brought about by the 
state in the last two centuries, the Humboldtian principle 
that research and teaching should remain free of government 
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influence has been a steadfast and sacred pillar of German 
academic life. The court found the principle of academic 
self-governance to be rooted in early nineteenth-century 
university statutes as well as in various national and state 
constitutions. States reserved the right to oversee the 
appointment of university professors, the court noted, but 
this traditional practice seldom interfered with the essential 
autonomy of the scholarly enterprise or the self-governance of 
the university. 
Al though in the area of the university organization the 
legislature enjoyed considerable leeway in shaping university 
policy, this discretion is driven and limited by the right to 
freedom secured by article 5 (3) and the value judgment it 
contains. On the basis of the constitutional consideration, 
the court felt constrained to assess the organizational 
features of laws dealing with institutions of higher learning 
by determining whether and to what extent they favour or 
impede either the basic right of every individual scholar to 
research and teach freely or the functional capacity of an 
institution dedicated to "free scholarship" to operate. 
In line with this the court was of the opinion that the "group 
university" as such was not incompatible with the value 
inherent in article 5 (3), as in itself it is not "alien to 
scholarship" to allow members of the university a say in its 
affairs because it does not necessarily lead to procedures and 
policies in opposition to freedom of research and teaching. 
Such a system may serve as an appropriate instrument for 
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resolving group conflict in the university and also as a means 
for mobilizing the expertise of individual groups for the 
purpose of reaching better decisions in the administration of 
the university. The Constitutional Court, however, refrained 
from deciding whether this system was the most appropriate 
form of university organization. 
The court was of the opinion that academic assistants are as 
much entitled to the rights provided for in article 5(3) as 
regards research activities as university professors. The 
court further found that there was no constitutional objection 
to the participation of students in academic administration as 
long as and to the extent that they are participating in 
research and teaching .. The involvement of non-academic staff 
in university self-governance, the court further contended, 
did not basically conflict with the constitutional pledge of 
academic freedom. This group includes experts whose practical 
experience can be particularly beneficial in the 
administrative area of universities. Academic activity at 
universities is largely dependent on these experts to an 
increasing extent. They create the technical and 
administrative conditions which make teaching and research 
possible and carry corresponding responsibility. 
As the court further contended, university professors enjoy a 
special position in research and teaching. By virtue of their 
office and commitment they bear a particularly heavy 
responsibility for the smooth running and academic status of 
the university. They therefore hold a key position in 
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academic life. The court concluded that the state is under an 
obligation to keep this special position of professors in mind 
when it shapes the organization of academic administration. 
This task requires that due attention be paid to the value 
decision contained in article 5 (3) coupled with the 
general-equality clause which prohibits treating those groups 
equally which are essentially unequal. For this reason the 
legislative required to confer on professors that degree of 
authority and responsibility commensurate with their scholarly 
mission in the light of the functions of the university. It 
must ensure an organizational framework that does not allow 
other groups to undermine the free scholarly activity of 
professors. While the legislature was at liberty to prescribe 
the voting strength of various groups in the decision-making 
councils of the "group university" it must consider the 
special position of university professors and ensure that 
their strength is proportionate to their status and functions. 
Where teaching is concerned, the court went on, it is not only 
the university teachers who fulfil essential functions but 
also teaching and research assistants. Al though their 
participation in discharging teaching tasks in the modern mass 
university is not always the same when compared on divisional, 
departmental and sectional levels, their share is nonetheless 
quantitively significant and qualitatively important. When it 
comes to decisions directly affecting teaching, they possess 
the kind of factual knowledge and interest that readily 
justifies their rights to codetermination. As teaching also 
directly affects the interests of students, appropriate 
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decisions can often be reached only if the experiences and 
arguments of both teachers and students are taken into 
account. There are cherefore no constitutional objections to 
the participation of student representatives when deciding 
such issues. The unrestricted participation of non-research 
and non-teaching staff in decisions relating to teaching, 
however, cannot be justified by any of the aforementioned 
considerations. For this reason the legislature must 
guarantee that within the framework university teachers retain 
the degree of influence commensurate with their position in 
the area of teaching. 
When determining the extent of codetermination by various 
groups in matters directly concerning research, one must use 
stricter criteria, the court argued. Decisions on research 
presuppose the ability to assess the current status of 
research in a given field and the urgency of an individual 
research project in the light of social needs, as well as the 
ability to understand clearly the technical, financial and 
personnel possibilities in individual areas of research. The 
responsibility which emanates from such decisions becomes 
particularly clear when large amounts of money are needed for 
expensive special facilities required by modern research or 
when research facilities are established or expanded. While 
research assistants cannot be denied the right to co-operate 
with specialists in making such decisions, and while the large 
number of students will not possess the qualifications 
necessary for participation in research, based on their level 
of education and qualifications, one cannot completely rule 
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out the fact that students contribute to some extent to these 
decisions. There are therefore no constitutional objections 
against allowing students a certain degree of codetermination, 
particularly because decisions affecting research may also 
have an eventual effect on teaching. 
The value judgment of article 5(3) together with article 3(1) 
of the Basic Law, however, demands that university teachers 
retain the privilege of having a decisive influence in 
decisions concerning research directly. By virtue of their 
qualifications, functions and responsibilities, university 
teachers must be able to prevail against other groups in this 
special area. 
The court concluded that in university councils concerned with 
teaching, professors are constitutionally entitled to at least 
50 percent of the votes. In matters relating to research, 
however, the influence of university professors should be 
decisive. This meant, according to the court, that university 
professors must have substantially more than 50 percent of the 
votes so that they may be able to assert themselves against 
the combined opposition of other groups. 
This was no doubt an extremely important case in reasserting 
the importance of academic freedom for professors. It has 
been regarded as a "classical example of judicial legislation 
of a kind not frequently encountered outside the United States 
of America 11285 • From a very general statement the Federal 
Constitutional Court inferred what has been legitimately 
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termed "a professorial charter". The court provided critical 
support for the standardization of university governance~. 
In assuming this acti vistic role the court embarked on a 
course of judicial creativity with consequences which are 
potentially extremely far-reaching, not least for the court 
itself and the position of respect which it occupies in 
Germany287 • In this way it became the single most important 
element in the university task environment with regard to the 
process of legislative reform~. 
Whatever the merits or demerits of this decision, it was a 
reflection that some people felt that the democratization 
process had been taken too far and was sometimes remarkable. 
It was also an attempt to demonstrate that simple 
democratization may be inappropriate for the university. The 
university as an academic institution places a high premium on 
knowledge and expertise. 
There were other rulings which emanated from the 
Constitutional Court which tackled head on the most 
controversial issues confronting German higher education. 
These included questions of criteria for admission the 
determination of classroom "capacities" and acceptable 
teaching loads and the government supervision of personnel 
policy. These rulings were subsequently translated into 
legally codified guidelines for the L~nder governments as the 
1976 Federal Framework Law for Higher Education 
(Hochschulrahmengesetz = HRG) 289 • 
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In the light of t:iese developments, it is clear that the 
extension of the judicial approach of "politicized legalism" 
(Verrechtlichung) into the sphere of educational reform policy 
created the cenditions under which the judicial branch of 
government emerged as the public's vehicle for political 
conflict resolution in Germany290. The term Verrechtlichung is 
used to embrace the combined effects of legal codification and 
courtroom interpretation of parliamentary statutes. It has 
been described as a process whereby the cons ti tut ion is 
repeatedly invoked and its principles elaborated and 
interpreted in exhaustive detail. Such legalism is regarded 
as having the effect of channelling recurrent conflicts among 
political or ideological factions in many institutions~1 • The 
institutions of higher learning were ordered to reform 
themselves, while LAnder interference made self-organization 
first difficult, and later impossible. What was harmful to 
the concept of university autonomy was the fact that 
subsequent drafts of the Framework Law followed what were 
essentially political proscriptions which appeared in the 
opinions of the judges which accompanied the decisions. The 
draft proposals did not promote administrative 
effectivenessm. When the Framework Law was passed in 1976 it 
became a political end in itself rather than a means to a more 
effective system of higher educationm. 
There is no doubt that the German experience had a profound 
effect on university autonomy and academic freedom. The 
student unrest, which was largely motivated by the feeling on 
the part of the students that they required greater 
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participation in the structures of governance, led to reforms 
that adversely affected university autonomy and academic 
freedom. The reforms led to the institutionalizaticn of 
conflict so that university structures could not effectively 
take decisions. 
this position. 
The Constitutional Court tried to ameliorate 
But its decisions may sometimes be criticized 
as going beyond adjudication to legislation. 
What is interesting is that what happened in Germany was not 
unique. Similar occurrences took place in the Netherlandsm, 
France295 and Italy296 with similar results. A lesson to be 
learnt from these experiences is that not everything that 
comes with transformation through democratization is for the 
benefit of university education and in particular university 
autonomy and academic freedom. 
5.5 AFRICA 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Although most of the African states have adopted universities 
modelled on western ones, African states in general have faced 
a crisis of democracy297 • Although many of the political 
leaders have paid lip service to freedom and democracy, Africa 
has generally been characterised by authoritarian regimes and 
lack of freedom. Admittedly many of the African states have 
taken steps to move away from one-party states to multi-party 
democracy. But on the whole a culture of .~<:te111<?.~ .. 1.::.~.SY and 
freedom has not developed in many of the African states298 • If 
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the view is true that university autonomy and academic freedom 
can only thrive in a free and democratic society owing to the 
indivisibility of human freedomm, it is obvious tha~ most cf 
the African states cannot be expected to be the defenders of 
university autonomy and academic freedom. 
Some of the African leaders have emphasized other expectations 
from universities than university autonomy and academic 
freedom. In particular they have emphasized t.hat these 
universities should contribute to development. LI IJ When it comes y 1 
to university autonomy and academic freedom, these have been 
seriously limited. Universities in general have been 
characterized by political control~. 
Some African politicians have expressed themselves on 
universities and academic freedom. Nkwame Nkrumah, speaking 
at a university dinner in 1963, said "There is, however, a 
tendency to use the words 'Academic Freedom' in another cause, 
--------"·------'-"~"'"'' -~,,.--........ --~----·-·· ' .-~·~ ,., .. •' ,,~ 
and to assert the claim that a university is more or less an 
' ' .·•><'•, ., ",.. > - "'-~ 
institution of learning having no respect or allegiance to the,_ 
community or country in which it exists~·· This assertion is 
unsound in principle and objectionable in practice"~. 
Another African leader who was outspoken on the role of the 
university was President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. "I know _,, ______ ,_.,,; 
~ askin~---~--9E~~!: ... ~e:a_~ ___ q_f."_.t:J:1~ Universit,y of East Afr~c~ (he 
said in 1963). I am asking its members to be both opjective 
and active, which is a difficult combination. What is more, I 
am asking this under circumstances in which I know that both 
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are liable to give rise to some misunder$tanding with the 
government and people. This will be reduced if there is 
complete honesty, but courage and self-sacrifice may be 
demanded from all of us, including the University members. 
Because I cannot claim that I, any more than my colleagues, 
will never mistake honest criticism for unconstitutional 
opposition. Nor can I honestly promise that our need for 
national unity in our struggles ahead will never lead us into 
the error of abusing the nonconformist. I hope we shall not 
make these mistakes, but of only one thing am I quite certain. 
The basis of human progress throughout history has been the 
existence of people who, regardless of the consequences to 
themselves, stood up when they believed it necessary and said 
'That is wrong; this is what we should do' ... Members of this. 
University) must serv:e. Africa as rner1ials, collecting and 
disseminating the ... we ought to w~nt. At the same time they 
must be torch bearers of our society, and the protectors of 
. •"""'"'--""-~'·' ~~'-""'''""''""""" ..• ,,·~·\-'~ ·-· " ·v., " 
the flame should we., in our urgency, endanger its 
brightness 11302 • 
--~-·~ 
In 1966 he r~E'.:1.53.-.~.~-~ed the notion that a university cou~.9., 
operate in isolation from government or that there was an 
- ....... , ..... ~ ',. ·-'""' 
unavoidable clash with the government as though "Government is 
not concerned with truth". As he further put it: 
"I fully accept that the task of a university 
is to seek for truth, and that its members 
should speak the truth as they see it 
regardless of consequences to themselves. But 
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you will notice the words 'to themselves'; I 
do not believe that they should do this 
regardless of the society"~. 
President Nyerere was prepared to spell out the moral grounds 
of the academic's obligation to speak out and to say what he 
had discovered: 
"The purpose of learning is the advancement of 
man. Knowledge which remains isolated from 
the people, or which is used by a few to 
exploit others, is therefore a betrayal. It 
is a particularly vicious kind of theft by 
false pretences. Students eat the bread and 
butter of peasants because they have promised 
a service in the future. If they are unable 
or unwilling to provide that service when the 
time comes, then the students have stolen from 
the peasants as surely as they had carried off 
their sacks of wheat in the night"~. 
It would appear that this view implied that this remained true 
even if students returned to the peasant or his 
representatives in government, the kind of knowledge that they 
did not expect to be given and did not much like when they 
were given it. Moreover, it would appear that Tanzania did 
not have a place for a "freedom" which allowed a small elite 
to exchange privileged or unpopular truths among themselves~. 
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Nyerere's speech at the inauguration of the University of 
Dar-es-Salaam, demonstrated a much more restricted view on the 
issue of academic independence than his previous speeches had 
done: 
"Having made clear why we are establishing it, 
and what we expect from it, and having done 
our best to select administrators and teachers 
capable of fulfilling our intentions, we have 
then to trust those we employ and those we 
select to attend it. We can watch and warn. 
We can demand that they should explain what 
they are doing and why - and we can tell them 
to change if that is necessary! We can 
instruct the staff to examine themselves and 
their work every year to conduct 
'post-mortems' with the students at the end of 
every course ... But we should be stupid to try 
to bind the University staff hand and foot, 
and move them like puppets. The University 
must be allowed to experiment, to try new 
courses and new methods. The staff must be 
encouraged to challenge the students and the 
society with new arguments, and to put forward 
new suggestions about how to deal with the 
problems of building a socialist Tanzania 
based on human equality and dignity. Further 
they must be allowed, and indeed expected, to 
challenge orthodox thinking on scientific and 
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other aspects of knowledge ... Only by allowing 
this kind of freedom to our University staff 
will we have a University worth its name in 
Tanzania ... For the University of 
Dar-es-Salaam will be able to serve out 
socialist purposes only if we accept that 
those whom we are paying to teach students to 
think, must themselves be allowed to think and 
speak their thoughts freely"~. 
The reason for quoting extensively from the 
President Nyerere is because they demonstrate 
speeches of 
the general 
trend on university autonomy and academic freedom in Africa. 
Before independence black political leaders would be critical 
of the colonial regime and the lack of autonomy and freedom of 
universities. After independence they would adopt a 
conciliatory approach in terms of which they would expect 
greater harmony between the university and the government. 
But when the honeymoon was over, they would be much more 
intolerant to the freedom that universities have wanted. 
It is for this reason that throughout the African continent 
post-secondary education institutions have erupted in 
protests, strikes and demonstrators. Students have risen 
against authoritarian regimes. African governments have often 
retaliated with closure, expulsions, imprisonments and even 
brutal physical force~. 
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Academics on the other hand have attempted to keep the flame 
of academic freedom alive. A typical example is a symposium 
that was organized in Kampala, Uganda, on 2-29 November 1990 
on the theme: ''Academic Freedom, Research and the Social 
Responsibility of the Intellectual in Africa". The academics 
debated critically the following sub-themes: 
(a) The state and academic freedom; 
(b) Civil society and academic freedom; 
(c) The intelligentsia and academic freedom; 
(d) Donors and academic freedom; and 
(e) The social responsibility of intellectuals. 
At the end of the symposium the African academics produced The 
Kampala Declaration on Intellectual Freedom and Social 
Responsibility. In its preamble the declaration states quite 
clearly that: "Intellectual freedom in Africa is currently 
threatened to an unprecedented degree" and in article 13 calls 
upon African states to take prompt and appropriate measures in 
respect of any infringement by state officials of the rights 
and freedoms of the intellectual community brought to their 
attention308 • It will be instructive to have a closer look at 
a few African countries. 
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5.5.2 UGANDA 
5.5.2.1 Introduction 
Tertiary education in Uganda was influenced by the colonial 
system. Makerere University was established in 1922 
originally as a technical school although in a fairly short 
time it had embarked on the offering of courses in Medicine, 
Agriculture, Elementary Engineering, Surveying and Teacher 
Education. It was the first tertiary institution in the whole 
of East Africa. No legal instrument specifically established 
Makerere as the highest institution of learning in East Africa 
as it then was~. This did not mean that Makerere evolved 
"naturally" or autonomously from the existing colonial 
educational programme. As a technical school it drew its 
resources mainly from the colonial government and offered 
courses that were approved by the colonial administration310 • 
By the early 1930's the government had not yet formulated a 
distinct policy on tertiary education. It also did not see 
the need to make statutory provision for the functioning of 
the college. Higher education at Makerere and elsewhere in 
East Africa was still in its formative stages of development. 
In March 1929, the directors of education of the three East 
African territories agreed that Makerere be the centre of 
higher education in the region. 
When a commission was appointed in 1935 to examine and report 
on higher education in East Africa, it gave further substance 
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to this decision. ~he commission examined the organization 
and operation of Makerere Collsge, ins ti tut ions or other 
agencies for vocational training connected with the college 
and the system of education fro:n which students at the college 
were drawn. Recommendations were made on the development and 
administration of the college in the light of the general 
interests and needs of the committees from which future 
students might be drawn and the education needs of the 
women311 • 
The commission made several other recommendations concerning 
education in general and Makerere College in particular. 
These included that: 
(a) all post-secondary courses at the college and its 
associated institutions should form the "Higher College 
of East Africa"; 
(b) the Higher College should have an autonomous governing 
body; 
(c) the principal and staff of the College be of "university 
type" and "university status 11 ; 
(d) professional courses in teacher education, medicine, 
agriculture and veterinary science continue; and 
(e) the College be developed as a centre for research. 
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Soon after the recommendations of the commission, an ordinance 
was passed by the governor to regulate the operation and 
development of the college. 
5.5.2.2 The Makerere College Ordinance of 1938 
The first legal instrument passed to regulate the operation of 
Makerere was designed to make provision for the control, 
administration and working of Makerere College. It clearly 
demonstrated that tertiary education was to be closely 
monitored and developed by the colonial state. The ordinance 
established an assembly of the College with a chairman 
appointed by the conference of East African governors312 • 
Other members included the principal of the college, one 
appointee of the native government of Buganda, another from 
the Makerere College Union Society and two from the Academic 
Board. The remainder of the assembly was to comprise 
appointees of the governors of the three territories and the 
British Resident of Zanzibar313 • The main function of the 
assembly was to receive and consider the annual report and 
accounts of the council and advise the council on questions of 
general policy in regard to the conduct of the college314 • 
The actual control over the administration and operation of 
the College was vested in a council that was established as a 
body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal315 • 
The chairman was to be appointed by the secretary of state, on 
the recommendation of the governor, following consul tat ion 
with the conference of East African governors of each 
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territory and the academic board. The main duties of the 
council were the management and control of the affairs, 
concerns and property of the College and to undertake that 
management and to exercise that control in accordance with the 
provisions of the ordinances and the directions of the 
governors, acting on behalf of the conference of East African 
governors. It also had to act at all times in a manner that 
appeared or was best calculated to promote the interests of 
the College316 • 
The council had a duty to consider any advice offered by the 
College assembly, and where such advice was not accepted, to 
report the matter to the assembly and to the governor. 
Specific duties entailed the consideration and submission for 
approval to the governor of the annual estimates of revenue 
and expenditure; fixing the scale of fees and boarding 
charges; regulations regarding the terms of service, duties 
and discipline of the staff and the establishment of an 
academic board and boards of studies. All members of staff 
were to be subject to the general authority of the council and 
of the principal, although officers seconded from the 
government were to be disciplined by the governor. The 
principal was to be appointed by the secretary of state on 
such terms and conditions to be fixed in consultation with the 
governor and the council317 • 
The dominant role played by the colonial and metropolitan 
state in the organization and control of the college 
demonstrated that the college did not have any academic 
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autonomy. The appointment of the principal of the college 
vested in the secretary of state as d~d the appointment of the 
chairman of the council. Frequent reference was made in the 
ordinance to the governor and the conference of East African 
Governors. Most of the duties of the council were overseen by 
the governor. In the constitution of the respective organs of 
the university college, government-appointees predominated318 • 
In the amendment to the 1938 Ordinance passed in 1941, the 
situation did not change to any considerable extent. The 1941 
Makerere College (Amendment) Ordinance319 incorporated the 
off ice of secretary of state in the formulation of the 
conditions of service, appointment and dismissal of staf f 320 • 
It also made provision for the secretary of state to remove 
the college principal on the recommendation of the council and 
the governor321 • One would have expected that as the College 
began to develop, measures would have been taken to allow it 
to function more autonomously of the state. On the contrary, 
the college had no autonomy. There was also agitation for 
freedom from colonial rule which was on the increase. The 
source of discontent was the growing awareness and agitation 
of the indigenous population. This also engulfed Makerere. 
As a result it was felt necessary that a firm hand be 
maintained over the College to deal with such indiscipline and 
the colonial state moved in directly and decisively to ensure 
that such control could be easily imposedm. 
It is interesting to note that there was no separation between 
the state and the university as was the case in Britain. This 
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shows that Britain was inconsistent in its colonial policy. 
She was prepared to do in the colonies what she did not do to 
its citizens at home. At the college for instance the 
representation of persons drawn from within the College was 
minimal. It ensured that state policy could on the whole be 
fully implemented in the operations of the institution (01-0n 
61). With the President as chancellor, the clearly political 
nature of his other off ice, revealed the absence of any 
independence between the state and the university323. 
The 1949 Act, which replaced the previous legislation, was not 
different from it. However, it abolished the college assembly 
and made provision for the appointment of a visitor by the 
secretary of state3~. The visitor was vested with the powers 
to revoke or amend section 7 of the Act relating to the 
membership of the college council after consulting the council 
and subject to the secretary's prior approval3~. 
him general advisory powers. 
It also gave 
The Act made the College council the main governing body of 
the institution with the governor as the remaining supervisory 
officer. There was also a marked reduction in the reference 
to the governor, the East African High Commission and the 
secretary of state. Although the secretary of state remained 
responsible for appointing the principal of the College, this 
was to be done after consultation with the visitor and the 
College council. He also retained the power to remove him, 
al though this could only be for good cause and on the 
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recommendation of the visitor and the council 326 • The governor 
no longer featured in this action. 
What accounted for this general relaxation of state control 
was that there was a general relaxation in the controls 
exercised by the colonial government over political and social 
life in the colonies in the post-war era. These developments 
coincided with the heightened agitation for liberation and 
self-government which commenced in the 1940's and epitomized 
by the Bataka Uprisings of 1945 and 1949. This led to the 
state adopting a "liberalized" attitude to social and 
political life in the colonies. Yet in the university 
governance the government appointees still predominated on the 
council, the activities of staff were strictly monitored and 
no African was appointed as a member of the council even 
thought some were eligiblem. 
In 1950 Makerere College students started to read for external 
degrees of the University of London. Makerere had thus become 
a University College of London. At the administrative level, 
the 1949 Act was still in operation and there was no legal 
instrument that regulated the relationship between the two 
institutions. The formal link with London signified the 
attainment of maturity on the part of Makerere. In 1961 
Makerere became Makerere University College as a result of the 
termination of the link with London due to the dawning of 
independence. In 1963 the University of East Africa was 
established, with Makerere, the University College of Nairobi 
and Dar-es-Salaam forming its three constituent colleges. The 
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1962 University of East Africa Act vested the institu~ion with 
the responsibility for u~iversity education within East Africa 
and it required it to co-operate with the governments or other 
appropriate bodies in the planned development of higher 
education, and, in particular to examine and approve proposals 
for new facilities, new departments, new degree courses or new 
subjects of study submitted to it by the constituent 
colleges 328 • 
The University was dissolved as a regional institution as a 
result of the growing economic crisis that confronted the 
three East African countries almost from independence. But 
even before the dissolution of the University of East Africa, 
steps had already been afoot to autonomize Makerere and make 
it an independent institution fully accountable ~o the 
government of Uganda. 
5.5.2.3 The post-colonial control of Makerere University 
On 12 January 1970, Ugandan President Obote set up a 
Visitation Committee to report and make recommendations on the 
status and direction of the education offered by Makerere at 
the time. Before the completion of the visitation report, 
parliament assented to the Makerere University (Interim 
Provisions) Act on 29 June 1970. The preamble to this Act 
stated that until the submission of the Visitation Committee 
Report, it was advisable that the law of Makerere University 
be delayed but interim provision should be made to establish 
Makerere University to enable it to carry on its educational 
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and other functions in the interim period. When the Makerere 
University, Kampala Act was passed on 5 October 1970, 
resembled the earlier Interim Act in many ways. This implied 
that the Visitation Committee was set up primarily as a 
cosmetic measure and that the government had already decided 
on the type of institution it wanted as well as the measure of 
control to be exercised over itm. 
5.5.2.4 . The Makerere University, Kampala Act 1970 
A characteristic feature of the 1970 Act was the introduction 
of extensive state control over the institution similar to the 
first colonial statute which governed Makerere. The Act made 
the President of the Republic automatic Chancellor of the 
University330 , with exclusive powers of appointment of the 
Vice-Chancellor, his deputy331 and the chairman of the 
university councilm. Extensive reference was made to the 
Minister (of education) in relation to the establishment of 
constituent collegesm, the appointment of the secretary and 
registrar34, the appointment of faculty deansm, professors and 
institute directors~ as well as the approval of any statutes 
made by the council for the government control and 
administration of the University"'. 
The minister could, if he deemed it to be in the public 
interest to do so, direct any university control over 
Makerere. This was in line with the rise of extensive 
dictatorial tendencies in the administration of Obote 
commencing from the middle of the 1960's. The powers given to 
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cabinet ministers gave the ministers virtual control over 
parastatal organizations and educational institutions. 
Makerere was therefore brought firmly under governmental 
control. This was a serious violation of its academic 
autonomy and freedom™. 
The dictatorial powers of the President were reflected in his 
being automatic Chancellor of the University. This was not 
simply a ceremonial position, although he could also confer 
degrees, but he was also empowered to appoint the 
Vice-Chancellor on such terms and conditions and for such 
period as the President might determinem. Thus an off ice 
that was supposed to be primarily academic and professional, 
was made highly political. The University was made a 
subsidiary of the government and this placed a check on the 
freedom of expression of both staff and students not to 
mention the control of the administration. For this reason 
the President had to intervene into every major crisis 
affecting the University. The Vice-Chancellor had therefore 
no fixed tenure of off ice. He could be removed at the 
pleasure of the President. Moreover, he could not take any 
stand which might not be liked by the government. Whenever 
there was a crisis on campus he would wait in trepidation. At 
the same time within the campus he would be a power unto 
him/herself and there existed no checks and balances to 
curtail the possible abuse of powey>IO. 
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5.5.2.5 The Makerere University, Kampala Act (Amendment} 
Decree, 1975 
The 1975 decree which amended the 1970 Act was a curious piece 
of legislation in that while it appeared to lessen the direct 
control of the state over the institutions, it also curtailed 
the staff and student organisation and representation. The 
reduction of ministerial control was seen in SS concerning the 
establishment of constituent colleges which had then to be 
done after consul tat ion with the council and the senate. 
Section 7.4 provided for consultation with the council and the 
senate. Section 7. 4 provided for consultation with the 
chairman of the council in the making of recommendations to 
the President on the appointment of a member of staff to act 
as Vice-Chancellor. The amended s8.2 still provided for the 
appointment of the secretary and registrar by the Minister, 
but acting on the advice of the appointments board on such 
terms and conditions as the Minister might determine. Similar 
amendments were m~de to sections 12. 1 concerning the 
appointment of faculty deans and 12.2 on the appointment of 
professors and directors. 
The curious nature of this decree is evident in the amendment 
of s22 concerning 
appointments board. 
responsibility " ... 
the constitution and powers of the 
The new section vested the board with the 
except as otherwise provided ... for the 
appointment, promotion, removal from service and discipline of 
all officers of the University". The exception in fact 
defeated the rule as the power over appointments and 
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dismissals of senior academic and administrative staff 
remained vested eit~e~ i~ the President, the Chancellor or the 
Minister. Moreover, the nine members of the board were still 
to be appointed by the Chancellor, with nc representation from 
within the UniversitY41 • 
The overtly fascist ideology of the Amin regime was reflected 
in the decree. It removed reference in section 9 of the Act 
concerning the membership of the council to "two members of 
the academic staff (elected by the Academic Staff 
Association)" and instead substituted "two members of staff 
elected from amongst themselves jointly by the academic staff 
and the senior administrative staff". The effect of this 
amendment was to make legal Amin's previous outlawing of the 
Academic Staff Association, on the grounds that the 
association was engaged in politically divisive activities. 
It also combined the representation of the academic staff with 
that of the senior administrative staff thereby reducing such 
representation to an even smaller figure than before. The 
decree thus confirmed the prevailing government attitude that 
academic freedom was a privilege and not a right. The same 
view was apparent in the amendment of section 16 concerning 
the membership of the senate which deleted reference to 
student representation~. 
The Minister's general powers of direction were greatly 
strengthened by the amended section 35 which specified that 
the Minister might give directions on any matter to a 
university authority as to the exercise of any powers and the 
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performance of any functions under the Act and the authority 
would be compelled to comply with such directions. 
The situation in Uganda was such that politically it was 
impossible to challenge the authority of the state. Anyone 
who did so, did so at his own peril~. The formal structures 
of staff and student organizations were outlawed having no 
vehicle for the expression or communication of any grievances. 
The 1976 invasion of the campus by armoured troops made ugly 
face of the authoritarian require clear~. The government was 
characterized by the abuse of power and the utter contempt for 
the rule of law. This demonstrated that where there is gross 
violation of the civil liberties of the ordinary citizen it is 
impossible for academic freedom to flourish because human 
freedom tends to be indivisible~. 
In spite of the take over by the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) the position of the University and academic autonomy did 
not improve to any significant extent. Al though the NRM 
relaxed some of the more draconian controls over the 
university when the staff and students challenged the 
government on fundamental issues, relating to governance and 
the economy, the government reacted by suppressing the 
students and staff~. 
The confrontation between the university and the government 
has been a reflection of the socio-economic and political 
realities of Africa. For many of the l>~frican countries 
tertiary education has been regarded as a luxury. What has 
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been of primary importance is pr~mary and secondary education. 
Issues like academic autonomy and freedom have therefore been 
treated with nonchalance~. 
At a symposium on Academic Freedom in Kampala in 1990 many 
questions relating to legal control over the University were 
raised and debated. The conclusion was that to the extent 
such control must exist, they must be based on dialogue and 
democratic practice. The removal of the rights of association 
and assembly to students and staff, the dictatorial control 
exercised by the university council and excessive emphasis on 
discipline, without due regard to the grievances of students 
and staff are only a recipe for conflict. They only heighten 
the undemocratic nature of those controls especially the use 
of armed forces on the campus~. "The ultimate conclusion is 
that draconian laws in place at tertiary institutions cannot 
work, if the objective is to secure the acquiescence of the 
university in the operation of the neocolonial state, whether 
that operation is characterized as 'development', 
'modernization', 'science and technology', or the fight 
against 'poverty, ignorance and disease'. Nothing short of 
the transformation of the character of the neocolonial state 
will lead to the positive transformation of the society over 
which it governs" 349 • 
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5.5.3 ZAMBIA 
5.5.3.1 Introduction 
The Zambian higher education system developed against a 
colonial and post-colonial backdYop. It was characterized by 
limited provision of facilities and restrictive access to 
apprenticeship training. FoY a long time Zambia (then 
Northern Rhodesia) shared the services of a common 
institution, the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland with 
Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Owing to colonial rule 
university autonomy and academic freedom were not a major 
priori ty3-<o. 
Upon independence in 1964 the Zambian government set out to 
reform the previous restrictions and deprivations in the 
higher education system. It was decided to establish a 
university in Zambia and to reorganize technical education and 
vocational training. In 1966 the University of Zambia was 
opened351 • 
Zambia entered its independence as a 
dominated by the ruling United National 
pluralist system 
Independence Party 
(UNIP). However, pluralism was short-lived and in 1973 a 
one-party political system was established by UNIP after a 
national referendumm. The introduction of a one-party state 
meant the curtailment of civil liberties which had a negative 
impact on academic autonomy and freedom. 
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5.5.3.2 The University of Zambia Act 1972 
The University cf Zambia was established by the Act of 1965. 
In 1972 a new Act was enacted. It provided for the 
appointment of the Chancellor by the President on the advice 
of the council™. Provision was made for the appointment of 
the Vice-Chancellor by the Chancellor on the advice of the 
council. The Vice-Chancellor would be the academic and 
administrative head of the university~. The tenure of office 
of the Vice-Chancellor would be determined by the councilm. 
These provisions demonstrated that there was no clear autonomy 
for the university as the President was responsible for the 
appointment of the Chancellor who in turn had to appoint the 
Vice-Chancellor. 
The Act also provided for the establishment of the council 
responsible for the general control and supervision of the 
property and policy of the university356 • The council 
consisted of various members the majority of whom were 
appointed by the President357 • This also demonstrated the 
political control over the university through the President's 
appointment of the majority of the members of the council 
which is the policy making body of the university. 
The pattern of political control over the university was 
similar to other one-party states in Africa. The tendency in 
Africa has been the dominance of the ruling party and the 
consequent one-man rule. 
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5.5.3.3 The University of Zambia Act of 1987 
The University Zambia Act of 1987 provides for the 
establishment of the university and senate to administer the 
affairs of the University. The council members are appointed 
by the chancellor who is also President, on the advice and 
recommendation of the relevant authorities. Members of 
council are drawn from the university community, local 
authority area, parliament, selected ministries, the 
international academic community and the Zambian public. The 
council is responsible for the general control of the 
university358. 
The senate is the academic governing body. It organizes, 
controls and directs the entire academic life of the 
university in teaching, research, assessment and general 
standards of education. Senate members are appointed mainly 
from the university community. Deans and directors are 
members. Other members include the librarian, dean of 
students and professorial and nonprofessorial academics. 
Non-university members are few and are appointed by the 
Vice-Chancellor359 • 
A ~ollegial system of authority and participation forms the 
basis of the administration of the University. Formal 
committees at different levels allow wide participation by 
both academic and non-academic staff in the decision-making 
process. The University Act allows membership of most of the 
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key bodies and their standing commitcees by academic and non-
academic scaff. 
Academic staff are represented on the University council and 
its standing commit tees, the senate, boards of studies and 
other university and department-based unit committees. Non-
academic staff are represented on ~he University councils and 
all their subcommittees except the appointments, finance and 
disciplinary committees~. 
Despite this collegial system of administration, there is 
virtually little academic autonomy. This is evidenced by the 
dominant position played by the President and the fact that 
the majority members of the council are government appointees. 
There is therefore no clear separation between the government 
and the University. This is not surprising because Zambia was 
for a long time a one-party state. One-party states have been 
characterized by an authoritarian style of government which 
dominates all sectors of society including the tertiary-
education sector. 
Admittedly since the 1980's and especially after the collapse 
of communism in many Eastern European countries, UNIP came 
under severe criticism within Zambia. The pressure on UNIP 
mounted to such an extent that in 1990 Zambia abandoned the 
one-party for a pluralist democracy. Despite these political 
changes a culture of democracy has not completely evolved and 
as a result academic autonomy and freedom have not flourished. 
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5.5.4 ZIMBABWE 
5.5.4.1 University autonomy and academic freedom in general 
5.5.4.1.l Historical background 
The origins of the University of Zimbabwe can be traced back 
to the years of World War II, when a group of white business 
and professional people primarily interested in an institution 
providing university education for white Rhodesian youth, 
formed the Rhodesia University Association. In addition to 
this group, 
liberals, 
there was also a much smaller group of white 
mainly missionaries and clergymen, who were 
interested in providing university education for Rhodesian 
blacks. The latter had the support of the British government, 
which was concerned with the provision of higher education for 
blacks in the three territories of Central Africa, namely 1 the 
then Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) 1 Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 
and Nyasaland (Malawi) The Rhodesia University Association 
later promoted a bill in the Southern Rhodesia parliament 
establishing an inaugural board, which was to lead to the 
formation of the university161 • 
When the University College of Rhodesia was established in 
1955, it was therefore a product of two distinct and 
conflicting forces or impulses- 11 the impulse of white 
Rhodesians' nationalism, which wanted to have a university of 
its own, and the impulse of Colonial Office thinking about the 
provision of higher education for Africans in Northern 
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Rhodesia and Nyasa land 11361 • This was further influenced by the 
fact that local Rhodesian whites were not able to raise the 
necessary finance to start a university without compromising 
with the desire of the colonial off ice that Africans be 
allowed to attend it. The fact, however, that the 11 A11 level 
was a requirement for entry into university was regarded as a 
sufficient bar to prevent a lot of Africans to enter the 
university for a long time~. 
There is therefore no doubt that the issue of university 
autonomy and academic freedom was not uppermost in the scheme 
of things of the university college364 • The international 
backers of the university college were also aware that there 
was no local grouping committed to university autonomy which 
could guarantee the new institution freedom of action. There 
were those among whites who felt that a Rhodesian university 
should be a proper university and consequently like others in 
the anglophone world. There was also a measure of support for 
this view among certain politicians although others took this 
with a grain of salt. Nonetheless they took advantage of 
these views with a view to giving the new university an 
elaborate and artificial protection. A royal charter dated 
February 1955 brought the infant university into legal 
existence as an autonomous body with all powers of the 
university college vested in a council charged with the duty 
of governing the institution. The charter provided for the 
creation of an academic board to control, regulate and 
supervise instruction, education and research, subject to 
review by the council. Power to appoint staff was vested in 
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the council on the advice of a selection board drawn fr.:::m the 
academic staff. The council itself consisted ten 
academics, seven nominees from government bodies, a~ :;;even 
nominees from the business and professional sectors Its 
royal charter and its affiliation with the Uni ver~ y of 
London were aimed at protecting both academic free· and 
academic standards against local pressures~. 
The outcome of all this, however, did not please anyo~ One 
newspaper commented as follows: "The University CoL ~ of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland has been an institution foreign this 
land right from its very inception. It has been concei not 
to help this country as we know it, but to promote to 
something outlandish, way out of recognition. It has i· jead 
in the clouds, its soul in London, and its heart heaven nows 
where" 367 • 
The University was started at a time in Rhodesian histc; 
the liberal, assimilationist, meritocratic perspect 
white Rhodesian politics, always present but never asc'. 
was perhaps at its most favourable position to make its 
felt. "The confluence of its aspirations at this pc 
time with the international influence brought to bear 
British Government and other grant-awarding agencies p) 
what may perhaps be its single most significant and er 
accomplishment - tradition, protected against some of tr 
..vhen 
in 
1nt / 
ght 
in 
the 
lCed 
~ing 
:-tore 
flagrant particularisrns of its environing society by its ~yal 
Charter" 368 • 
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The University College was therefore exposed to conflicting 
expectations. Whites did not feel it met their needs and 
there were extremely few Africans in it to have any meaningful 
impact on African society. Some valued the protection offered 
by the royal charter and the association with London as the 
threats to academic freedom posed by the prevailing political 
climate could be foreseen. Nonetheless, the views of white 
society had an influence on the university. This was 
evidenced, among others, by the withdrawal of the offer of 
appointment by the principal Dr Walter Adams, to Dr Bernard 
Chidzero who was to have been the first African lecturer, when 
he discovered that he was married to a white woman. There 
were other instances like the drying up of municipal grants to 
the university if the extra-academic activities of the staff 
with a political inclination were publicized~. 
5.5.4.2 The era of Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
The conditions that favoured an assimilationist, meritocratic 
voice in white Rhodesian politics did not endure. In 1962, a 
government came to power committed to the reaffirmation of the 
racial principle as a fundamental factor in the structuring of 
Rhodesian society. From then until the final overthrow of the 
government nearly 20 years later, the university was thrown on 
to the defensive, regarded as a "Trojan horse in the midst of 
a country fighting for its existence as a white state" 370 • It 
managed to survive, with considerable political difficulty 
through various strategies. These included a degree of 
independent funding from overseas sympathisers; the fact that 
5 ~,, .C.J... 
it was the country's only provider of trained people in 
certain fields, and the recognition that its very existence 
was an important symbol of international legitimacy for a 
government which needed ·~ ll... "Its existence was a major 
legitimating factor for the state, the strength of which 
paradoxically was in direct proportion to the degree to which 
it was permitted to operate in its universalistic mode". This 
meant that the state of Rhodesia, at the time under deep 
international suspicion of not being free, not being 
multiracial, and indeed of hardly being a state at all, was 
able to say to a sceptical world, "we have a free, multiracial 
international university", and acquire some legitimacy from 
doing sa311 • 
Because of the prevailing political situation, some academics 
felt that they could do something and that the best way of 
doing this was to join the African nationalist parties. But 
they also appreciated that if they were attacked, searched or 
banned from meetings or even deported for this, what would 
have happened to them would have been the violation of civic 
liberty and not academic freedom. Although some politicians 
argued that academic freedom was untouched this was highly 
doubtful. When some members of the academic staff became 
involved in a sit-in campaign against the colour bar in 
Salisbury, the university authorities were extremely critical 
of this, as they did not see it as an expression of academic 
freedom372 • This criticism is evident in a letter which the 
Principal wrote to these members: 
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"The College Council is worried by the effect 
on the College of the publicity aroused by the 
political activities of some members of the 
staff... The problem is not one of academic 
freedom. If it were, the Council would not 
hesitate to resist any attempts to restrict 
the legitimate academic activities of any 
member of 
research 
its staff, whether in teaching, 
problem is or publication. The 
whether and how far a member of the academic 
staff, in his personal capacity as a citizen, 
should feel himself free to engage in public 
political activity. Some classes of citizen 
are by rule or custom debarred from any such 
activity; members of the civil service and 
judges are examples ... The Council sees no 
reason for extending this. . . to university 
academic staff... On the other hand there may 
be some limit to the extent or kind of public 
political activity that is appropriate for a 
member of a university staff. . In the 
present, controversy has led to hostile 
criticism of the College itself, and to some 
damage to its interests, in the loss of 
prospective students, in the loss of financial 
support, 
and in 
and the loss of financial support, 
the creation of doubts in the 
objectivity of 
Membership of 
its teaching and research ... 
a university (involves) a 
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special obligation of discret.ion and 
responsibility in both public statements and 
actions. The obligaticn is two-fold, an 
obligation to speak and to lead, and an 
obligation to weigh with scrupulous care the 
effects of speech and action. Membership 
implies a loyalty to the interests and 
strength of the university institution 
itself "373 • 
The university was generally regarded as a threat to the 
racial particularism of the state. The white Rhodesian 
solution was not to do away with the university, but to 
"discipline" it, either by placing it under much stricter 
government control or by making it all-white, with the 
possible creation of a separate black uni versi ty374 • 
Although the university was regarded as autonomous, there were 
various avenues through which the government could exert 
pressure on the university. The most pervasively important of 
these strategies was the increasing dependence of the 
university on government funding. After UDI, access to 
British government funding was almost completely cut off, as 
was access to UNESCO funds and personnel. Consequently the 
university became almost entirely dependent upon the Rhodesian 
government for both operating budget and development capital. 
A further important control in the hands of government was its 
ability to prohibit the entry to the country of university 
appointees or prospective students and to detain or deport 
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members of the university who incurred its displeasure, a 
prerogative the government used fre~~ently during the histoYy 
of the university. The government could also exercise a 
degree of control on student intake by its allocation of 
scholarship and bu~sary funds and, indirectly, could influence 
the university's curriculum development and the subject choice 
of black students by its influence on the racial aspects of 
the occupational structure into which black graduates would 
move. Access to research data could and was often denied to 
scholars, although it must be conceded that the government's 
performance in this regard was better than that of many 
African countries. Censorship laws were enacted which 
inhibited in some cases the publication of the results of 
research and analysis and restricted access to the range of 
academic literature necessary for full debate. All these 
factors, coupled with veiled threats to intervene in the 
university's affairs to "maintain public order" had a 
pervasive subjective effect in inhibiting the performance of 
the university's critical role from the universalistic 
perspective. Most of these pressures were, however, indirect 
and not direct threats to the university's autonomy. The 
response of the council was partly determined by this fact, 
partly by the composition of the council and partly by the 
means available to the council to counteract them375 • 
The council's membership consisted of government nominees, 
academic nominees and nominees of business and professional 
interest. In essence the council espoused the assimilationist 
perspective of the "liberal" white Rhodesian element of the 
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fifties. Committed to a university of international academic 
standard on the British model, to which access could be 
provided on a meritocratic basis, the council was strongl}' 
disposed to defend the university's formal autonomy. It used 
various strategies to achieve this purpose 376 • In the 
difficult years the university manoeuvred on many different 
fronts to ttmanipulate its resources in the bargaining process 
to maintain the degree of autonomy necessary to perpetuate the 
universalist, rational ethos of the university traditionttm. 
Certain bargaining strengths allowed the university a degree 
of autonomy and to exercise a measure of academic freedom not 
anticipated or intended by the state. It maintained and 
implemented its prerogative to admit students solely on the 
basis of academic criteria. In its teaching and research it 
maintained a constructively critical universalistic 
perspective, subjecting to the test of rationality the goals 
and values of Rhodesian society. It provided its students, 
black and white, with an alternative communal context in which 
different racial perspectives could be evaluated on the basis 
of interpersonal contact as well as by intergroup debatem. 
5.5.4.3 The post-independence era 
From 1980 onwards, the successor to the University of 
Rhodesia, 
different 
the University of Zimbabwe, 
political climate in which 
was operating in a 
the black African 
majority which now formed the government was demanding radical 
changes in the university-3'9. The price of survival under the 
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previous white government had, among other things, been a pace 
of Africanisation of academic staff that was felt to be slow, 
and although black students had continued to be admitLed, iL 
was not in proportion to the ethnic make up of the 
populationm. While the university maintained the principle 
of non-racialism and often defended it, the pace of 
Africanisation seen in terms of student intake and staff 
appointments, was for a variety of reasons, regarded as slow. 
This was a cause for much tension and suspicion between black 
and white staff. This was so even though over the years there 
had been co-operation and intermingling. Under a repressive 
minority white government the university's meritocratic values 
had been perceived as an instrument for preserving black 
African participation in a multi-racial university, but under 
a representative African government the university would have 
to pay attention to the need to increase this on a racially 
sensitive and selective basis~. 
In September 1980, a former dean of the law faculty at the 
University of Dundee, Walter Kamba, was 
vice-chancellor at the University of Zimbabwe. 
appointed 
The term 
"Africanisation" was replaced with "Zimbabwenization" which 
required that non-Zimbabweans be appointed to permanent posts 
only if no appointable Zimbabwean was available. 
virtually all departmental headships were in 
At this time 
white hands. 
Kamba undertook that current contract and tenure arrangements 
would not be affected. At this time a three-phase policy 
modelled on the American affirmative action was implemented. 
This meant the removal of discrimination, equalisation of 
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opportunity and redressal. Kamba's policy involved a decisive 
shift of departmental control into black hands and a review of 
staff appointment procedures~. 
Having implemented a redressal Kamba next moved on the 
departmental issue. University Ordinance 25 of 1982 had 
separated professional status from departmental administration 
which was delegated to the department chairperson appointed by 
the Vice-Chancellor. The chairpersons did not have to be full 
professors. In January 1983, Kamba appointed a large number 
of blacks to department chair posts, although in a number of 
departments white also were appointed. As "chairperson" 
implies consultation in a way that "head" does not, this was 
perceived as a move towards democracy. It also had the effect 
of Africanising the middle echelons of the university and 
creating the perception among black staff that control of the 
university had effectively passed into black hands. 
Next, Kamba addressed the prevalent view that whites had been 
appointed above their qualifications, and blacks below. In 
1982 he appointed a Vice-Chancellor's working committee to 
review salary notches, grading and tenure issues. The black 
majority in the commit tee, gave more weight to academic 
excellence, less to diffuse experience criteria, and advocated 
tougher promotion criteria. A 1983 ordinance formalised the 
committee's findings by providing a review channel for staff 
who felt aggrieved. In 1985 there were 35 applications for 
review, four from whites and of these, seven were promoted. 
The committee's review gave greatest weight to the most 
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traditional academic criterion, 
publications383 • 
5.5.4.4 The Zimbabwe Act of 1982 
namely, research 
The Zimbabwe Act of 1982 replaced the previous charter of the 
University of Rhodesia. The objects of the university were 
regarded as "the advancement of knowledge, the diffusion and 
extension of arts, sciences and learning, the provision of 
higher education and research and so far as is consistent with 
those objects, the nurturing of the intellectual, aesthetic, 
social and moral growth of the students at the 
University ... 11384 • 
Section 5 (1) of the Act prohibits discrimination in the 
membership of the university on the basis of political belief, 
race, colour, origin, nationality or sex in the employment of 
any person as a member of the academic or administrative staff 
or employee and in the admission of students. Section 5(1) 
provides that nothing in this sub-section will be deemed to 
prevent preference being given in the making of appointments 
and promotions or in the admission of students to citizens and 
residents of Zimbabwe. 
5.5.4.5 The university-government relations 
The constitution of the university especially the senior 
membership and the composition of the council demonstrates 
that there is no clear separation between the government and 
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the university. It clearly shows more overt government: 
control than was the case before. ~he President of Zimbabwe 
is, for instance the Chancellor of the University. In this 
capacity he is the Chief Officer and not only has power to 
preside over any assembly or meeting held by or unaer the 
authority of the university385 , he also has power to appoint 
the Vice-Chancellor after consultation with the Minister of 
Education and the council. 
appointment386 • 
This appointment is a contract 
The Vice-Chancellor is the chief academic, administrative and 
disciplinary officer of the universit:y, with general 
responsibility for maintaining and promoting the efficiency, 
effectiveness and good order of the university337 • In this 
capacity he has wide powers to discipline staff and students, 
to control the admission of students and to suspend or 
dissolve any student organization~. 
Provision is also made for the appointment of one or more 
Pro-Vice-Chancellors by the council with the approval of the 
Minister. The Pro-Vice-Chancellor has such duties and powers 
as may be delegated to him by the Vice-Chancellor389 • 
A disturbing feature of the Act is the composition of the 
council. The council is dominated by government nominees. 
Not only as the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and 
Pro-Vice-Chancellors ex officio members of the council, but a 
majority of the members are appointed by the Ministerm. This 
therefore demonstrates that there is no clear separation 
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between the government and the University. Although it could 
be argued, that there is no harm in such a relationship, there 
is no doubt that it has a negative effect on university 
autonomy and academic freedom as has been demonstrated in 
other African countries. 
No doubt when the new black majority government took over, 
some, especially among black academics, felt that there would 
be no harm in having more governmeLt intervention into the 
affairs of the University. After all it was a democratically-
elected and therefore legitimate government which also had a 
mandate to remove discrimination and expedite the process of 
transformation. They undoubtedly believed that government 
intervention would always be benevolent. But this would not 
always be so. 
A number of incidents in 1988 and 1989 on the campus of 
Zimbabwe led to direct government intervention into the 
University. A crackdown on "left wing" campus critics of 
Zimbabwe's officially Marxist government sent shock waves 
about the future of academic freedom. Scholars were concerned 
that anti-student violence by Zimbabwe's democratically-
elected and predominantly black government might be used by 
neighbouring South Africa's white government to justify its 
more drastic suppression of dissent. Conflict began on 
September 29, 1988 when riot police used clubs, teargas and 
rubber bullets to block a demonstration organized by the 
University of Zimbabwe and Harare Polytechnic Student 
Representative Councils at what they regarded as the 
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government's failure to follow its own socialist principles. 
Subsequent to this, an outspoken law lecturer was expelled 
because he was suspected of sparking the protests. The law 
faculty reacted by condemning the expulsion of the lecturer 
and by criticising President Mugabe391 • 
In the subsequent months the government threatened action 
against "radical" lecturers and students. This provoked a 
strong reaction from academics at the University. A number of 
academics signed an open letter supporting the right to 
demonstrate and opposing the government's attack on human 
rights and academic freedom392 • 
In October 1989 an ugly confrontation between the students and 
the police took place on campus. This followed on the arrest 
of two student leaders. Vice-Chancellor Walter Karnba decided 
to close the University in consultation with President Mugabe 
after demonstrators had set fire to the his car. More 
students were arrested. The Vice-Chancellor said that 
academic freedom did not protect extreme anti-government 
language such as that of students. He defended the right of 
police to intervene on campus when they saw fit. A year 
later, Prof. Karnba decided to retire citing "interference from 
non-professional fingers" as one of the reasons for his 
decision393 • 
The announcement by Prof. Kamba of his intention to retire 
came at a time when there was confrontation between the 
government and the University on the University Amendment Bill 
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which members of the University community regarded as denying 
them academic freedom. The Bill eventually became the 
University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 1990, under protest from 
lecturers and students~. The University community expressed 
concern at the fact that there was no democratic participation 
in the passing of the Amendment Act. Submissions from the 
University community had been ignored by the government; 
Parliament as the people's instrument for realising the hard 
won democratic traditions, was denied the fullest input and 
digestion of views from the University community over the 
Amendment Act. Moreover, the University community expressed 
concern over various aspects of the Act relating to the 
Minister's power of appointing staff, the Vice-Chancellor's 
powers, the Minister's role in appointing members of the 
council and the staff disciplinary procedure•. All of this 
fell on deaf ears. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
When one considers what has been discussed above, one might be 
inclin~.? __ t,.~ say. the idea of an autonomous university is a 
myth396. 
----·,--.. 
This is so because even countries like the United 
------.,, 
States and Britain, not to mention African states, have tended 
.,,,,,.,.,,..._.,.""' -,_,,. -, ,- +,,,_,_, __ ~-""-·'·'''h 
to limit the scope of what may. be regarded as legitimate 
academic autonomy. The better view, however, is that there is 
~~------.-·---·-" 
no absolute uni vers,..itY~.a:u.t...onQJI!Y but only degrees of relative 
autonomy. It would appear that no stp..te will suppo:rt a 
-·-
university or allow it to exist within its midst unless this 
existence is perceived to be functional for its preservation 
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and extension. The university has its own functional 
~·"•<-,_.--.....,---·-~,,. <' 
requisites and, in so far as it has a universalistic 
perspective, will have its own reference point for action 
embedded in an academic sub-culture which is considered to be 
international397 • The degree to which it attains the autonomy 
necessary to maintain this perspective will, to a large 
extent, depend on the continuous bargaining process between 
the institution and its environing society. The university is 
obviously in a weaker position than the government, because it 
is dependent on the government for subsidy. Its role and its 
status is therefore the result of a "trade-off", an exchange, 
which is constantly being redefined. Moreover, the result of 
the interchange can produce unintended and unanticipated 
consequences, characteristic of the interaction between the 
institutions of education and politics in societies 
everywhere398 • 
From the afore-going comparative perspective, South Africa 
a number of lessons to learn as to what should be done 
what should not be done. These lessons can be learnt ~ot only 
from Britain and the United States, but also from the African 
countries. What may be learnt from the African experience are 
broad policy issues on academic autonomy. From the American 
perspective the ~ourts can learn to deal with a number of 
issues that impinge on academic autonomy and freedom. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The issue of university autonomy and academic freedom is as 
old as the universities themselves. It is as old as it is 
fundamental. For this reason it cannot be questioned. What 
may be questioned is the extent of autonomy and academic 
freedom; hence the need for re-assessment. Although it is 
customary to regard academic autonomy as being traceable to 
the time. The one was the 
centuries, two models emerged at 
f 7 h~iogna model where the autonomy 
....__...~~. ~ ..... ...,_., 
the twelfth and thirteenth 
concerned the freedom of the students to learn and the 
_..students were in control of their masters. According to the {_'],,/ 
1:§:Ei..§-~.1!1-°-.9:.tl autonomy related to the teachers who had the 
freedom to teach and the student had little autonomy. The 
reason behind these differences is that the students of 
Bologna were more mature and experienced people. Most of them 
were already working being businessmen and other influential 
people. The students of Paris on the other hand were still 
young and inexperienced1 • 
. t:jer, other models devel~d, namely the ~~ntian modJ;l, the 
~poleonic model and the British and German mod.els, most of 
which were a further development of the ~ar~s moq~J. These 
models themselves have not remained static and have changed as 
a result of economic and political factors. These changes 
have been more in the direction of greater governmental 
intervention especially because the government has come to 
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perform more duties in the modern age than was the case 
:!Jef ore2 • 
One of the factors which facilitated t: development of 
university autonomy and academic freedom a· the inception of 
universities was the system of guilds whict 4s generally used 
by people involved in trade and craf manship. The 
characteristiss of coherence and independer. which the guilds 
had in running their internal affairs wa2 appealing to the 
scholars of the time and they emulated thes~ 
Another factor which contributed to tr>: development of 
university autonomy was the fact that u versities had no 
property in the form of buildings anc:. other immovable 
structure. For this reason they hir-· other people· s 
buildings for their lectures. What appear_J as a weakness on 
the one hand, was a strength on the other. It was used as an 
effective weapon by the university in ba:r·caining for better 
rights and privileges. If they were badly reated in one city 
they could decide to migrate to another. .every threat of a 
university to leave a city was a seriou~ one to the city 
authorities, because it meant loss of po ~tial revenue and 
prestige to the town or city. In a numbe::: :if instances this 
was used effectively against city authorit' - 4 
The possession of a great degree of indep I dence meant trat 
universities had a great measure of freedc<c· in the managemr-nt 
of their internal affairs. This was also conducive to the 
development of academic freedom. The auto~omy of universities 
I 
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did not mean that they were a.oove the law or the secular 
authorities. On the contrary 1 the universities subjected 
themselves to the law and to the secular authorities. They 
used the emperor and the pope to obtain more powers to run 
their affairs or to protect themselves against city 
authorities. 
From this account it is clear that university I autonomy ',/ 
developed not as a deliberate goal of the university 1 but as a 
by-product of the universities in their struggle against the v~ 
church or city authorities. University autonomy and academic 
freedom were obviously affected by various social 1 economic 
and political factors throughout the history of the 
development of the universities so that the type of autonomy 
universities have today is different from what they had then. 
The greatest single factor which has accounted for the 
limitation of autonomy is the fact that 9overnments all over 
the world have come to be responsible for a significant 
portion of the funding of universities. Implicit in this 
funding has been an expectation of loyalty to the government. 
Moreover[ governments have felt justified to stipulate certain 
conditions to the giving of subsidies. These are aimed at 
ensuring accountability. In this way therefore the autonomy 
is defined by the government and not by the university. 
Throughout the centuries 1 however, university autonomy and 
academic freedom have been regarded as the corner-stones of 
the university system. This is so, especially since the 
Humboldtian era i.n Germany because the role of the university 
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was regarded as that of teaching and research. Teaching and 
research have become an inseparable whole which sets the 
university apart from other institutions that teach or do 
research. A university that has no academic autonomy 
freedom is therefore regarded as a contradiction in terms. 
The significance of university autonomy and academic freedom 
today is of more than historical interest. The historical 
dimension is only important in as far as it demonstrates the 
resilience and tenacity of these concepts. The significance 
of university autonomy and academic freedom is based on the 
fact that universities have to generate and disseminate 
knowledge and information. In order to be able to do this 
effectively, they must enjoy a great measure of autonomy and 
freedom to run their internal affairs and to decide on what 
research to do and the academics should be able to decide not 
only what research to undertake, but also what ideas to 
propagate. 
The definition of autonomy that has become a classic not only 
here but has also been g1:J.oteq with a:pprovCl,l in numerous 
American cases is that it entails the freedom of a university 
to determine for itself on academic grounds only who should 
teach, what should be taught, how it should be taught and who 
should be admitted as students. Although this definition has 
later been found to be narrow, it st ill remains a useful 
guideline in demarcating the limits of legitimate autonomy. 
The limits of this autonomy are important because some people 
have problems as ~o how an institution that is subsidized by 
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the government can claim to be autonomous from the government. 
Is it not true that he who pays the piper calls the tune, they 
Notwithstanding this view, there is no doubt that a university 
needs autonomy and a measure of freedom for its academics if 
it has to play its role of generating and disseminating 
knowledge effectively. Academic freedom is important because 
it enables academics to think freely, to speculate and to 
experiment with new ideas. Im~ortant developments have been 
spearheaded by those people who think freely and creatively. 
Knowledge generated through this creative and critical 
thinking is important for the development of society. 
Academic freedom is also important because it allows for 
critical scrutiny of all aspects of society, social, economic 
and political and facilitates re-evaluation and renewal. 
Knowledge is advanced through critical inquiry and not through 
encouraging orthodoxy or adherence to accepted dogma. 
Politicians and other members of society tend to react 
negatively to new ideas even if they are ultimately to the 
benefit of society. Experience has taught that if free 
thinkers are muzzled, society in general suffers. Societies 
that allow for freedom of thought and speculation tend to be 
more advanced socially, economically and politically than 
those that do not. 
Another just if i ca ti on for academic freedom is that 
universities are regarded as institutions for the generation 
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and dissemination of knowledge. This means that when they are 
established there is an implicit understanding that they will 
do what they were created for. It would therefore be 
inconsistent to punish academics for what they are supposed to 
do or to restrict universities from what they are supposed to 
do. A university without autonomy and academic freedom is not 
strictly a university. Although this view may be 
questionable, it emphasises an important aspect of a 
university. 
Although the names "university autonomy" and "academic 
freedom" are often used synonymously, they are distinguishable 
from each other. Autonomy refers to the ability of a 
university to take decisions relating to the institution as a 
/whole, its ability to decide who should teach, what should be 
t \ ~· 
\'taught, the proportion between teaching and research and who 
,¥should be admitted to study. It relates to the managerial and 
administrative functions of the university. The university 
should perform these without outside interference or pressure. 
Academic freedom relates to the freedom of the individual 
academic to teach, to do research, to espouse ideas that may 
be new and even unpopular and not be sanctioned for holding 
those views. It involves even the decision as to what 
research to undertake and to publicize the results of that 
research, either individually or collectively. It also 
entails freedom to participate in the decision-making 
processes of the university and freedom to associate. This 
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freedom also extends to students so ~hat they can learn and 
express ideas and views freely. 
Although university autonomy is distinguishable from academic 
freedom, these are mutually interdependent. University 
autonomy is a necessary although not a sufficient precondition 
for academic freedom. Academic freedom can only thrive in an 
autonomous institution although even an autonomous institution 
can stifle academic freedom. But there can be little or no 
academic freedom in a university that is not autonomous. Both 
the university and the individual academic have this freedom 
and autonomy. Thus in terms of the Constitution the 
individual should be able to raise the defence of academic 
freedom if the university as employer infringes it and the 
university should be able to raise this defence against 
external interference in its internal affairs. The individual 
can raise this defence not only against the university as 
employer, but also against the government or other outside 
interference. Although the interim Constitution has been 
regarded as being of vertical and not of horizontal 
application, and although the university is not a government 
organ, it is generally bound by the bill of rights and 
consequently by the provision on academic freedom6 • 
University autonomy and academic freedom are institutional and 
not ordinary human rights. They are derived from membership 
of an institution and not from being human in general. This, 
however, does not mean that they are not important. On the 
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contrary, they aye fundamental to the existence and 
functioning of the university and the creation of knowledge7 • 
What has also emerged is that university autonomy and academic 
freedom can only flourish in a free and democratic society. 
The reason for this is that human freedom is one and 
indivisible. In a society where there is little civic 
liberty, it becomes difficult to defend or to promote academic 
autonomy and freedom which may be regarded as elitist. That 
is why in many of the African states university autonomy and 
academic freedom have not flourishe~ . 
.,,,..-\ The concept of autonomy is not immutable and static. It j shif0;;:~cording to the degree to :~--:-~: government would 
like to be involved in directing the affairs of higher 
education. With the increase in government subsidization of 
higher education and the diminishing of resources, there has 
been a greater degree of government involvement in the 
internal affairs of universities by way of a demand for 
rationalization and financial accountability. While 
politicians have not disregarded academic freedom in general, 
they have emphasized that this should be balanced with 
responsibility. Britain is the typical example. In South 
Africa this has also been the case and this will increase 
rather than decrease'. 
There is no doubt that when universities were established in 
South Africa, they were based largely on the British and 
German models. They also emphasized all the values developed 
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by universities in Europe over the centuries. Among these 
were academic autonomy and freedom. There is no evidence that 
before the era of apartheid, universities were under strict 
government control al though they were subsidized by the 
government. Universities 1 however 1 could not escape the 
-'" influence of the prevailing political situation. 
Al though universities enjoyed a measure of autonomy 1 they 
seldom exercised that a~tonomy to the benefit of black people 
in general. They were much more influenced by the societal 
and political views. Even those universities that regarded 
themselves as "open" 1 did not pursue a completely 
non-discriminatory policy in the treatment of black students. 
Although black students were admitted to some historically 
white universities 1 their-right to dignity was not recognized 1 
in that segregation in social and extramural activities was 
applied. Some of those universities applied separation in 
both class and the social life of the studentsro. 
We have no doubt moved full circle from the time when 
universities were autonomous and could determine who could be 
admitted as a student and who could teach at a university. 
This was punctuated by a period of government intervention in 
the running of the affairs of the university. This coincided 
with the period of the est;~.£1:.i.E?.hrr.t.~Ill:_., of the historically black 
uni ~~-E§-~.t.ies 1 which .were created with a itical motive of 
separating blacks from whites in their training to further 
reinforce the government's policy of apartheid. These 
universities were more controlled by the government than the 
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historically white one's and had no autonomy. But even 
historically white universities becal'!le constrained by the 
government from admitting black students. This government 
intervention seriously compromised university autonomy and 
academic freedom11 • 
During this era of government intervention in the university 
affairs, it does not mean that the situation remained static. 
On the contrary a number of developments took place which led 
to the attai~_ment of greater autonoIT1X by especially the 
historically black universities and the recovery of autonomy 
by the historically white universities. These developments 
were caused by the protests of students especially in the 
seventies and the actions of certain universities. The 
government was also under intense international pressure. 
Today all universities are theoretically open and relatively 
autonomous although in practice some will be more open than 
others. There is more academic freedom than in the past. 
Admission criteria may be adopted by various universities 
which may tend to limit access to university education. No 
doubt some universities are under pressure to admit more 
students or more students of colour. The idea of 
"massification" advocated by the NCHE implies that most 
universities will be under pressure to grant access to 
university education to an increasing number of students 
sometimes beyond their capacityu. 
Apart from direct government intervention in the internal 
affairs of universities, the government seriously restricted 
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academic freedom th:::-ough race and security legislat.ion. 
Security legislation violated freedom of thought and 
expression and freedom of research, especially on Y.ace and 
government policy issues, unless one wanted to risk detention 
without trial, banning or deportation. This is evidence that 
academic freedom can only thrive in a democratic state where 
the other freedoms are respected. Where other human freedoms 
are severely restricted, it is impossible for academic freedom 
to flourish. The courts did very little to promote academic 
freedom. In a few contempt cases, the courts demonstrated that 
the protection of academic freedom was not high on their scale 
of priorities. Despite the limitation of university autonomy 
and academic freedom, this situation could not continue 
indefinitely. Changes gradually began to take place which had 
the effect of reversing this state of affairs. But the 
restriction of university autonomy and academic freedom at the 
time adversely affected the role of universities13 • 
When one considers the negative implications of the government 
intervention in the affairs of universities, it becomes quite 
clear that this was not beneficial to the development of the 
universities. It would be folly therefore to repeat the 
mistakes of the past. The opening up of universities has 
created further problems, some of which stem from the poor 
educational system from which black students have emerged14 • It 
is ironical that the government had to engage in the tactics 
of separating universities on racial lines in the past and 
today it is equally engaged in strenuous efforts to remove 
traces of discrimination although it is understandable that 
564. 
the new government has to do this. That is why universicies 
are under pressure for transformation. 
From this it is clear that universities do not exist in a 
,,,__,.,,e,,,,,,,,,._,,.W,''' '', 
vacuum, but in a social and political context. They are 
influenced by the society of which they form part and by the 
policies of the government. The government has a considerable 
influence especially where it is responsible for the 
subsidising of the universities. Government subsidy is always 
given with a tacit expectation of loyalty to the government. 
The influence of society cannot be underestimated. Most of the 
historically white universities were influenced by this in 
their treatment of black students. Even the "open 
universities" could not freely admit black students and treat 
them equally after admission even before the era of government 
control. In order to overcome negative societal influences, 
universities need a leadership that is deeply committed to 
university autonomy and academic freedom and to other values 
that form part of a free and open society. 
Although the university and the government are interdependent, 
they have distinctive roles. It is not desirable that the 
government should prescribe to universities what to do, but 
should allow them a great degree of autonomy and academic 
freedom. Whether or not the government does allow this 
autonomy and academic freedom depends on whether it is 
democratic and respects fundamental human rights in general. 
Authoritarian governments tend to be more interventionist than 
those that espouse liberal democracy although the experience 
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of Britain demonstrates that even democratic governments can 
limit autonomy and academic freedom. The government may see 
itself as having a legitimate interest in limiting these, in 
the interests of what. it regards as higher ideals of 
accountability, transparency and responsibility. 
Now that we have a new democratic dispensation, it appears 
that there .is greater likelihood that universities could 
~ ~become more autonomous. This is also supported by the 
protection of academic freedom in the Constitution. That, 
however, depends on how the government of this country behaves 
in future. The fact that it has behaved well now does not 
guarantee that it will do so in future. It is hoped that it 
will learn a lesson from the mistakes of the past government. 
But that cannot be taken for granted. Universities themselves 
must jealously guard their autonomy and academic freedom. The 
challenge will not be easy as universities are subjected to 
s_~~~~icting expectation~ as is the case in a society in 
transition. Universities themselves may not be united on the 
defence or assertion of academic freedom as was the case in 
the past. For some it may not be ":i;:>,gJiticallX correct" to do 
so. When governments intervene in university affairs, 
usually use various pretexts which may obscure their 
motive. It is only a government that is not only committed to 
democratic values, but also one that sees the value of 
knowledge and the production of well-trained personpower that 
will respect the autonomy of universities. 
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Although the new government was democratically elected, it 
does not mean that we now have a culture of democracy. 
Democracy in this country will not flourish overnight. 
Experience has taught that democracy takes time to strike 
root. The role of universities could nonetheless be important 
even during this era. But that will depend on how the 
government relates to uni versi i:ies. The incl us ion of a 
provision in the interim Constitution which entitles national 
government to alter the governing bodies of universities may 
create problems. Fortunately, it is subject to the provisions 
of a bill of rights and it is a transitional measure. 
The American experience also demonstrates that even a 
democratic government can violate university autonomy and 
academic freedom. The experience of the McCarthy era bears 
eloquent testimony to this. That is why the Supreme Court in 
order to curb excesses produced by the scare of communism 
declared academic freedom a concern of the first amendment 
which is essential for the maintenance of democracy and the 
creation of a healthy society15 • 
The conflict between the universities and the government is 
often caused by the fact that the government has policies it 
wants to implement to which universities may be opposed, or of 
~ 
which they may be critical. This may be because these 
policies may be in the interests of the universities or 
society in general. Universities are supposed to be critical 
of government policies. Criticism is generally not pleasant 
even for a democratic government. When governments try to 
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pre-empt this criticism by controlling universities, 
universities may be opposed to this. But not all ur.iversities 
oppose government policies. Some do, while others may ag~ee 
with them. This is largely a question of self-interest. 
Parochial self-interest, however, is not to the benefit of 
higher education in general. This was the case in the past in 
South Africa and it will always be the case whatever 
government is in power. 
This shows that university autonomy and academic freedom are 
as vulnerable and as precarious as the concept of judicial 
independence. It is perhaps because they share some 
similarities although they also differ. Judges are appointed 
by the executive and there may be an expectation that they 
should have some loyalty or indebtedness to the executive. If 
they do not, those who appointed them may either be angry or 
feel betrayed. Similarly, although university staff are not 
appointed by the government, universities are highly 
subsidised by the government. With government subsidy comes 
some expectation of loyalty to the regime. If universities 
are critical and not supportive of government policy, the 
government is irritated and may react by suppressing such 
criticism. Judicial independence, like academic autonomy and 
freedom, is crucial to the role of a judge. 
President Kruger is said to have once remarked that a judge is 
as free and independent as a fish in a net. He was obviously 
averse to the issue of judicial review which he regarded as 
the principle of the devil which the devil introduced in the 
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Garden of Eden to test God's law16 • This further demonstrates 
that governments in general do not feel comfortable if their 
acts are subjected to critical scrutiny either by academics or 
by the courts. To further illustrate the point, it is said 
that two South African Ministers of Justice, Mr Tielman Roos 
and Mr Oswald Pirow, both had occasion to complain that. 
certain judges found against the government which appointed 
them and said: "The trouble about these judges is that they 
get delusions of grandeur. Having acquired security of 
tenure, they imagine they were appointed on merit" 17 • The same 
could be said about academics by some government officials. 
This may be the reason why in Britain the government decided 
to abolish tenure which in America is regarded as fundamental 
to academic freedom. Obviously r.he British government did not 
give that reason for abolition. 
Despi t~ .,YY'bat ha.s been said above, there is greater .§£.9.P~~- for 
w~,.- ··' ~ ,· ·..,~,~'.....,. -'-""'"' 
the protection of academic autonomy and freedom in South 
Africa. This is largely due to the fact that the Constitution 
~.........._~"""'»"' .,,..,. 
provides not only for the protection of academic freedom but 
also of fundamental rights in general. We have not yet 
established a culture of fundamental rights. The foundation 
for that has been laid. The creation of a culture of 
democracy and of rights requires effort and commitment to the 
values that underpin a bill of rights. 
Although academic freedom is protected in the Constitution, it 
does not mean that it will easily flourish. Academic freedom, 
which includes institutional autonomy, sometimes competes with 
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other rights. It has to be balanced with those rights. This 
has been the case in the United States of America and it will 
be the case here. In resolving the conflicts that may arise, 
the courts will have recourse to the rich international and 
comparative jurisprudence on the issue. The American 
experience is particularly instructive in this regard 
especially when it comes to institutional autonomy and the 
prohibition of racial discriminationu. 
The issue of transformation through democratisation and 
affirmative action"~ seriously impinges on university autonomy 
~ '·'"'~"' ,.,,,,,.,,._ "''''""' -1 "·~'\, - < • ' • '' 
and academic freedom. We shall do well to learn from the 
American and European experiences in this regard. According 
to the American experience affirmative action is a highly 
contentious issue. Some would see it as crucial in creating a 
diverse student body and staff whereas others regard it as 
reverse discrimination. Be that as it may, while provision is 
made in the Constitution for affirmative action, it has to be 
implemented with care. It should not unnecessarily restrict 
academic freedom in that universities should be compelled to 
appoint people of a particular race or group only to increase 
the representativeness of that group without taking into 
account the qualifications and competence of each person. 
Zimbabwe soon learned this lesson19 • 
On the issue of democratisation, there is no doubt that this 
has a great appeal in South Africa especially because blacks 
in the past were excluded from political participation in the 
mainstream politics of the country. The belief, however, that 
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democracy as it applies in the cour.try in ~eneral can simply 
be applied to universities lock-stock-and-barrel, is greatly 
mistaken and may undermine academic freedom and autonomy. The 
European experience is of great significance in this respect. 
It demonstrates that simple democratisation is not a panacea 
for all the ills of university education. While there is no 
doubt a need for the representation of various constituencies, 
including non-academic staff and students in the structures of 
governance of the university, for purposes of legitimacy, it 
should always be borne in mind that a university is an 
academic institution which should place the highest premium on 
knowledge and expertise. When it comes to fundamental 
academic decisions, the views of those qualified by training 
and experience should predominate. This is what the German 
Constitutional Court had to decide. No doubt, the other 
constituencies may need to be consulted on matters that 
directly affect them. The German experience teaches that 
simple democratisation may lead to the in,st::Jtutionalisation .. of 
---=--·---·····-~-- .... 
conflict rather than the resolution thereof. Moreover, to 
assume that people who do not have a culture of democracy will 
automatically become democrats simply by being involved in 
democratic structures has been proved to be incorrect. 
Democracy requires more than the setting up of formal 
democratic structures. It also requires a culture of 
tolerance of differing views. In other words liberal 
democracy, and not authoritarianism, is what is required to 
bring about a culture of democracy. Marxist supporters tend 
to be extremely authoritarian and rigid. They may also 
support violent attacks on the university administration which 
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is incompatible with academic freedom. Academic freedom can 
only flourish in an atmosphere where there is scope for 
rational thinking and where there is no threat to " . ~ ..Ll.1,.e, limb 
or property20. 
As stated earlier, university autonomy and academic freedom 
are not ends in themselves. They are a means to an end which 
is the generation and dissemination of knowledge which is to 
the benefit of society and the. training of high-level 
personpower. There is no doubt that in societies where 
academic freedom is protected, universities are in a better 
position to create more knowledge and to produce well-rounded 
leaders. Knowledge is essential to enable people to lead a 
good life. In authoritarian societies, this may not be the 
case. The reason for this is that distinguished academics 
either leave or do not go to such universities. ·Intelligent 
and gifted people do not tolerate living under a repressive 
regime where they are told what to think. Where there is a 
brain drain from a country, the country and its people suffer. 
This has been the problem with many African countries21 • 
Although many African countries emphasise issues of 
development than academic autonomy and freedom, it do~s not 
mean that contribution to deveJQPm~nt i§ inc;9m:eatible with 
these. On the contrary, where academics are free to speculate 
and to experime:nt, they may be in a better position to 
contribute to development than where they have to be directed 
from above. 
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South Africa is in some respects in a similar position as many 
African countries. It can still be regarded as a "developing" 
country. The RDP is evidence of this. While there is merit 
in universities contributing to the RDP, universities should 
be allowed not only to contribute to the RDP, but also to be 
critical of it and to suggest whatever improvements. 
Because the government is deeply involved in funding 
university ed11cation, there is no doubt that it is going to be 
more and more involved in directing the course of tertiary 
~at ion. This will obviously mean the narrowing of the 
boundaries cf academic autonomy. The NCHE, however, has 
strongly recommended that the principles of academic freedom 
and institutional autonomy be maintained as key conditions for 
a vibrant higher education system. Although the Commission 
also re9ommended co-operative governance, this does not mean 
arbitrary government interference in the affairs of 
institutions. It means universities are entitled to do their 
work creatively al though there may be a need for greater 
accountability22. It is hoped that this will continue to be so 
and that both the government and higher education institutions 
will be committed to the same societal goals. What is 
unacceptable, however, is that politicians be responsible for 
the appointment of senior staff at universities and that 
councils consist of a majority of government nominees. Just 
as it has been said that justice should not only be done, but 
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done, academic 
autonomy and freedom should not only be practised, but should 
manifestly be seen to be practised. That cannot be the case 
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where the university is under virtual government control. 
council is the main governing body of the university. If it 
consists of a majority of government nominees, the conclusion 
will be unavoidable that its decisions are inspired by the 
government. In that case universities become pawns in the 
political game23 • 
The. fact that academic freedom is protected in the 
Constitution is obviously an advantage. But experience has 
taugn't that to provide for rights in a bill of rights is one 
thing, and to make those rights effective is another. It is 
accepted that constitutional safeguards are not a complete and 
indefeasible bulwark, but 11 they do make the way of the 
transgressor, of the tyrant, more difficult. They are, so to 
speak, the outer bulwarks of defence" 24 • 
The effective protection of academic freedom will obviously be 
strengthened by the way the courts interpret the provisions of 
the Constitution. If the courts interpret these provisions so 
as to protect academic freedom, the government will be 
reluctant to interfere with it. What will also contribute to 
this strengthening is that universities themselves must be 
prepared to assert and def end their academic freedom which 
includes both institutional and individual academic freedom. 
The universities, and especially the leadership, will have to 
be united on this issue of academic freedom and speak with one 
voice. What we cannot afford is to have universities divided 
on this issue. That will weaken the position of universities. 
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In order to circumvent excessive and unnecessary government 
intervention into universities, universities themselves will 
have to insist not only on their autonomy and academic 
freedom, but also on accountability and responsibility. It is 
not always easy to say when government intervention is 
legitimate and when excessive and unwarranted~. But it can be 
said that government involvement in universities is legitimate 
if it is aimed, not at imposing a particular ideology on the 
university, but to ensure accountability and responsibi~ity. 
Accountability and responsibility are not necessarily in 
conflict with academic autonomy and freedom. University 
autonomy and academic freedom should not be used to attain 
goals for which they were not meant, but rather for the 
effective attainment of the functions of the university, which 
are teaching and learning. If that be the case, universities 
will remain centres of excellence and when they raise 
objections, they will be taken seriously. 
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